Topic / Program

Philosophy is certainly not famous for its understanding of practice. Philosophers have tended to regard practice as merely a space defined by theory - and theory the privileged domain of philosophers. However, despite this seemingly clear attitude, the last 150 years have seen philosophy show an increasing interest in the notion of practice. Whilst the Hegelian left may have been a first step in this direction, the rather crude Marxist phrase "being defines consciousness" boils the issue down well. However, "Pragmatism", which developed on the threshold of the 20th century, is the clearest illustration of this shift in philosophic interest.

Nowadays it is a philosophic commonplace that practice be attributed a more important role than it previously received. Yet this does not mean that it is at all clear what its role precisely consists in. In the last few decades two main paths seem to have developed with regard to this question. These may be broadly defined respectively under the keywords "constitution" and "subversion".

The first of these paths relates above all to "Pragmatism" and the name Wittgenstein (as well as Sellars). The ideas relevant to this side can be summed up as follows: practice is considered the basis upon which all the attributes are developed that define speaking and thinking beings. Following pragmatism one would say that it is in practice that all the differences and determinations lay which orient the behaviour of beings. Wittgenstein expands this understanding further: for him, practice constitutes the rules and norms as well as the normative forces that bring us to recognize and follow the rules as such. All rules, standards and manners of ordering are based on forms of practice or use, by means of which, according to Wittgenstein, they establish themselves "blindly".

The second path relates to certain aspects of the philosophies of Foucault, Derrida and Butler. These can be summed up as follows: Practice is considered to be the dimension in which (intersubjective) structures are disrupted and order is broken. This conception centres on a structural understanding of discourse. According to this understanding it is impossible to infiltrate discourse internally. Discourse is sealed system which already incorporates everything that might attempt to speak against it. Practice alone offers a playroom for possible subversion. Practice is here understood as something to which discourse cannot have (unlimited) access, something which is therefore able to turn against discourse. Practice is thus the place of infiltration, displacement and disruption.

In the light of these competing positions, we would like to invite people to consider the philosophic significance of the concept of practice. Does practice mean constitution or subversion? Or can the two perspectives we have sketched be reconciled? Moreover, since each perspective can be seen to have developed in the context of different traditions, could it be that these questions relate to issues of political theory, and the relation between "Francophone left-wing hermeneutic" philosophy and the "Anglo-American right-wing hermeneutic" tradition? From the point of view of the Francophone-oriented writers, the idea of practice as "constitution" represents perhaps an attempt to cleanse the notion of practice of its unruly or unmanageable aspects. From the point of view of the Anglo-American stance, on the other hand, one might ask whether discourse is not necessarily based on practice, or whether it is not wrong to assume discourse as a given? Are these reservations respectively justified? Do they amount to questions of theory politics. Or are they, as the Francophone would suggest, fundamentally political?

Despite all efforts to noblify the concept of practice, philosophy is still at a loss with regard to it. Nowhere is this more apparent than with regard to its terminology. For it is still unclear whether the appropriate expression in this context is "practice", "use", or even "doing". For this reason we have chosen to place two alternative expressions next to each other in the title of this colloquium. This is also intended as an invitation to search for the appropriate concept. We hope that through linguistic clarification the debate surrounding practice may well be sharpened and indeed perhaps some progress made as to the philosophic significance of the concept that proves most appropriate to these questions.


Program

MONDAY, July, 15th
matin
Danic Parenteau (Paris): "Le rôle de la 'pratique' chez Hegel"
Andreas Niederberger (Frankfurt/Main): "Ontologie als Praxis oder Praxis statt Ontologie? Einige Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Praxisphilosophie und 'praktisch-pragmatischer' Wende der Philosophie"

après-midi
Jo-Jo Koo (Montreal): "Practice and Sociality"
Emmanuel Stéphane Prokob (Paris): "Eine Pflicht zu lügen? Die Subversion als konstituierendes Element einer gerechten Ordnung bei Benjamin Constant: eine Antwort auf den Hiatus zwischen Theorie und Praxis bei Immanuel Kant"

TUESDAY, July, 16th
matin
Clélia Aparecida Martins (São Paulo): "Zur Veräußerung"
Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover (Melbourne): "Pierre Bourdieu's habitus as Praxis or Interpretation: A Critique in the Context of C. S. Peirce's belief as habit"

après-midi: Workshops
(1) Michael Groneberg (Fribourg): "The missing link: zwischen Semantik und Politik"
(2) Alice Lagaay (Berlin): "Stimme/Stimmlichkeit"
(3) Christian Doude van Troostvijk (Luxemburg/Amsterdam): Immanuel Kant: "Über den Gemeinspruch : Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis"

WEDNESDAY, July, 17th
matin
Katrin Nolte (Berlin): "Urteilsvermögen und -Gebrauch"
Konstanze Baron (Paris): "Sprache als Praxis bei Sartre und Derrida"
Georg W. Bertram (Gießen): "Praktiken als Basis der Sprache und des Geistes"

après-midi
Oliver C. Speck (Wilmington, NC): "The Practice of Overcoming Metaphysics: Constitution et Subversion"
Margret Ozierski (Durham, NC): "Subverting Nihilism: The Practice of Maurice Blanchot"

THURSDAY, July, 18th
matin
David Lauer (Berlin): "Pragmatics corporealized. Zu Robert Brandoms Begriff sprachlicher Praxis"
Christophe Laudou (Madrid): "Où sont passés les déictiques de l'action ?"
Simone Mahrenholz (Berlin): "Komponieren zwischen Körperlichkeit, Materialität und Sprache. Das philoso-phische Problem von Sinn-Subversion und Sinn-Konstitution am Beispiel des Musikdenkens Wolfgang Rihms"

FRIDAY, July, 19th
matin
Werner Kogge (Berlin): "Der Witz der Praxis: Das Zusammenspiel von Subversion und Konvention"
Christian Lavagno (Bremen): "Intellektuelle Praxis"

après-midi: discussion terminale