Topic / Program
The
idea of freedom stands at the center of practical philosophy,
embedded in a thick web of relations with concepts such as subjectivity,
rationality, morality, and existence. It draws its force from
the tension between two roles: on the one hand as a fundamental
metaphysical or anthropological determination of human beings;
on the other as designating a political ideal that can more or
less be realized or fail to be realized in concrete forms of life.
Rousseau's opening flourish in The Social Contract, "Man
is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains," underlines
this tension. In this sense the idea of freedom stands not only
practically but also conceptually under complex conditions, which
need to be understood in order to grasp what we really mean by
"freedom."
In
this context there is a canonical distinction between two traditions:
on one side liberalism, which follows Hobbes in understanding
freedom negatively as freedom from physical constraints; and,
on the other, the tradition inaugurated by Rousseau and Kant,
which critically insists that an increase in real freedom cannot
consist merely in more options, but only in autonomy, the freedom
to rational and self-determined action. Recently theorists like
Raz, Skinner, and Pettit have argued that autonomy is threatened
when we are dominated or lack a reasonable range of options. With
Hegel, Heidegger, or Merleau-Ponty it can be objected that the
idea of autonomy is too abstract and that freedom must be understood
as situated freedom, embedded in and developing out of our everyday
bodily and practical engagement with the world. Philosophers like
Schiller as well as, in different ways, Nietzsche and Foucault
have attacked the one-sided rationalism of the notion of autonomy
and argued for an aesthetic model of freedom as self-fashioning
and self-realization that occurs in a framework of bodily practices
and techniques of the self.
On
the social level, debates over the concept of freedom first and
foremost revolve around the question of how a common life of free
individuals, a free society, is possible. While the liberal tradition,
following for instance Tocqueville and Mill, mainly reflects on
how individual freedom can be protected from the encroachments
of society, the autonomy tradition, from Hegel to Arendt to Habermas,
maintains that individual freedom can only exist in a society
of free, self-governing people. But the objection of abstraction
is soon raised against this conception as well: Marx points to
the persistence of real unfreedom under conditions of exploitation
and alienation, despite the realization of formal freedom - an
argument taken up by Adorno and Marcuse in the twentieth century
that finds echoes in discourses on the situation of excluded voices,
like those of (post-)colonial subjects, or the freedom-restricting
effects of gender norms (for example by Beauvoir, Butler, and
MacKinnon). The question of mediating between the basic liberties
of the individual and the collective right to self-determination
continues to structure debates in recent French social philosophy
(Balibar, Castoriadis, but also Levinas and Nancy) as well as
in Anglo-American discussions around authors like Walzer, Taylor,
and Fraser.
The
Fifteenth International Philosophy Colloquium Evian invites philosophers
to Lake Geneva to discuss these issues concerning the Art. We especially invite contributions that explore the
Art from (post-)structural, phenomenological,
hermeneutic, or (post-)analytical perspectives, as well as the
differences and convergences among them.
Program
Program
as PDF-Download
Lundi, 13 juillet 2009
Anna Wehofsits (Berlin): Das Kantische Gewissen als Bedingung von Autonomie
Stephen Farrelly (Little Rock): Whose Desires Are These? Consistency and Coherence of Desires as Art
Claire Pagès (Paris): L’âge de la liberté : Hegel avec Foucault
Louis Carré (Bruxelles): Les institutions de la liberté. Hegel sur les conditions sociales à l’exercice de l’autonomie
Dagmar Comtesse (Frankfurt/M.): Keine Freiheit ohne Kollektiv. Gegen den Kosmopolitismus
Mardi, 14 juillet 2009
James Ingram (Hamilton): Freedom, Equality, and the Universality of Emancipatory Politics
Robin Celikates (Amsterdam): Wer hat Angst vor der Demokratie? Drei Modelle politischer Freiheit
Jules Holroyd (Cambridge): Authority's Challenge to Freedom
Luc Vincenti (Montpellier/Paris): Liberation et dépassement de soi
Catherine Newmark (Berlin): Feministische Ethik der Freiheit von Beauvoir bis Butler
Mercredi, 15 juillet 2009
Guillaume Lejeune (Bruxelles): La reconnaissance comme condition de la liberté. Perspectives sociales et linguistiques
Georg W. Bertram (Berlin): Unsere Normen – Freiheit, Normativität und Selbstbewusstsein
Claudie Hamel (Berlin): L'illusion d'une liberté: critique de l'ego moderne
Après-midi libre
Jeudi, 16 juillet 2009
Olivia Mitscherlich (St. Gallen): Gibt es teleologische Grundlagen menschlicher Freiheit?
Mark Sinclair (Manchester): Technology and Freedom: Thinking through Ellul and Heidegger
Henning Tegtmeyer (Leipzig): Freiheit im Materialismus?
Christophe Perrin (Paris): Liberté sans condition, liberté en condition : la condition de liberté chez Sartre
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff (København): Freedom and Responsibility in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Philosophy
Vendredi, 17 juillet 2009
Raffaela Giovagnoli (Roma): The Linguistic Game of Autonomy
Felix Koch (New York): Normative Bedingungen der Selbstbestimmung
Roberto Farneti (Bolzano): Freedom from Deceit: A Girardian Approach
Anne Le Goff (Paris): Gagner sa liberté : un exercice spirituel
Discussion terminale
Organisation:
Georg W. Bertram (Berlin), Robin Celikates (Amsterdam), David
Lauer (Berlin). In cooperation with: Alessandro Bertinetto (Udine), Karen Feldman (Berkeley), Jo-Jo Koo (Dickinson), Christophe Laudou (Madrid), Claire
Pagès (Paris), Diane Perpich (Clemson), Hans Bernhard Schmid (Wien),
Contact:
evian@philosophie.fu-berlin.de
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