_________________________________________________________________ VOLUME 2, ISSUE 1 PSYCHNEWS INTERNATIONAL January 1997 _________________________________________________________________ SECTION A: THE FIFTH COLUMN -------------------------------------------------------- Note: The Fifth Column is a regular, independent column written by Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D. For this issue, Dr. Schaler has invited his colleague, Psychology Professor Emeritus James C. Mancuso, to contribute to the Psychnews as a guest columnist. Opinions and comments are invited. Please send them to the PsychNews Int'l mailbox: pni@badlands.nodak.edu -------------------------------------------------------- THE CONCEPT OF REALITY AND ITS CONTROL James C. Mancuso According to the cynical humorist, "If you're not crazy, you're not paying attention to what really goes on." On the other hand, a very contemporary textbook (Sarason and Sarason, 1993), designed for instruction in undergraduate courses tells us that Someone who is psychotic makes incorrect inferences about reality..., and believes that the inferences are real and actual. When the person can understand that the inferences are not _real_ but are the products of fantasy or misperception, the psychosis is no longer present. (p. 323, emphases added by JCM) According to the cynical humor, an attempt to attend to and to make sense of a chaotic world leads to a "crazy" state. On the other hand, the abnormal psychology textbook marks a person as psychotic (crazy) when he/she uses incorrect inferences to create a non-conforming view of what is really happening. In either case, the definition of "craziness" depends on whether or not anyone can tell us what is really going on "out there." The text below prompts considerations about how we discuss "what is really going on." Many ideas in this essay come from the works (e.g. Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994) which have honored Berger and Luckman's (1966) recommendation that scholars must understand "How it is possible that subjective meanings become facticities" (p. 18). In the case of this essay, I work to understand how the subjective "feeling" of a _real_ world becomes "the fact" of _truth_ and _reality._ I will show the ways in which the concept of _reality_ has girded the pronouncements of people who are accorded status and power in modern societies. The very use of the concept fortifies positions of power, particularly when powerful persons endorse methods by which to verify that persons can _discover_ the status of a world that "exits out there." I offer specific instances of the ways in which modern thought has supported "the fact" of "a reality." Then, I endeavor to outline the possibilities of and benefits to be derived from discussing our search for "working knowledge" as _social construction_, rather than as a search for and validation of _truth_. THE CONCEPT OF REALITY AS A SUPPORT FOR POWER Concerns about _reality_ clearly surface in the document _Telling the Truth_, (National Endowment for the Humanities, 1992) -- a document "presented in fulfillment of the congressional mandate" to report on the state of the humanities." The report concentrated "specifically on higher education" (p. 53). The dominant voice speaking through this 1992 report apparently was that of Lynn Cheney, the then-chairman [title from the report] of the U.S.A. National Endowment for the Humanities. Cheney prepares to take issue with two active historians. She offers a summary of what she perceives to be their position: "We cannot know the truth, in other words, so we should abandon the pursuit of it in scholarship and in the classroom -- and advance whatever is politically useful" (p. 20) Cheney then registers her disagreement with the view which she ascribes to these historians: "Indeed, to abandon truth and objectivity as goals and put political expedience in their place is to move perilously close to the world of George Orwell's _1984_, the world where two and two make five -- if it's politically useful" (p. 20). Cheney asserts, in this quasi-governmental document, that There are those who still value truth and objectivity as aims of education and who believe deeply that their pursuit, both by professors and students, must be protected. When that pursuit is hindered from within...academic freedom may well require those outside the department -- and outside the university -- to speak in its defense. (p. 35) Clearly, Cheney, as a powerful government functionary, could thus threaten the increasing number of scholars who do not think of knowledge-building as "discovering truths" about "things out there;" as acquiring "_true_ knowledge of _real_ things." Cheney's request for a commitment to a search for TRUTH, appeals to the ancient idea that a knowledge-making person ultimately can ascertain that his/her knowledge directly matches a reality which exists outside his/her knowledge system. One who accepts this commonplace view readily finds supporters. Nevertheless, considering the troubles we engage when we accept this idea, we surely should ask the question, "Why do we need the concept 'reality' -- the idea that we relate to a 'real, out there world?'" DETERMINING WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING Cheney's position, of course, relies on the belief that "those outside the...university" can convince "errant" scholars that there is value in pursuing something which she and everyone else can unequivocally know as TRUTH -- knowledge that copies a "real world." Just as a harried wife confidently turns to "mental health professionals" to determine whether or not her husband can or cannot make correct inferences about reality, Cheney would need to trust an approved arbiter to chart the way for those who would propose that we need not think about truth and objectivity. If Cheney were to call in her experts, how might they verify that a particular knowledge system can stand as an accurate "picture of reality?" Would they try to rely on the social conventions of _logic_ and _reason_ to assess progress toward building _accurate representations of reality_? _Logical reasoning_ has been granted the status of a method of ascertaining the _credibility_ of a proposition. It would follow that anyone who persists in presenting a personal view of an event, particularly when everyone else uses another construction of the event, can face the challenge, "Be _reasonable_!" _Reason_, one should assume, provides a means of demonstrating the presence of _truth_. _Reason_, itself is _truth_! Reason reflects the _true_ working of the world! If one accepts these notions about reason, other "inappropriate" means of establishing knowledge stand in contrast to reason. It can be said that people follow their _emotions_ to _unreasonable_ knowledge, and must often require professional help in order to break free of the clutches of their _emotions_ and to return to _reasonableness_. In effect, then, so long as one uses language that shows that he/she agrees on what people accept as _reason_, _logic_, _rational_, etc., he/she can make allowable claims about reality. Within such linguistic systems, when Mr. Perdito develops propositions which contradict statements that are regarded as valid by his fellows, someone among his colleagues will confidently claim that Perdito has allowed his _emotion_ to override his _reason_. Or, Mr. Perdito could be granted the role of a person of a lesser intellect, and then some of his associates will excuse his failure to see the inaccuracies of his premises and/or the fallacies of his logic! Societies have developed other conventions by which to decide who knows what is "really going on." Most governments have arrangements by which one can engage the subtleties of the law to check out conflicting _truths_ about _reality_. By applications of fine points of contracts and/or tort procedures litigants can determine which views of "reality" shall prevail. Less formally, societies either can respect or can condemn a prophet who claims to speak as a representative of the prime mover -- the entity which created all truths. Some seers are allowed to act as a mouthpiece for that supreme cause: The prophet speaks only of what is _real_. In special cases the followers of the prophets can then create cloisters at which their elite interpret those words of their deity which have been transmitted through their prophets. Those admitted to study at the holy place may then emerge as interpreters of _reality_ as created by the deity. In other cases, a society can deny a would-be prophet the status of an interpreter of _reality_, and tag him with negatively-valued labels: _delusional_ or _charismatic cult leader_. By yet another strategy, thought leaders can assert that methods such as the _scientific method_ can lead only to the _discovery of truth_. THE MOVE TOWARD ABANDONING THE TALK ABOUT REALITY In the end, however, we need to admit that all of these conventions by which we "prove" the truth of a statement depend on our accepting a whole series of prior assumptions which would result from answering the following questions: Does the working of the world follow a definable logic? Do people communicate with prime movers? Does a statement become more valid if it is reduced to a mathematical formulation, which is, after all, another human invention? With only a bit of directed provocation, an adult can conclude that whatever comes through a human's senses -- inputs -- cannot be regarded as unequivocal signifiers of "out there givens." "...[T]he substance which [a person] construes does not produce the structure [of his knowledge]: the person does" (Kelly, 1991/ 1955). The patterns of light which arrive at a person's retina do not create the idea of _two_. Those patterns serve as the "aliment" for the creation of a society's number system. The claim that "two and two make five" would be taken as absurd only in a world in which two is previously defined within a coherent, socially-developed system of mathematical terms devised to designate number. In a binary system of counting, which works superbly well in many applications, our decimal system's _two_ and _five_ would stand as "translations" of a _zero-one_ system. In another example, two persons, Person A and Person B, who had never learned the decimal system of numeric terms could readily "count out" equal shares of a commodity. What we designate as two would stand as the first turn for Person B; i.e., "Yours, mine," says Person B. _Five_ would stand as the third turn for Person A: "Yours, mine, yours, mine, yours." This third turn need not be taken as a reality which exists outside of the social interaction in which this system of counting is invented and applied. Those of us who use the decimal system can use our preexisting assumptions to announce blithely that "Since we have five of these, you take two and I take two, and we'll give the fifth one to Aunt Carmella." When we do so, we have no need to claim that we are reacting to the _five out there_. We need only believe that we are reacting to our system for constructing -- making mental sense of -- whatever is out there! We need not worry about what is _really_ out there. Such worries, of course, readily arise when our psychological development takes place in a society that constantly uses terms that hinge on the belief that a "real" world is "out there," awaiting to be included in our knowledge system. One needs to understand, then, that long before humans gave thought to their own thought processes, people had already developed languages which included "reality-based" terms, such as _to be_, _to become_, and _to have_. "That event out there, which _has_ four-legs, _is_ a puppy. It will _become_ a dog." If we observe a child aged less than six years, we can see that he/she believes that everyone has the same understanding of an event. After the child reaches the age of six, it is capable of grasping the notion that each individual can construe an event in his/her own unique fashion. The post-six-year-old, generally, also knows that rules stand as socially agreed-upon constructions of events, and that, as such, rules may vary if people agree to look at things in a particular way (Piaget, 1932). By this time, however, the child's realist naive epistemology has a head start. Language, with verbs that imply "real" existence and rigid "out there" categories, prompts the child to continue its reliance on his/her belief that he/she "knows the real thing." He/she can "identify" a dog, and knows "the characteristics of" a dog. The developing child's knowledge of its own knowing process are, however, hidden deep within his/her psychological system. Further, it is to the advantage of particular social groupings to foster childish naive realism -- to promote the belief that we can know things simply by having events "pressed into our minds." (A counterpart view of "reality" may be promoted by scholars and sages who can offer sophisticated justifications for a formal realist view). In special cases of doubt, "superior intellects" can inform lesser minds of what is really happening "out there!" By certifying those "superior minds," and locating them in hallowed halls -- to which other elite of the society are admitted -- a society can establish rituals by which TRUTHS are "discovered" and transmitted. Thereupon, a university president may say Because Rochester is a world player, a Rochester education is different from that of any liberal arts college and different again from the vast number of nominal universities in the land. ...We know a lot about cancer -- but we don't know enough. The world, reality, the actual course of the disease eludes us...and we want to press on to the _real_ truth. (O'Brien, Winter, 1992- 93; emphasis O'Brien's) ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO ANALYZE THE CONCEPT OF REALITY Those who think about the concept of _reality_ may assess the consequences of asking the person-in-the-street to consider the possibility that each of us must be satisfied with our own personal realities. People easily experience threat when they meet the possibility of a chaotic world in which one construction is as valid as another. To avoid such threat, for example, one can believe that an event which has been _discovered_ to be _good_ must perpetually and eternally remain as _good_. If "man is the measure of all things," -- if that which is _good_ is relative to a social group's changing ideas of value -- then that which is _good_ can tomorrow earn the category of _bad_. People can easily believe that a society avoids chaos only by upholding the _reality_ of moral values. People worry about the dangers of living in a society in which rules can never be enforced on the basis of upholding that which is "really just." Nevertheless, people should be prompted to consider the gains that would derive from abandoning the concept of _reality_. In the long run, the concept fosters elitism. Thereupon, the "reality finders" can cynically warn the populace of the dangers of _rampant relativism_. The concept fosters _submissive-dominance_ relationships as people compete to establish methods of affirming or denying the validity of one or another "realistic" position. Very simply, the person-in-the-street should be encouraged to consider the advantages of speaking of their knowledge in ways which do not require a discussion of _reality_. AN ALTERNATIVE TO "THE SEARCH FOR TRUTHS" From the position of constructionism (Anderson, 1990), one takes the view that persons construct the world from the elements of their own minds -- that humans proactively "send out" constructions in order to give shape and meaning to the signal patterns (whatever they are) that affect our sensory systems. A constructionist need not engage the problems that arise from attempting "to tell the _truth_." Instead, a constructionist tries to look at how a person determines the adequacy of his/her knowledge. How does a person determine that his/her construction effectively _fits_ the signal patterns? More importantly, in that most of us spend most of our lives immersed in a group, we should understand how a group prompts us to determine the _fitness_ of a particular knowledge statement. The supporters of a realist perspective -- those inclined to advocate the search for TRUTH -- can immediately fall back on the vast network of supports, linguistic and otherwise, to counter a constructionist approach. "You mean that there isn't a chair there?" "Every society accepts the concept of mental illness, and you are trying to tell me that _schizophrenia_ is nothing but a social construction?" "Reasonable people of all cultures all over the world have averred that murder is _evil_. Why would you take a _moral relativist_ position to tell us that it ain't necessarily so?" To accept constructionism is to give up the capacity to tell another person, "You are wrong!" To reject another person's construction, the constructionist rejecter (reprimander?) must say, "I cannot construe this situation as you have construed it." Thereupon, the participants in the interchange may dialogically negotiate a fitting construction. A _socially agreed-upon construction_ then may guide the actions of the group. As a consequence of universal acceptance of constructionism Professor Sapiente would need to take the position that she, like every other person, at best builds a construction by which she anticipates the flow of signals. As a professor and researcher, she has learned to use "a scientific method" to demonstrate the ways in which she has derived her propositions. If her rhetoric proves acceptable (McCloskey, 1985), and if her colleagues judge that her method conforms with current usages, then her peers may regard her propositions as valid. As a constructionist she would have no reason to believe that she has "made a discovery," or that she has "demonstrated a TRUTH" or "a NATURAL LAW." THE NEED TO DEVELOP WAYS BY WHICH TO DETERMINE WHICH CONSTRUCTION SHALL PREVAIL In a society which generally accepts constructionism, a person would not attempt to relegate a construction to the garbage heap on account of it's failure to reflect _truth_. A failed construction might, at another time, gain acceptance when the society later uses new technologies, or invents new foundational constructions, or accepts goals which differ from those in effect when the construction was judged to be nonfitting. If a society has the goal of maintaining a population growth of two percent, its membership might determine that it should use the construct _bad_ to construe _coercive_ methods of gaining individual compliance toward achieving that goal. Following a change in the goal, a change, for example, toward a minus two percent growth rate, a different construction of _coercion_ might evolve. Working from a base of these views about _truth_, _knowledge_, and _constructions_ a group must express an explicit commitment to the need to work out ways to determine the acceptability of a construction. That is, a group must specify its rules for determining what should be taken as working knowledge. Paradoxically, one can argue that those concerned with "telling the truth," by their recourse to the confirmatory devices of _logic_, _authority_, the _scientific method_, _systems of jurisprudence_, etc., have done nothing more than co-opt the rules for determining the fittingness of constructions. Such rules, though they might appear otherwise, represent socially agreed-upon propositions about what shall be taken as _true_ constructions. These systems of rules prescribe the society's methods of inventing _local truths_. Again, these rules about establishing the validity of knowledge can be made to appear as _realities_ -- as incontrovertibly appropriate means of assuring that one has managed, at last, to devise techniques which adequately give persons access to what is really going on "out there." Though there has been social agreement on the use of epistemic values such as _logical thought_, they are no different from other value-laden notions about how one develops knowledge -- _communicating with one's deity or developing a coherent theory which is consistent with one's overarching hypothesis about the functioning of the social order_ (e.g., racist, classist, or sexist explanation). In this sense, all knowledge would be taken as "ideological," in that it is based on accepted doctrine about the ways in which one gathers knowledge. If one sees these preferred confirmatory processes as the approved devices for the "construction of a good narrative," -- devices for authoring a useful story about what is going on -- one must also keep in mind that "_All_ our notions are narrative-dependent, including the notion of rationality" (Hauerwas and Burrell, 1977, p. 21). In short, it is advisable to extend our public discussion to cover not only the content of a knowledge base, but also to cover the processes of developing knowledge bases. Just as Mrs. Duce should meet the obligation of defending her constructions of an assumed world, she should defend her methods of developing those constructions. Her knowledge is based on following private guides for accepting evidence -- guides which might also attain social consensus, that is, attain the status of a rule. Insofar as all knowledge evolves from the practice of such guidelines, one cannot claim that his/her knowledge has derived from some kind of uncontaminated observation of an extant world. No one should be allowed the easy course of simply asserting that her constructions have a privileged position because they had been developed through the use of _logic_, or by _the scientific method_, and so on. THE PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING WHICH METHODS OF VALIDATING KNOWLEDGE SHALL BE ACCEPTABLE At this point in the history of the debates about _truth_, I cannot envision a system for determining the validity of knowledge that would function more effectively than would a system of multiple systems which function on a competitive basis. The implementation of a multiple system approach leaves unsolved the matter of which construction shall be taken as the base for social action. The solution to this problem, of course, would be a socially agreed-upon construction -- a rule. As such, we must recognize that a society's rules about which constructions shall prevail also evolve from interactions of multiple systems of validation. At this time, the prevailing ideal construction appears to be the rule that law -- formally prescribed rules -- shall stand as the agreed-upon construction. Again, from a constructionist perspective, one could not take a position that formal legal systems are _correct_ or _incorrect_. One could, however, object to claims that one or another legal system represents "natural law," or some equivalent transcendent, "truthful" formulation of "the way things really are." I must note, however, that the adequacy of a system of multiple systems would depend on two important constructions about truth-making; constructions which have already been discussed above. First, every person must be given the opportunity to explore the matter of knowledge-making. Just as the knowledge maker would be constrained from asserting a privileged position regarding his/her particular system of knowledge making, all instruction must be built on a view that humans have exercised multiple systems of knowledge making, and that societies have worked out methods for determining which knowledge shall serve as the basis for social action. A second construction must under gird the implementation of a multiple systems approach. Every person must have access to a forum in which his constructions may be explicated. Conversely, specific individuals cannot be allowed to monopolize the media by which persons exchange their constructions and their justifications for adopting those particular constructions. FINALE Current discussions of issues regarding knowledge-making have moved thinkers to take a more sympathetic view to social constructionist thought. That is, those who think about these issues are more willing to think of knowledge as a system of constructions which cover the inputs which we, as humans, are inclined to experience. Contrariwise, thinkers have moved away from views of knowledge-making which assert a privileged position from which one builds knowledge about an extant, mind-independent world. Indeed, growing numbers of people are willing to refrain from talking about a "real world" or about "reality" (Anderson, 1990). With these developments, thought leaders can promote the general acceptance of constructionist views. The considerations of concerned scholars should be transmitted throughout the society, and people should be prompted to consider their personal knowledge- making from constructionist perspectives. People should have the opportunity to explicate their understandings of the ways in which they formulate and validate their own personal knowledge. They should have the opportunity to perceive all knowledge-making from a constructionist perspective. In the end, it is advisable for societies to refrain from trying to convince its members that knowledge-making is a special enterprise by which select individuals search for "out there realities" from which to derive transcendent rules for the functioning of that society. Our current understandings of knowledge making should be put into effect in order to prompt every person to take the opportunity to participate in the making of the constructions which shall guide his/her society. All of this, of course, evolves from placing positive value on each person's participation in a multiple systems approach to evolving the "local truths" which the society invents in its efforts to organize and control social action. REFERENCES Anderson, W. (1990). Reality isn't what it used to be. New York: Free Press. Berger, P. L. & Luckman, T. (1966). The social construction of reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. Hauerwas, S. & Burrell, D. (1977). From system to story: An alternative pattern for rationality in ethics. In S. Hauerwas (Ed.). Truthfulness and tragedy: Further investigations in Christian ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Kelly, G. A. (1991). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1955). McCloskey, D. N. (1985). The rhetoric of economics. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. National Endowment for the Humanities [Lynne V. Cheney, Chairman]. (1992). Telling the truth. Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Humanities. O'Brien, D. (Winter, 1992-93). Letter from the President: Exacting tolerance. Rochester Review, 2. Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child (M. Gabain, Trans.). London: Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1932). Sarason, I. G. & Sarason, B. R. (1993). Abnormal psychology: The problem of maladaptive behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Sarbin, T. R. & Kitsuse, J. I. (Eds.). (1994). Constructing the social. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. James C. Mancuso, Ph.D., is a professor of psychology emeritus at the University of Albany, in Albany, New York. Professor Mancuso's major writings have been devoted to elaborating Personal Construct Psychology. He also has written extensively on the construction _mental illness_ as a social construction. E-mail: mancusoj@Capital.Net