

In the Eye of the Storm. European Commission and ECB in the 'Battle' of Attributing Responsibility in the Eurozone Crisis

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1. Introduction

The Eurozone crisis has not only put the southern European countries in economic and political turmoil, it has also changed the European polity in a fundamental way. Two institutions which are particularly subject to this change are the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB). Both were designed as basically technocratic institutions executing a politically defined agenda in independence. This independence is codified in the Treaties¹ and not only precludes intervention from governments (though of course "exchange of arguments" happens continuously) but also democratic control. "The institutional cornerstone of the EMU [Economic and Monetary Union] is the European Central Bank (ECB), a quintessentially technocratic and nontransparent body with 'no clear accountability to any other arm of national or European government.'" [Lindseth, 1999 #10618: 649, quoting *The Economist*, 2.1.1999]. Lindseth predicted already before the monetary union was fully established: "Should some precipitating event, such as a major economic downturn, place Europe's supranational institutions under significant strain, these legitimacy concerns could turn into a legitimization crisis in which the very idea of supranational normative power may be brought into serious question" (649).

Though it is not very difficult to find in retrospect somebody (among the thousands of voices) who made the correct prediction, the core argument of course is well established and in the crisis all too obvious. Institutions which are only based on output legitimacy without any input legitimacy [Scharpf, 1999 #6284] are under severe stress if the output is not (perceived as) sufficiently successful.

However, success and failure of an institution (and any actor) are not only, not even basically a matter of factual developments. For every social process there is a multitude of actors whose action contributed to the process or did not stop it and whom to make responsible is a matter of interpretation. Even if there is agreement whether a process is regarded as positive or negative, whom to attribute success or failure is quite open. Accordingly, success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan. It is this social construction of responsibility, which becomes so crucial for output legitimacy and institutions based on output legitimacy. At the same time, to assess the development of output legitimacy we should focus our attention on the public debate and the public social construction of responsibility rather than (solely) looking at factual developments. For the technocratic institutions European Commission and ECB this social construction of responsibility is of major importance as they receive their legitimacy mainly from their output, i.e. the success attributed to them. As the crisis is the situation of significant strain and the European Commission as

¹ See Treat on the European Union***

well as the ECB play central roles in the crisis policies the interpretation of their role in these developments is of major importance.

The attribution of responsibility in the public is shaped by the many voices which form a public debate. Among these voices are potentially the institutions themselves. Those being accused for wrong doings can also reject accusation of wrong actions, inadequate hesitation etc. They could also actively shape the interpretation by blaming others or requesting action by others. In short: they could strike back.

In this paper we analyze the public attribution of responsibility in the context of the crisis in respect to the two technocratic European institutions which are central to the crisis politics: the European Commission and the ECB. These two institutions are “in the eye of the storm” in this crisis shaking Europe in its core. Specifically, we want to know to which extent and under which conditions these two institutions participate in the public attribution of responsibility. This question is particularly interesting because theoretical considerations lead to contradictory expectations. We could either assume that the institutions are inactive because they are technocratic and unaccountable or that they are active because they are in need of additional legitimacy due to the crisis developments. Furthermore, related to these arguments we could try to predict the timing of intensified attribution activity by these institutions. With respect to their technocratic, non-elected character, their attribution activity may be independent of other events (independence logic). We could also expect them to become active either when they are attacked in the public (discursive logic) or when they are in need for public support to find backing for crucial decisions (decision logic).

For this question we analyze the public discourse in three fora: the public in Greece, the public in Germany and the reporting of the Thompson Reuters news agency. Thus, we cover the debates in two countries which both are prominent in the crisis with opposing roles. Greece is the country most severely hit by the crisis and Germany is the largest donor countries who has taken a leading role among the forces on Europe pressuring for reforms and austerity. Reuters’ reporting adds another layer representing a source not directly linked to one of the countries but representing a European stance with a strong leaning towards economic issues.

In the following, we will first outline the theoretical reasoning (2.) before we explain our data (3.). Results are first presented for the participation of the two institutions in the public attribution of responsibility (4.) before we take a closer look at how we can explain the timing of intensified public attribution in respect to either the independence logic, the discursive logic or the decision logic (5.). In the end we short some conclusions (6.).

2. Theoretical considerations

The attribution of responsibility has been basically analyzed from the perspective of blame avoidance [classically \Weaver, 1986 #5270;see also \Bovens, 1998 #10152;Bovens, 2014 #10619;Hood, 2011 #10151]. The primary focus is on which institutional designs and political strategies minimize the probability of being accused for wrong doings and what are the consequences for policy making. From this perspective technocratic agencies are particularly attractive for politicians. If they are able to delegate unpopular decisions to agencies they can hide away from public blaming. For elected office holders this is of central importance as blame avoidance (probably) translates into chances of re-election. Accordingly, we can expect elected politicians to be more oriented towards a positive self-presentation in respect to attribution of responsibility, while non-elected, more technocratic actors have less incentive for positive self-presentation as they are not dependent on public support [Gerhards, 2009 #5686;Gerhards, 2013 #5781;Hasler, 2013 #10237]. Accordingly we can expect the

European Commission and the ECB to be less active and less oriented towards positive self-presentation than elected political actors.

H1: The European Commission and the ECB are less active in public attribution of responsibility than elected political actors.

H2: The European Commission and the ECB are less oriented towards positive self-presentation than elected political actors.

However, especially due to the crisis developments also the European Commission and the ECB are in desperate need of legitimacy. They have left the shadows of political guidelines which are only executed. Rather they are important, active political players in the crisis developments and this is mirrored in the discourse. The European institutions are politicized [De Wilde, 2011 #10331; Hooghe, 2012 #10333; Prior, 2013 #10344; Rauh, 2014 #10212; Roose, 2015 #10349; Statham, 2012 #10339]. Their action is discussed controversially in the media [Hutter, 2014 #10340]. They become addressees of blame, undermining their output legitimacy. This suggests a reaction by these institutions. Hence, we should be able to predict the timing of intensified attribution of responsibility by these institutions.

Under which conditions a public reaction can be expected is not straight forward. Theoretical considerations suggest three options. The first option is already covered by the thoughts on hypotheses 1 and 2, suggesting that these technocratic institutions which are not bound to elections do not react at all. Accordingly, a first option would be that European Commission and ECB do not engage in a public debate. They may voice positions from time to time but the timing of these statements would be unlinked to other events. According to this independence logic attribution of responsibility by European Commission and ECB is unrelated to other events.

Alternatively, also technocratic, non-elected institutions are in need of legitimacy, especially if output legitimacy is questioned. As the crisis has put the European Commission and the ECB in such a difficult situation (unlike before the crisis) they may feel the need to defend themselves by either rejecting blame or proposing alternative attributions of responsibility which indirectly counter accusations. If this mechanism dominates we would expect more intensive attribution activity in times when these institutions are more frequently addressed and blamed. According to this discursive logic attribution of responsibility by European Commission and ECB is a reaction to accusations in the discourse.

The third option is an attribution behavior which is linked to a specific need for legitimacy. While non-elected institutions may not be in strong need for support they still need acceptance and support of some degree for their decisions. This may be unproblematic for routine decisions but if stakes are high and decisions are at the same time far-reaching and controversial, the need for legitimacy is more pressing. Accordingly, we may expect increased attribution behavior aimed at gaining legitimacy at times when important political decisions are taken. According to this decision logic attribution of responsibility by European Commission and ECB is linked to important decisions taken by the institutions.

The third hypothesis is proposing three alternatives:

H3a: The timing of attribution activity by the European Commission and the ECB is unrelated to other events (independence logic).

H3b: Attribution activity by the European Commission and the ECB intensifies in reaction to increased addressing and blaming of these institutions (discursive logic).

H3c: Attribution activity by the European Commission and the ECB intensifies in the context of important decisions taken by these institutions (decision logic).

3. Method: Discursive Actor Attribution Analysis

The discursive actor attribution analysis (DAAA) is a tool for the standardized measurement of the backbone of a controversial discourse: the attribution of responsibility. Its unit of analysis, an actor attribution, is the reconstructed answer to the question: Who makes whom responsible for what? The actor attribution consists of an attribution sender, an attribution issue and an attribution addressee, including an evaluation.

Actor attributions can appear in different forms. Blame as a kind of classical form establishes a causal link between the attribution addressee and the diagnosis of a fact which is negatively evaluated. Praise or credit in the classical sense would be identical except a positive evaluation. However, blame and credit can also be prognostic, i.e. the addressee is blamed/credited for an expected fact in the future. These kinds of attributions are causal as they regard the attribution addressee as having caused the evaluated attribution issue. Alternatively, the addressee can be called to action. These requests are request attributions as they not only want something to happen but the request is directed at an actor making specifically this actor responsible for the action to be taken. This form of responsibility attribution is at the centre of the political claims analysis. While the request attributions call for a specific action, the competence attribution is the ascription of a general competence for action beyond the specific case.

Taken the different forms of attribution together we derive an attribution tree which distinguishes ten kinds of actor attributions altogether. The relation between attribution addressee and attribution issue can be a causal relationship (i.e. the addressee causes the issue), a request (i.e. the addressee should act in a specified way) or a generally attributed competence (i.e. the addressee should be in charge of handling issues like this in general). The causal relationship can be directed to the presence and past as diagnostic or to the future as prognostic, while the other relationships are necessarily prognostic. All these attributions can be positively or negatively evaluated. For the causal attributions we also allow for ambivalent attributions which discuss positive as well as negative aspects. Proposals and calls for action are by nature unidirectional.² The kinds of actor attributions are summarized in figure 1.³

##Figure 1 about here##

² In the project on attributions of responsibility in routine EU politics, for competence attributions an ambivalent evaluation was also possible for the coders but practically never used.

³ While causal attributions and competence attributions were already part of the concept by Gerhards et al. [, 2007 #4337], the request attribution was added. To our understanding the request attribution is a crucial kind of attribution in cases of controversial issues. It is the attribution kind which links the concept of responsibility attribution to political claims analysis and embeds political claims analysis in the broader actor attribution analysis. Also, in the Gerhards et al.-project the coding distinguished between the attribution of responsibility (i.e. the actors is made responsible) and the rejection of an attribution of responsibility (i.e. an actor negates being responsible). In the analysis, however, attributions were always combined according to the implication on the addressee. Accordingly, attribution of blame and rejection of success were taken together as negative implication for the addressee, and attribution of success and rejection of blame were taken together as positive implication for the addressee. To slightly simplify a coding process which is already quite complicated we decided to combine the two options (attribution of blame+rejection of success/attribution of success+rejection of blame) already in the coding process.

The actor attributions are reconstructed in newspaper reporting on the Eurozone crisis. Based on this material, we looked for actors who attribute responsibility to others, in direct or indirect quotes. Actors are not necessarily individuals; also collective actors like institutions and organizations can be senders or addressees. Journalists are only regarded as senders when they abandon their neutral observer position and get involved in the debate by explicitly evaluating others. For each attribution of responsibility, we coded a case with information on the sender and addressee, the issue at stake, the attribution type and some further information.

Data for this analysis has been collected in the project “The Greeks, the Germans and the Crisis”, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) and the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT) of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Culture and Sports of Greece.⁴

The sample is taken from quality newspapers between 2009 and 2013. The data for this chapter stems from the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as well as the Greek *Kathimerini*, *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea* (for 2012, the year that *Eleftherotypia* stopped operating). We sampled every seventh issue resulting in a rotating week design with changing week days. The selected days are covered by each newspaper in turn. For this paper, we coded a total of 8829 attributions. The coders are instructed to include only those articles and to code only those attributions containing relevant information connected to the Eurozone crisis.⁵

As we are currently in the phase of data cleaning and trouble shooting, the presented results are preliminary. Though we do not expect major changes, we might spot some shortcoming or necessary modifications. Interested readers are kindly asked to refer to the project website www.ggcrisi.info to check for an updated version of the paper.

4. Attribution activity

In a first step we look at the activity of European Commission and ECB in the public discourse on responsibilities. This analyses takes together all the various issues connected to the crisis. Hence, the attributions refer to the crisis as such but also to measures taken in response to the crisis.

The relative activity of an actor depends on the definition of an actor. As the focal actors are the European Commission and the ECB respectively, we define other actors accordingly.⁶

In Greece, the European Commission appears as a sender of 2.4 % of the causal attributions (table 1). The ECB appears as a sender of 1.1 % of the causal attributions. These figures are way below the domestic elected political actors like the Greek government (11.9 %), party actors (16.0 %) or members of the Greek parliament (9.7 %). Even if we disaggregate the numbers further and single out politicians stemming from one party among the party actors and parliament actors, the more prominent parties account for 1.3 % to 2.0 % and thus for more attributions than the ECB and not much less than the European Commission.

⁴ For more information on the project see www.ggcrisi.info.

⁵ A detailed description of the sampling procedure, the crisis definition and the coding instruction can be found in our codebook which is online on www.ggcrisi.info. See also Roose et al. (2014).

⁶ E.g. for the national government we take together the head of government together with all national ministries including all spokespeople etc. However, subnational division (e.g. the Bundesländer in the German case) are handled separately, just as the national banks are separate from the ECB. The national parliament is considered as one actor, the same applies to parties.

In Germany, attributions from the European Commission and the ECB are relatively more frequent with 3.0 % and 3.8 % respectively.⁷ At the same time the German government is a much less prominent sender of causal attributions (7.5 %) compared to the Greek government but still much more active than the two European institutions. The comparison with German parties is less clear. Taken together parliamentary actors or party actors account for more attributions than ECB or European Commission but in comparison to single parties the two European institutions are more frequent attribution senders.

The reporting by Reuters is a bit different. Due to its European character, there is no domestic government for Reuters and this also implies that attributions from single national governments are dominating less (not reported in the table). At the same time the extensive coverage of European institutions and the ECB in particular is worth noting. However, also in Reuters at least the German government appears slightly more often as attribution sender (8.3 %) than the European Commission (5.5 %). The ECB is covered much more often with a remarkable 12.5 % in Reuters. The special focus on economic policy on a supranational level is mirrored by this focus. All the more surprising is the strong appearance of the single national government from Germany.

Table 1: Causal Attribution Senders, in %

	GRC	DEU	Reuters
Domestic Government	11.9	7.5	
Domestic Parliament	9.7	4.5	
Domestic Parties	16.0	4.1	
Domestic politics, other	1.4	2.9	
Domestic media	27.6	34.3	
Domestic, other	14.4	12.9	
(Other) EU Member States	12.6	18.8	69.9
European Commission	2.4	3.8	5.5
European Parliament	0.8	0.9	0.5
European Central Bank	1.1	3.0	12.5
Troika	0.8	1.4	0.2
Eurogroup	1.1	2.1	2.6
EU, other	1.6	1.9	3.2
IMF	1.6	1.8	6.1
N	2404	1255	618

Data: Project GGCRIS.

Overall, for both countries we can conclude that the respective national governments are much more active senders of causal attribution than the European Commission and the ECB. This is in line with our assumptions of more active elected actors in comparison with the two non-elected European institutions in respect to causal attributions.

For requests and competence attributions the picture looks very similar. Again the share of attributions of this category sent by the European Commission and the ECB is relatively small in both countries, again considerably smaller in Greece than in Germany and with higher shares in the Reuters reporting. The domestic national government is a much more active attribution sender in both countries and in Greece single parties reach similar levels as the ECB with e.g. 0.8 % of the

⁷ The absolute numbers of attributions are slightly lower than in Greece but as the Greek total number of attributions is around twice compared to Germany the percentages are remarkably different.

attributions stemming from SYRIZA actors and 2.4 % from PASOK. We regard hypothesis 1 supported also for request and competence attributions.

Table 2: Request and Competence Attribution Senders, in %

	GRC	DEU	Reuters
Domestic Government	10.4	14.1	
Domestic Parliament	7.3	2.0	
Domestic Parties	15.3	1.9	
Domestic politics, other	2.0	7.6	
Domestic media	10.0	16.6	
Domestic, other	17.8	13.4	
(Other) EU Member States	14.3	14.1	58.9
European Commission	2.4	6.9	10.6
European Parliament	0.8	0.8	0.2
European Central Bank	1.1	5.1	14.9
Troika	0.8	1.1	1.0
Eurogroup	1.1	2.4	2.3
EU, other	2.9	4.9	6.1
IMF	2.6	5.3	8.0
N	1274	831	839

Data: Project GGCRIS.

Hypothesis 2 assumes that elected actors are more inclined to present themselves positively in public than the non-elected European Commission and ECB. Testing this hypothesis is only partly possible. What we primarily find is a very small number of self attributions by the European Commission and the ECB (table 3). While the few existent self attributions by these two institutions are overly positive, it is the small number which is remarkable. Obviously, the elected national government attribute themselves much more frequently and then mostly in a positive tone. This applies equally to Germany and Greece. We regard hypothesis 2 as supported though not by the content but rather by the frequency of self attributions.

Table 3: Share of Positive Causal Attributions by self-attribution and external attribution, in %

	Positive self-attribution	N	Positive external attribution	N
Greek newspapers				
Greek government	76.2	105	46.5	71
European Commission	80.0	5	44.2	52
ECB	100.0	4	52.4	21
German newspapers				
German government	73.1	26	39.7	68
European Commission	66.7	3	48.9	45
ECB	83.3	12	57.7	26
Reuters reporting				
ECB	80.0	20	56.1	57

Data: Project GGCRIS.

5. The logic of attribution activity

Our second empirical interest are the occasions when the non-elected European Commission and ECB engage in attribution activity. Which logic does the temporal pattern follow?

The independence logic would be mirrored in a comparatively continuous communication behavior. The discursive logic would show reactions to accusations voiced in the public against the respective institutions. Finally, the decision logic would imply increased attribution behavior in the context of important decisions. We discuss these concepts for the European Commission and the ECB in turn.

In Greece, attributions stemming from the European Commission appear in the beginning of the crisis more often than in the later phase, though not overly often (see fig. 2). As there are very few attributions directed at the European Commission, it is not possible to link the Commission's attribution activity to a discursive logic. Though the blaming peaks of February 2010 and February 2013 are followed by more attributions sent by the Commission, we cannot deduce a reaction here as the Commission is intervening in the Greek debate from time to time. Accordingly, there is no (direct or lagged) correlation.

The decision logic is difficult to test in the Greek case. There was a huge range of political decisions which had to be taken in relation to the agreements with the EFSF and the ESM respectively. As part of the Troika, the European Commission was involved in the framework setting while the actual decisions were taken by the Greek parliament. Focusing on the bailout packages confines the decision logic to two core decisions. In both cases we find relatively more attributions in the month before the decision, but these peaks are no unusual. Again, we cannot identify any connection between attribution intensity by the European Commission and the timing of the decisions.




Figure 2: Attributions related to the European Commission (AS or AA) in Greek newspapers.




Figure 3: Attributions related to the European Commission (AS or AA) in German newspapers.

In Germany, negative attributions addressed at the European Commission (excluding self-attributions) are slightly more frequent (see fig. 3). For Germany, we do find a relation between the sending activity by the European Commission and blames as well as negative requests/competence attributions sent to the institution. Blames as well as negative requests/competence attributions are both correlated with the number of attributions sent by the European Commission (0.376 and 0.653 respectively). This is an indication that the discursive logic is at work here.

The decision logic is less able to explain the pattern. We find a strong activity by the Commission before the extension of the EFSF in October 2011 but this does not apply to the introduction of EFSF and the ESM which both got together with bailouts for Greece. Also other bailout packages for Ireland or Portugal (not in figure 3) are not accompanied by increased sending activity by the Commission.




Figure 4:Attributions related to the ECB (AS or AA) in Greek newspapers.

Overall, in Greece there are only few attributions stemming from the ECB which culminate in a specific point in time (fig. 4). There are only few attributions and those are dispersed over the period under analysis. While at first the ECB received only little blame this changed over time. Frequency of blames directed at the ECB and attributions from the ECB are uncorrelated. This is different for negative requests/competence attributions (0.409). However, the number is extremely small and this is why we rather reject the discursive logic for this case.

A more apparent explanation is decision logic. The few peaks in attribution activity by the ECB coincide with crucial decisions, being the introduction of the mechanisms (EFSF, ESM) jointly with bailouts for Greece and also with the famous speech of Mario Draghi who announced that the ECB would defend the Euro “whatever it takes” (26 July 2012).⁸ The decision logic is most adequate for this case.

⁸ See <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html>.




Figure 5: Attributions related to the ECB (AS or AA) in German newspapers.

Finally, we take a look at the attributions in relation to the ECB in Germany (fig. 5). Outstanding is the attribution activity in May 2010 which is the result of an interview given by the ECB president Trichet.⁹ Besides this peak we find continuously criticism of the ECB in the form of blames and to a smaller extent negative requests/competence attributions. Leaving the peak aside, there is a correlation between blames addressed at the ECB and attributions sent by the ECB, supporting the discursive logic.

However, also the decision logic has some limited plausibility. That introducing the EFSF, the bailout for Greece and the interview with Trichet coincide is not accidental and is presumably not only due to journalistic effort (though this of course is a part). Also around the second bailout for Greece, jointly decided with the ESM, the ECB is more active. The developments in Cyprus during spring 2013 and Spain in June 2013 seem also to result in more sending activity by the ECB.

6. Conclusion

The EU is without doubt in stormy times and two non-elected institutions with a technocratic conception are amidst this storm: the European Commission and the European Central Bank. However, in the eye of the storm is silence – and this is what we basically find for these two institutions. Looking at the public debates on attributing responsibility in the context of the Eurozone crisis, we find a controversial, often heated debate. This applies to Germany and much more to Greece. Interpretations of who is to blame for the crisis in whole or measures dealing with it are continuously presented and challenged. However, it is the national governments and national politics which is primarily addressed by these attributions. The transnational actors are less targeted and though the European Commission and the European Central Bank are highly important in this process they are seldom blamed or criticized. An astonishing result.

⁹ This resulted not only in many attributions sent by him but also the journalist included in his questions blames which are recorded.

Astonishment can be reduced by theory. We have arguments established long before the crisis that non-elected institutions are a useful escape from risking blame. Delegation of decisions to agencies was one of the strategies of blame avoidance identified thirty years ago [Weaver, 1986 #5270]. Weaver's argument works even the other way round. It is not only that blaming non-elected institutions is less dangerous for elected politicians but it seems that blaming non-elected institutions is less attractive and therefore a seldom choice in public debates. Instead of blaming an actor who will not be punished by public criticism anyway it seems to be more attractive to blame the political opponent. The non-elected European institutions can cower down and let others face the wind. This also works in the Eurozone crisis.

Having the low level of being addressed and attributing in mind, we can still take a look at temporal patterns of attribution for European Commission and ECB. Findings on these questions are to be taken cautiously because we are talking about quantitative findings based on small numbers. The sampling technique does not allow for firm conclusions and the reconstruction of direct debates but public communication is often indirect. The indications in our data are highly interesting though. In the German reporting the discursive logic is supported for the European Commission and the ECB alike. In both cases the number of blames in a month is correlated with the attributions sent by the respective addressed institution. In the case of the ECB also the decision logic has some plausibility. However, this explanation does not work for Greece. Here, neither of the explanations is adequate, though we find limited support for the decision logic in respect to the ECB.

This difference, if we let our methodological suspicion aside, may be explained in two ways: by different roles of the countries in the crisis but also by different discourses. The roles of the countries in the crisis could not be more different, with Greece as a highly indebted country, receiving support from the financial mechanisms in connection with tough requirements. Not only the macro constellation but also reported details on the climate between Troika and Greek officials suggests the interpretation that European Commission and ECB did not regard the Greek government or the Greek public as overly important for their policies. Maybe, the institutions ignored Greece simply because they regarded Greece as not crucial.

However, there is also another possible explanation. The Greek debate is much more nationally focused. While other countries tried to find consensual ways to deal with the fundamental restructuring of their country in the crisis, the Greek politics remained polarized, continuing a polarized tradition. This is mirrored in the debate. Mostly actors within the national polity blame each other [Scholl, 2014 #10346] while European or other transnational institutions receive little attention. This explanation would suggest that the Greek and particularly the Greek political caste are not overly interested in the European Commission and the ECB.

Our data does not allow to decide between these options and of course others are possible. Still, the analysis helps to shed light on the role of highly influential but non-elected institutions and their role in the public discourse. As the crisis and crisis measures are fundamentally changing Europe it remains important to analyze the behavior of these institutions, also in public discourse.




Figure 1: Types of attribution

