Thematic Network

EUROPEANIZATION, COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSES (IDNET)

Final report
Edited by
MATTHIAS L. MAIER and THOMAS RISSE

Project co-ordinator: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, Florence (Prof. Thomas Risse)

Partners: Institute of Psychology, Consiglio Nazionale di Ricerca, Rome
(Prof. Laura Benigni, Dr. Anna Triandafyllidou)
ARENA, University of Oslo
(Prof. Jeffrey Checkel)
Institute of Sociology, University of Konstanz
(Prof. Bernhard Giesen)
Institute of Sociology, Humboldt University, Berlin
(Prof. Klaus Eder, Prof. Willfried Spohn)
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, Florence (Prof. Thomas Risse)

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Abstract

IDNET is an interdisciplinary research network dedicated to questions of European identity, comprising political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and historians. Its primary objective was to investigate the processes by which, and the outcomes with which, Europeanisation impacts upon and transforms collective identities relating to the nation-state. Mass media and public discourses as well as individuals’ direct interactions in more private settings were analysed to this effect, with a special emphasis on various forms of socialisation processes. Regarding the outcomes of processes of identity formation and change, particular attention was paid to the identification with Europe as opposed to, or in addition to, other collectivities; and to the substantive memories and values constituting a European identity. Process- and outcome-oriented perspectives were combined in analyses of the existence and the character of a European public sphere, as well as in discussions of the Eastern enlargement and its impact on European and national identities.

IDNET has shown, among other things, (1) that European and national identities are related to each other in non-zero sum, but rather complex terms; (2) that European integration has left its mark on collective identities in EU member states, although to different degrees among elites and masses; (3) that in the study of identities there is great potential for cross-fertilisation between various methodologies; (4) that different ways of remembering the past, and in particular the shift from triumphant to traumatic memories, constitute an important element of contemporary European identity; (5) that the concept of socialisation provides a useful tool for analysing identity changes but that socialisation processes vary strongly depending on specific conditions; (6) that a European public sphere is emerging, at least on specific issues, but more sophisticated analytical frameworks are needed to capture it; and (7) that the Eastern enlargement of the EU poses a variety of challenges as well as chances for the development of collective identities in the East as well as the West.

On the basis of these findings IDNET draws several lessons for policy-makers in the EU and its member-states. These include (1) taking the existence of multiple national and European identities seriously; (2) the politicisation of European affairs; (3) overcoming the obstacles posed by linguistic diversity through consciously staged public rituals; and (4) the urgent need of going beyond mere institution-building and focusing on intercultural communication, especially in and with the new Eastern member states.
1. Executive summary

1.1 Background and objectives

Modern democracies rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules. Collective identification with a polity provides an important source of diffuse support for political systems. The normative desirability and the empirical possibility of a collective European identity are thus directly linked to the issue of the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union.

In this context, IDNET has been concerned with four sets of questions: (1) What is the impact of Europeanisation and the emergence of a European polity on the collective identities of social groups in various countries? (2) What are the micro-mechanisms by which collective identities change; what is the role of learning, arguing, persuasion, and material incentives in these processes? (3) Which role do the media and public discourses play in these processes of identity formation and identity change; is there an emerging European public sphere, or do public spheres continue to reside exclusively in the nation-states? (4) How does the Eastern enlargement of the European Union influence the European, national, and social identities, the inter-European perceptions and discourses as well as the political cultures and the legitimacy bases of the European integration project?

1.2 Results

Research on European identity: the state of the art

Students of contemporary collective identities face a number of challenges. We live in a world which is increasingly globalised but also increasingly fragmented. As a result, hybrid identities that include local or national traditions and allegiances intertwined with global cultural patterns emerge. The collectivities which are the bases of social identity today are more in number, more varied, more intermingled, and more open to redefinition than ever before. Studying identity in this context becomes troublesome because the scholar is faced with a whole range of social and cultural forms that sit uncomfortably with existing definitions of social identity. The aim of our project was not least to discuss the very concept of identity, and to address conceptual and theoretical issues concerning the
definition of identity and its operationalisation in empirical research. * Most importantly, this discussion has driven us towards attempts at overcoming traditional methodological cleavages, such as the one between macro-sociological and micro-psychological research, or between quantitative and qualitative methods (see in particular Section 3.2 below).

The current multiplicity of identities poses particular difficulties in terms of research, but it also creates opportunities for the formation of European identities. If individuals hold multiple social identities, they can feel a sense of belonging to Europe as well as to their nation-state, their gender, etc. It is thus wrong to conceptualise European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreased one’s loyalty to national or other communities. Survey research shows that “country first, but Europe, too” is the dominant outlook in most EU countries, and people do not perceive this as contradictory (Citrin and Sides [5]). The real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe, on the other hand. From this we conclude that the European polity does not require a “demos” that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist and complement each other (Section 3.1 below).

Just how multiple identities are related to each another is another issue. Traditionally, identities have been thought of as being either nested inside each other or as cross-cutting. We propose a third way of conceptualising the relationship between European and other identities, called the “marble cake” model of multiple identities, according to which the various components of an individual’s identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels, as the concepts of both nested and of cross-cutting identities imply, but rather influence, mesh and blend into each other (ibid.). A corollary of the “marble cake” model is that European identity might mean different things for different people. Hence it does not mean much if we find in survey data that people identify with “Europe.” Such survey data are also challenged by qualitative studies which, e.g., find no spontaneous mentioning of Europe or the EU by inhabitants of border towns (Meinhof [5]).

The conceptual distinction between “civic” and “cultural” components of identity (Bruter [5]) helps us to make sense of such findings. It is mainly cultural identity which forms the

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* Throughout this report, numbers in square brackets refer to publications resulting from IDNET as listed on p. 84 below.
substance of citizens’ identification with Europe as a whole, whereas the EU has achieved “hegemonic” status in the civic dimension. And not only does the EU increasingly define what it means to be “European,” it also aims at filling “Europeanness” with distinct post-national civic and liberal substantive values. Nonetheless, identification with Europe is made difficult especially by the lack of clear boundaries. It depends on the political context whether Europe’s “others” are perceived in geographical terms (other regions of the world and their culture, politics, religion, etc.), in historical terms (the continent’s own past of militarism and nationalism), or in social terms (the “enemy within”, e.g. xenophobia).

Visions of Europe and historical memory

The historical dimension is important not only for the definition of Europe’s “others”. Socio-historical analysis also helps to put into context the widespread scepticism with regard to the formation of a European identity. Such scepticism is fuelled not least by the fact that Europe is and will remain a multilingual community. Nations, however, are not naturally given collectivities either, but historical products generated by and imagined in particular public discourses. Moreover, the idea of Europe has a long intellectual history. There have been strong visions of European unity and identity before anybody could think of the European Union. Contemporary efforts to determine the “nature of the beast” can be stimulated and enriched by looking back to these historical visions of Europe.

We analyse three such Europe-wide mediated visions (Section 3.3 below). All of them were generated as a response to the traumatic experience of devastating wars within Europe, and all of them imagine Europe as a cultural unity. The first, “classical” model refers to common descent and heritage. The invention of a historical continuity between the ancient Roman Empire and the Carolingian empire represented the first construction of a European unity and identity. Yet this imagination of a European descent as represented by a cultural heritage was challenged by the devastating confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second, “modernist” vision of Europe is instead based on joint destiny and mission. This vision looked to the future instead of looking to the past, and the idea of hegemonial empire was replaced by its opposite, a de-centred balance of power between the European states.

Today, however, neither the idea of translation and embodied heritage nor the idea of Europe as a vanguard of universal history can provide a distinct European identity that will be accepted by the outside world without major reservations. The relationship between
politics and culture in today’s European Union also differs strongly from the one that pre-
vailed during most of Europe’s history, when the unity of Europe could be found in the
cultural realm while the political map was patterned by diversity. Today unity and integra-
tion are pushed forward by politics, whereas on the cultural level the diversity and poly-
centrism of European cultures are stressed in order to counteract the unifying and levelling
forces of market and administration. Hence the reference to a common cultural heritage
will hardly engender a strong European identity today. Nor can European identity be built
on a revolution as the most important founding myth of modern democratic nations, since
there is no common memory of a triumphant uprising that includes all European nations.

However, the reference to triumphant foundations, to heroes and revolutions is not the only
path of collective memory that could give rise to a European identity. In modern Western
nations the triumphant founding myth is increasingly replaced by the reference to a trau-
matic past, to the collective memory of victims and perpetrators – the third, “post-modern”
way of constructing collective identities on the basis of historical memories. Its importance
for current nation-state identities is reflected in monuments as well as in official rituals,
which are part of a new political culture of confessions of guilt, focusing mainly on the
Nazi genocide of the European Jews. Today many representatives of different European
nations officially confess their nations’ involvement in the Shoah. In this sense, a new
European identity can be said to exist which is based neither on triumphant rejoicing nor
on the fear of an outside threat; instead, it is based on melancholy, on non-action rather
than on action. European rituals of confessing the guilt of the past differ markedly from
other nations’ – e.g., Turkish or Japanese – collective memories of past genocides. This
difference in turn can be explained by Europe’s religious tradition, in particular the Chris-
tian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent.

European integration, socialisation and identity change

In IDNET we were interested not least in the impact of European integration, and in par-
ticular EU institutions, on the formation and expression of collective identities. A large gap
between (limited) mass public and (almost consensual) elite support for EU membership
suggests that this impact is much higher in the case of societal elites than in the case of
“ordinary” citizens. In line with expectations generated by the marble-cake model of mul-
tiple identities (see p. 3 above and Section 3.1 below), however, the number of those mem-
ers of the general public who felt only attachment to their nation-state has declined over
time, while the percentage of those who perceived some sense of belonging to their nation-state and to Europe has increased (Citrin and Sides [5]).

We suggest that elite-mass differences in identification with the EU can at least partially be explained by different degrees of “entitativity” or “realness” of European institutions in the lives of elites and masses, respectively (Castano [5]). The EU is an entitative community for the European political, social, and economic elites, as a result of which their sense of belonging is also rather high. For other citizens, the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now. The prevailing ambivalence in elite discourses about the EU also contribute to this state of affairs.

Different causal mechanisms can be invoked in order to account for the impact of European integration on collective identities. Functional models assume that institutions almost automatically change people’s perception of community and sense of belonging. Socialisation models focus on actors’ differential experiences with the institution and its consequences. Finally, persuasion models complement socialisation concepts by emphasising the active role of institutions as agents of identity construction. We have been interested especially in the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialise state actors (Section 3.4 below). For our purposes, the classical definition of socialisation as a process of inducting actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community had to be expanded, to include not only full-fledged belief changes but also cognitive role playing and strategic calculation. We wanted to establish both how socialisation happens (mechanisms) and when it occurs (scope conditions).

These issues were addressed at two different levels. At the micro level we explored the role of socialisation processes in central EU institutions, in particular committee settings under the Commission and the Council, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Our analyses draw attention to these European institution’s basic organisational characteristics and their compatibility (or the lack thereof) with an individual’s domestic organisational home. The length and intensity of an individual’s interaction with European institution do influence supranational allegiances and loyalties, but the latter remain secondary to pre-existing national and sectoral allegiances. We also show that actors’ multiple embeddedness must explicitly be taken into account, and that any study of European-level socialisation must explore and control for the effect of domestic context. In line with our general theoretical assumptions, the pattern of identity change in Coreper does not indicate
that national identities are replaced or subsumed; rather, there is a socialisation dynamic leading to new understandings of national identities and an expanded conception of the self (Lewis [1]).

In a second set of studies we have explored socialisation dynamics more at the macro-level, analysing the socialisation potential of NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe with regard to Central and Eastern European states. Consideration of these other European institutions helps us to put into context arguments made about the EU. More specifically, we show socialisation effects to be dependent (a) on whether national actors are “novices” or not, and (b) on the international interlocutors’ “teaching style” (lecturing vs. dialogue and debate). We pay particular attention to the relative importance and the interaction of persuasion-based diplomacy, on the one hand, and incentive-based conditionality, on the other. Persuasion mechanisms alone rarely change policy outcomes; the clear provision of incentives is necessary as well. Both mechanisms interact in the socialisation mechanism of “intergovernmental reactive reinforcement,” where international organisations offer material and political rewards in return for norm compliance, but do not coerce non-compliant governments (Schimmelfennig [1]).

Public discourses and the European public sphere

The effects of European institutions on collective identities clearly depend on the legitimacy of these institutions. The EU has a somewhat ambiguous reputation in this respect, as continuous discussions of its “democratic deficit” show. Modern democracies generally rely upon multiple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. In this context, an open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media is considered crucial for providing an interface between state and society in a democratic polity. How to conceive of such a democratic public sphere on the European level, and how to demonstrate its existence or the lack thereof, was another of IDNET’s central concerns.

Two different ways of measuring the degree of Europeanisation of the public sphere, leading to seemingly contradictory results, coexist in the literature (Section 3.5 below). On the one hand, counting how often terms such as “Europe,” “European institutions,” or “European affairs” are mentioned in the media almost inevitably results in the conclusion that European questions pale in comparison with national, regional, or local issues. On the other hand, leaving aside their relative salience vis-à-vis non-European issues, to the extent
that European issues are discussed in national media, it turns out that this is done in a very similar fashion and using similar reference points across Europe – suggesting a much further developed European public sphere than the first type of analyses.

In order to reconcile these findings, we propose to consider the level of media attention to European affairs, on the one hand, and the similarity or difference of frames of reference in reporting on these affairs, on the other, as two separate dimensions. While both a high level of attention and similar frames of reference would be required for an ideal-typical European public sphere, current empirical findings of low salience yet similar substantive interpretations suggest that a European public sphere may gradually be emerging out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres.

We apply this conception of the European public sphere to an empirical analysis of media discourses surrounding the participation of the rightwing-populist FPÖ in Austria’s last federal government and the way other EU member states dealt with this situation. Given that the “Haider debate” quickly turned into a debate on what the EU is really about, we considered this to be a “most likely case” for the formation of a European public sphere. Indeed, newspapers in the five countries analysed used very similar meaning structures or frames of reference in discussing the issue, irrespective of their particular stance on the issue. We take this as evidence of the potential for a cross-border “community of communication” to emerge in Europe.

*Europeanisation, national identities, and Eastern enlargement*

With the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and with the following process of a progressing reconnection between Western and Eastern Europe through the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the relations between European, EU and national identities are also in the process of a fundamental reconstruction. This process unfolds asymmetrically on different sides of the former “iron curtain”. From a Western European perspective, what is most noteworthy is a resurfacing of the civilisational foundations of European integration. We argue that European integration cannot be based on constitutional patriotism alone but has to include also a European cultural foundation, without however adopting an essentialist definition of a European civilisation. In this context too, we emphasise the resilient weight of nation-states and national identities and the need to build a European identity on the foundations of these multiple national identities, rather than by opposing or replacing them.
From an Eastern European perspective, the parameters of the relational triad of European, EU and national identities are different. Here, the civilisational and national identities are primary and an EU identity will only emerge with the realisation of accession – although the enlargement negotiations and the close prospect of accession already show an increasing impact on collective identities in the postcommunist societies, in accession as well as non-accession countries. In this context, and against the background of the burdened history between Germany and Poland, we analyse the progressive coming-to-terms with the past in these societies as a crucial building block of Eastern enlargement of the European Union (Spohn [15]). In a related study, we show that and how Polish attitudes related to the own nation and the EU in the context of the emerging Eastern enlargement have changed in the last decade (Marody [15]).

The general theme of collective memory and its role in the construction of national identities (see p. 4-5 above) has also been explored in a comparative perspective on Western and Eastern Europe, as well as with regard to East-West European integration. A basic West-East cultural cleavage is shown to be involved in the enlargement of the European Union (Eder and Spohn [2]). In Western Europe, Eastern enlargement is primarily seen as a vehicle to expand the Western European peace and security order, the European economy and welfare zone and the Western political and civic culture to the East. In those nation-states with long civic-democratic traditions, collective memory emphasises more the triumphant aspects of national identity and thus feeds into an unproblematic European civic mission to the East. In those nation-states with an authoritarian past, collective memory is related to the troublesome history of democratisation, serving as the basis for an attitude showing solidarity with post-communist transition countries. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the major common interest is securing national identity, preventing ethno-national conflicts, stabilising the new democracies and catching-up to the Western European socio-economic level. At the same time, collective memory is haunting the accession to the European Union and creating ambivalence with regard to (a) the renewed transfer, even if partial, of national sovereignty, (b) the memory of Yalta as a treason of the Western European nations vis-à-vis the Eastern empire, and (c) the potential renewal of a German Sonderweg against the Eastern peripheral nations.

Finally, we have tried to find out which consequences the presence of ethnic minorities has for the construction of national and European identities, either through historical processes of nation-building or through growing international and transnational migration processes,
and whether, and if so how, the impacts of these ethnic minority groups on collective identities differ between Western and Eastern Europe. Among other things, our case studies analyse the manifold social and cultural ways in which the processes of immigration and incorporation as well as adaptation and ethnicisation impact on the social structure, political culture and national identities of the host societies. Taken together they show a pattern of transformation of national and European identities on the part of the European host societies as well as on the part of the (im-)migrants that is more nuanced than the current debate on European citizenship and derived forms of European identity.

1.3 Policy implications

The development of a European identity that stands in opposition to (sub-)national traditions and cultures is not only highly unlikely, it is also unnecessary for the legitimacy of European institutions. Individuals hold multiple identities, and to the extent that supranational identifications emerge, they will be supplements to, rather than substitutes of, existing loyalties and affiliations. The diffuse support on which the legitimacy of European institutions rests thus does not depend on the weakening of national identities.

The key toward increased identification with Europe and the EU is increasing the reality of the community in the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The EU already plays an important role in the lives of many political, social and economic elites, but less so for the rest of the citizenry. Public-relations efforts or information campaigns about the EU in themselves are unable to create the shared cultural values, perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness which make a community “real” for its members. It would be more important to overcome the ambivalence of elite discourses about the EU in member states, where “Brussels” is routinely used the shift the blame for unpopular policies, while national policy-makers try to take all the credit for popular ones. Moreover, it is wrong to try and avoid the politicisation of European affairs. Politicisation increases the salience of the EU in the perception of the citizens. Hence controversies about EU policies are not bad for European identity; they can actually increase the sense of community among Europeans.

Another way of increasing the sense of community among European citizens is through symbolic means such as monuments, museums and public rituals. Given the absence not only of a common language but also of a pan-European revolutionary founding myth as a basis for a common identity, it might make sense for the EU to rely more strongly on pub-
lic rituals, the authenticity of which is based on the facticity of bodily presence rather than on words. One suggestion along these lines is for the opening ceremony of the European parliament to be staged on European city squares and broadcast across the continent, somewhat like the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.

Such conscious efforts notwithstanding, the construction of any pan-European identity will be a slow and protracted process. Our studies of socialisation processes suggest that particular attention should thus be paid to arenas for moulding and adapting attitudes and identities over the longer term, in particular schools and educational curricula more generally. In addition, domestic politics and national context are important for the effectiveness of socialisation. In policy terms, this means there is a need to craft more nuanced and country-specific socialisation instruments.

This is particularly true for Central and Eastern European (future) accession countries. A key finding is that Western efforts to induct these states into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of the existing community work best when a variety of policy instruments are used, including straightforward conditionality as well as more pedagogic suasion/teaching techniques. Especially in view of the considerable and partially rising anti-EU sentiments in the accession candidates, the public clarification of the European Union as a pluralistic, secular and religious, value community besides special material support is seen as import. Relevant intercultural programs should be developed in cooperation with local organisations.

The endemic ethnic-national conflicts in most of the postcommunist countries, and the ambivalent impacts of the Eastern enlargement on those conflicts, also deserve particular attention. Finally, in view of the tendency – not only in the current member states but also in the new member states – to exclude Turkey and other Eastern European states as accession candidates, a middle way of a privileged in-between status between full and non-membership urgently needs to be found, and a transnational public debate on these issues needs to be launched.
2. Background and objectives of the project

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a collective European identity and how it relates to national identities. The debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU). There is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules. Collective identification with a polity provides one source of diffuse support for political systems. The EU is no exception.

IDNET was launched as one of the first attempts on the European level to create an interdisciplinary research network dedicated to questions of European identity. Given the rather limited state of the theoretical, methodological, and empirical art in the area, this network was meant to substantially expand our knowledge base on collective European identity and European public spaces. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists and historians have joined forces within this interdisciplinary network to collect and further develop the available empirical data and theoretical expertise on the changes of collective identities at the various levels of subjective affiliation resulting from Europeanisation, and to make these data and concepts available to policy-makers and the public in general.

Thus, IDNET’s primary objective has been to investigate the processes by which Europeanisation impacts upon and transforms collective identities relating to the nation-state. We have analysed the role of the media and public discourses in the processes by which individuals and social groups negotiate and transform their collective identities. At the same time, the private conversations among citizens as well as the socialisation experiences of actors involved in European policy-making at the various supranational, national, and sub-national levels have also concerned us.

More specifically, IDNET has investigated four sets of questions:

1. What is the impact of Europeanisation and the emergence of a European polity on the collective identities of social groups in various countries? To what extent do the emerging European “discourse” and increasing transnational communication patterns influence established national identities in different countries and contribute to the processes of redefinition of such national and sub-national identities? How will Europeani-
sation affect collective identities on the various levels of subjective affiliation in the future?

2. What are the micro-mechanisms by which collective identities change? Do European integration and the increasing involvement of social groups and actors in European policy-making at the various levels lead to socialisation effects on the collective identities of actors? What is the role of learning, arguing, persuasion, and other legitimation attempts in these processes? What are the identity-related effects of efforts by EU institutions such as the Commission and by national governments to increase the support basis for EU policies among ordinary citizens?

3. Which role do the media and public discourses play in these processes of identity formation and identity change? Is there an emerging European public sphere, or do public spheres continue to reside exclusively in the nation-states? How do transnational influences and developments in other countries affect national public debates, and what are the consequences for collective identities referring to the nation-state or sub-national entities?

4. How does the Eastern enlargement of the European Union influence the European, national, and social identities, the inter-European perceptions and discourses as well as the political cultures and the legitimacy bases of the European integration project? How does the Eastern enlargement of the European Union impact upon the restructuring of opportunity structures, social interests, and social identities? What developments are likely in the future?

IDNET was divided into four substantive sections (“workpackages”). Each of the workpackages described in the following sections has concentrated on one particular set of questions, with a common emphasis on the complex methodological and theoretical questions involved in the study of collective identities.
3. Scientific description of the project results and methodology

3.1 How can we study European identity and what do we know about it?

An overview

THOMAS RISSE (Free University of Berlin)

This section draws on results from IDNET as well as from a joint project of the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University and the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (Herrmann, Brewer and Risse [5]’), so as to set the stage for the more specific reports on findings from individual projects which follow below. In particular it addresses the questions of (1) whether, and if so, how European and other collective identities go together, (2) what it means, in terms of composition and content of identity, to be “European”, (3) under what conditions EU institutions are likely to influence the formation of collective identities, and (4) what are the mechanisms by which EU institutions impact upon collective identities.

How do European and other collective identities go together?

It is no longer controversial among scholars and – increasingly – policy-makers that individuals hold multiple social identities. As a result, people can feel a sense of belonging to Europe as well as to their nation-state, their gender, etc. It is wrong to conceptualise European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decrease one’s loyalty to national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) and people can feel as part of both communities without having to choose some primary identification. Analyses from survey data suggest and social psychological experiments confirm that many people who strongly identify with their nation-state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe (Citrin and Sides [5]; Castano [5]; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Martinotti and Steffanizzi 1995).

This finding may be trivial for scholars studying collective identities, but it nevertheless has important implications for the political debates about Europe and the nation-state. Take the contemporary debate about the future of the European Union and about a European

* Throughout this report, numbers in square brackets refer to publications resulting from IDNET as listed on p. 84 below.
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European identity

constitution. Many people still hold that Europe lacks a demos, one indicator being the lack of strong identification with Europe in mass public opinion. Yet, as Citrin and Sides [5] demonstrate, “country first, but Europe, too” is the dominant outlook in most EU countries and people do not perceive this as contradictory. Moreover and more important, the real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe, on the other hand. Citrin and Sides show that the individual willingness to support further European integration increases quite dramatically from the former to the latter group. They argue, therefore, “that willingness to grant the EU authority does not require an identification that actually prioritises Europe over the nation.” In other words, the European polity does not require a “demos” that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist and complement each other. This is a significant empirical finding which speaks directly to the current debate on the future of the union.

Beyond the rather simple insight that European and national identities can go together, the more interesting question is how multiple identities go together and how they relate to each other. We can think of multiple identities in at least two different ways. First, identities can be nested, conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the next. Someone’s regional identity is nested in her national identity which is again nested in her “Europeanness”. We find the “Russian Matruska doll” model of European and other identities on both the levels of elites and of ordinary people. This model suggests some hierarchy between people’s sense of belonging and loyalties. European and other identities pertaining to territorially defined entities can be nested into each other so that “Europe” forms the outer boundary, while one’s region or nation-state constitute the core. The survey data that mass publics in most countries hold national and regional identities as their primary sense of belonging, while Europe runs a distinct second, are consistent with such a concept of how multiple identities relate (Bruter [5]; Citrin and Sides [5]).

Second, identities can be cross-cutting. In this configuration, some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group. One can feel a sense of belonging to Europe and strongly identify with the Catholic Church, and some, but not all of one’s fellow Catholics would share this European identity. Elite surveys show, for example, that member of the European Parliament or of the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) hold such overlapping identities by feeling a sense of belonging to Europe as well as to their party groups and their nation-states respectively (Laffan [5]; Wodak [5]).
This sometimes leads to “double hating” and a sometimes conflictual relationship between European and other identities among officials working in Brussels. In a similar vein, the professional identities of journalists working in Brussels can be shown to cut across their identification with Europe (Siapera [5]). Distinct role identities of journalists as investigators, chroniclers, or therapeutic analysts go together with distinct perspectives on the construction of Europe (anti-national, national, post-national).

There is, however, a third way of conceptualising the relationship between European and other identities which people might hold. We could call it a “marble cake” model of multiple identities. Accordingly, the various components of an individual’s identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels as both concepts of nestedness and of cross-cutting identities imply. What if identity components influence each other, mesh and blend into each other? What if someone’s self-understanding as German inherently contains aspects of Europeanness? Can we really separate out a Catalan from a European identity? Or take the major European party families. From the 1950s on, Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe were at the forefront of European integration. Europeanness has always been a constitutive component of post-World War II Christian Democratic ideology originating from the inter-war period. The same holds true for modern Social Democrats in Europe. It is interesting to note that the turn toward accepting capitalism and the social market economy which the German Social Democrats experienced in the late 1950s, the French Socialists in the early 1980s, and British Labour in the 1990s, went hand in hand with a strong identification with European integration in each of these cases. Today, Europeanness forms a constitutive part of modern Social Democratic ideology (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse 2001).

What does it mean to be European?

What do we know about the substantive content of European identity in terms of both “who is us?” (composition of group identity) and “what is us?” (content of group identity; see the introduction)? One corollary of the “marble cake” model is that European identity might mean different things for different people. EU membership, for example, might lead to an identity change, which impacts upon the previous national identity. Since EU membership identity then interacts with rather different national identity constructions, the overall effect will not be homogenous leading to a generalised EU identity. Rather, Europe and the EU become enmeshed with given national identities leading to rather diverging
identity outcomes. This concerns, above all, the content and substance of what it means to identify with Europe. Indeed, a longitudinal study of political discourses about Europe among the major parties in France, Germany, and Great Britain revealed that the meaning of Europe varied considerably (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse et al. 1999). For the German political elites, “Europe” and the European integration meant overcoming one’s own nationalist and militarist past. The French elites, in contrast, constructed Europe as the externalisation of distinct French values of Republicanism, enlightenment and the mission civilisatrice. While French and German political elites managed to embed Europe into their understandings of national identity, the British elites constructed Europe in contrast to their understandings of the nation, particularly the English nation.

To some extent Europe can thus be thought of as an “empty categorisation” (Breakwell [5]) with various and rarely unchallenged social meanings. If European identity means quite different things to different people in terms of its ideological, territorial, political, or cultural and even religious connotations, it does not mean much if we find in survey data that people identify with “Europe.” Such survey data are also challenged by findings from qualitative studies. A series of in-depth interviews found no spontaneous mentioning of Europe or the EU by people in border towns even though the significance of EU enlargement is quite obvious for them. When confronted with photographs containing European symbols, interviewees would still not refer to Europe. Only when asked direct questions concerning their attachment to Europe would people start talking about it. However, the statements were contradictory and inconsistent; respondents gave very different accounts of what Europe means for them (Meinhof [5]).

An important conceptual distinction that might help us think more clearly about the substance of European identity is the one between civic and cultural components of identity (Bruter [5]; see also Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). On the one hand, “culture” in this understanding encompasses everything from history, ethnicity, civilisation, heritage to other social similarities. A recent Europe-wide focus group study commissioned by the EU Commission’s Governance Unit (OPTEM 2001) as well as a most recent Special Eurobarometer study (Gallup Europe 2001) suggest that it is mainly cultural identity which forms the substance of citizens’ identification with Europe as a whole. “Civic identity”, on the other hand, is much more circumscribed and refers to identification of citizens with a particular political structure such as the EU or the political institutions of the nation-state. In the civic dimension the EU clearly appears to have achieved “hegemonic” status in Europe. States in
Europe are increasingly defined as EU members, non-members, or would-be members. Their status in Europe and to some degree also world-wide depends on these categories. The extent to which the EU defines Europe in political terms can be seen also in the context of Eastern enlargement, where Central Eastern European states want to “return to Europe,” as if they were currently outside the continent.

The EU’s hegemonic role in defining European civic identity has potentially far-reaching consequences, insofar as the EU succeeds in its attempts – supported by other European institutions such as the Council of Europe – to promote a post-national civic identity in the Habermasian sense emphasising democracy, human rights, market economy, the welfare state, and cultural diversity (Laffan [5]). These values have become constitutive for the EU, since you cannot become a member without subscribing to them, at least from the Copenhagen criteria onwards. As the enlargement debates show, the self-description of the EU and the dominant discourses surrounding it have moved quite a long way toward building a polity and going beyond simple market integration (see also Laffan, O’Donnell, and Smith 2000). Thus not only does the EU increasingly define what it means to be “European,” it also aims at filling “Europeanness” with distinct post-national civic and liberal values as far as its substance is concerned.

Yet social identities not only describe who we are as members of a community, they also connote the boundaries of a group, who is “in” and who is “out.” In the case of Europe, and the EU in particular, the lack of clear boundaries makes identification more difficult (Castano [5]). A quick look at those international organisations that carry “Europe” in their name shows that there is no uniform answer to the question where Europe ends. Moreover, Europe’s “others” are usually invoked dependent on the political context. We routinely pitch the “European welfare state” against “American laissez-faire capitalism” (see also Wodak [5]). In a different context, Europe’s other is the continent’s own past of militarism and nationalism (Risse et al. 1999). Furthermore, in the context of the “Haider debate” regarding the new Austrian government and the European reaction to it, Europe’s other was the “enemy within”, e.g. xenophobia (see Section 3.5 below). In sum, Europe has many “others” which are referred to and represented in a context-dependent way. This does not mean at all that anything goes, but it warns us not to reify the concept of European identity and to fix its meaning once and for all (see also Siapera [5]).

Finally, social psychology warns us that increased tolerance toward fellow Europeans is highly conditional on the complexity with which Europe is presented. According to the
“ingroup projection model”, individuals who simply project their own values on Europe and then identify with their “national” Europe actually tend to be less tolerant with fellow Europeans (Mummendey and Waldzus [5]). If, for example, German understandings of “Europe” and the EU largely conform to visions of German social and political order, this might lower rather than increase German tolerance of Italians. The German discourse on the Euro and the convergence criteria was a case in point. In order to reconcile these findings with the liberal cosmopolitan picture, according to which identification with Europe increases tolerance for foreigners and decreases xenophobia, a better understanding is needed of how various attitudes relate to each other and co-evolve.

When do EU institutions matter for identity?

The degree to which individuals’ attachment to Europe matters in relation to their other collective identities is one question. Yet we do not only want to describe the degree to which citizens – elites and masses alike – identify with the EU and with Europe in general, but also to explain identity change resulting from more than forty years of European integration. Do the European institutions affect collective identities? Do they lead to a greater sense of belonging to Europe? And if so, what are the mechanisms of identity change?

In general, the EU is an elite-driven project – similar to other nation-building projects. No wonder that identification with and support for Europe and its institutions is highest among political and social elites. Eurobarometer data demonstrate an enormous gap between elite support (in fact, elite consensus) for the EU, on the one hand, and widespread scepticism among the larger public, on the other. According to 1998 data, European elites supported EU membership almost unanimously (94% mean across EU 15), while only a bit more than 50% of the mass public endorsed membership of their own country. Countries with the largest gaps between mass public and elite support for EU membership include Germany, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Finland, and the United Kingdom (Spence 1998).

Of course, these data do not measure identification with Europe, but support for the EU. But since attachment to Europe and support for integration co-vary, we can safely assume that identification with Europe among the elites is also higher than among the citizens where Europe and the EU run a distant second (or third after regional identification; cf. Citrin and Sides [5]).

Yet, European and national identities are not zero-sum propositions and citizens can easily negotiate strong national identities and some secondary identification with Europe. More-
over, Citrin and Sides point to a quite dramatic change during the 1990s. From 1991 to 1999, the number of those who felt only attachment to their nation-state declined by 12.6% across the EU 15 (from 65.8 to 53.2%), while the percentage of those who perceived some sense of belonging to their nation-state and to Europe increased by about the same number (from 29 to 42.6%). The outliers are British and Greek citizens, while Belgians, Italians, Spanish, and East Germans express above average dual identities. These developments are quite interesting, since support for EU membership and perceived benefits from EU membership – the latter being the main indicator for “utilitarian” evaluations of the EU – declined during the 1990s. At the same time, the correlations between identification with and attachment to Europe, on the one hand, and support levels for the EU as well as perceived benefits from EU membership, on the other hand, grew much stronger.

The social psychological concept of “entitativity” (Castano [5]) can help to explain these developments, both the difference between elite and mass identification with Europe and the change during the 1990s. Entitativity refers to the reification of a community resulting from increasingly shared cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness which then lead to collective identification. Yet increased salience of a community in people’s lives does not necessarily increase support for the community; it could also result in growing rejection (ibid.). Different levels of entitativity could well explain the enormous difference between elite and mass identification with Europe and the EU.

The EU is certainly very real for Europe’s political, economic, and social elites. Whoever is doing business in Europe has to constantly be aware of and refer to EU rules and regulations. Policy-makers and government officials on all levels of governance spend a considerable amount of their daily time dealing with the EU (Wessels 2000; Rometsch and Wessels 1996). In other words, the EU is an entitative community for the European political, social, and economic elites as a result of which their sense of belonging is also rather high.

For the citizens, the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now. There are at least three reasons for this which relate to the concept of entitativity. First, while EU law is the law of the land, has direct effect, and overrides national law, EU authorities do not implement European rules and regulations, but national and sub-national authorities do. Thus, when citizens are confronted with, say, environmental regulations in their daily lives, they do not even know that these are EU rules more often than not. The salience of the EU is rather low, even if the EU affects the citizens’ lives on a daily basis. Second, as men-
tioned above, “Europe” has fuzzy boundaries. While there are plenty of indicators telling me that I have left Germany, it is unclear when I have left Europe. Having to show my passport is certainly not a valid indicator, as I argued above regarding the funny boundaries of “Schengenland”. Boundedness, however, is a crucial ingredient of entitativity.

Last not least, the elite discourses in most EU member states about the EU are ambivalent at best when it comes to “shared values” and “common fate.” On the one hand, there is the conscious identity construction of a liberal and civic community emanating from the EU and its various institutions (for the latest effort see Commission of the European Communities 2001). On the other hand, national policy-makers routinely reify the nation-state in their dealings with Brussels. Whenever they can charge the EU for some tough decision at home, they adopt a populist rhetoric of conscious blame-shifting (“Brussels made me do it”) and construct EU institutions as remote bureaucracies which cannot be trusted (in contrast to national governments, of course). At the same time, whenever the EU succeeds in solving a commonly perceived problem, national policy-makers take the credit in front of national media. Few citizens know, for example, that the liberalisation of telecommunication markets slashing people’s telephone bills across Europe during the last ten years, was actually due to EU initiatives. The ambivalent position taken by the media certainly does not help to increase the entitativity of the European Union. As Siapera points out, journalists in Brussels who routinely report about the EU, hold multiple affiliations and see their professional role in various ways which adds to the ambivalent and fuzzy picture of the EU emanating from the mass media, the most important source of information about Europe for the citizens.

In sum, it is probably safe to argue that the EU as a community still lacks quite some entitativity as a condition for collective identification among the citizens. At the same time, things seem to be changing, the more Europe “hits home”. The reported change in sense of attachment to Europe could well result from an increasing reality of the EU in people’s daily lives. The single market, Schengenland, for all their fuzziness, have enlarged the entitativity of the EU, and the Euro is likely to do so even more.

How do EU institutions matter for identity?

Unfortunately, our knowledge about the effects of the EU on collective identity only allows for tentative conclusions with regard to the causal mechanisms involved. On an abstract level, three such mechanisms can be distinguished (Herrmann and Brewer [5]):
Functional models assume that institutions almost automatically change people’s perception of community and sense of belonging. Socialisation concepts focus on actors’ differential experiences with the institution and its consequences. Finally, persuasion models focus on institutions as identity-shaping agents. Deliberate efforts may be made to create collective identification through myths, symbols, or framing.

What does the available evidence suggest about these mechanisms? There is little evidence for a functional logic at play. Haas’s ideas that those elites that profit most from the union, would gradually transfer their loyalty to supranational institutions, seem to be disconfirmed (Haas 1958). Neofunctionalism’s basic argument has been that European integration would lead to identity changes among those transnational interest groups benefiting from European integration. There is little evidence for such a mechanism. Farmers, for example, who arguably benefit most from the EU through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are not particularly known for their enthusiasm for European integration. In more general terms, the data presented by Citrin and Sides show rather modest correlations between attachment to and identification with Europe, on the one hand, and individual perceptions of benefiting from the EU, even though this correlation grew stronger during the 1990s. The direction of the causal arrows also remains unclear from these data. One could, for example, turn the functional logic on its head and argue that strong identification with the EU leads to a sense of profiting from EU membership, rather than the other way round.

Socialisation appears to be a better candidate for explaining the findings in various studies. This is particularly true for those who are directly involved in the daily business of EU policy-making, either in Brussels or in national capitals (e.g., cf. Egeberg 1999; Lewis 2000; Wessels 2000; Laffan [5]; Wodak [5]; Siapera [5]; see also Section 3.3 below). Individuals working in EU institutions tend to adjust to the various “logics of appropriate behaviour” (March and Olsen 1998) in these institutions. These officials have direct experience with the institutions and need to internalise their rules of appropriateness at least to some degree in order to be able to carry out their tasks. As a result, we expect them to develop a stronger sense of group identity with the EU than those who have less direct experience with its institutions.

Different degrees of socialisation in terms of direct experience with the EU would also explain the huge gap between elite identification with Europe and the mass public where European identity runs a distinct second or third after national and/or regional identities. The ability of citizens to identify with the EU in terms of a civic and political identity and
the reported increase in (secondary) identification with Europe and EU during the 1990s could be explained on the basis of the socialisation hypothesis. During that time period, the EU has become more visible in people’s lives – from the single market to the single currency, “Schengenland”, Eastern enlargement, and most recently debates about institutional reform. At the same time, the EU has started portraying an image of itself as a political actor on the world scene going beyond pure market integration.

This leads to the third mechanism connecting institutions and social identities, persuasion. Persuasion does not actually constitute an alternative account to socialisation, but rather complements it by emphasising the active role of institutions as agents of identity construction. A complex picture emerges. On the one hand, the attempt by European leaders to deliberately construct the EU around civic and post-national values has made some inroads in people’s perception of and identification with the EU. The growing visibility of the EU in people’s lives is connected to a specific content and substance of European identity as civic and post-national emphasising liberal values of democracy, human rights, and the social market economy with a strong welfare state component. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the EU is often presented in the national discourses including the media in a rather fuzzy and contradictory manner. In other words, the homogeneity which is a prerequisite of entitativity and identity-building, is clearly lacking (Castano [5]; see also Breakwell [5]).
3.2 Europeanisation and identity change: conceptual and methodological questions

LAURA BENIGNI and ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU
(Institute of Psychology, CNR, Rome, and European University Institute)

“Identity” has become one of the unifying frameworks of intellectual and political debate since the 1990s. Most of the social science and humanities disciplines have something to say about it: sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, geography, history, philosophy. Politicians and journalists seem to be no less interested in identity matters. Indeed, much of the political and public discourse concentrates on collective and individual identities and their evolution in post-industrial societies. This debate reflects a growing concern with identity politics started by the New Social Movements in the 1960s around issues of peace, ecology and gender and followed up since the 1990s by the resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism as significant political forces. Indeed, identity as a concept embraces all these different social issues and seems to provide a keyword for our times.

Popular concern about identity is in large part perhaps a reflection of the uncertainty produced by rapid change in late modern societies (Giddens 1990; Beck 1986). The compression of space and time, the exponential development of transport and communication, the mass mediated contact with distant countries and peoples and also the actual cultural contact with migrants or tourists have created new socio-cultural landscapes especially in large urban centres. The future is no longer so predictable as it seems to have been for previous generations. Rather, the future is intertwined in the present in the late modern new conception of the individual’s life (Giddens 1991). Naturally, change, the confrontation of languages, traditions and ways of life, the transformation of divisions of labour and population flows are not confined to late modernity. However, it is the pace and magnitude of change today that seems to trigger feelings of insecurity and brings the issue of identity and its presumed stability, “authenticity” or coherence to the fore.

During the past decades, theoretical and empirical research in the social sciences has concentrated on the concept of collective identity and the related phenomena of identity formation and change in the contemporary world. More specifically, in the context of European integration, increasing attention has been paid to the possible existence or emergence of a European identity and also to the complementarity or opposition between feelings of attachment to Europe or the EU and national identity. Some scholars have argued that col-
lective identity has lost its meaning in the post-industrial world, where population and capital mobility as well as communication networks have increased exponentially. Contradictory tendencies are however observed. On the one hand, the culture of consumerism and technological progress have overruled traditional lifestyles while, on the other hand, there is a revival of local and ethnic cultures and identities both in Europe and elsewhere. As a matter of fact, individuals live in societies that are increasingly globalised but also increasingly fragmented. As a result, hybrid identities that include local or national traditions and allegiances intertwined with global cultural patterns emerge.

New tools for analysis

This dynamic state of affairs requires new tools for analysis and understanding. The concept of identity and the research methods used to study it have often been accused (see for instance Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Malesevic [7]*) for their vagueness and lack of clarity. Indeed, the intellectual debate on identity does not always sound too different from everyday common talk. There is for example a tendency to take for granted what identity is, and to focus upon expressions of, or changes in, particular identities without considering the broader theoretical issues which may be at stake (Jenkins 1996).

Studying identity, be it ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national or regional, in the contemporary context becomes troublesome because the scholar is faced with a whole range of social and cultural forms that sit uncomfortably with existing definitions of social identity. The aim of our project was not least to discuss the usefulness of the very concept of identity. More particularly, we addressed conceptual and theoretical issues concerning the definition of identity as a concept and its operationalisation in empirical research. Our aim was to avoid conceptual or methodological confusion in both theoretical and empirical studies. Given, however, the increasing fluidity of identities and the polarising tendencies towards either cosmopolitan individualism or the “ethnicisation” of society, we also welcomed the use of alternative and/or complementary concepts that may help us capture the increasingly complex, fragmented but also dynamic nature of collective identity nowadays.

Although identity has been a central concern in a number of disciplines during the past decades, there has been considerable disagreement regarding the methodological tools most suitable to study its formation and change. Social psychologists have analysed collec-

* Throughout this report, numbers in square brackets refer to publications resulting from IDNET as listed on p. 84 below.
tive identity through experimental studies conducted mainly in laboratory settings. The aim of such studies has been to isolate specific variables and test concrete hypotheses concerning group identity formation and change. However, this type of research tends to isolate artificially the social psychological mechanisms studied from their social and political context. Sociological research, on the other hand, has often overlooked the psychological dynamics underlying collective identity formation, privileging sociological explanations based on social, economic or political factors. Sociolinguists have sought to overcome the dichotomy between “universalist” and “contextualist” accounts by addressing the issue of identity development and transformation in a context-sensitive perspective, without however neglecting the social psychological dynamics activated in discourse. Nonetheless, discourse studies have been influenced by the quantitative-qualitative dilemma in social science methodology. Thus, empirical research in this area has developed either along the content analytical tradition or following an entirely qualitative logic. In brief, few have been the attempts to combine qualitative and quantitative tools in the study of identities and also to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective drawing together concepts from sociology, social psychology, anthropology or linguistics.

The workshop organised in the context of this IDNET project (see programme on p. A-6) has shown how “borrowing” from different disciplines can provide for new insights in the study of identity and even help clarify the analytical status of the concept. Dilemmas between sociological and psychological approaches, qualitative and quantitative methods, theory and empirical research are shown to be false. Our aim has been to propose research strategies that combine “positivist” with constructivist approaches as well as quantitative with qualitative methods.

**Different views on identity**

Different views on identity have been elaborated in our workshop and in the papers presented there and revised later in the light of the workshop’s discussion. Xenia Chryssochoou [7] introduces a social psychological model for studying identity introducing the idea of identity as social representation. Chryssochoou reviews the relevant social psychological literature with particular reference to social identity theory, self-categorisation theory, identity process theory, social identity definition and enactment and the cross-cultural approaches to the self, in order to unpack the different concepts of identity they assume and their methodological implications. The aim of such analysis is to understand how iden-
tity is conceptualised, the different ways of measuring identity and their links and/or discrepancies with the concept. Further, the paper discusses the common-sense perception of identity and its function in policy-making discourse and argues that a useful conceptualisation of identity is to perceive it as a social representation. This approach allows us to highlight the relationship between scientific and common-sense perceptions of identity and embeds identity within the dynamics of society, showing why it is an important concept in explaining social phenomena.

Jessica Jacobson (2001) adopts an empirical perspective highlighting the complexities of collective identity at the individual level with particular reference to British Pakistani youth. Her paper addresses the question of how to conceptualise collective identity in the current era. In doing so, it draws on two very different sets of empirical data from two studies conducted in 1990s Britain. The first of these was a qualitative study of attitudes to identity issues among young Britons from Pakistani backgrounds; the second, an analysis of expressions of national identity in the British tabloid press. Thus the paper looks both at individual perspectives on identity and at part of the cultural context within which individuals operate. Both data sets indicate that the parameters of collective identity in contemporary Britain are shifting and mutating. There is great diversity in the British Pakistani respondents’ comments about the content and significance of their ethnic, national and religious identities; and most appear to regard identity-formation as a necessarily open-ended process. The data from the tabloid newspapers illustrate that conceptions of British and/or English nationhood are rapidly changing and take many forms: being British can be about, for example, defying “Europe”; hanging one’s head in shame at the behaviour of the nation’s football hooligans; joining with others to mourn the death of Princess Diana; remembering the glories of the former Empire; participating in the general excitement over the National Lottery. Such findings accord with much current social scientific theory about the increasing fluidity and hybridisation of collective identity, in this era of globalisation.

But should it be concluded from the data that individuals are free to construct their own social identities out of the numerous and ever-changing cultural building blocks available to them? That it is time to invert social identity theory, as the individual is no longer defined by, but must himself define, the groups to which he belongs? In fact, a further interrogation of the data clearly reveals that many of the processes of social inclusion and exclusion are still perceived as inevitable, almost immutable, and as the source of much meaning in life. It is therefore apparent that the collectivities which are the bases of social
identity today may be more in number, more varied, more intermingled, more open to re-definition than ever before, but still exist above and beyond the individual. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps most appropriate to conceive of collective identity not so much as being a matter of group belonging and not-belonging, but as arising out of the sense of being bound to others within large, dense networks of social ties. These ties can sometimes be cut or at least worn down, while others can be strengthened, expanded, or slowly built up over time; but all individuals are to some extent enmeshed.

Marina Petronoti (2001) points to the importance of context in studying identity from an anthropological perspective. Her paper focuses on national identity construction in contemporary Greece. In particular, it looks at the multiple dimensions of this process and examines the use of elements which are regarded as stable (such as the purity and continuity of the Greek nation) as well as those which tend to be negotiable (such as the European-ness of national identity). The discussion is placed within the framework of social interaction between Greeks and Eritrean refugees as this has developed during the thirty years or so since their arrival in Athens. The author argues that the ways in which national identity is defined, maintained or reformulated is context specific. The more demanding surrounding situations are, the more individuals or groups resort to values and stereotypes they are familiar with. Through the analysis of oral testimonies, social practices and interrelationships the author delineated the areas in which dominant values and representations are reproduced, contested, disguised or altered in the process of national identity construction.

Peter Collins [7] analyses identity as a narrative drawing on ethnomethodology, anthropology and philosophy. He argues that identity is an unusually complex concept, particularly so when applied to the human self and human culture. In adopting an ethnographic approach to identity he tries, first, to avoid oversimplifying the social construction of identity and, second, to show how identity is fundamentally storied. Through his own fieldwork among a religious community in the North of England, he sets out to describe the three spheres of narrative identity (the canonic, the vernacular and the prototypical) and attempts to make sense of their articulation in everyday life.

Giovanna Leone (2001) presents a psychological perspective emphasising the importance of memory in the construction of identity. Her presentation focuses on the problem of time dimensions in social identity, and she notes that the fact that individuals have to cope with the problem of changes of their social position in time has not been explored in depth. She argues against the linear representation of temporal changes of identity – time as a kind of
physical movement: backward (from present to past) or forward (from past to present, or from present to future) – and suggests that a more complex perspective should be adopted shifting from a linear to a configurational model of time perspectives in identity. Leone substantiates her point by considering in some depth two classical psychological theories: Lewin’s description of the psychological field and Bloch-Halbwachs debate on the problem of persistence of collective mentalities, later developed in the well-known hypothesis of Braudel’s longue durée.

Arie Nadler’s paper (2001) concentrates on group relations and on the politics of identity in high conflict areas. He suggests that a group can establish social dominance, and maintain it through helping the out-group. Further, by refusing to seek or receive help from the dominant group, the low status group may challenge the existing social hierarchy. From that perspective inter-group helping relations are viewed as a benign form of establishing, maintaining or challenging power hierarchies between groups.

Ruth Wodak (2001) shows how discourse-analytical tools can be used to highlight the construction of multiple identities in a variety of social settings. She analyses different genres (speeches of politicians, media, interviews, focus group discussions) of discourse in order to highlight the discursive construction of national and supranational identities. Her paper analyses the re-contextualisation of certain central topoi and arguments constructing identities, and analyses a number of important macro-strategies which serve to construct, transform or deconstruct identities. As Petronoti, Wodak also sustains that identity narratives and constructions are context dependent. She also discusses issues of methodological design, arguing that discourse analysis but also trans-disciplinary approaches are useful to investigate identities on all levels.

Clive Seale [7] comments on the use of quantitative and qualitative tools in the study of identity through text analysis. After briefly reviewing several ways in which social researchers have tried to combine qualitative and quantitative methods, he illustrates one approach to such mixing of methods that he used in a recent study of news media reports, the topic of these being narratives of self identity told by (and about) people with cancer. He shows how computer software for text analysis, chiefly NVIVO and CONCORDANCE, enabled him to combine the advantages of both modes – quantitative and qualitative – of analysis, in a way that is relevant for researchers engaged in studies of collective identity.

Gordana Uzelac (2001) highlights the possible uses of statistical analysis to uncover the meanings that national identity has for different individuals. She argues that the determina-
tion of “national identity” involves at least two levels of analysis: one which is oriented towards “measuring” intensities of identity; and another which tries to determine the differences in actors’ perception of the object with which they identify. Following Richard Jenkins’s distinction between “nominal” and “virtual” identity, her paper examines how a social group that shares the same nominal identity differs in perception of the object of their identification, that is, their nation. She thus alerts researchers about difficulties in measuring collective identities in a meaningful way.

Sinisa Malesevic [7] inquires into the conceptual roots of the identity concept and the ways in which these are reflected in empirical research. He explores the links between the conceptual and methodological problems in the study of ethnic identities. More specifically, he argues that conceptual deficiencies in defining and understanding the notions of “identity” and “ethnic identity” are reflected in the quality and type of the research strategies used to assess empirical claims about ethnic identity.

Last but not least, Arturo Tosi (2001) emphasises the role of language and language politics in issues of identity formation as well as education policy. He discusses the relationship between language competence and ethnic identity in countries of old immigration and of new immigration, and shows that pride in identity and language and cultural maintenance are often stronger in countries of old rather than new immigration. Tosi argues for more nuanced research concerning the concept of ethnic identities in today’s context where national identities are also at a phase of mutation while transnational communities seem to gain ground.

Identity as social representation

Among the different views on identity represented in this project, we would like to highlight in particular the model proposed by Chryssochoou for the study of identity. Chryssochoou [7] discusses the concept of identity in social psychology, suggesting that it is a particular form of social representation that mediates the relationship between the individual and the social world. She argues that identity makes the link between social regulations and psychological organisations (i.e. identifications/self-categories) and constitutes the organising principle of symbolic relationships. Its functions are to inscribe the person in the social environment, to communicate peoples’ positions and to establish relationships with others (social recognition). In the model proposed by Chryssochoou, identity is seen as a cyclical process constituted by three actions: knowing, claiming and recognising. The au-
Author in fact argues that through their active participation in the social world (by knowing, recognising and claiming), individuals construct a set of knowledge about the world and themselves: their identity. To protect from, provoke or respond to changes to this knowledge people act in the name of identity. Thus, identity constitutes the social psychological context within which worldviews are constructed, through which these worldviews are communicated and for which battles are fought.

Chryssochoou’s proposal to look at identity as action opens new possibilities for using the concept to analyse contemporary social and political phenomena. Through the three-part cyclical process of cognition, communication and recognition, she links personal identity to the social world and provides a “process” framework through which to study, for instance, identity politics, specific claims of individuals as well as groups or identity disputes.

This model goes also beyond past cleavages between social psychology and sociology where the former looked for universal psychological processes completely detached from their historical context, while the latter concentrated on the specific historical, social or political conditions in which group phenomena took place neglecting the social-psychological mechanisms involved. The author here provides a way out of the impasse by theorising identity as a social psychological concept in relation to social action, successfully anchoring it into earlier social psychological research but also current social and political concerns. The importance assigned to communication as one of the links between cognition and recognition gears this model towards a discursive perspective too, enabling for instance the adoption of discourse-analytical methods and tools for empirical research and subscribing to an overall conceptualisation of identity as meaning that is built, negotiated, developed and changed through discourse.

Overcoming the qualitative-quantitative divide

Among the contributors to this project, Collins and Seale in particular propose different strategies for combining quantitative with qualitative tools in the study of identity. Peter Collins [7] proposes a “storying” perspective for the analysis of identity. He distinguishes among three levels: individual-prototypical, local-vernacular and social-canonic. His model borrows from ethnomethodology, anthropology and philosophy and creatively integrates these perspectives. It is a reflexive approach, which seeks to dynamically elaborate the individual and the social level through the heuristic albeit empirically based notion of
the local-vernacular, intermediate level. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken among British Quakers, the study attempts to elucidate some of the connections between the narrative quality of everyday interaction and the local construction of self. Focusing on the Quaker Meeting, Collins finds that the social identity of individual participants is precipitated in the interplay between three modes of discourse: the prototypical or individual, the vernacular and the canonic. For individuals to participate successfully in the Meeting they are required to present and then reconstruct their autobiographical selves in response to their increasing familiarisation both with well-known canonic texts and also the local expression of these texts. The tensions which characterise this process may also be said to define the politics of community in this case.

Aiming to make the most of new methodological tools, Clive Seale [7] argues against stereotypical views of “traditional scholarship” as presumably incompatible with methodologically informed procedures. He argues that such stereotypes, which parallel the presumed dilemma between quantitative and qualitative studies, can have a negative effect on the practice of social research in general, and textual analysis in particular. Drawing on a study of morally charged narratives of identity in newspaper texts, where personal stories of the experience of cancer are told with considerable attention by speakers and writers to the politics of gender, Seale shows how this distinction can be overcome in research practice. Quantitative analysis is shown to be useful in exploring text and generating insights, as well as strengthening generalisations from qualitative anecdotes. Automated text analysis using NVIVO and CONCORDANCE software can produce new “readings” otherwise hidden from view that can be followed up in close qualitative analysis. Seale thus shows how traditional views of qualitative research as exploratory and quantitative as confirmatory can be overturned. Automation and counting are shown in this study to enhance the scholar’s capacity to think creatively, indeed more than qualitative methods do in this case at least. The methodological tools proposed by Seale contribute to refining our understanding of identity formation and representation in discourse.
3.3 European identity, visions of Europe, and historical memory

BERNHARD GIESEN and VALENTIN RAUER
(Institute of Sociology, University of Konstanz)

How is European identity mediated in the past and today? With which representations can we conceive of the European people; what is the collective identity of Europe? In the case of the European Union the traditional relationship between the sovereign people and the political system appears to be reversed: Europe has already a legal system, soon it will have a constitution, but its collective identity has yet to be constructed, its sovereign people has yet to be defined. This collective identity of Europe is not to be reduced to just an unstable alliance of volatile interests or to the mere addition of the national identities of its member states. If the European *demos* is the ultimate source of law and politics, its identity has to claim an unconditional validity, it has to be constructed on seemingly unquestionable foundations as they are represented by common descent and destiny, by kinship and culture. Only if this collective identity of Europe can be conceived in a convincing way, only if the sovereign can imagine its identity – the *volonté générale* of the people – as stronger than the diverging interests and varying identities of its component parts – only then will the member states voluntarily accept majority votes in the European Council or engage in international solidarity as it is practised in national frames for disadvantaged regions and for the victims of catastrophes.

Within IDNET, there had been serious doubts as to what extent Europe will ever be able to generate this kind of identity. The main obstacles on the road to European identity are commonly considered to be the following:

1. In contrast to most nations, Europe is a multilingual community and will stay so for the foreseeable future. A transnational public sphere that could give rise to an encompassing European identity would have to overcome this linguistic diversity.

2. Some multilingual nations like Switzerland were able overcome this obstacle by referring to a common rebellion against the monarch or against foreign rule. Revolutions are, by their very definition, ruptures in the continuity of constitution and legal rule, a relapse into the “state of nature”. Therefore the revolution is the most important founding myth of the modern democratic nation. But Europe is not united by the memory of a common revolution.
3. The imagination of a threatening outside is another way of forging a strong collective identity. But this route also seems to be blocked for Europe today. Who should represent this common enemy? The Islamic world? The African immigrants knocking on the doors of the European welfare fortress? Russia? Japan, the US?

4. Finally, reaching out to a level above the nation will not enhance identification and attachment. Both are relatively easy to produce on the level of personal relations and local communities, but they tend to fade away if large invisible communities are concerned. Even the construction of national identity has to be taken as a highly improbable and fragile achievement that has to be reinforced by rituals and myths, by museums and monuments.

Considering these problems, the “euroscepticism” of the scientific literature would seem to make sense.

We argue, however, that eurosceptics forget two important historical facts: First, nations, too, are not naturally given collectivities, but historical products generated by and imagined in particular public discourses (Giesen 1998, 1999, 2001). There was a time in which – faced with the diversity of dialects, regional cultures and religious confessions – the idea of an encompassing German nation could easily be discarded as lofty speculation. The second historical fact that eurosceptic voices tend to forget is the long intellectual history of the idea of Europe. There have been strong visions of European unity and identity before anybody could think of the European Union. Contemporary efforts to determine the nature of the new Hobbesian beast could be stimulated and enriched by looking back to these historical visions of Europe.

In the remainder of this Section three such Europe-wide mediated visions, based on the results of our project, will be outlined. The first refers to common descent and heritage, the second to a joint destiny and mission, the third to the collective memory of a past trauma. We could call the first model of Europe the model of classicism, the second could be called the model of modernism, and the third has some traces of post-modern melancholy. All of them were generated as a response to the traumatic experience of devastating wars within Europe and all of them imagine Europe as a cultural unity.
Europe as common descent

The “ideal” way to collective identity is the mediatisation of a common past, of a myth of origin, of a common heritage (Assmann 1999, Delanty 1995, Connerton 1989). And indeed it was the invention of a historical continuity between the ancient Roman Empire and the Carolingian empire, the famous translatio imperii that represented the first construction of a European unity and identity (Ullmann 1969). The Carolingian renaissance of Europe in the seventh century fulfilled the yearning to overcome the misery of tribal wars that had devastated the continent after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Europe was represented as the prey of barbarian tribes warring each other and turning the classical civilisation into ruins. An escape from suffering and misery was expected from monastic communities and ascetic life. And it may well be that the Irish monks and missionaries who baptised the tribesmen in Germany were the first who mediated the term Europe after the decline of the classical world.

After his coronation in 800, Charlemagne was praised as the pater europae. The person of the emperor embodied not only the continuity of the imperial heritage, but also the identity of Europe as the unity of spiritual and mundane power, of imperium and sacerdotium. This unitary idea of Europe continued to inspire intellectuals and politicians, priests and princes even after the Carolingian empire was split up into three separate parts – what contemporaries regretfully described as the separation of Europe. The Ottonian and the Staufian emperors renewed the European ambition of the empire, and even later on the European frame of the empire and the church remained an obvious difference from Byzantium and the Muslim world. We can understand the crusades only if we consider them as a pan-European enterprise that related church and empire, sword and cross, politics and religion (Wallach 1972, Pirenne 1987, Leyser 1992, Reuter 1992).

However, during the crusades the Christian knights were not only united by a common descent and a common mission, but they discovered also their national differences. National differences and the partition of the empire into different kingdoms shifted the unitary vision of Europe gradually from the empire to the church. Even if later attempts to restore the imperial power often referred to its European roots, the Christian church mediated the idea of European unity more than any other institution. Thus the growing tension between pope and emperor, between church and state, between the spiritual and the political powers, appeared also as an opposition between a cultural construction of a common European heritage on the one hand, and a political construction of boundaries and diversity as repre-
sented by the fractionated and scattered map of feudal states on the other. The unity of Europe that was lost on the field of politics was still represented in a common culture.

This common European heritage centred around Christian faith, but it was also based on the continuity of the Roman law and on the classical repertory of art and architecture, literature and philosophy. The changing tides of epoch and style varied the mode of reference to the classics, but all these epochs and styles had a European scope and, hence, contrasted with the fractionated situation of political units.

The social carriers, the mediators of this European cultural identity were not the rulers, but scholars, monks, artists and humanist intellectuals – a relatively small intellectual elite who travelled across Europe between monasteries and academies, universities and feudal courts, and who, most important, wrote and spoke in a common European language – Latin. We can hardly overestimate the importance of Latin for the construction of a European public sphere until the rise of national literatures in the sixteenth century.

*Europe as destiny and mission*

This imagination of a European descent as represented by a cultural heritage was challenged by the devastating confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The original religious unity was gone, Europe was divided into three confessional camps – the polycentrism that had marked the political arena before now took over also the realm of culture and religion.

European intellectuals responded to this situation of decay and dissection by a new intellectual movement of European scope and ambition – the Enlightenment – and by a new discourse about Europe. This new discourse about Europe, too, was carried by a small intellectual elite that included enlightened princes, noblemen, scholars, officeholders and merchant capitalists. It was not descent and heritage, but education and scholarship that granted membership in this intellectual elite. Scholars like Pufendorf or Erasmus, Leibniz or Bodin, Grotius or Spinoza did not yet address a large public and they imagined their readership not yet in national contours. They travelled between the princely courts and changed their commitments, they communicated in several European languages and they published frequently abroad to escape censorship. New publications of famous authors were quickly translated and available to a Europe-wide educated readership. Certainly Paris and Leiden, London and Königsberg, Edinburgh and Göttingen had their own intellectual climate. But the enlightenment was a decisively transnational movement.
This new movement changed the idea of Europe in two important respects that prefigured the spirit of modernity. On the political level, the vision of a European unity centred around the hegemonial empire was replaced by its opposite – the idea of a de-centred balance of power between the European states. Europe was represented as a realm of peace devoid of religious fanaticism and devoted to reason, tolerance and the rule of law. The polycentrism of European powers that patterned the political reality since the thirteenth century was turned into a program of European integration and international peace. The fractionated and fragmented political map of medieval Europe deviated from the original ideal of the hegemonial empire centred around the person of the emperor. The new vision of Europe considered this very hegemonic and centred structure to be the “pathological deviation”.

Thus the modern imagination of Europe as a de-centred system prefigured the modern conception of society as a system of different but equally important spheres. Like the European powers that should abstain from hegemonic ambitions and be sovereign in their domain, also society was, later on, imagined as consisting of economy and state, culture and family, each sphere governed by its distinctive logic, without allowing one sphere to dominate the other.

But the new discourse about Europe differed from the classical heritage not only by its focus on balance and equilibrium, on tolerance and equality. It also had a new temporal orientation: it turned from descent to destiny. The enlightenment vision of Europe was no longer based on the defence of a classical heritage. Instead it imagined Europe as a cultural mission, as the vanguard of history, it looked to the future instead of looking to the past.

Of course the enlightenment did not invent the idea of European mission. The idea of a European mission can already be found in early modern Christianity. In this missionary vision, Europe was gradually decoupled from its territorial ties, it gained a temporal connotation. The res publica christiana could and should finally include every human being. European Christendom was turned into a universal community in relation to a God who was invisible and omnipresent, inaccessible and beyond description. The sacred core of European culture could not any longer be seen as embodied in particular places and objects. It became a missionary project that referred to all human beings and to all regions of the globe. This missionary universalism was secularised in the eighteenth-century notions of enlightenment, progress and education (Gollwitzer 1964). The constitutive boundary between Europe and the outside was even more temporalised and decoupled from the ties
of descent and territory. It did run between the European vanguard of history and the backward “races” of outsiders, but it could also hint occasionally at the backwardness and decadence of the European centre and at the natural innocence of the periphery. The noble savage could be closer to human perfection than the European – in particular in times when the Europeans seemed to oppose the rule of reason and the natural order.

The Enlightenment was a European movement that transcended territorial boundaries – it aimed at a universal community of humankind. Everybody’s true identity was European, and it was the task of education and emancipation to further the awareness of this identity. Thus what started as a genuine European movement dissolved into a free-floating discourse that could be appealed to by every human being everywhere and at every time. Later on this missionary universalism promoted the abolition of slavery and engendered the cause of human rights – including the respect for human life and the abolition of the death penalty.

**European collective identity and traumatic memory**

Today, however, neither the idea of translation and embodied heritage nor the idea of Europe as a vanguard of universal history can provide a distinct European identity that will be accepted by the outside world without major reservations. In a post-colonial world the idea of a European mission, of a Europe teaching the world, faces as strong objections as the idea of a European empire – obviously the days of European hegemony are gone. But also the much less offensive idea of an inimitable cultural heritage may provoke frowns because of its highly exclusive claim.

Furthermore the relationship between politics and culture in today’s European Union differs strongly from the one that prevailed during most of Europe’s history. For a thousand years the unity of Europe could be found in the cultural realm while the political map was patterned by diversity. This relation between unity and diversity is reversed today: unity and integration are pushed forward by politics, whereas on the cultural level the diversity and polycentrism of European cultures are stressed and marked in order to counteract the unifying and levelling forces of market and administration – again it is a compensatory relationship but this time the other way around. Hence the reference to a common cultural heritage – although not completely without appeal – will hardly engender a strong European identity today.
Also other modes of relating to the past may not open up an easy road to European identity. We mentioned already the revolution as founding myth of the modern demos. In the heroic uprising against the princely rule or foreign domination, the people relapse in a state of nature and constitute themselves as the ultimate political sovereign. In the memories of triumphant or tragically failed revolutions this democratic sovereignty is re-narrated, represented and re-enacted.

But it is exactly this memory of a revolutionary birth of the demos that is lacking in the European case – there is no common memory of a heroic uprising that includes all European nations. The memory of a triumphant uprising is almost exclusively tied to single nations, i.e. it undercuts systematically the level of an all-embracing European identity. Even the memory of a tragically failed revolutionary uprising is related to a particular nation that rebelled against an oppressor, i.e. mostly against another European nation. Whether triumphant or tragic, the memory of past revolutions can hardly unite all European nations.

However, the reference to triumphant foundations, to heroes and revolutions is not the only path of collective memory that could give rise to a European identity. In modern Western nations the triumphant founding myth is increasingly replaced by the reference to a traumatic past, to the collective memory of victims and perpetrators. New national memorials and museums rarely remember triumphant victories, but recall the victims of the past. This turn from triumph to trauma, from heroes to victims has been preluded by a major change in the monuments representing the nation as embodied in the hero. After the First World War the monument of the anonymous soldier rephrases the once victorious hero who had a face, name and story as a tragically failing hero (Koselleck 1997). At the end the hero is replaced by the nameless victim who ranges among other depersonalised victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The new national memorial of the reunited Germany in Berlin is such a memorial of anonymous victims, a memorial constructed by the nation and for the nation of perpetrators. In remembering a collective trauma it includes victims as well as perpetrators, and it can do so because it represents the collective memory of the German nation instead of hinting at the personal guilt of individual perpetrators, very few of whom are still alive. Individual suffering and guilt on the one hand and collective trauma and responsibility on the other are decoupled here.

The turn from the memory of heroes to the memory of victims and perpetrators, from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective identity, is also reflected by official rituals
performed by representatives of the state. After the First World War the head of state on an official visit in a neighbour capital paid respect to the fallen soldiers and the victims of war of the host nation. In the frame of this ritual the German Chancellor Willy Brandt performed the famous kneeling gesture in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial thirty years ago (Giesen, Rauer and Schneider forthcoming). This gesture was considered to be a turning point of Germany’s post-war history. It engendered, later on, a political culture of ritual apologies with respect to the victims of the past (Cunningham 1999). So, in a strange way, not only the figure of the victim, but also the figure of the perpetrator becomes an archetype of collective identity – not only in Germany, although the public confession of guilt may be regarded as a special German contribution to the political rituals of post-war Europe (Giesen forthcoming).

Today many representatives of different European nations officially confess their nations’ involvement in the Shoah. France is more concerned with issues of collaboration than with the myth of resistance, Norway’s former President Brundtland admitted publicly that more young Norwegians died in the ranks of the Waffen-SS than as victims of the German occupation, Poland discovers its own genocide-involvement in Jeddabwne, the Pope apologises for the non-intervention of the Roman Catholic Church, and even the Italian Neo-fascist leader Fini and Austria’s Haider visit Auschwitz (Giesen, Rauer and Schneider forthcoming). Compared to these solemn confessions of guilt and its representation in monuments, museums and public debates, the traditional celebrations of triumphant memorial days are increasingly reduced to the status of local folklore.

The spread of a new political culture of ritual confessions of guilt focuses the Nazi genocide of the European Jews. But it views the Holocaust not as an exclusive German issue, it sees it as a collective European trauma which relates to many nations as victims and collaborators and even includes the allied forces, insofar as they did not prevent or stop the genocide by bombing the railroads to the death camps. This secular shift from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective memory contrasts sharply with the post-war attempts to purify one’s own community by shifting the guilt to one nation and within this nation to a limited group of criminal if not demonic perpetrators. Today the turn towards a collective memory of past traumas blurs the once clear-cut separation between the nations of perpetrators and those nations that could remember themselves as victims.

This holds true even for Germany. Today Germany not only commits herself clearly to the guilt of the past, but also starts slowly and cautiously to rediscover and to remember her
own victims – the victims of bombing raids and of ethnic cleansing after the war. This explains the extraordinary success of Günter Grass’s novella “Im Krebsgang” that describes the death of thousands of German refugees in a shipwreck in January 1945. A new traumatic memory of perpetrators and victims seems now to unite the European nations. It provides for a tacitly assumed moral consensus: a melancholic European identity based on the horror of the past.

Today, the burden of collective trauma is accepted by European nations more readily because most of the individual perpetrators are already dead and therefore out of the range of jurisdiction. By decoupling collective identity from the sum of individual identities, the present of the European Union has been separated from the European past of war and genocide – in similar way as the Carolingian Empire responded to the trauma of the tribal wars and as the enlightenment vision of Europe responded to the trauma of the confessional wars.

This new European identity based on a collective trauma of Nazism was challenged when the right-wing FPÖ, lead by Jörg Haider, entered the Austrian government in 2000 (see Section 3.5 below). Not the sheer existence of right wing extremism, but the official representation of a member state by a party that is considered to be ridden with Nazism, was the reason for sharp critique. We may consider the European response to the Austrian government to be grossly exaggerated – Haider is a right wing populist not much different from French Le Pen or Italian Fini – but the Austrian case provided an excellent opportunity to emphasise the new collective identity of European nations by staging the deviant case and marking Austria as an outsider. Stigmatising the Austrian government also demarcated the European boundary with respect to future candidates for a membership of the European Union.

The new European identity is based neither on triumphant rejoicing nor on the fear of an outside threat; instead, it is based on melancholy, on non-action rather than on action. This melancholic identity explains also the European hesitation to engage in warfare, and it is strongest in those member nations that have to bear the burden of the past in a concentrated way – in Germany more than e.g. in Great Britain or in Ireland.

*The particularity of European collective memories*

At the end of our research one could raise the question why this secular shift from triumphant to traumatic memories occurred in Europe, which conditions fostered it and in par-
ticular why this memory of a collective trauma should be considered as a European peculiarity? Indeed the trauma of genocide and the collective responsibility of the perpetrators are by no means a unique European feature. But the official responses of Turkey to the Armenian genocide or the Japanese reaction to the international pressure to apologise for the Nanjing massacres greatly differ from the European response to the Shoah.

The Turkish and Japanese reluctance even to admit the crimes can hardly be explained by a phase of latency in which a nation is ridden with haunting individual memories and cannot stand to face the brutal conversion of her triumphant heroes into criminal perpetrators. In Europe as well as in Japan or in Turkey the perpetrators are dead and out of the reach of jurisdiction. Also the rise of international media networks that increases the sensitivity with respect to triumphant manifestations of national identity between neighbour states extends to Japan as well as to Europe.

But it is not just plain chauvinism that prevents these nations from admitting their genocide crimes. Instead their reluctance or refusal hint at different religious foundations of collective identity. The Judeo-Christian tradition starts with the idea of the original sin that is handed from generation to generation until the redeemer, the Messiah, appears in order to dissolve the bonds of the collective guilt. In the Christian tradition this Messiah is embodied in the person of Christ. Christ represents the ultimate innocent individual, the Son of God who sacrificed his life in order to relieve the burden of collective guilt from his people (the myth of the divine king sacrificing himself was quite common in African kingdoms too, see Eliade 1963). Because he is innocent his suffering does not result from retaliation and revenge but, instead, it represents the ultimately sovereign act of the divine hero. For the individual person this myth of original sin and redemption is turned into the ritual of confessing the guilt. The confession of guilt not only relieves the confessor from the burden of guilt but it even uplifts him to a purified position. If in addition to this, the confessing individual even is innocent, but nevertheless takes the burden of collective guilt, then he sanctifies his own mundane individuality; he performs Christomimesis. As a political leader he partakes in the charisma of the divine hero. Thus the European ritual of confessing the guilt of the past relies on a mythology that continues even if the political representatives performing this ritual are utterly secularised individuals who ignore the cultural origin of their actions.

In contrast, Japanese confessions of guilt are limited to individuals, who are blamed for having put shame on the collectivity, the nation, the family (Benedict 1974). Here, the rela-
tion between individual and collective identity is reversed: it is only the individual who can be guilty, who can be humiliated and ashamed, whereas the embracing collectivity can not be imagined other than being innocent. The reason for this remarkable difference can be found in the axial contrast between the this worldly deed and otherworldly salvation in the European case, whereas in the Japanese perspective the confession of guilt cannot be alleviated by the promise of salvation in an otherworldly realm (Eisenstadt 1996). There is no otherworldly salvation in Confucian civilisation.

Even with respect to the spread of rituals of mourning and confessions of collective guilt, European identity relies on a cultural heritage that persists – in many transformations – even if the Europeans are no longer aware of it. Of course, the Christian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent is not the only possible foundation of European identity. Other institutions and ideas – the enlightenment, the idea of civil equality and civil rights, the individual as the source of creativity and carrier of rights in contrast to the authority of the state, the separation of state and religion, the constitutional nation state – all these are of similar importance and have been exported to other areas of the globe, mostly even without keeping a mark of their European origin. But confessing the collective guilt of the past may provide a European identity that can neither be accused of missionary triumphalism, nor be regarded as darkening the future of Europe.
3.4 European integration, socialisation, and identity change

JEFFREY CHECKEL (ARENA, University of Oslo)

This part of the IDNET project has brought together EU specialists and international relations (IR) theorists to explore the ability of European institutions to transform the interests and identities of states and other social agents. Put differently, it explores the socialising role of European institutions. Do national representatives “go native” in Brussels, adopting European mores and values at the expense of national traditions? How and through what mechanisms are the transition states of East Europe and the Former Soviet Union adopting European standards, e.g., on ethnic rights and civil-military relations, thus facilitating their “return to Europe”? Is it possible to view what is arguably the world’s most successful military alliance – NATO – as a socialising institution?

More specifically, at issue are the conditions under which and mechanisms through which institutions in Europe socialise states. While standard sociological definitions, with their stress on the internalisation of values and norms, emphasise the end point of this process, it ought to be “unpacked” – exploring the intervening mechanisms that may lead to such end states. This issue is addressed on three different levels:

1. Theoretically, these intervening mechanisms of state/agent socialisation are explored from a variety of analytic perspectives, including organisational theory, social constructivism, rational choice and social psychology. We do not pretend to offer a single theory of socialisation; rather, the emphasis is the development of so-called scope conditions. In theoretical terms, the goal is thus middle-range or typological theories of socialisation.

2. Empirically, this theoretical diversity helps to capture the complex reality of contemporary Europe, where a variety of mechanisms are socialising states and individuals/groups within them. Project participants thus analyse the socialisation potential and practices of several different European institutions (EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE), and do so in both West and East Europe and in macro (state socialisation by European institutions) and micro (individuals within the EU Commission, say) settings.

3. Methodologically, each contributor addresses a series of operational issues – how to recognise socialisation when we see it; the development of empirical indicators; what
counts as good data – and thinks in terms of scope conditions (when and under what conditions is a particular socialisation mechanism more likely to be at work). Attention to such questions improves the validity of individual contributions, while also helping to place the nascent socialisation literature in IR and EU studies on a more systematic footing.

Socialisation: definitions and levels

In a classical definition, socialisation refers to a process of inducting actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community. While this is an excellent and well-established starting point, the devil is in the details. Earlier work – especially within sociology (Siegel 1965, 1; see also Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 287-92) – equated socialisation with internalisation and belief change. More appropriately, however, this should be seen as only one element in a multi-stage process (see also Alderson 2001, 417-20; Johnston 2001, 495).

In particular and as an increasingly robust empirical literature suggests (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, for example), this “process of induction” can include a variety of causal mechanisms. A central goal of our project was better to specify these mechanisms and the conditions under which they operate. We thus argue and empirically document that socialisation can proceed along several different levels or dimensions simultaneously – ranging from partial (behavioural adaptation), to intermediate (role enactment), to complete (internalisation). Put differently, when a social agent comes to follow the “norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community,” one or more causal mechanisms may be at work: strategic calculation, cognitive role playing or normative persuasion.

The purpose of this analytic parsing is not simply to come up with a roster of socialisation mechanisms. Rather, questions of scope and domains of application have to be explored as well – that is, when and under what conditions is a particular mechanism more likely to be operative. We thus face a two-fold analytic challenge: to establish how socialisation happens (socialisation mechanisms) and when it occurs (scope conditions).

These conceptual preliminaries were necessary because, until recently, mainstream research in both international relations theory and EU studies ignored, downplayed or undertheorised socialisation dynamics. Within IR, neorealists advanced a Darwinian and empirically inaccurate view of it. Even the so-called English School, which stressed the socialising role of international society, paid little heed to how this occurred (Bull 1977). A similar
state of affairs confronted students of the European Union. While the early neo-
functionalist work of Haas and others had hinted at the EU’s powerful socialising role,
theoretical underspecification and methodological challenges had hindered the develop-
ment of a robust empirical research program (Pollack 1998; Martin and Simmons 1998).
This was and is a pity, for the EU’s densely institutionalised structure would seem an ideal
laboratory and “social soil within which actors’ preferences might be transformed” (Capo-
raso and Jupille 1999, 440).

Socialisation research: the state of the art

Given this background, the good news is that the last decade saw a revitalisation of sociali-
sation research by both IR theorists and Europeanists. One strand of research – conducted
by IR constructivists – views institutions in a macro and holistic sense as promoters of so-
cialisation in public arenas. In an important sense, this recent work thus builds on the ar-
guments of Bull and others in the English School regarding the socialising effects of inter-
national society; its value added comes in systematically explicating how and when such
effects occur (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, for example).

Another strand of socialisation research views institutions at a more micro-level as sites of
socialisation in private settings. Here, Europeanists and a smaller group of IR constructiv-
ists have taken the lead. The former theorise and document how West European state el-
ites, in insulated settings where social pressure is absent or deflected, adopt multiple identi-
ties and redefine their interests through processes of social learning. The latter build upon a
long tradition of research in integration studies (early work by neo-functionalists), IR the-
ory (Haas 1990) and negotiation analysis (Chayes and Chayes 1995) that emphasises the
socialising affects of international organisations and institutions on the actors who partici-
pate in them. In these diplomatic, in-camera settings, scholars have shown how social
learning and persuasion can change people’s minds.

The project directly addresses unsolved problems and puzzles in this more recent socialisa-
tion research. In particular, for both the macro- and micro-perspective we theorise and then
empirically document the mechanisms of socialisation and the conditions under which they
are expected to operate.
Four contributions explore the role of micro-socialisation processes in central EU institutions. Collectively, they utilise rich empirical data to add specification and nuance to earlier claims on the transformative power of European institutions. They also highlight the central importance of domestic politics, broadly understood.

The studies by Egeberg, Trondal and Beyers all explore socialisation dynamics within committee settings under the Commission and Council.

The exiting literature on this issue is dominated by two competing theoretical claims. Intergovernmentalists claim that national officials arrive pre-packaged at the EU level, and that their interests and identities remain largely unchanged while participating in European institutions. Most institutionalists and constructivists, on the other hand, argue that international institutions are capable of socialising government representatives so that their preferences and identities might be transformed. Morten Egeberg [1]* argues that to explain when and how EU institutions socialise government representatives, it is necessary to unpack an institution’s basic organisational characteristics and explore whether these compete with or reinforce those of an individual’s domestic organisational home. He uses data on national officials’ participation in EU Commission and Council committees to shed light on these questions.

Applying an institutional approach to the socialisation of national civil servants embedded in EU committees, Jarle Trondal [1] claims that individuals who participate in Council working groups tend to supplement pre-existing allegiances with supranational role perceptions. EU committees are seen as transformative institutions and sites of socialisation with respect to the roles of the committee participants. Based on survey and interview data with Danish and Swedish government officials who attend Council working parties, Trondal argues it is the length and intensity of attendance on Council working parties that accompanies the enactment of supranational allegiances and loyalties among the participants. However, contrary to neo-functionalist arguments, these supranational allegiances are clearly secondary to pre-existing national and sectoral allegiances.

In a contribution that partly challenges Trondal’s findings, Jan Beyers [1] explores whether the adoption of supranational role conceptions is caused by extensive and sustained contact

* Throughout this report, numbers in square brackets refer to publications resulting from IDNET as listed on p. 84 below.
with “Europe” – a key assumption for many studies of European socialisation. Based on qualitative and quantitative interview data, he scrutinises this so-called contact hypothesis, arguing that studies on European socialisation must take actors’ multiple embeddedness more explicitly into account. In an empirical analysis of committees operating under the European Council, Beyers then demonstrates that any study of European-level socialisation must explore and control for the effect of domestic context.

A fourth study on the EU turns our attention to a central – but poorly understood – EU institution: the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or Coreper. As the heart of everyday EU decision-making, Coreper is a key laboratory to test whether and how national officials become socialised into the Brussels-based collective culture and how this impacts national identities. Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a controversial EU citizenship directive, Jeff Lewis [1] finds evidence of a socialisation process in Coreper that goes beyond mere strategic adaptation. Crucially, however, the pattern of identity change in Coreper does not indicate national identities are replaced or subsumed; rather, Lewis uncovers a socialisation dynamic leading to new understandings of national identities and an expanded conception of the self.

Socialisation at the macro-level

Three additional contributions explore socialisation dynamics more at the macro-level. In doing this, they consider the socialisation potential of other European institutions, thus contextualising arguments made about the EU; they also broaden our theoretical toolkit for understanding such processes by drawing upon insights from both social constructivism and rational choice.

Alexandra Gheciu [1] examines the dynamics and implications of NATO’s socialisation of Czech and Romanian actors after the end of the Cold War. She argues that the organisation’s involvement in Central/Eastern Europe has been more complex than rationalist analyses might lead us to expect. In addition to (a limited use of) instrumental incentives, NATO has relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion. A close empirical study of the Czech and Romanian cases reveals that international socialisation affected not just the socialisees’ strategies, but also their definitions of identity and goals. Gheciu goes on to argue that successful persuasion of this sort is most likely when the national actors are “novices” and when the international interlocutors (from NATO in this instance) do not lecture, but instead engage in dialogue and debate.
In her contribution, Judith Kelley [1] combines quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the role of the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe in shaping domestic policy on ethnic minorities in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s. The author explores the influence of two very different socialisation mechanisms: persuasion-based diplomacy and incentive-based conditionality. Highlighting the key role of domestic politics, Kelley theorises the scope conditions for when each of these socialisation mechanisms works. Empirically, she demonstrates that persuasion mechanisms alone rarely change policy outcomes and that the clear provision of incentives is necessary as well. The findings thus suggest that rational choice models can also provide important insights into socialisation dynamics.

Frank Schimmelfennig [1] advances a slightly different rationalist approach for understanding key aspects of socialisation in the transition states of post-communist Europe. In particular, he theorises the main socialisation mechanism as one of “intergovernmental reactive reinforcement,” where international organisations offer material and political rewards in return for norm compliance, but do not coerce non-compliant governments. Empirically, Schimmelfennig substantiates these propositions with quantitative data on the development of liberal democracy in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and with case studies on Slovakia and Latvia.

**Putting results into context**

We have made a particular effort to place the theoretical/empirical claims advanced by individual contributors in a larger context. What is good and bad? Where do we need to go next in terms of theory and method? In his evaluation of the project’s meta-theoretical framing and its empirical cases, Michael Zuern [1] takes a number of contributors to task for not giving alternative accounts a fair enough hearing. While such a criticism can be levelled at most research, it is of particular concern given our bridge building aspirations. Theoretically, he calls for greater attention to the increasingly robust literature on compliance as it offers additional tools for exploring the mechanisms of socialisation.

In another evaluation of the project’s overall accomplishments, Iain Johnston [1] assesses the core analytic claims regarding institutions. Are there other literatures that can shed additional light on the relation between institutions and socialisation? Integrating across the studies, what collective lessons can be gleaned on the role of institutional design in promoting/hindering socialisation? Finally, Johnston asks whether our arguments are really
about *European* institutions as opposed to more generic institutional effects. Why is it that institutions and their socialising influences are so seemingly different in Europe than in other world regions – Asia or Latin America, say? He argues that cross-regional comparisons are essential to help us develop more fine-grained hypotheses on the (multiple) causal connections between institutions and socialisation.
3.5 Public discourses and the European public sphere

THOMAS RISSE, VALENTIN RAUER, SYLVAIN RIVET, and MARIANNE VAN DE STEEG
(Free University of Berlin, University of Konstanz, and European University Institute)

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a European public sphere. This debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU). There is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon multiple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. In this context, an open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media is considered crucial for providing an interface between state and society in a democratic polity. If we conceive of the EU as an emerging democratic polity beyond the nation-state, the issue of a European public sphere is raised quite naturally.

Yet, there is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes a democratic public sphere, let alone a European public sphere – and how do we know one when we see one. As a result, different conceptualisations lead to diverging assessments about whether there is a transnational public sphere in Europe in an empirical sense and, if the answer is no, whether something resembling such a sphere could actually emerge in principle. Different concepts of a public sphere inevitably result in different empirical indicators how to measure it which leads to almost incompatible empirical data.

In this section we try to make sense of the empirical and theoretical literature by asking two questions:

1. What do we know empirically about a European public sphere?

2. How can we make sense of the empirical findings in light of the theoretical debate on a European public sphere?
We also report empirical findings from a content analysis of print media in five European countries pertaining to the so-called “Haider debate,” i.e., the access to power of a right-wing party in Austria in 2000 and the European reactions to it.*

The short answer to the first question is somewhat paradoxical: the available evidence suggests that the salience of European themes is still low, but that similar meaning structures and frames of reference prevail in media reporting about Europe. The short answer to the second question is that a European public sphere emerges out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres. An ideal typical European public sphere would then be characterised by

- a comparatively high degree of attention to European themes in the national media;
- similar frames of reference with regard to European affairs in media reporting about Europe and the EU indicating an emerging “community of communication.”

Linking theory and evidence, we can then conclude that we can see an emerging European “community of communication,” the more salient European themes become in the various national public spheres.

*This project has been directed by Bernhard Giesen (University of Konstanz) and by Thomas Risse (Free University of Berlin, formerly European University Institute). It has been funded by the German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).
porting on national, European, and global affairs seems to indicate that “Europe” only matters in media reporting on monetary questions, agricultural issues, and, of course, on issues of European integration itself (Ruud Koopmans, personal communication). This work, therefore, concludes: There is no European public sphere to speak of in a meaningful sense given the rather low issue salience.

2. Others concentrate on particular European issues, such as the corruption scandal of the European Commission, BSE, or the debate about the future of the European Union (EU) (e.g. Eder 2000; Eder and Kantner 2000; Trenz 2000). These studies tend to observe that these European issues are discussed in the various media across Europe in a very similar fashion and using similar reference points. Our own study on media reporting about the European reaction to the new Austrian government (the “Haider debate”) shows very strongly, that newspapers in five different countries used very similar meaning structures (frames) in discussing the issue. This was irrespective of one’s particular stance on the issue. In this case, we could clearly observe a “community of communication”. As a result, these types of studies are usually more optimistic with regard to the existence of a European public sphere, since they observe many more commonalities.

So, who is right? There is no easy answer, since the two types of studies measure different aspects of what could be a European public sphere. On the one hand, the first measurement refers to the significance or salience of European affairs, as compared to local, regional, national, or global questions. If media pay little or no attention to the EU, the public awareness of European questions is equally low, hence the scepticism about a European public sphere. On the other hand, the second type of measurement refers to common meaning structures and frames of reference. If media report about Europe and the EU at all, they seem to do so using similar frames and meanings; in other words, they have a similar understanding of what it is that they talk about, irrespective of their political standpoint. We might disagree about how we judge the Commission’s corruption scandal, but we all agree that corruption is bad behaviour.

Putting the two findings together then leads to a paradoxical result: The national media do not report about Europe and the EU as often as policy-makers in Brussels would like them to do, but if they do report, they use similar perspectives irrespective of national backgrounds. The following graph summarises this finding:
Graph 1: Dimensions of a European Public Sphere and Empirical Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Attention for European Affairs</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>LOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frames of Reference in Media Reporting on European Affairs</td>
<td>SIMILAR</td>
<td>Ideal typical European public sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFFERENT</td>
<td>Prevailing national perspectives on Europe</td>
<td>No European public sphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How to make sense of a European public sphere?

What do these results tell us about the (non-) existence of a European public sphere? Conventional wisdom holds that there is no European public sphere, because there is no “community of communication” on the European level based on a common language and genuinely European media. This suggests that we must somehow transcend our national public spheres and that a “European public sphere” is somehow located above and beyond the various national media and publics. In concrete terms, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and “Le Monde” could never be part of the same public sphere, by definition. But there is no reason why we should all speak the same language and all use the same media in order to be able to communicate across national borders in a meaningful way. If people attach similar meanings to what they observe in Europe, they should be able to communicate across borders irrespective of language and in the absence of European-wide media. Thus, the findings reported above disconfirm conventional wisdom.

Moreover, the conventional view is based on an idealised picture of an almost homogenous national public sphere which is then transferred to the European level. There is no reason why we should expect agreement or consensus on an issue in a common public sphere. Agreement about European policies across boundaries, ideological, and other cleavages cannot serve as an indicator for the existence of non-existence of a European public sphere. The same holds true for support levels for European integration. One could even argue that the lively debates in France, Britain, and Denmark about whether or not to join Euroland at least show that people care about Europe, in comparison to the silencing of such debates which we witnessed in Germany, Italy, or among other staunch supporters of the Euro.
In short, contestation might be a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence. The more contentious European policies and politics become and the more social mobilisation occurs on European issues, the more we should observe truly European public debates. If political issues are not contested, if European politics remains the business of elites, the attention level for Europe and the EU will remain low. In sum, European issues must become salient and significant in the various public debates so that a European public sphere can emerge. Politicisation of European affairs would then be crucial to raise the low salience of Europe in the national media reported in the empirical studies.

Social mobilisation about and contestation of European policies and politics is a necessary pre-condition for an emerging European public sphere, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. One could easily imagine social mobilisation and public debates surrounding European policies within the member states that discuss these questions solely from the various national perspective. Is joining the Euro in the British, Danish, or German national interest, or not? If the debate is solely framed in these national terms, people would still debate the same question, but the frames of reference would be totally different. A study of the Commission’s corruption scandal showed, for example, that Spanish media reported it as a German attack on a Spanish Commissioner for some mean nationalist reasons. German media, in contrast, reported the issue as another proof that Southern European cultures including the Spanish one just do not understand that corruption is irreconcilable with democratic values (see Trenz 2000). While the two public spheres still observed each other, the same question meant two very different things in the two national communities.

Some authors are, therefore, very sceptical about the emergence of a European public sphere: “The territorial boundaries of the public sphere are, therefore, mostly identical with the territorial boundaries of democracies, because the elected representatives of the respective people orient their communicative, public behaviour to the “demos” who elected them and on whom they depend” (Gerhards 2000, 292, our translation). In the absence of transnational interest groups, parties, and social movements, we are unlikely to see an emerging European public sphere in which the issues are discussed from a European rather than the various national perspectives. The result is clear: We need to fix the democratic deficit of the EU first, before we can fix the deficit in European “public-sphereness”. Others, however, see the emergence of a European public sphere as a pre-condition of being able to tackle the European democratic deficit. Is this then a “hen and egg” type of problem?
And is it really necessary that we all adopt a European rather than a national viewpoint in order to be able to communicate meaningfully across borders in a European public sphere? At this point, we are back at square one: What constitutes a public sphere? Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner suggest in this context (building on Jürgen Habermas’s work on public spheres) that a meaningful concept of public spheres requires that media communicate “the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance” (Eder and Kantner 2000, 315). What does this mean concerning our question of a European public sphere?

First, the Eder/Kantner definition starts from the assumption that a transnational European public sphere can be built on the basis of the various national publics and media. Second, the concept implies a similarly (high) degree of issue salience across national public spheres. These two points are not controversial in the literature.

The controversy starts with the third part of the definition, “same criteria of relevance”. On the one hand, there are those who would argue that a European public sphere requires that speakers in the sphere adopt a European rather than a national or otherwise partisan perspective (see above). There can still be controversies, but the debate would centre on whether or not a particular policy is in the European rather than any other interest. On the other hand, there are those who argue that “same criteria of relevance” simply means that we are taking notice of each other in a common public sphere, that we mutually observe each other. The example above of the German and Spanish media reporting of the Commission’s corruption scandal would still qualify as one public sphere, since the two national media still observe each other.

But can we really argue that a common public sphere exists in the absence of some “community of communication?” In particular, if we posit the existence of a common public sphere as a necessary ingredient of a democratic polity, it is inevitable to talk about a community of communication. But how can we do this without falling into the trap of simply projecting our national democratic polities unto the European level? Are we stuck between a rock and a hard place? In other words, how much community spirit in Europe is necessary to find a European public sphere and how do we know it when we see it?

Communication in a public sphere means that speakers talk to each other and to their audiences rather than simply voicing utterances. As a result and at a minimum, speakers in a public sphere should recognise each other as legitimate participants in a debate. We might disagree fundamentally, but we take each other’s statements seriously in a democratic polity. Nationalist reactions deny this legitimacy. Polarisations along national lines by defini-
tion create boundaries using nationalist “self-other” distinctions, as in the case of the corruption scandal: *The Germans are after our* (Spanish) *Commissioner. The Spanish don’t know what the rule of law means. In these and other statements, the two public spheres still observe each other and they also use some common reference points. But they surely do not treat each other as legitimate speakers in one’s own public sphere. There is little sense of belonging to the same “community of communication.”

Thus, accepting other fellow Europeans as legitimate speakers in a public sphere implies that the “we” in whose name actors speak and to whom they relate, extends beyond national boundaries. Thus, a certain degree of collective identification with Europe is necessary to treat fellow Europeans from other countries as legitimate voices in one’s own national public sphere. We can call it “identity light,” since it does not imply a deep sense of loyalty toward each other, but some minimum sense of belonging to the same community.

But how do we know that speakers in a public sphere treat each other as legitimate participants in a debate across borders? There seem to be two ways of measuring it which we used in our project on the European public debates concerning the rise of Haider’s party into the Austrian government and the European reactions to it (see below). First, we can find out who the “we” is in whose name speakers communicate or to whom they refer in their utterances. We can also find out who the “they” is against whom the community is constructed or who is treated as outside the community. To what degree is a European “we” constructed and how does this relate to the national “we”?

Second, it is possible to measure the degree to which national media use similar reference points, similar frames and similar meanings when reporting about an issue. They do not need to agree in their views on specific policies, only on the criteria or the references that are at stake here.

*An empirical approach to the public sphere in the EU: the “Haider debate”*

In early October 1999 Jörg Haider’s FPÖ won a major electoral victory in Austria. The coalition formed by the FPÖ and the ÖVP in February 2000 led to protests from all over Europe and bilateral sanctions of the other EU member-states against the Austrian government. Eventually, these sanctions were withdrawn in September 2000 when a commission of “wise men” judged the situation in Austria in line with the founding values expressed in the EU Treaty. The reason that precisely this case has been selected to learn about the public sphere in the EU is that we decided to go for the most likely case. This is a
crucial case, for the debate on Haider and the situation in Austria turned into a debate on what the EU is actually about now and in the future. In the end, the EU itself and what it stands for became the object of the debate. It is easy to maintain that if even in this debate nothing like a European public sphere can be identified, it is better to stop looking for it.

In order to analyse the material, we used frame analysis. Frame analysis is a method for studying the way in which social reality is meaningfully defined and valued in discourse. On the basis of our specific material, we identified 22 different frames. The four frames which turned out to be the most salient are: on Europe “Europe is a moral community”, and “European legal standards”, and on Haider and the FPÖ “Haider and the Nazi-past”, and “Haider and xenophobia”.

Whenever in the debate normative issues are raised it is repeatedly done by stating for example that there are “European common values” or that “the EU is more than a common market”. We called this frame “Europe is a moral community”. Usually, the exact meaning of these “European values” is left open or remains rather vague, e.g. references are made to concepts such as “democracy”, “respect of Human Rights”, “anti-racism” or “anti-nazism”. Those who refer to this vision of the EU usually tend to legitimate the sanctions against Austria. The logic of this frame is that Haider and the FPÖ cannot be accepted in the EU because they do not share its common values based, amongst other things, on the refusal of Nazism and xenophobia.

In another perspective, the EU is identified with certain institutional procedures, laws or Treaty articles. This is the frame of “European Legal Standards”. It is a reference to the “rule of law” as a founding principle for the EU. In most of the cases, the sanctions against Austria are criticised by referring to common European legal standards such as the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty provides for sanctions to be taken in case a member-state “violates the basic principles of freedom, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental rights, or the state of law in a serious and continuous way”. This often leads to the conclusion that since Austria did not violate any law it should not be sanctioned a priori.

The frame of “European legal standards” is a different definition of the legitimacy within the EU than the one based on values, as in “Europe is a moral community”. In “European legal standards” reference is made to “rules” and not to “norms and values”, to formality and not to ethics, to the realm of the law instead of to the one of politics. However, what is striking about these two visions of the political community with which the EU is identified, is that the dividing line is not drawn between the EU and the nation-state, but between two
political visions of the EU. The question raised here is “which Europe do we want”, and not the belonging to the EU as such.

In the previous section, we have seen the EU being portrayed as being a community based on moral values, or on a legal structure. However, there is another way of defining what the EU is about, namely by taking a distance from the darker side of our European heritage. Often, this is done by way of two specific frames. First, Haider is branded as a xenophobe and a racist. Racism and xenophobia are posed as a counter-model to the European ideals. Traces of xenophobia can be found in the European traumatic past as well as in the ideologies of right-wing political parties that nowadays constitute a challenge to European democracy. In the debate, Haider and the FPÖ are depicted as a symbol of what the EU does not want to be. Denouncing Haider, the EU is projecting itself as an anti-racist political body. Second, the issue and its protagonists are linked to the Nazi-period for example by comparing or denoting Haider as Hitler. As a proof the articles cite Haider talking positively about the Nazi politics or using typical Nazi-expressions.

The overall meaning of the “past”-frames can be summarised as: “Europe has learned of its past and will not make the same mistakes again, thus Haider should be stopped without any hesitation!” These frames about the past propel a strong symbolic mobilisation, against a collective “other”. Everything which can be done, should be done to oppose against this dangerous other. However, it is important to mention that this “other” is neither Austria as a country, nor Haider as a person, but instead Haider as a symbol for a past that should never occur again. If this is a pertinent way of framing in the newspapers from all the five countries, than one could safely speak of the Nazi-period as a common European “them”, or in other words, the ego/alter of Europe would be a collective past, i.e. the traumatic experiences of the Second World War.

A public sphere in the sense of a community of communication can be identified by looking at whether there are significant similarities in the discourse that is produced. To find out whether the debate between the various newspapers is significantly the same or different a statistical analysis is used. (In SPSS a Post-hoc ANOVA analysis was run [Tammehan]). On the basis of the differences and similarities between the newspapers it might be possible to distinguish various patterns, such as clearly identifiable national clusters, left-wing or right-wing clusters, and clusters of the quality newspapers in contrast with the more popular newspapers. In the end, the main conclusion from our data is that there is a high amount of similarity between the newspapers from all the countries in the number of
times they used the 22 frames. What is striking is that no specific national clusters can be pointed out, which confounds the hypothesis of the Haider-issue being debated in specifically national public spheres.

For each frame, one can count the amount of relations of difference and similarity between the various newspapers. Graph 2 reports for the four frames discussed previously the number of times that two newspapers are significantly different or significantly the same while leaving aside in an “open” category those occasions in which it is statistically impossible to say whether the newspapers in question are different or similar. From this graph can be clearly noticed that there is quite some similarity, and only little difference, between the debate in the newspapers from the various countries. In this sense then, we found a “community of communication” in the Haider debates.

**Graph 2. Relations of similarity and difference between newspapers (in percentages)**

![Graph showing relations of similarity and difference between newspapers](image)

**Linking theory and evidence: an emerging European public sphere**

Summing up the above theoretical discussion, we can speak of a European public sphere in a meaningful sense if

1. similar issues are communicated at the same time with the same salience or significance;
2. the speakers treat each other as legitimate voices in a community;
3. the reference points and meaning structures in which a particular policy problem is being communicated are similar across national publics.
If we use these three criteria to interpret our empirical findings, the conclusion is very clear: People do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one’s particular viewpoint in the issue at question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national public sphere to the other, as far as the frames of interpretation are concerned. In this latter sense, media reporting about the EU is no different from their reporting about national issues and events. In sum, we can observe an emerging European public sphere.
3.6 Europeanisation, national identities, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union

KLAUS EDER and WILLFRIED SPOHN
(Institute of Sociology, Humboldt University Berlin)

The major research aim of the scholars brought together in this group of the IDNET research network has been to explore methodologically and analyse empirically the relations between European and national identities in Western and Eastern Europe with a special focus on the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In order to reach this research aim, the group assembled about 30 scholars from various Western European member states and Eastern European accession countries as well as from three major academic disciplines: sociology, political science and history with both social-scientific and cultural-scientific orientations. Accordingly, the group had to bridge not only the different disciplines through cross-disciplinary theoretical and methodological orientations but also the different national academic traditions in the West and the East.

The research aim of the group was pursued at two conferences, both of which will result in book publications, edited by Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou [15] and Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn [2], respectively.* The following sections summarise the interdisciplinary and comparative results of the “West-East” group’s main research topics on the relation between European and national identities in Western and Eastern Europe. These main research topics have been: (1) an interdisciplinary conceptualisation of European and national identities; (2) Europeanisation, European and national identities; (3) Europeanisation, national identities and collective memory; and (4) Europeanisation, national identities and ethnic minorities.

An interdisciplinary conceptualisation of European and national identities

In the West-East IDNET group, given the disciplinary presence of sociology, political science and history, different theoretical approaches to the relation between European and national identities have been present. On these bases, the emerging cross-disciplinary common ground can be defined as a constructivist macro-sociological conceptualisation of the

* Throughout this report, numbers in square brackets refer to publications resulting from IDNET as listed on p. 84 below.
relation between national and European identities. The background of this macro-sociological constructivist approach is the multidisciplinary debate on whether or not and in which ways national identities have been transformed through the process of European integration. The stark oppositions on this battleground of European identity (Kohli 2000) are two complementary “essentialist” concepts of collective identity: a national and a European one. The first position sees national identities, according to the presupposed confederal character of the EU, as the basic form of collective identity in the EU compared to which a European identity is an empirically negligible and normatively unwanted phenomenon. The second position expects, based on the assumption of the developing transnational-functional character of the EU, the replacement of national identities by a common overarching European identity.

In between these stark oppositions, there are positions which, according to the multi-level character of European governance, converge in a perspective that sees the character of European collective identity as a varying mix of national, subnational and transnational or European components. These multiple identities, as summarised by Thomas Risse for IDNET as a whole (see Section 3.1) can be conceptualised as “nested” or “cross-cutting” or perhaps most convincingly as “marble-cake” identities: all three models are in tune with empirical findings on the complementary rather than exclusive relations between national and European identities. In the same direction, the West-East IDNET group has taken up the macro-sociological constructivist approach from one of the major participants (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). Here, collective identities are seen as socially constructed through boundary definitions and symbolic distinctions in the primordial, civic and cultural/religious dimensions and within specific social, institutional and cultural contexts. Accordingly, in approaching the relation between national and European identities our main methodological orientation is to analyse the social construction of the multiple collective identities involved in the European integration process.

More specifically, two theoretical elaborations of this macro-sociological constructivist approach have guided the interdisciplinary work in the West-East IDNET group. The first one is represented by Klaus Eder’s approach to European identity that emphasises the reflexive construction of a European identity through processes of communication (Eder 1998). From this perspective, a de-coupling of collective identities from the nation-state and an increasing coupling with Europe is theoretically presupposed, directing the analytical focus to the social-communicative construction of a European public sphere in interac-
tion with national-communicative spaces. This includes particular attention to the construction of a European public sphere in its issue-specific components (Eder and Kantner 2000).

The second theoretical elaboration is represented by Willfried Spohn’s formulation of a three-tiered model of national, European and EU identities (Spohn 2001). Against the backdrop of the planned inclusion of the East Central and Eastern European accession candidates and their invoked European identities, the proposal here is to differentiate between the national, European-civilisational and European-integrationist aspects of collective identities and to focus analytically on the constructive interaction between these dimensions.

Within the framework of this macro-sociological constructivist approach, the main guiding questions regarding the impact of Eastern enlargement of the European Union can be formulated as follows:

1. Which impact does a European public sphere have on the construction of national and European identities? How does this impact converge or diverge in its effects in the Western European member states as compared to the Central and Eastern European accession candidates? And conversely, how do the national identities, national public spheres and embedded European orientations as well as the international relations or mutual constructions of national identities impact on the process of Eastern enlargement of the European Union?

2. What specific role do the manifold and interrelated collective memories play in the constitution of national identities and their mutual construction? What impact do the heroic and inversely the traumatic layers have in this collective memory? How do these layers in collective memory converge or diverge in Western and Eastern Europe? Which European civilisational components in interaction with other civilisations and which elements of the European integration experience in interaction with each national society are of importance here?

3. What consequences for the construction of national and European identities does the presence of ethnic minorities have, either through historical processes of nation-building or growing international and transnational migration processes? How do the impacts of these ethnic minority groups on collective identities differ between Western and Eastern Europe? What role do the differences in citizenship and incorporation modes between Western Europe as primarily receiving societies and Eastern Europe as (still) primarily sending societies play? Do the inter- and transnational migration proc-
esses, the different national incorporation modes and emerging forms of European citizenship enhance European or rather national identities on the side of the migrants and on the side of the host societies?

*Europeanisation, European and national identities*

One of the crucial starting points of the West-East IDNET group has been that with the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and with the following process of a progressing reconnection between Western and Eastern Europe through the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, the relations between European, EU and national identities are also in the process of a fundamental reconstruction. On the Western European side, the hitherto progressing, deepening and widening European integration process within an iron-curtain demarcated border to the East, has been challenged by the opening of the Eastern European space. As a consequence, the civilisational foundations of European integration resurfaced and the international relations between Western and Eastern European countries re-emerged. On the Eastern European side, the wish to return to Europe as one of the crucial *leitmotifs* in the anticommunist revolutions were confronted with the prospect of entering the Western European transnational organisation of the European Union. Here, an – often ambivalent – European integrational identity started on the foundations of national identities formed in opposition to the transnational Soviet Empire, invoking at the same time a common European civilisational identity. Thus, an asymmetric process of the reconstruction of the interrelations between European, EU and national identities in the West as compared to the East has to be assumed.

Within this general geopolitical and geo-cultural context, several scholars participating in the West-East IDNET group have attempted to analyse the general contours of the interrelations between European civilisational, European integrational and multiple national identities. In “The collective identity of Europe: Constitutional practice or community of memory”, his contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume, Bernhard Giesen [15] defends the view that European integration cannot be based on constitutional patriotism alone, but has to include also a European cultural foundation. But in contrast to essentialist definitions of a European civilisation, he sees the task to build on the European multiple cultural heritage as transforming it into processes of cultural reconstruction and symbolic representation. Of particular importance here are two legacies: the Greek-Roman tradition of city democracy and the consciousness of moral guilt resulting from the nationalistic destruction
and the Holocaust in World War II. Richard Münch [15] in his contribution “Democracy without demos: European integration as a process of the change of institutions and cultures” argues that European integration is leading to a pluralistic multi-level democracy that is not based on a uniform European demos but rather on a European society of individuals linked by a complex web of networks. John Hutchinson [15] in his article “Enduring nations and the illusions of European integration” emphasises the resilient weight of nation-states and national identities and the need to build a European identity on the foundations of these multiple national identities, rather than by opposing or replacing them.

These different approaches to the relational triad of European, EU and national identities, though of a general European analytical relevance, are primarily developed in a Western European perspective. From an Eastern European and East-West European comparative perspective, the parameters of this triad of collective identities are different. Here, the civilisational and national identities are primary and an EU identity will only emerge with the realisation of accession, though the enlargement negotiations and the close prospect of accession already show an increasing impact on collective identities in the postcommunist societies – in accession as well as non-accession countries. With this theoretical orientation in mind, Willfried Spohn’s [15] contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume, “European East-West integration, nation-building and national identities: the reconstruction of German-Polish relations”, analyses against the background of the burdened history between Germany and Poland the progressive coming-to-terms with the past in both societies as a crucial building block of Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In a related study, Miroslava Marody [15] in “Polish identity in the process of Europeanisation” shows that and how Polish attitudes of their own nation and the EU in the context of the emerging eastern enlargement have changed in the last decade. Finally, Erhard Stölting’s [15] contribution “Russian perspectives on German and Russian self definitions” explores the historical relations between the Russian imperial-national identity and embedded European components by reference to Germany and its implications for the currently developing relations between post-Soviet Russia and the EU.

**Europeanisation, national identities and collective memory**

A more fully developed comparison of the relations between European, EU and national identities emerged in the follow-up conference and the related volume on “Europe, national identities and collective memory: cultural impacts on the eastern enlargement in
Western and Eastern Europe” (Eder and Spohn forthcoming). Here, the focus was not primarily on the triadic relations between European, EU and national identities but rather on the specific role of collective memory in the construction of national identities in a comparative perspective on Western and Eastern Europe as well as in East-West European integration. As developed by Bernhard Giesen (forthcoming), a comparative analysis of collective memory focuses on the highly emotional, triumphant or traumatic, components of collective identity formation that are of particular importance for the cultural repertoires, moral bases, boundary definition and symbolic distinctions of national as well as European identities.

Regarding Western Europe, Hartmut Kaelble in his contribution “European identity in Western Europe” [2] outlines five constitutive cultural codes which are developed by European intellectuals rather than representing mental currents of mass consciousness. These cultural codes are European superiority, threatened Europe, Europe as part of global modernisation, Europe as one civilisation among others and European unity in diversity. They crystallise in varying combinations in the periods before 1914, from 1918 to 1960 and after 1960 on the basis of common European social and cultural particularities. From this perspective, European integration as developing in the period after 1960 has played an important role in the constitution of a European identity, but on the basis of deeper social and cultural commonalities, including common triumphant and traumatic components.

The traumatic components in collective memory for the constitution of a European identity, on the one hand, are then exemplified in several case studies on the reconstruction of German-Polish relations by Oliver Schmidtke [2], on the reinvention of Europe in the case of Italy by Ilaria Favretto [2], and on the role of the transition to democracy and Europeanisation in Spain for the “Special solidarity with the East” by Pablo Jauregui [2]. The triumphant aspects for a typically ambivalent European identity, on the other hand, are highlighted by Atsuko Ichijo in her contribution “A reluctant European and a tactical European: British and Spanish views on Europe” [2].

Regarding Eastern Europe, Jerzy Jedlicki in his contribution “East-European historical bequest en route to an integrated Europe” [2] points to the various layers of national identities and collective memory within an overall context of a strengthening romantic ethno-national identity under the conditions of Nazi genocide and Soviet terror. At the same time, he analyses these traumatic historical memories as a ballast in the threefold sense of a burden to be forced upon, preserved and thrown away: as social, cultural and morally reflexive
foundations on the way of Eastern European countries to European integration. These
deeply traumatic components of collective memory in the East Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries are then again exemplified in several case studies by Andras Kovacs on
“Joining NATO and national identity: the Hungarian case”, by Karel Kubis on “Trouble-
some Anniversaries: the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic and its European fellows in
Czech collective memory”, and by Olga Sezneva on “Converting history in ‘cultural treas-
ure’ in post-1991 Kaliningrad: social transitions and the meaning of the past” [2].

Comparing the Western and Eastern European national identities and collective memories,
a basic West-East cultural cleavage is involved in Eastern enlargement of the European
Union. In Western Europe, Eastern enlargement is primarily seen as a vehicle to expand
the Western European peace and security order, the European economy and welfare zone
as well as the Western political and civic culture to the East. In the nation-states with long
civic-democratic traditions, collective memory emphasises more the triumphant aspects of
national identity and thus feeds in an unproblematic European civic mission to the East. In
those nation-states with an authoritarian past, collective memory is related to the trouble-
some history of democratisation, serving as the basis for an attitude showing solidarity
with post-communist transition countries. In the case of Germany, the support of Eastern
enlargement is directly connected to the coming to terms with the Nazi past, feeding in a
mission of reconciliation towards the East. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the major com-
mon interest is securing national identity, preventing ethno-national conflicts, stabilising
the new democracies and catching-up to the Western European socio-economic level. At
the same time, collective memory is haunting the accession to the European Union. The
first ambivalence is connected to the renewed transfer, even if partial, of national sover-
eignty or the enforced de-coupling of national identity to an Empire-like transnational or-
der. The second ambivalence relates to the memory of Yalta as a treason of the Western
European nations vis-à-vis the Eastern empire. And the third ambivalence is linked particu-
larly to Germany and the renewal of a German Sonderweg against the Eastern peripheral
nations.

*Europeanisation, national identities and ethnic minorities*

One of the important components in the construction and reconstruction of national and
European identities, covered as an additional research topic by the West-East IDNET
group, has been the role of ethnic minorities. On the one hand, ethnic minorities play a
crucial role in the historical formation of nation-states and national identities, and given the mostly troublesome history of the relations between majority and minority ethno-national groups, they have become a central part in the construction of European citizenship. On the other hand, ethnic minorities have developed also as a consequence of the growing migration and immigration movements changing the ethnic composition of nation-states, transforming national identities, and thus impacting on the construction of European citizenship as well.

The role of historical ethnic groups for the formation of national and European identities is addressed by several case studies in the Spohn-Triandafyllidou [15] volume as well as in the forthcoming Eder-Spohn volume. Y. Michal Bodemann in his contribution “Globalization and ethnicity: European Jewry in the Making?” [2] analyses the process of reconstruction of German Jewry in post-Shoah Germany from an essential part of traditional German high culture to a German ethnic-religious minority, the legitimatory use of German Jewry for the moral reconstruction of German society and at the same time the fundamental problems of a Christian-secular nation-state in accepting German Jews in their ethnic-religious identity as an equal part of German society. Europe, here, figures as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and civic solution to this troubled relation between national majority and minority. The reconstruction of Russian identity in postcommunist Kaliningrad, subject of Olga Sezneva’s above-mentioned study, is another example of the impact of German history and memory on Russian national identity in combining it through the German legacy with Europeanness. In a similar direction, the article by Judith Toth and Endre Sik on “Joining an EU identity: integration of Hungary or the Hungarians?” [15] analyses the ambivalent role of the European Union in constructing through Eastern enlargement new borders between the Hungarian nation and Hungarian near-abroad co-nationals, and the thrust of a Hungarian European identity to bridge these historical and new borders.

The role of migratory ethnic groups for the construction of national and European identities again is the subject of several case studies in both volumes. Krystyna Romaniszyn in her contribution “Migration, cultural diversification and Europeanisation” [15] analyses, in a comparative Western European perspective, the manifold social and cultural ways in which the processes of immigration and incorporation as well as adaptation and ethnicisation impact on the social structure, political culture and national identities of the host societies. Although here the predominant reaction is a fortress-Europe radicalisation of non-
western European immigrants, the author also sees at work a tendency towards Europeanisation, i.e. a European inclusion of Eastern Europeans and non-Europeans.

These conflictive tendencies between an ethnic exclusivism and a European inclusivism on the part of the host societies are also the subject of Ruth Wodak’s study “Racism at the top: Parliamentarian debates on issues of immigration in six EU countries” (2002). On a micro-sociological ethnographic level, these conflictive tendencies are moreover analysed by two closely related studies by Norbert Cyrus on “Changing rhetoric and narratives: German trade unions and Polish migrant workers” (in Berlin, Germany) [15] and by Ewa Morawska on “National identities of Polish (im-)migrants in Berlin: four varieties, their correlates and implications” [15]. Whereas Cyrus shows the strongly exclusivist orientations of German trade unions to be accompanied by a counteracting European rhetoric, Morawska demonstrates that the experience of (im-)migration predominantly strengthens nationalist-exclusivist identities, but also generates as a minority current of European inclusivist orientations.

These case studies show a pattern of the transformation of national and European identities on the part of the European host societies as well as on the part of the (im-)migrants that is more nuanced than the current debate on European citizenship and derived forms of European identity (cf. Eder and Giesen 2001). This debate is elaborated in Andrew Geddes’s contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume on “Integrating immigrants and minorities in a wider and deeper Europe” [15]. From a political-scientific top-down perspective, Geddes investigates the recent developments in the immigration policy designs on the European Union level that may override national sovereignty if the issue at stake concerns existing legal and economic repertories such as anti-discrimination policy or market-related provisions. Yet the empirical – historical, ethnographic, and quantitative sociological – studies assembled by the East-West IDNET group show that the European notions of citizenship on the top do not reflect directly the European identities at the bottom, but rather conflicting tendencies between ethno-nationalist exclusivist and European inclusivist identities, and that an interaction between both levels is at work here.
4. Conclusions and policy implications

4.1 European identity

The complexity of contemporary collective identities

The discussion above, in particular Sections 3.1 and 3.2, draws attention to the complexity of contemporary collective identities. In addition to the national level of identification, sub-national and transnational levels have to be taken into account. Also open to discussion are the ways in which these multiple levels of identity, in particular European and national or regional identities, relate to each other. With regard to European identity, both the boundaries of the collective of its bearers and the substantive values and beliefs of which it is composed are malleable and elusive. And while there are good reasons to believe that European institutions do have an impact on the formation of collective identities, the strength of this impact clearly varies across sections of the population, and the precise nature of relevant causal pathways needs more attention.

All of this has implications both for further research and for policy-making. First of all, in terms of research an interdisciplinary approach to the study of identity is indispensable (see Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.4). Political scientist, sociologists, social psychologists and historians have joined forces within IDNET, and although interdisciplinary cooperation does pose particular challenges of its own (see especially Section 4.4 below), the expediency of our joint efforts, we feel, is borne out throughout this Report. More attention also needs to be paid to the combination of diverse methodological perspectives and tools. The use of new types of software and the intertwining of quantitative with qualitative methods may provide the means for understanding better the dynamics of identity formation and change (see especially Section 3.2).

In terms of policy-making, it follows from the complexity of contemporary collective identities that cultural or education policies should take into account different levels of identity formation, the importance of local realities as the “place” where individual identities are expressed but also where wider collective identifications are actualised. Moreover, attention ought to be paid at the fluid and often “hybrid” character of individual identities in post-industrial societies. Important here is the distinction between nominal and virtual identity, or more simply put: the possible difference between a group label and the actual
content of the group identity for its members. Moreover, cultural and citizenship policies need to pay attention to the individualisation and fragmentation of ethnic and national identities while keeping up also with more traditional current of national identification. The politics of communication and recognition are important aspects that need also to be addressed at the national as well as European or EU level.

An increasing sense of community

Despite remaining uncertainties of conceptualisation and measurement, the available evidence shows quite clearly that there is an increasing sense of community among the European citizens, among elites and ordinary people alike. The EU clearly represents a genuine community for the political, economic, and social elites in Europe and it essentially defines modern statehood in Europe for them. Among the citizens, identification with and attachment to Europe (in conjunction with the nation-state) has also grown in recent years, while exclusive loyalties to the nation-state are in decline. Moreover, the EU is understood as a civic community as distinct from cultural understandings of Europe in general.

There is more to an emerging European demos than many seem to realise. In particular, the European polity does not require a “demos” that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist. Europeanisation, European integration, and European identities seem to co-evolve over time, both at the elite and the mass levels. The causal arrows between European integration and institution building, on the one hand, and the evolution of European identities, on the other, seem to run both ways. The increasing “realness” of the EU in people’s daily lives seems to affect their identification with Europe as a political community. At the same time, support for European integration and attachment to Europe appear to be closely related motivating European elites toward continuing on the path of institution building.

It follows that building a European identity has little to do with public relations efforts or information campaigns about the EU. Rather, the key toward increased identification with Europe and the EU is increasing the reality of the community in the daily lives of the citizens. In this sense, the Euro represents a huge experiment in collective identity building, and Europe could need more symbols and collective myths of this and other kinds (see the following sub-section). Relatedly, national political elites, who care about the EU, should stop the blame shifting games (“Europe made me do it!”). This does not imply to support everything that comes from Brussels. But routine references to “those faceless bureaucrats
in Brussels” represent cheap ways of avoiding political responsibility, and they confuse efforts at European identity construction.

*The ritual construction of a European identity?*

Thus there are ways of further increasing the sense of community among European citizens, and the turn from triumphant memories of past heroism to traumatic memories of a collective entanglement into guilt and victimisation (see above, Section 3.3) may help to overcome the lack of a revolutionary founding myth in Europe. Yet the absence of a common language remains a major impediment on the way to a transnational European public sphere. Indeed a European-wide sphere of deliberation, a space for an exchange of arguments that could ignore the boundaries between linguistic communities will hardly emerge in the near future. TV programs and newspapers will address a national and not a European audience.

However, collective action and public communication are not confined to discourse, to speech and texts. Even stronger than arguments that may provoke counter-arguments are monuments, museums and public rituals. Monuments and museums can remember the past without lengthy texts, and it is the very absence of text or its limited use that conveys a sense of immediacy and compelling presence in museums and monuments (Nora 1986, Schechner 1990). Rituals, too, construct a collective identity that claims unconditional validity for the participants and that is mostly experienced as authentic and unquestionably given. This authenticity of rituals is based on the facticity of bodily presence and the coordination of bodily movements in the ritual performance – on common singing, praying, listening, dancing, marching or being silent. And the feeling of authenticity even extends to those who are not directly participating in the ritual, who are even not present in the local site of the ritual but watch a live broadcasting of it on TV. This explains the extraordinary and European-wide attention of ceremonies like the funeral of princes Diana, the wedding of a Dutch crown prince or even the annual blessing of the pope *urbi et orbi* on Saint Peters. These rituals are highly formalised, there is not much suspense in them, but they attract millions of spectators all over Europe.

The European Union could refer to this feeling of authenticity that is generated by public rituals in order to construct a collective identity of the European demos that transcends the boundaries of language and region. E.g., the opening ceremony of the European parliament could be staged and broadcast like the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games – with
colourful choreography, with music and public addresses in all languages of the Union. The site should be changing between the beautiful European cities with a republican tradition like Barcelona and Florence, Bruges and Prague, Frankfurt and Dublin. The spectacle should not only show the diversity of European nations, but it should also present the particular cultural heritage of the respective city or region as part of an embracing European identity. We assume that this would not only attract a large audience, but also enhance the public construction of a European demos.

Most strong constructions of collective identity are grounded in a ritual performance that merges the diversity of the participants into a community. The staging of European collective identity, too, has to balance the symbolic representation of the diversity of the members states with the symbolic performance of unity and commonality. In this respect, too, the ritual representation might be especially appropriate for the process of constructing a European collective identity that can refer neither to unanimously hold historical memories nor to a common language.

4.2 Socialisation and identity change

Empirical, theoretical and methodological conclusions

In substantive terms, our research has shown that European socialisation and subsequent identity change is not an “either/or” process. Acquiring new roles and identities in Brussels or Prague does not come at the expense of national identities and traditions. Rather, one has a layering, a “complexification” of identities. For sure, this is not a totally unexpected finding as there have been arguments of this sort circulating within the scholarly literature for several years. Moreover, it is consistent with numerous Eurobarometer polls showing that most individuals feel themselves to be both European and Spanish (or whatever) at the same time. The value added of our work on socialisation and identity change, and of IDNET as a whole (see in particular Section 3.1), has been to provide better theoretical specification and robust empirical confirmation of these insights.

Theoretically, our project demonstrates the utility of middle-range, grounded theory for best capturing and explaining socialisation processes. Such approaches are complex, typically identifying a series of causal variables to explain an outcome (socialisation, in this case). While we feel there are more general grounds for developing such theory, its use is essential for socialisation studies. In particular, our empirical results led us to appreciate
the complex and multi-faceted nature of socialisation as a process involving not only internalisation (the traditional focus of earlier work), but strategic adaptation and cognitive role enactment as well. Middle-range theory, with its emphasis on scope conditions and domains of application is particularly well suited for disentangling such dynamics.

The stress on contingent, middle-range theories had another important benefit, one glossed over by most previous research. Simply put, our findings demonstrate that when one unpacks the concept of socialisation and attempts theoretically to specify its various mechanisms, rational choice frameworks that stress the calculation of costs and benefits and individual choice have a role to play as well. This realisation allows the work package to speak to the emerging dialogue and debate in the broader theoretical literature between rationalism and more sociological approaches.

However, such complex theorising places a premium on methods and research design. Methodologically, then, a key challenge for the workpackage was to address such issues. We did this in a number of ways – explicit discussion of research methods and their limitations; serious attention to alternative analytic accounts, for example. However, the contributions by Johnston and, especially, Zürn suggest that more is needed. In particular, future research must adopt more ambitious cross-national and, ideally, cross-regional designs that will control for: (a) the fact that Europe is a most likely case for regional institutions to have socialising effects; and (b) the independent effect of the various causal factors the work package uncovered (for example, role of material power asymmetries, role of noviceness, role of domestic organisational base).

Policy Implications

Four policy implications follow more or less directly from our findings. First, the development of a European identity that stands in opposition to national traditions and cultures is highly unlikely. Rather, to the extent that supranational identifications emerge, they will be supplements to existing loyalties and affiliations.

Second and related, our work on European socialisation indicates that the construction of any pan-European identity will be a slow and protracted process. Indeed, many of the dynamics we studied – prolonged professional contact in Brussels, sustained efforts at teaching and persuasion, requirements of joining European organisations, and the like – had minimal impact in changing identities. (However, this finding should be read with some caution as the temporal focus of all work package contributions – 4 to 5 years at most –
was perhaps too short to detect longer term dynamics of identity change.) In policy terms, this indicates that an insight from the older literature on political socialisation still holds, namely, that schools and educational curricula more generally are key arenas for moulding and adapting attitudes and identities over the longer term.

Third, a robust finding across our studies is the importance of domestic politics and national context. If one wants to understand the degree to which national officials “go native” in Brussels, it is essential to control for prior domestic socialisation and organisational context. Likewise, it is impossible to predict whether the former communist states in East Europe will adopt the mores and values of the West without first exploring their own national traditions and constellations of political actors. In policy terms, this means there is a need to craft more nuanced and country-specific socialisation instruments.

Fourth, regarding East Europe, a key finding is that Western efforts to socialise these states work best when a variety of policy instruments are used, including straightforward conditionality as well as more pedagogic suasion/teaching techniques. Different instruments reach different domestic actors and have different types of effects (changing cost/benefit calculations versus changing beliefs and attitudes), thus maximising the likelihood of a successful socialisation process.

4.3 Identities and enlargement

Interdisciplinarity in practice

As an overarching theoretical-conceptual approach to the analysis of identities in the context of Eastern enlargement, we have used the Eisenstadt-Giesen macro-sociological constructivist framework that has been able to bridge the different inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary approaches and methodologies (see Section 3.6). In particular, this framework has served to link constructivist orientations within the sub-discipline of international relations in political science on the one hand, and constructivist approaches in sociology and history on the other. As it turned out, the core problematique of this interdisciplinary link has been the methodological interconnection between the “top-down” analyses dominant in political science and the “bottom-up” analyses of national and European identities dominant in sociology and history.
Since we did not understand this project primarily as a theoretical-methodological seminar but rather as an explorative methodological and analytical enterprise, the core problem-attique of linking top-down and bottom-up perspectives was tackled not in the form of a systematic cross-disciplinary investigation but rather in the context of the various empirical studies. Specifically, top-down and bottom-up perspectives had to be linked in three research areas: (i) the relation of national and European identities in the process of European East-West integration; (ii) the specific contribution of collective memory for the formation of these collective identities; and (iii) the impact of ethnic minorities on the construction of national and European identities.

Regarding the first research area of the relation between national and European identities, the major contribution of the East-West IDNET group has been to complement the predominating political-scientific international relations research by exemplary analyses of the historical-inter-societal construction of national and European identities. The Eder-Kantner approach to the communicative formation of a European public sphere as a social-cultural basis of European identity formation, here, is one fruitful direction, though further research should extend the Western European focus also to the Eastern European accession candidates as well as to the analysis of Eastern enlargement as specific issue of European identity formation. Spohn’s triadic model of national, European and EU identities here is another fruitful direction which is of particular value for the comparative analysis between the varying identity configurations in Western and Eastern Europe.

Regarding the specific focus on collective memory in the formation of national and European identities in a Western/Eastern European comparative perspective, the research network clearly explored new ground. Collective memory has been so far rather a topic of anthropologists and historians rather than sociologists and political scientists and therefore applied to the past or non-European societies. Regarding the contemporary construction of collective identities in Europe and their implications for European East-West integration, the work of the West-East IDNET group has generated interesting new data.

Regarding the second specific focus on ethnic minorities in their impact on national and European identities, the West-East IDNET group has moved on a large body of well-established inter-disciplinary research on historical and migratory ethnic groups as well as on national and European citizenship. The specific and important contribution, however, relates to the comparative micro-sociological analysis of the national-ethnic nexus and its link with national and/or European identities. A second important contribution, though to
be developed in further systematic and comparative research, is the link between the macro-configurations of national/European citizenship and the micro-levels of national/European citizenship in collective identity formation—either in the host societies or in the ethnic communities themselves. Also here, a further exploration of the methodological connections between the approaches present in this research network and the Eder approach on cultural codes, boundary constructions and ethnic minorities would be a fruitful future task.

Finally, regarding the role of national and European identities in Eastern enlargement, the East-West IDNET group has oriented its interdisciplinary research on a highly relevant and rarely investigated topic. Here, the social and political scientific research is dominated by investigations into the institutional, political, legal and economic dimensions of the EU Eastern enlargement. The cultural dimension and particularly issues of collective identity formation, by contrast, are however rarely researched. An inter-disciplinary East/West European comparative perspective, linking top-down perspectives on Eastern enlargement of the European Union and bottom-up perspectives on social and cultural processes of European East-West integration is one of the crucial results of the West-East IDNET group, a result which also defines a desideratum.

**Policy implications**

Within the macrosociological-constructivist framework and on the basis of the research foci of this project, tentative policy recommendations have been developed in two directions: (i) with the aim of supporting the evolution of a civic-democratic European identity by enhancing the arenas of a European public sphere as well as by empowering it through symbolic representations; and (ii) with the aim of bridging the cultural divide between Western and Eastern Europe as a fundamental task of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union.

Based on the above-mentioned social-communicative approach to the European public sphere as a constitutive element of the construction of a European identity (Eder and Kantner 2002; Section 3.6 above), we call for a “progressive era” in the enhancement of a European public arena and, with it, the overcoming of the democratic deficit of the European Union (policy memo by Cathleen Kantner; see Section 5.2). The empirical basis for this call is the emergence of transnational, issue-specific forms of communication across Europe that already constitute a partial European demos and function as a democratic chal-
lenge and corrective of political decision-making on the European level. Accordingly, the so-called pessimistic particularist view is criticised for restricting the existence of a public sphere to the individual nation-state and neglecting the emerging forms of a transnational public sphere. But inversely, also the so-called optimistic federalist view is criticised for over-estimating the possibilities of constitutionalising and parliamentarising the EU-institutions. Instead, it is argued for a progressive enhancement of a European public sphere backed up by transnational institution-building.

Against the backdrop of the cultural divide between Western and Eastern Europe based on the longue-durée centre-periphery relations between Western and Eastern Europe and the short-term experiences in the 20th century, we argue for a conscious tackling of these cultural West-East asymmetries as a crucial task for a successful dealing with the challenges of the eastern enlargement of the European Union. Seven proposals are developed (memo by Willfried Spohn):

(1) In view of the basic ambivalence of the Eastern European accession candidates regarding the just won national sovereignty and its partial transfer to the European level, it is recommended to enhance the public discussion on the specific character of the EU and the subsidiarity principle.

(2) In view of the crucial importance of overcoming the traumatic experience of the short 20th century as a basis for a European identity, it is recommended to support and develop public spaces particularly in the postcommunist countries as a counterweight against the nationalistic-exclusivist fears in those countries and some recent attempts to increase them by external pressures—as in the case of the re-politicised Benes decrees.

(3) In view of the considerable and partially rising anti-EU sentiments in the accession candidates particularly in less secularised social risk zones, the public clarification of the European Union as a pluralistic, secular and religious, value community besides special material support for the people at risk is seen as import.

(4) In view of the likelihood that the social risk zones as simultaneous social carriers of nationalistic-xenophobic attitudes in the Eastern European accession candidates will continue to exist and even grow also after the incorporation into the EU, it is recommended to develop intercultural programs in cooperation with local organisations to reach these people.
(5) In view of the endemic ethnic-national conflicts in most of the postcommunist countries and the ambivalent impacts of the eastern enlargement on those conflicts, it is seen as a crucial task to improve a European public debate on and counteract the negative consequences.

(6) In view of the partial intensification of nationalistic-xenophobic attitudes of (im-)migrants from the East to the West in the context of discriminating every-day life experiences, again special intercultural programs should be developed to improve transnational communication and incorporation.

(7) In view of the rising tendencies, not only in the current member states but also in the new member states, to exclude Turkey and other Eastern European states as accession candidates, there is a special urgency to find a middle way of a privileged in-between status between full and non-membership and enhance a transnational public debate on these issues.

The interesting common denominator of these recommendations is that they are not only directed at European Union policy makers but also at collective actors in what could be called an emerging European civil society (see also Section 4.1 on “The ritual construction of a European identity?”). The focus is not only on European institution-building, but also on European intercultural communication to construct a common civic-pluralistic European identity intertwined with ethnic, cultural and civic components of national identities. This common denominator reflects the macro-sociological inter-disciplinary framework and research focus of the East-West IDNET group. At the same time, after the first meeting of European policy makers and academic intellectuals, there is also the need to further clarify the relationship between the policy memos and the political actors addressed. At least, it remains an open question whether the policy memos presented meet actually the action horizon of the addressed policy-makers, whether the policy memos should be formulated in a different way to the same public, or whether the addressed policy-makers represent the adequate political public for the thrust of the policy recommendations.

4.4 The European public sphere

Empirical research on the existence and the nature of a European public sphere is still in an early stage. IDNET in our view has made significant contributions to this evolving research area both in conceptual and in empirical terms (see Section 3.5). Conceptually, we
have stressed the distinction between two different dimensions along which the existence of a European public sphere can be measured, namely the salience of European issues in national media on the one hand, and the extent to which substantively similar frames of reference are employed across national boundaries in reporting on European affairs. In the light of this distinction, existing findings which emphasise the relatively low salience of European as compared to (sub-)national and global issues should not be overestimated in their importance for the (non-)existence of a European public sphere. Cross-national comparison should look not just at the amount of space and time, but also at the substantive frames of reference which media apply to issues of European importance.

Our empirical research has focused on this second dimension of a European public sphere. It leads to the conclusion that people do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one’s particular viewpoint in the issue at question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national public sphere to the other, as far as the frames of interpretation are concerned. In this latter sense, media reporting about the EU is no different from their reporting about national issues and events. In sum, we can observe an emerging European public sphere.

The policy conclusion is equally clear: Many political and business leaders in Europe believe that controversial debates on Europe, the EU, and European policies will endanger the European integration process and slow it down considerably. Therefore, one should not touch the European elite consensus which still prevails in many, particularly Continental European countries. This belief is dangerous in democratic terms and plain wrong in empirical terms. Contestation and politicisation is constitutive for a democratic polity including the European polity. And it serves a European purpose, since it is bound to increase the issue salience and significance of European affairs in the national polities. The data on frames of reference suggest that raising the salience of the EU in the national polities will not drive the Europeans apart, but pull them together in a European public sphere.
5. Dissemination and exploitation of results

5.1 Academic conferences and workshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organiser(s)</th>
<th>Place &amp; time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European integration and the changes in European boundary constructions</td>
<td>Spohn and Triandafyllidou</td>
<td>Florence, 7-8 April 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation and multiple identities</td>
<td>Risse with Brewer and Herrmann (OSU)</td>
<td>Florence, 9-10 June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation and identity change: theoretical and methodological issues</td>
<td>Checkel</td>
<td>Oslo, 16-17 June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective identity: conceptual and methodological issues</td>
<td>Giesen</td>
<td>Konstanz, 8-9 December 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International institutions and socialisation in the New Europe</td>
<td>Checkel</td>
<td>Florence, 18-19 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation: institutions and the evolution of social identities</td>
<td>Risse with Brewer and Herrmann</td>
<td>Florence, 18-19 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying collective identity: a conceptual and methodological inquiry</td>
<td>Benigni and Triandafyllidou</td>
<td>Rome, 6-7 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation and the public sphere</td>
<td>Giesen and Risse</td>
<td>Florence, 20-21 February 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International institutions and socialisation in the New Europe</td>
<td>Checkel</td>
<td>Florence, 22-23 February 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Transformed? The European Union and collective identity change</td>
<td>Checkel and Risse</td>
<td>Oslo, 11 October 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Dissemination activities for policy-makers and the general public

An annotated bibliographic database

An annotated bibliographic database compiled in the framework of IDNET is accessible for the general public via our website on the server of the Robert Schuman Centre <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Tools/IDNET/Access.html>. The database contains some 900 entries on the subject of identity, with a sharper focus on European identity. References cover a wide range of social scientific disciplines, spanning over the last 25 years. The database can be searched in a variety of ways. The standard type of search is by field, such as by author, title, date and so on; in this respect the database can be searched in the same way as a standard library web site. In addition, the entries to the database have been
classified on the basis of certain categories (“IDNET keywords”, see Section 7.1), with a
view to facilitating a more focused type of search. All the works cited in the database have
been classified on the basis of: discipline; theoretical orientation (when applicable); meth-
odology (when applicable); country concerned (when applicable); and subject matter. All
entries can then be searched according to these dimensions; for example, one may be inter-
ested in publications on identity within sociology, from a social constructivist theoretical
perspective, with a qualitative methodology, with a focus on ethnicity. Thirdly, free key-
word searches can be conducted which extend beyond the range of IDNET keywords. Fi-
nally, to the extent that abstracts are available individual terms can be searched for in those
abstracts.

Outreach conference
An international policy outreach conference was held at the University of Oslo in October
2002. This event brought together practitioners from the European Commission, national
ministries and journalists along with IDNET scholars to discuss and debate our findings.
The conference itself was divided into four sessions. Session one addressed the broader
questions of what we know about collective political identities in Europe, both conceptu-
ally and empirically, and how identity formation can be promoted. The remaining three
sessions addressed more focused aspects of these broad questions, namely the precondi-
tions for a European public sphere, the impact of Enlargement on collective identity forma-
tion and the importance of socialisation for the production of a common identity. The pro-
gramme and an extended conference report are reproduced in Section 7.4.

Policy memos and briefing book
For the Oslo conference, we produced and distributed a briefing book, which is composed
of brief “policy memos” where various IDNET scholars highlight the policy relevance and
implications of their research in non-technical language. The briefing book can be accessed
at <http://www.arena.uio.no/events/idnetgeneral.htm>. The briefing book not only sparked
a lively discussion at the policy conference itself; it has also been highlighted in several
national media outlets, including the Irish Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
5.3 Publications resulting from IDNET activities


* See Section 7.3 below for edited volumes’ tables of content.

### 5.4 List of agreed deliverables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title/description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Availability*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conference report on international conference “Europeanization and Changes in Collective Identities” (Workpackage 1)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Annex to first periodic progress report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-3 joint research reports on collective Identity formation as part of the European integration process (Workpackage 1)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>See this report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Edited volume “Europeanization and Changes in Collective Identities” (Workpackage 1)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>See [5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Workshop report summarizing the findings from the three workshops on conceptual and methodological issues pertaining to the study of socialization, identity change, and the role of the media (Workpackages 1, 2, 3)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>WP 1: see [7]; WP 2: see [1]; WP 3: Annex to second progress report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Edited volume on “European Integration, Socialization, and Identity Change” (Workpackage 2)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>See [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Workshop Report on “European Integration and Changes in European Boundary Constructions” (Workpackage 4)</td>
<td>Completed in revised form</td>
<td>See [15]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conference Report and (possibly) Edited Volume on “The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Social Transformation and Collective Identities in Western and Eastern Europe” (Workpackage 4)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>See [2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Short Policy Memos for decision-makers on the various levels of European governance summarizing relevant findings from network activities (all workpackages; coordinated by EUI)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td><a href="http://www.arena.uio.no/events/idnetgeneral.htm">www.arena.uio.no/events/idnetgeneral.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Conference Report on “International Outreach Conference” (Workpackage 5)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Annex to this report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers in square brackets refer to the list of publications on the previous page.
6. Acknowledgements and references

6.1 Acknowledgements

At the European University Institute, Florence, the following individuals contributed to the coordination of IDNET activities: Iñaki Lopez Martin, Jeanette Mak, Sylvie Pascucci, Sylvain Rivet, Eugenia Siapera, and Marianne van de Steeg (all at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies), as well as Roberto Nocentini, Serena Scarselli, and Sarah Lüdemann (at the EUI’s Academic Service). Technical advise by Prof. Jaap Dronkers of the EUI’s Department of Political and Social Sciences was used in the analysis reproduced in Section 3.5. Our thanks to all of them.

6.2 References


Giesen, Bernhard (forthcoming). *Triumph and Trauma*.

Giesen, Bernhard, Valentin Rauer, and Christoph Schneider, eds. (forthcoming). *Tätertrauma*. Konstanz: UVK.


7. Annexes

7.1 IDNET keywords, as used in the annotated bibliographic database

I. DISCIPLINES
ANTHROPOLOGY
COMMUNICATION/MEDIA/CULTURAL STUDIES
ECONOMICS
GENDER STUDIES
GEOGRAPHY
HISTORY
LAW
LINGUISTICS
PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL SCIENCE
SOCIAL & POLITICAL THEORY
PSYCHOLOGY
RELIGIOUS STUDIES
SOCIOLOGY
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

II. THEORIES
POST-MODERNISM/POST-STRUCTURALISM
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
SYSTEMS THEORY
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY
PSYCHOANALYSIS
MODERNIZATION THEORY
HISTORICAL/SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
RATIONAL CHOICE
CRITICAL THEORY
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

III. METHOD
QUANTITATIVE/SURVEY
QUALITATIVE METHODS
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
THEORETICAL/METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF IDENTITY
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS

IV. COUNTRY CONCERNED
EU-EUROPEAN (ALSO: SPECIFIC COUNTRY WHEN APPLICABLE)
EASTERN-EUROPE (SPECIFIC COUNTRY WHEN APPLICABLE)
NON-EU WESTERN EUROPEAN (AS ABOVE)
NON-EUROPEAN: CONTINENT (E.G.: AMERICA; AFRICA; AUSTRALIA; ASIA)
ACCESSION COUNTRIES (ADD SPECIFIC INFO. WHEN AVAILABLE)
EUROPE (GENERAL)
MEDITERRANEAN
BALKANS
REGION (USED ONLY WHEN SPECIFIC REGION IS MENTIONED – ALONG WITH COUNTRY IN WHICH REGION IS FOUND)

V. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS
NATIONALISM/STATE BUILDING
CITIZENSHIP
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
ETHNICITY
GLOBALISATION
REGIONALISM
RACISM
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
LANGUAGE
WAR/CONFLICT/DEFENCE
IMMIGRATION
REPRESENTATION OF IDENTITY IN FILM/LITERATURE/ART/MEDIA
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
SOCIALIZATION
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY
POLITICAL ASPECTS
NORMATIVE ELEMENTS
GENDER IDENTITY
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS
POLICY ISSUES
7.2 Selected conference programmes

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE NEW EUROPE

FRIDAY, 18 MAY 2001

Villa Schifanoia, Sala Europa (Via Boccaccio 121)

(NB: Paper writers do not present; instead, each session begins with the discussant’s commentary.)

12:00 - 13:30 Lunch (diningroom adjoining Sala Europa)

13:45 - 14:15 Welcome, Workshop Goals (Jeff Checkel)

14:15 - 15:30 Jeff Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe - Chapter 1: Introduction”

Discussant: Iain Johnston

15:30 - 16:30 Jan Beyers, “Europe and the Distance between Policymaking and Politics: The Social Mechanisms Affecting Political and Administrative Actors’ European Adaptation”

Discussant: Mark Pollack

16:30 - 17:00 Coffee Break

17:00 - 18:00 Jeffrey Lewis, “Diplomacy in Europe’s Polity: Socialization and the EU Permanent Representatives”

Discussant: Michael Zuern

20:00 Workshop Dinner
SATURDAY, 19 MAY

Villa Schifanoia, Sala Europa (Via Boccaccio 121)

8:30 - 9:00 Coffee, tea, danish

9:00 - 10:00 Jarle Trondal, “Why Europeanisation Happens: The Transformative Power of EU Committees”

Discussant: Thomas Risse

10:00 - 11:00 Morten Egeberg, “What Organisation Tells us About Preference and Identity Formation: EU Committees and National Officials”

Discussant: Jeff Checkel

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:30 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Conditionality, Cost, and Commitment: Explaining the Uneven International Socialization of Central and Eastern European Countries”

Discussant: Iain Johnston

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch (diningroom adjoining Sala Europa)

14:00 - 15:00 Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO, International Socialization and the Politics of State Crafting in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe”

Discussant: Michael Zuern

15:00 - 16:00 Judith Kelley, “Norms and Membership Conditionality: European Institutional Influences on Ethnic Minority Policies”

Discussant: Frank Schimmelfennig

16:00 - 16:30 Coffee Break

16:30 - 18:00 Reflections (Iain Johnston, Michael Zuern) & Next Steps (Jeff Checkel)

20:00 Workshop Dinner
EUROPEANIZATION: INSTITUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES

Workshop,
organized by Thomas Risse (European Forum/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and IDNET Thematic Network), Marilynn Brewer, and Richard Herrmann (Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio)

Florence, 18-19 June 2001,
Villa La Fonte, Seminar Room

Monday, 18 June 2001

9.30 Thomas Risse (EUI) Welcome

9.45 How Do (European) Institutions Shape Identities?

What are the mechanisms by which institutions shape identities? Brewer and Herrmann start with three mechanisms. Across the chapters other mechanisms are discussed and sometimes the same mechanisms are discussed using different names. Can we identify a set of mechanisms and reach any preliminary conclusions about whether they operate as expected?

Lead-off Speakers/Papers:

Richard Herrmann and Marilynn Brewer (Ohio State University), Europeanization: Institutions and the Evolution of Social Identities – Introduction and Overview

Brigid Laffan (University College of Dublin), The European Union and Its Institutions as ‘Identity Builder’

11.00 Coffee Break

11.15 Continuation of Discussion

12.00 Lunch

13.30 European Identity and Depth of Europeanness: An Elite Phenomenon?

What is the depth of Europeanness? Is this only an elite phenomenon or does it have deeper roots? How can we tell?

Lead-off Speakers/Papers:

Eugenia Siapera (EUI), EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State

Jack Citrin/John Sides (University of California, Berkeley), Is It the Nation, Europe, or the Nation and Europe? Trends in Post-Maastricht Political Identities

15.30 Coffee Break

16.00 Is European Identity a Survey Artefact? Methods to Study European Identities at the Mass Level?

What should we make of the apparent fact that at the mass-level people do not offer European spontaneously as an identity? How should we evaluate methods that prompt people to think about being European as distinct from those that claim to capture natural language situations?

Lead-off Speakers/Papers:

Glynnis Breakwell (University of Surrey), Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of EU Institutions

Ulrike Hanna Meinhof (University of Bradford), Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victims, and the Threat of the Other
Tuesday, 19 June 2001

10.00 **Do European and National Identities Go Together?**

Are the positive correlations between national and European identities real or artifactual? If the positive correlation is real what does this mean? Does it mean, for instance, that tolerance for other Europeans is growing as a common in-group identity forms? If it is not connected to support for integrative behaviors, what value is it to know these positive correlations exist?

Lead-off Speakers/Papers:

Emanuele Castano (University of St. Andrews), *European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective*

Amelie Mummendey/Sven Waldzus (University of Jena), *National Differences and European Plurality: Discrimination or Tolerance Between European Countries*

12:00 Lunch

13.30 **Who Is Us and What Is Us? Civil and Cultural Aspects of European Identity**

What is the relationship between who is us and what is us? In other words, how does the criteria used to determine the in-group affect who is in the group?

Lead-off Speakers/Papers:

Michael Bruter (University of Hull), *Civic and Cultural Components of a European Identity. A Pilot Model of Measurement of Citizens Levels of European Identity*

Ruth Wodak (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna), *National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Oriented to in Interviews with EU Officials*

15.30 Coffee Break

16.00 **Wrap-Up Discussion:**

Lead-off Speaker:

Thomas Risse (EUI), *Conclusions: What Have We Learned?*
STUDYING COLLECTIVE IDENTITY:
A CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

Workshop organised by the Institute of Psychology, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), under the auspices of the IDNET Thematic Network funded by the European Commission Research DG

6 and 7 July 2001
Institute of Psychology, CNR
viale Marx 15, Rome 00137, Italy

Workshop directors: Dr. Laura Benigni, Dr. Anna Triandafyllidou
Organisational secretary: Mr. Andrea Rausa
Administrative staff: Ms. Gisella Pellegrini, Mr. Albano Leoni

PART I: BEYOND IDENTITY?

Friday, 6 July
Chair: Laura Benigni

12.30-14.00 Lunch
14.30-15.00 Welcome and Introduction by Laura Benigni and Anna Triandafyllidou

15.00-15.20 Xenia Chryssochoou: Beyond which identity? – An analysis of social psychological representations of identity
15.20-15.40 Jessica Jacobson: Tying ourselves in knots: an examination of collective identity in a multicultural society

15.40-16.10 Discussion

16.10-16.30 Coffee break
16.30-16.50 Marina Petronoti: Social interaction as a framework for analysing national identity construction
16.50-17.10 Peter Collins: Storying Self and Others
17.10-17.30 Giovanna Leone: Social identity and collective memories. How individual and groups cope with their need of psychological roots.

17.30-18.00 Discussion

20.00 Dinner
PART II: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Saturday, 7 July
Chair: Anna Triandafyllidou

9.50-10.10  Arie Nadler: Inter-group helping relations: Helping relations between groups as power relations
10.10-10.40 Discussion

10.40-11.00 Coffee break

11.00-11.20 Ruth Wodak: Discourse analysis and the study of multiple identities
11.20-11.40 Clive Seale: Combining qualitative and quantitative analysis in studying media texts
11.40-12.10 Discussion

12.10-13.30 Lunch

13.30-13.50 Gordana Uzelac: Attitudes and national identity
13.50-14.10 Sinisa Malesevic: Measuring the invisible: The conceptual and methodological problems in researching ethnic identity
14.10-14.30 Arturo Tosi: Ethnic community and collective identity: the mediating role of language competence
14.30-15.30 Discussion

15.30-16.00 Conclusions by Laura Benigni and Anna Triandafyllidou
20.00 Dinner
EUROPE, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY:
CULTURAL IMPACTS ON THE INTEGRATION BETWEEN WESTERN AND
EASTERN EUROPE

Humboldt University of Berlin
25 and 26 January 2002

Friday January 25, 2002

Morning Session: 9-12:30

Introduction
Klaus Eder (Humboldt U): The formation of transnational identities in Europe - a sociological approach

Part I: The Destruction and Reconstruction of Europe: Collective Memories and National Identities in Comparative Perspective

Hartmut Kaelble (Humboldt U): Europe from a Western European Perspective

Piotr Stzompka (U Krakow) (or Jerzy Jedlicki U Warsaw): Europe from an Eastern European Perspective

Willfried Spohn (EUI): National Identities, Collective Memory and the Integration between Western and Eastern Europe

Lunch (13-14:00)

Afternoon Session 14:30-18:00

Part II: Europe, National Identities and Collective Memory:
Western European Case Studies

Robert Frank (UK): France
Jessica Jacobson (LSE, London): Great Britain
Oliver Schmidtke (Vancouver): Germany (+Poland)
Gilbert Weiss (U Wien): Austria
Ilaria Favretto (U Milano): Italy (+Slovenia?)
Pablo Jauregui (EUI) Spain
**Saturday 26/01, 2002**

**Morning Session 9-12:30**

*Part III. Europe, National Identities and Collective Memory: Eastern European Case Studies*

Andras Kovacs (CEU Budapest): Hungary
Karel Kubis (Czech Technical University Praha): Czech Republic
Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (Lund University): Poland
Olga Sezneva (Columbia U, New York): Koenigsberg/Kalinigrad
Svetlana Boym (St.Petersburg U): Leningrad/St.Petersburg
Augusta Dimou (EUI): Greece and the Balkans

*Lunch (13-14:00)*

**Afternoon Session 14:30-18:00**

*Part IV. East-Western European Integration and Collective Identities*

Ruth Wodak (Wien), Europe and Anti-Semitism
Michael Bodemann (Toronto), Europe, European Jewry and Israel
Berhard Giesen (U Konstanz): European Integration and Collective Traumas
EUROPEANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Wednesday, Feb. 20

12.30 Lunch at the workshop venue

14.00 Session 1: Civil Society, Collective Identity and the Public Sphere

Chair: Willfried Spohn (Humboldt University, Berlin)

Papers

Jeffrey Alexander (Yale University), “Globalization or Civil Society? Some Theoretical Considerations on the Contradictory Processes of Supra-National Integration”


Alessandro Pizzorno (Florence), “European Identity – The Democratic Deficit”

20.00 Dinner at Ristorante “Da Tito”, via San Gallo 112/R (red)

Thursday, Feb. 21

9.30 Session 2: Europeanization and the Public Sphere – Preliminary Empirical Results from a Research Project

Chair: Ruth Wodak

Papers

Thomas Risse (Free University of Berlin), “How Do We Know a European Public Sphere When We See One? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators”

Valentin Rauer (Konstanz)/Sylvain Rivet (EUI)/Marianne van de Steeg (EUI), “Preliminary Empirical Evidence from a Media Analysis of the Haider Debate”

Discussants: Klaus Eder (Humboldt University, Berlin), Ruth Wodak (Academy of Sciences, Vienna)

12.30 Lunch
14.00  **Session 3: Europeanization and the Public Sphere – Presentations of Research Projects**

*Chair:* Jeffrey Checkel (ARENA, University of Oslo)

*Papers:*

Klaus Eder, “The Making of a Transnational Public Space in Europe”

Ruud Koopmans (Science Center Berlin), “The Transformation of Political Communication and Mobilization in European Public Spheres”

*Discussants:* Jürgen Gerhards (University of Leipzig), Patrizia Nanz (Max Planck Project Group, Bonn)

20.00  Dinner at Ristorante “I’Toscano”, via Guelfa 70/R (red)
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE NEW EUROPE  
(Third Project Workshop)

Workshop Program

WEDNESDAY, 20 FEBRUARY, THURSDAY, 21 FEBRUARY

Participants attend the Giesen/Risse IDNET workshop at EUI

FRIDAY, 22 FEBRUARY

Villa La Fonte

(NB: Paper writers do not present; instead, each session begins with the discussant’s commentary.)

12:00 - 13:30 Lunch

13:45 - 14:15 Welcome, Workshop Goals (Jeff Checkel)

14:15 - 15:30 Jeff Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe”

Discussant: Thomas Risse

15:30 - 16:30 Morten Egeberg, “Organizational Structures and Socialization: The Case of EU Committees and National Officials”

Discussant: Frank Schimmelfennig

16:30 - 17:00 Coffee Break

17:00 - 18:00 Jarle Trondal, “Why Europeanisation Happens: The Socializing Power of EU Committees”

Discussant: Mark Pollack

20:00 Workshop Dinner: Restaurant Da Mimmo, Via San Gallo 57_59/Rosso
SATURDAY, 23 FEBRUARY

Villa La Fonte

8:30 - 9:00 Coffee, tea, danish

9:00 - 10:00 Jan Beyers, “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in ‘Old’ Europe: The Case of Belgian Officials”

Discussant: Alexandra Gheciu

10:00 - 11:00 Jeffrey Lewis, “Nesting Identities in Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision-Making in the European Union”

Discussant: Matthew Evangelista

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:30 Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe”

Discussant: Michael Zuern

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 - 15:00 Judith Kelley, “Unpacking Socialization: Persuasion, Incentives and Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe”

Discussant: Michael Zuern

15:00 - 16:00 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Costs and Conditionality: The Uneven International Socialization of Central and Eastern Europe”

Discussant: Matthew Evangelista

16:00 - 16:30 Coffee Break

16:30 - 18:30 Michael Zuearn (Meta-Theoretical, Theoretical and Design Issues/Extensions) and Iain Johnston (Regional and Theoretical Extensions)

Discussants: Jeff Checkel and Thomas Risse
7.3 Forthcoming publications: tables of content

IDENTITIES IN EUROPE AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Editors:
RICHARD HERRMANN, Ohio State University
MARILYNN BREWER, Ohio State University
THOMAS RISSE, European University Institute


1. Richard Herrmann and Marilynn Brewer, "Introduction and Overview"

Part I: EU Institutions and Elite Identities

2. Brigid Laffan (University College of Dublin), "The European Union and Its Institutions as Identity-Builders"

3. Ruth Wodak (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna), "National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Oriented To in Interviews with EU Officials"

4. Eugenia Siapera (European University Institute), "EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State"

Part II: Identity Formation Processes

5. Glynnis Breakwell (University of Surrey), "Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of EU Institutions"

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EUROPEANIZATION, NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND MIGRATION:
CHANGES IN BOUNDARY CONSTRUCTIONS IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

Editors:
WILLFRIED SPOHN and ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU
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Language & Politics, Special Issue, forthcoming (early 2004)

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Participants

IDNET SCHOLARS
Jan Beyers (Post-Doctoral Scholar, Leuven University and Guest Researcher, ARENA, University of Oslo)
Michael Bruter (Lecturer, London School of Economics and Political Science)
Jeffrey T. Checkel (Professor of Political Science and Researcher Professor, ARENA, University of Oslo)
Morten Egeberg (Academic Director, ARENA, and Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo)
Alexandra Gheciu (Post-Doctoral Scholar, Oxford University)
Bernhard Giesen (Professor of Sociology, University of Konstanz, Germany)
Atsuko Ichijo (Research Officer, London School of Economics and Political Science)
Cathleen Kantner (Research Associate, Humboldt University of Berlin)
Judith Kelley (Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Duke University)
Thomas Risse (Professor of Political Science, Free University of Berlin)
Willfried Spohn (Senior Lecturer, Humboldt University of Berlin)
Jarle Trondal (Associate Professor of Public Administration, Agder University College)
Marianne Van de Steeg (PhD Candidate, European University Institute)

EU POLICYMAKERS
Angela Liberatore (Scientific Officer, DG Research, European Commission)
Anna Melich (Head, Central Library, European Commission [formerly head of Eurobarometer])
Ambassador Gerhard Sabathil (Head, European Commission Delegation to Norway and Iceland)

NATIONAL POLICYMAKERS
Tore Nedrebo (Head, European/EU Politics Section, European Division, Norwegian Foreign Ministry)
René Söderman (Councillor for Press and Culture, Embassy of Finland)

JOURNALISTS/OTHER
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   Chair: Jeff Checkel
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Welcome and introduction by Jeffrey T. Checkel

What do we really know about the formation and change of collective identities in Europe? What do we know about a European public sphere and about how Enlargement is affecting these processes? How does scholarly research match up with the experiences of policy makers, practitioners, journalists etc.? The purpose of this conference is to provide a setting where these questions can be addressed and where academics and practitioners can complement and learn from each other. The aim is therefore to approach the subject-matter in a down-to-earth, empirical way and to enhance as much discussion as possible.

The main focus of the conference is the EU, but it should be noted that IDNET also includes researchers who study various European institutions, e.g. NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This is an advantage as it provides a possibility for comparison and helps to contextualise both the empirical and the theoretical claims that are made about the EU.

This conference is divided into four sessions. After the opening remarks by Johan P. Olsen, session one addresses the broader questions of what we know about collective political identities in Europe, both conceptually and empirically, and how identity formation can be promoted. The next three sessions address more focused aspects of these broad questions, namely the preconditions for a European public sphere, the impact of Enlargement on collective identity formation and the importance of socialisation for the production of a common identity.

Introduction of IDNET by project leader Thomas Risse

There are at least four different groups participating at this conference. The first group consists of people who are in one way or the other affiliated with the European Commission. The second group is people from the Norwegian policy community. The third group contains fellow academics mainly from Norway and the fourth group is represented by the IDNET scholars.

IDNET is a thematic network funded under the EU’s Fifth Framework Programme and brings together scholars from five different institutions. These five partners are (1) ARENA represented by Jeff Checkel, (2) Humboldt University represented by Willfried Spohn and Cathleen Kantner, (3) University of Konstanz represented by Bernhard Giesen, (4) the Institute of Psychology, University of Rome (no participants present at the conference), and (5) the European University Institute (Robert Schumann Centre) represented by Thomas Risse (although he is now situated at the Free University of Berlin).

The idea behind the establishment of IDNET was to bring together people from various disciplinary backgrounds who are doing research on European identity, on questions related to the European public sphere and to socialisation processes in the EU. IDNET is divided into four work-packages which are reflected in the four themes of the conference: Collective/ political identities in Europe in general, and more specifically, European identity formation in relation to the questions of a European public sphere, Enlargement and finally the socialisation dynamics in the EU and beyond.

The focus of the IDNET project has mainly been conferences and workshops, but in terms of deliverables, IDNET will also contribute with 3-4 books. In addition, there is a quite extensive bibliography available at the IDNET web site (http://www.iue.it/RSC/IDNET/) which presents work from various disciplines that are dealing with European identity issues. Another IDNET contribution is the briefing book prepared for this conference which
presents the results of the various research activities without the standard academic jargon. Here, the aim was to present the findings in a brief and concise manner in order to reach audiences outside the academic community.

Originally, the aim of this conference was to bring together an even or at least a more balanced number of academics and policymakers in order to enhance the communication and possibility of learning from one another. Unfortunately, not many policymakers were able to come, but it is still important for the two groups to communicate with each other. In addition, it is also important for IDNET to get input from other academics. In sum, all this contributes to guide the research avenues in the future.

**Opening remarks by Johan P. Olsen**

When the President of the Convention, Giscard d’Estaing, refused the Convention participants to sit according to party belonging, but rather alphabetically, this illustrates an awareness of what is going on in the Convention, that is, it is a meeting place for competing party loyalties, for European and national belongings and identifications, but also for institutional belongings. In addition, this illustrates an awareness that social context, interaction and communication are important.

On this background, it was interesting to notice that Giscard d’Estaing in his inaugural speech contrasted the Convention with the previous IGC processes which, in his words, have ‘provided an arena for diplomatic negotiations between member states where it was thought legitimate for each party to maximise its gain without regard to the overall picture’. In many ways the Convention is very different from the IGCs – it is not just about aggregating existing interests. It is rather a question of gradually forming a community spirit. The Convention participants are asked to see themselves not as spokespersons for a specific interest, but as representatives for the overall community. Moreover, this Convention cannot succeed if the members see themselves only as representatives for sectional interests. It must become a melting pot in order to find a common position. Giscard d’Estaing also raised the question of identity when he argued that it must be possible to find ways in which national and European identities can complement rather than compete with each other.

Likewise, Alain Lamassoure, a Convention member appointed by the European Parliament, emphasised that the EU is not only a legal enterprise, but that it is also an important example of cultural learning. For him ‘the most valuable aspects of our Community venture are the habit of working together, the fabric of trust woven day by day, the habit of listening to others, the quest for lasting compromises, the method of collective debate conducted in several languages, the exhausting practice of marathon negotiations, the emergence of new forms of solidarity to be superimposed on national forms, the amazing discovery that the output of this inevitably complex machinery is generally better than the most brilliant individual decision, etc. In other words, the art of living together’.

In contrast, the Swedish government, for example, conceives the challenge as one of efficient delivery of policies or services, and not a question of changing institutions or identities. In a White Paper from the Swedish government it was argued that the current structure has generally functioned well and should be the basis even in the future. The Swedish government questions whether there is any need for basic changes in the balance between the EU institutions. There is even less need for a shift in identities.

However, the Union is in the midst of a process that involves developing an institutionalised capacity for collective action and efficient problem solving. Likewise, the EU is in-
volved in a search for foundational principles that can give the Union a feeling of common purpose and direction and make its action capability accountable. In the process, some key concepts, such as ‘democracy’, ‘federalism’ and ‘constitutionalism’, are likely to be given new and modified meanings in new institutional embeddings. Possibly, the emergence of a new European institutional and constitutional context may also influence and modify the Europeans’ beliefs about themselves and others, beliefs about who they are or may become and how various identities and belongings may be combined or not.

Such issues are also at the core of key divisions in the social sciences. On the one hand, there are those who in an axiomatic way postulate universal and non-malleable political actors, and, on the other hand, there are those who are open for alternative identities and their attached rules of appropriate behaviour in different institutional and historical contexts. For the latter, the key questions are under what conditions various identities are evoked, developed or ignored; why some become dominant (and linked to strong emotional identification) or subordinate in situations where identities collide.

Put in another way: The IDNET international policy conference raises questions of great practical as well as theoretical importance. A first glance at the papers, and the fact that the conference has attracted so many interesting colleagues from various countries, indicates that we will have some valuable and challenging hours ahead.

ARENA and the department of Political Science at the University of Oslo are proud to host this conference. Surely, it will contribute to a better understanding of the various mechanisms and factors that make political identities evolve, that maintain them, that change them in salience and content, or perhaps even replace them. In sum, this will also give us a better comprehension of how and why people divide into political groups based on different allegiances.

SESSION I – COLLECTIVE/ POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN EUROPE

Memo I – Thomas Risse: An Emerging European Identity? What We Know and How to Make Sense of It

Risse addresses two questions: (1) What do we know empirically about a European collective identity? (2) How can we make sense of the empirical findings in light of the theoretical debates on a European identity?

The short answer to the first question is that the degree of citizens’ identification with Europe and the EU is regularly underestimated in the media and in the political debates. The short answer to the second question is that European identity does not replace national identities, but interacts with them in various ways, i.e. people hold multiple identities. The main cleavage in identity terms is no longer between those who feel loyalty to their nation against those who identify with Europe. Rather, most people identity with their national or regional communities and with Europe. This means that the EU does not need a demos that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist. Citizens also distinguish between Europe as a cultural and historical space and the EU as the dominant political space in Europe. This notwithstanding, identification with Europe and the EU still suffers from the lack of ‘realness’ of Europe in people’s daily lives and from its fuzzy boundaries. It is also not clear whether identification with Europe also increases people’s tolerance for each other in a cosmopolitan democracy.
There are various ways of conceptualising multiple identities (e.g. the Russian Matruska doll-, crosscutting and marble cake models) which, of course, will affect the notion of how a European identity is developed and maintained, but surveys show that the building of a common European identity has little to do with public relations efforts of information campaigns about the EU. Rather the key to increased identification with Europe and the EU is to increase the reality of the community in the daily lives of the citizens. Various things can be done in this context: Europe needs more symbols and collective myths. The politicisation of European affairs increases the salience of the EU in the perception of the citizens. Finally, national political elites who care about the EU should stop the blame shifting games.

**Memo II – Michael Bruter: Political Identities and Public Policy: Institutional Messages and the Politics of Integration**

This memo is concerned with how the relationship between the structure and evolution of political identities and the interaction between citizens and political institutions in terms of identity formation pattern in Europe. Political identities consist of two main components – a civic (identification with the EU as a relevant political and institutional system) and a cultural (perception of ‘Europe’ as a relevant political community) aspect. The memo is based on the findings coming out of a couple of studies on the impact of Europeanisation and the mass media in the emergence of a European identity.

The problem of integrating new citizens is one of the best examples of the parallel importance of the two main aspects of political identities, i.e. the civic and the cultural aspects. The findings from the surveys show that new immigrants’ cultural identity could not be expected to be deeply modified immediately, but that their civic identity could quite rapidly be transformed in order to guarantee the survival of the state. At the same time, the civic identity of the pre-established dominant populations does not need to be affected but rather the nature of their cultural identity, that is, their definition of who are ‘us’, has to evolve to avoid the emergence of a two-speed nation.

**Memo III – Bernhard Giesen: The Ritual Construction of a European Identity**

The EU can only claim sovereignty and democratic legitimacy if there is a European demos that exists independently from the operative procedures of the European government itself. How can we conceive of such a demos, how is it symbolically represented and empirically rooted, what promotes participation in and attachment to the European demos? In other words, how is it possible to construct a European collective identity of this kind? Historical and sociological research on the development of national identities shows that strategic interests, utility expectations and contractual obligations alone cannot generate a collective identity. A communal identity must have a non-contractual basis, that is, a frame of reference that is considered unquestionably and unconditionally valid by the respective community. A non-contractual foundation of this kind can be developed and fostered through common cultural traditions, collective memories and value convictions.

In order to develop cultural traditions, collective memories and value convictions that found an inclusive European identity, Giesen suggests that the annual opening ceremony of the European Parliament should be celebrated by a carefully and colourfully staged event in one of the many famous European city squares. This ceremony should be broadcasted live so that that every European citizen can watch the same ceremony at the same time. Like the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, the inauguration of the American
president and the Pope’s blessings on New Year’s, a ceremony of this kind can catch the attention of the whole European community. The power of ceremonial rituals and symbols is found in their capacity to promote a feeling of authenticity among fellow citizens – a feeling that is not even dependent upon the citizens sharing the same language.

Memo IV – Atsuko Ichijo: A Reluctant European and Tactical European: British and Scottish Views of Europe

What can we learn from the historical experiences regarding the question of how to forge collective identities and why is it easier for some groups to feel European than others? Ichijo contends that we can trace the historical experiences in order to shed light on these two inter-linked issues and she has conducted a historical study which aims to explain why the Scots are less sceptical to European integration and the forming of a European identity than the British.

Ichijo’s argument is that an important factor in determining the UK’s attitudes to European integration are decided by which historical experiences that are selected. Due to the emphasis on the British role in defending Europe from the Nazis, which tends to highlight the difference between the UK and the Continent, it is now a hostile environment for a European identity to emerge. This is more so in the Anglo-British- than in the Scottish case because historically the Scottish have had closer ties to Continental Europe than the Anglo-British. In addition, Scottish identity has been asserted against Anglo-British or English exceptionalism, but with a quite clear pro-European element. In order to promote a more pro-European attitude in the whole of the UK, Ichijo suggests, firstly, that the British history curricula should be restructured from an almost anti-European to a more pro-European focus and, secondly, that the relationship between the EU and the USA should be framed in a way that emphasises the closeness rather than the disagreement between them.

Discussion – Chair: Jeff Checkel

Checkel: From the memos it seems clear that there is agreement on the argument that people have multiple identities and belongings. Rather, disagreement starts with what role various mechanisms play in constructing a European identity.

Udgaard: Question to Giesen: Sceptical to whether Giesen’s belief that a public spectacle can contribute to the strengthening of a European identity. The American ceremony of the inauguration of the President is important because it reflects the change of the most powerful political office in the world. To situate the celebration of the inauguration of the European Parliament to an Italian piazza (e.g. in Siena) would not be the same exactly because the power aspect is missing. A ceremony that does not reflect any power is not enough to build political identities.

Giesen: Udgaard is right about the powerfulness of the American presidency compared to the EP, but the clue is not power, but the authenticity, reiteration or reflection of the people/demos. Ceremonies were important for the building of national identities because they referred to or made the imagination of the demos/people more tangible. Moreover, Giesen believes that well-designed public spectacles where for example the European anthem is sung by famous European pop-singers etc. will more effectively instil a European identity into European citizens than what teachers and schoolbooks can provide.
**Trondal:** Question to Giesen concerning the power of the media: Do information presented in the media, particularly on TV, have a long or short term effect on people, that is, what kind of effect does it have on the creation and maintenance of collective identities?

**Van de Steeg:** Question to Giesen: How is a public ceremony supposed to be linked or related to political identity? Public ceremonies may be successful in themselves, but they are not serving their purpose if it is impossible for the citizens to see link between the ceremonial rituals and a common identity.

**Giesen:** Firstly, it is important to separate identification to the state and identification to the nation. Secondly, rather than focusing on the Olympic Games we should look to the Catholic example or the public ritual where the Pope kisses the soil of different countries. This creates a global catholic audience which matters much more than any cunning and high-flung change in the Vatican.

**Haaland Matlary:** Comment to Giesen: Catholic identity has very little do with public ceremonies. One does not create Catholics out of public spectacles. Public spectacles cannot create identities, but they can create an interest in or enthusiasm for the community in question.

**Nedrebø:** Risse raised the question of whether the academic output on how to conceptualise the European public sphere is relevant for policy makers. The answer is yes, but mostly indirectly. Nedrebø’s contention is that academics lag behind actual policy development in Europe as well as in the perception of real politics. For example, the debates in the Convention on the future of Europe are way ahead of academic conceptualisations. There seems to be a romantic or idealistic notion that before anything can be done or established in Europe there must be a European demos. The historical experiences of state and nation building processes usually show the opposite. A European reality has been developing since 1951 and people are trying to come to terms with that, even in Norway. Identity is not an independent, but a dependent variable and governments should be very sceptical about turning identity formation into an active policy area. The aim of the state is not to create identities, but to serve in the interest of people. This is at least normatively correct, according to Nedrebø. Governments and states need to produce results more than rituals and ceremonies. Instead of focusing on ceremonies, rituals etc. one must think in a long-term perspective in order to build a common identity through means like school curricula, especially history teaching. Schools and universities educate the people who end up in the decision-making institutions. We should also keep in mind that nationalism is not thinkable without the European context, that is, national identities emerged because there was a common European heritage and identity prior to national communities and attachments.

**Melich:** Comment to Risse’s point on the relationship between cognitive and the affect dimensions in people’s identification or feelings about Europe: For many years the dominant argument within public opinion research was that the less you knew about the EU the more attached you were to the Union, i.e. knowledge about the Union had a negative effect on European identification. Research (there are qualitative EU studies available) shows, however, that there is absolutely no clear link between knowledge about and support of the EU.

Comment to Bruter’s distinction between the civic and cultural elements of collective identity: To Melich the civic element is attached to the private values whereas the cultural element is linked to public values. This is, however, perhaps only a matter of different terminology?

Giesen’s memo and emphasis on the importance of rituals is very interesting to Melich especially because she is a member of the Catalan Convention for the reform of Europe.
is an offspring of the Convention chaired by Giscard d’Estaing and it is only Catalunia and Poland that have organised conventions of their own. It should also be noted that there already exists a day of Europe (9 May). The problem, however, is not that no such day exists, but that no one knows about it. Children are not made aware of this in schools, newspapers hardly write about it etc.

Comment to Ichijo: Recommend the data set on the Regions of Europe from 1996. It is perhaps interesting to know that the governing structure of the Scottish government is based on the so-called Catalan model.

Sabathil: It seems safe to argue that there is a European identity, but that does not mean that it is or has to be practised every day or that it has to be linked to institutions. Look for example to the strong US identity and the low voter turn out in elections. The dilemma is, however, how to balance the different elements because the issue of a European identity is fraught with in-built paradoxes and the debate contains a combination of idealistic, rational and pragmatic approaches. With regard to the relationship between identity and the mass media we can conclude that there is no European mass media. There are regional, national and global news, but the European level is almost completely missing (cf. Udgaard’s point) and this contributes to silence Europe. In this connection it is interesting to observe that Norwegian identity has strong regional, domestic and global focuses. Norwegians identify perhaps more with Sri Lanka and Columbia than with Europe or it can at least be argued that they are primarily world citizens and only secondly Europeans. That the European level is lacking is to varying degrees also the case for the EU member states. Germany is another example where the focus is elsewhere, that is, there is arguably – and this was confirmed during the recent election – a change of identity or of the demos. The old identity or demos is being replaced by a new demos which includes the Turkish and East German populations.

In the process of building a European identity, we should keep in mind that historical identities are not necessarily examples to follow (national identities were largely built on war) and that we perhaps should welcome a post-modern identity. To develop a post-modern identity is much harder and will, of course, take a long time.

Finally, will the Convention contribute to identity building? Sabathil is sympathetic to Habermas’ conception of a constitutional patriotism and argues further that identities will necessarily always be paradoxical as they consist of very different elements. Hopefully, the outcome of the Convention can contribute to the building of a European constitutional patriotism.

Liberatore: Comment to Risse’s argument that the EU is not ‘real’ or tangible enough: This argument should be moderated because many people think that the EU interferes considerably in their lives in ways that does not make it particularly diffuse, think of milk quotas, social protection legislation, the awareness of rights etc. Consequently, the question is rather how this ‘reality’ can avoid being perceived as negative interference. A recent study has shown that more knowledge about the Union contributes to a more positive perception of the Union.

It is important not to mix the notion of demos/identity, polity and citizenship. The relationship between these components has to be carefully balanced in order to avoid that a European identity is founded on an antagonism towards non-Europeans. In this regard, Liberatore agrees with Nedrebo’s point that one should be very careful about introducing identity policies. Furthermore, she supports Ichijo’s argument that there is a need to disaggregate identities. For a European identity to develop and become relevant it is increasingly important to consider questions like whether Europe has a meaning for the Turkish population in
Berlin or for the Pakistani in London? Finally, history and collective memories do not necessarily represent obstacles to the discussion of common European curricula.

Føllesdal: There seems to be four conceptions of identity referred to in this debate. The first concerns who is included. The second concerns who we are enthusiastic about. The third is conceived around with whom we share similar values. The fourth is about whom we must trust in our common decision-making. In the long run, it is the latter conception that seems to be most important for the fostering of a common identity in the EU. A common identity is important in order to provide mutual trust between citizens in those policy areas where common decisions must be made.

Spohn: There is a difference in the way European identity is conceptualised in the memos and in the discussion. One the one hand, European identity is primarily connected to the EU whereas on the other hand, a European identity is linked to the larger Europe. The European moral community has very much to do with the historical legacies, the collective memories and the common experiences even in fighting each other. In this sense there is a relationship between this type of collective memory history culture and the ways in which the EU as an institution is built up and how the civic values relate to these cultural legacies. This picture looks different when the new members enter the EU because here the notion of the extended Europe and its historical legacies seem much more relevant as components for a common identity. Now, Giesen wants to establish a republican tradition in Europe, but is it not also necessary to include the many voices upon which the cultural identity of Europe is based, and perhaps particularly the troublesome nationalistic struggles and the overcoming of the European disaster which was one of the main motivations to build the EU? A European identity should not only reflect the reconciliation between the various people in Europe, but also the different voices and traditions within it. Perhaps this will provide a way to deal with the English/British question. Although the British are Euro-sceptic this does not mean that they reject Europe altogether. Rather, it may well be that they are Brussels-sceptic because the European type of democracy and civility somehow deviate from the British tradition and model.

Giesen: Firstly, trust and solidarity are foundational for any democracy. Secondly, Europe has to decide whether it wants to be a regime of enlightened absolutism based simply on the rule of law or whether it will be a true democracy. Thirdly, we have to distinguish between the constitutional patriotism and the democratic idea of sovereignty. The sovereign is above the constitution, he gives, installs and establishes the constitution and not the other way around. This is a fundamental flaw in the Habermasian position. Fourthly, no nation ever came into historical existence without a mixture between rituals (bottom-up) and political institutional interference (top-down).

SESSION II – PUBLIC SPHERES AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Memo I – Cathleen Kantner: Waiting for a European 'Progressive Era': The European Public and Its Problems

The debate about whether the EU can become democratic is often related to whether it is possible to establish a European public sphere. A public sphere is seen as a precondition for democracy. The question thus becomes whether it is possible for EU citizens to take part in a transnational political discourse? Kantner argues that political mass communication is indeed possible across the borders of different languages and media systems. The problem of the European public is not one of difficulties in understanding each other, but
rather one of how to link democratic institutions that establish arenas of public communication with political decision-making. In any modern political community we have to cope with different identities and opinions – no matter one or several languages – and we use different media in order to make up our minds about the political issues we are interested in. According to Kantner, Europeans have already entered the cycles of political mass communication on European issues, but democracy at the European level would help to improve this communication.

Only a common European identity in the weak sense is needed in order to establish European democracy. Europeans have to choose whether they recognise their interdependence and whether they are willing to deal with conflicts through democratic means. A European identity in the strong sense (i.e. a shared normative self-understanding) will develop (or not) from the positive and negative experiences in cooperative problem-solving. Common civic traditions and narratives develop when Europeans discursively reflect on their common history. The problem of the Public is to link political mass communication and political decision-making in the EU in a responsible, flexible fashion that respect the lasting differences between Europeans and leaving much space for democratic rule below the EU-level. What is needed is to invent new institutional arrangements – what is needed is a European progressive era.

Memo II – Thomas Risse: An Emerging European Public Sphere? What We Know and How to Make Sense of It

We know much more on European identity than on a European public sphere, particularly in the empirical field. In contrast to the debate on European identity, there is no agreement on theoretical criteria to evaluate whether a European public sphere exists. This consequently creates a situation where data are almost incomparable. Two questions are addressed in this memo: (1) What do we know empirically about a European public sphere? (2) How can we make sense of the empirical findings in light of the theoretical debate on a European public sphere? The short answer to first question is somewhat paradoxical: the available evidence suggests that the salience of European themes is still low, but that similar meaning structures and frames of reference prevail in media reporting on Europe. The short answer to the second question is that a European public sphere emerges out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres.

Theoretically, it is possible to speak of a European public sphere in a meaningful sense if (1) similar issues are communicated at the same time with the same salience or significance; (2) the speakers treat each other as legitimate voices in a community; (3) the reference points and meaning structures in which a particular policy problem is being communicated are similar across national publics. The empirical findings show that people do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one’s particular viewpoint to the issue in question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national sphere to another, as far as frames of interpretation are concerned. The data on frames of reference suggest that raising the salience of the EU in the national polities will not drive the Europeans apart, but rather pull them together into a common European public sphere. Contestation and politicisation should therefore not be seen as a threat to establishment of democratic institutions at the European level.
Memo III – Marianne Van de Steeg, Valentin Rauer and Sylvain Rivet: An Empirical Approach to the Public Sphere in the EU. Presented by Marianne Van de Steeg

Is there a European public sphere? The memo tries to answer this question through an empirical study of the Haider debate in five EU member states. Three questions were addressed: (1) How and to what degree does the debate differ in the five selected countries? (2) Is there a common horizon of reference beyond national or even political clusters? (3) What could these differences/similarities tell us about a possible European public sphere?

The data showed that all the newspapers, even the Austrian ones, use a similar reference horizon characterised by a positive common European vision and a negative notion of the Nazi past. It seems quite safe to conclude that various European national spheres refer to the same reference horizon and thus that there is no national cleavage on this issue. On a more abstract level it is possible to interpret these findings as a pattern of public self-definition which logically defines who belongs and does not belong to the community. Those who belong is expressed in the positive self-definition identified through those who defend the values of democracy, respect for human rights as well as the recognition of the EU as a legal institution. More striking is the excluded zone, the ‘them’ which is not identified as a particular country or person (it is neither Austria nor Haider), but rather a time-period, namely the European past. There is a strong consensus among all the newspapers that any resemblance of National Socialism is unacceptable.

Discussion – Chair: Jeff Checkel

Melich: General comment: Can we ever know what and if there is a European public sphere? According to Melich, it seems to be as hard to find out whether there is a European public sphere as it is to find out the sex of angels. This is not a normative comment. Whether there should be a public sphere is a different issue, it is the empirical aspect that puzzles Melich.

Question to Risse: Although often nationally framed, the Euro is a topic that has been discussed across the member states and which also is a genuinely European issue. Consequently, since many issues often are nationally framed and thus classified as national and not European, it can be extremely difficult – with the methods we have today – to discover a European public sphere by conducting a content analysis of the media.

Burgess: Question to Risse: Regarding the criteria for a public sphere (i.e. shared issues, shared discourses, shared meaning structure). But it is not also necessary to show that one country is aware of the other – that there is a communication between the countries internationally speaking?

Nedrebo: Comment: Although he agrees with the arguments and conclusions presented in the memos, Nedrebo argues that we have to look at the issue of a European identity and public sphere the other way around, that is, Europe is prior to nationality. Nations and national identities exist because there was a European history and heritage prior to the formation of the nation-state. It is the existence of Europe made national identities possible, not the other way around. Of course the communication at the national level is more intense than at the European level, but we are still Europeans. The policy implications of this has to do with the so-called mission civilisatrice of the EU, it has to go beyond the nation-state to create something new. Europe was the birth-place of the nation-state, but the EU is also the core of something that would go beyond the nation-state. Personally, Nedrebo thinks that we have to discuss a de-reification of the nation-state, it will be relativised and should
not thought of as the basic community. Rather, we need multiple identities and multiple public spheres (even a global one). The EU should think of itself as an alternative model to the UN. Whereas the UN is an intergovernmental body, the EU is something more than this and should strive to become a democracy. If we think in these terms, Turkish EU membership will not be a problem because just like the EU goes beyond nationality, it also goes beyond religion. But as long as Turkey accepts the acquis communautaire which represents the European heritage this will not be a problem.

**Burgess:** Can there be a European public sphere without the Europeans knowing it?

**Spohn:** Comment to the basic concept of the European public sphere: It seems as if this Eder/Kantner definition is a sort of pragmatic definition for empirical purposes and, as Kantner showed herself, the basic horizon is much broader. Secondly, Risse’s attempt to improve the empirical minimal definition of the public sphere is successful. It seems to be crucial that there is something like an imagined or communication community for a public sphere to appear. In this connection, the Haider example also works well. It is important to provide a thematisation of relevant European issues and to enhance the Europeaness of these issues. In addition, empirically there should also be an arena of transnational European communication flows. There is a confusion or at least lack of clarity between the notions of a European public sphere and a European democratic public sphere. The Habermas study is limited in this sense because it is analysing a particular German experience, namely the Bildungsbürger which is very different from the efforts to build a European public democratic space and is somehow related to democratic decision-making processes. In conclusion, the debate on the European public sphere is too ahistorical. We have a European public sphere, but it is not democratic.

**Kantner:** The question of whether there is a European public sphere and also whether there is a European identity are important issues to be clear because they are good excuses not to democratise the EU. It is therefore important to continue the discussions on the preconditions for democracy and a public sphere in the EU because otherwise there is a real risk that Union becomes paternalistic and autocratic and hinder people to get an opportunity to make up their minds about political decisions and use their rights in a responsible way. This will also be an obstacle to the development of even a weak European demos and thus also bad climate for European cooperation (everyone against everyone). The discussion about whether there is a European public sphere stems perhaps from the difference between whether political communication is taking place or not, on the one hand, and a democratic public sphere in the sense that public communication finds entrance into political decision-making. It is important to find ways to connect political communication with the institutions of decision-making in order to establish cycles of democratic decision-making and responsible citizenship.

**Liberatore:** The debate about whether there is or if it is possible to establish a European public sphere was – by policy circles in Brussels and elsewhere – quickly linked to the issue of democracy. Once this entered into the policy arena it was not about the public sphere in general, but about whether we have or whether it is possible to develop a European space that involves further democratisation of the Union. In this connection, the notion of the agora as the public space where people come together to discuss issues of common concern does not seem to be sufficiently discussed. It is also important not to forget that the European public sphere is not limited to the discussions taking place in the media. One should be aware of the role played by other public arenas than the media, especially parliaments, but also universities, schools etc. What is going on here? All these components of the public space contribute to generate public debate and should therefore be included in the analyses.
Giesen: Liberatore’s point is very important because we can see a tendency where leaders like Schröder, Blair and Berlusconi are avoiding the parliaments in the sense that they address the public directly through the media.

To Risse’s elaboration of the preconditions for a European public sphere, Giesen adds that it is not only important to recognise speakers abroad as legitimate, but also to respect the relevance for transnational audiences to the European public sphere. Moreover, it is a minimum precondition for a European public sphere that arguments and discussions are forwarded directly to a transnational audience.

There seems to be a surprising agreement on the definition of the evil in the research and even a surprising agreement on the repertoire of modes of coping with it, that is, moral crusading, bargaining, deliberation etc. However, the phrasing of it in each national sphere is different, i.e. national differences colour the ways in which the repertoires of modes of coping with the evil are phrased.

There is also a need to keep in mind the historical dimension when discussing the public sphere. There were three major discourses which contributed to the construction of Europe. The first was the Carolingian renaissance and the Medieval idea of the unity of sacrificium or latadotium(?) and imperium, i.e. the translation of the Roman Empire and was based on Christianity. The second discourse came after the devastating confessional wars and reflects the Enlightenment idea of polycentrism, not European unity as well as a polycentric system of balancing power based on sovereign states. The third discourse is the post-war consensus that a world war should never happen again and that Europe should be an area of peace. This was the discourse that directly gave rise to the establishment of the EU. All three discourses contributed to the EU we have today and they all responded to the collapse of internal peace. The first refer to the tribal wars occurring in the aftermath of the Roman Empire, the second to the confessional wars and the third to the second world war and the genocide. The ‘European mission’ is thus not only built on the latter discourse, but also on the first and the second.

Gheciu: Kantner concluded that common civic traditions and narratives develop if we discursively reflect on our common history. The question is who construct these narratives? Who are the political actors and what are the implications?

With regard to Van de Steeg’s memo, it is important to be aware of what kind of communities or public spheres that are invoked when reference to a common history is appealed to. This is a question of where to draw the boundaries of the public sphere in the sense that we have to keep in mind that there is a difference between Europe and the EU.

Ichijo: Two questions: Is there a need for a European public sphere? Of course in order to mend the democratic deficit problem. Ichijo has conducted interviews with European citizens for her own research. When she confronted the interviewees with the question ‘Do you know the arenas where you can participate in political debates on decisions that will affect your life?’ the answer is no. People do not know where to turn in order to participate in European discussions. For a European public sphere to be possible it seems to be crucial that people start worrying about how to get access to political discussions. When people were questioned about what they think are European values as opposed to American values, the respondents were able to articulate what they think that Europe is all about. These differences should be traced. Secondly, the conceptualisation of the European public sphere seems to be very universalistic in character. Which features make it genuinely European?
**Risse:** Response to Gheciu’s argument that the EU has been equated with Europe: This is all about construction. This does, however, not mean that you cannot contest it. But with regard to the frame of reference you cannot talk about Europe as something up in the air. The EU has, so to speak, colonised the conception of Europe as a moral project. Bridgid Laffan goes even further when she argues that the EU is constitutive for modern statehood in Europe, that is, you cannot be a modern state in Europe without to some extent also referring to the EU, even if you are not a member. We are talking about constitutive features and it is not a question of whether you agree with it.

Comment to Burgess on the methodological aspect of the Haider data set or that empirical indicators regarding the member states’ awareness of each other’s debates should be included in the study: In the Haider debate it was pervasive that the member states were aware of the debates in the other countries. It was not just a coincidence that the topic was framed similarly in the different member states. If you process the data from the beginning to the end, it will become clear that the framing originated somewhere and in this case the French media seems to be particularly significant. It can be argued that there was a mutual awareness across the national public sphere. It is, however, more difficult to show what Giesen argued, namely that the participants in the public debates directed their arguments directly to a transnational audience and in that sense treated non-nationals as part of a common communal setting. Finally, it should be noted that we picked the Haider case as an empirical example in order to find out something about the European public sphere – a topic we know very little about. It is very hard to generalise from this single case to other cases and the conclusions generated should therefore be used cautiously.

**Føllesdal:** There seems to be three debates going on. The first concerns a philosophical question about whether it is possible to conceive of a meaningful European public sphere. The second debate relates to Dieter Grimm’s approach to the public sphere, namely that while we wait for an influential European public sphere to materialise we should be a bit weary about making decisions according to a majoritarian method. The third debate revolves around the notion that we now have elements and traces of a normative European public sphere. In order to find out whether there is a link between the public debate and political decision-making we must ask whether there is any evidence that people make up or change their minds as a result of European mass media or European wide discussions on issues that affect their political decisions.

**Van de Steeg:** Response to Gheciu and Ichijo: There is no claim in the memo that what was presented as a European identity is limited to or only characteristic of the current western member states. Rather, a European identity was defined as being against Nazism.

To Spohn and the question of communication flows: It is very important to show that there is significant communication between the different arenas and countries, but it is more difficult to conduct such a study. In a media study the focus is on the process. There seems to be a community of discourse between the national leaders and elites, but it is hard to get direct access to these debates or to follow the communication flows across the borders because they are not always commented in the media. There is a community of international European intellectuals who write articles that appear in different European newspapers.
The EU’s decision to enlarge towards Central and Eastern Europe is based on how these countries comply with the Copenhagen criteria and how their membership qualifications are evaluated in the annual progress reports. In these reports cultural criteria are not important variables of evaluation, i.e. the state of national identities and European orientations do not play a role. If these ‘soft variables’ are considered at all, the predominant view is that apart from the East/West divide in socio-economic and political-institutional unevenness there is no parallel East/West divide in terms of national cultures and collective identities. In this memo, Spohn argues the opposite, namely, that there – due to different historical legacies – is an East/West divide also in national identities, collective memories and European orientations and that these matter and should be taken seriously by Enlargement policymakers.

The long-term legacies of the East Central and South Eastern societies relate to the history of dominating empires and thus peripheral forms of nation-state building. The short-term legacies are built on these long-term legacies and concentrated on the double-sided trauma as victims both of German Nazism and Soviet Communism. As a result, the new Europe and the EU’s Eastern Enlargement are both seen from the perspective of these traumas and the related concerns of a renewed peripheral dependence. It is possible to identify seven problem zones and seven corresponding policy issues of this cultural East-West divide in the composition of collective identities: (1) On the basis of the high importance of national sovereignty and low national integration in the Eastern countries, the EU constitutional Charter should put special emphasis on the legal specification as well as public presentation of the institutional relations between the EU and the nation-states and the related subsidiarity principle. (2) Regarding the special traumas linked to WWII and the Cold War era and the related anxieties particularly vis a vis Germany, EU policymakers should increase the support to the creation of multi-vocal cultural spaces between the nations to address the issues of the past. (3) Regarding the fears of a modernist secularist Westernisation of the Eastern national cultures, EU policymakers should be more explicit about the European value culture as a pluralistic culture, secular as well as religious, in which nationalist, socialist and religious values have a legitimate place provided that the pluralistic framework of the European civic culture is accepted. (4) Regarding the particular and eventually growing importance of the social risk zones in the new member states and their receptivity (inclination) to anti-Western and anti-European resentments, the EU policymakers should increase support for European intercultural programmes which address the social problems and cultural anxieties of these social risk groups. (5) Regarding the continuing ethno-national problems, particularly in the new Eastern border regions, EU policymakers should not only demand the protection of minority rights, but also invest more in intercultural programmes to intervene in these ethno-national conflict zones. (6) International migration to Western European countries does not automatically generate European orientations. On the contrary, the discriminating experiences in Western Europe contribute to growing nationalistic attitudes of working migrants. EU policymakers should therefore demand more forcefully from the current member states adequate citizenship rules and intercultural programmes to protect and reach the large number of undocumented migrants. (7) Regarding the widespread doubts of the Europeanness of Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine and the likelihood or certainty of non-accession of these countries, EU policymakers should, instead of
leaving the accession options vaguely open, consider a privileged in-between status for these countries including a quasi-inclusion of the whole of Cyprus and the Kaliningrad enclave.

**Memo II – Alexandra Gheciu: NATO and the Construction of Liberal-Democratic Identities in Post-Cold War Central and East European Countries**

Contrary to conventional wisdom in international relations theory, empirical studies show that a military organisation such as NATO is not just concerned with military power and the balance of material capabilities in the international arena, it has also contributed significantly to the construction of liberal democratic identities in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, looking at the post-Cold War period, Gheciu suggests that there is significant evidence that NATO has been systematically involved in the dissemination of a particular set of Western defined liberal democratic norms in Eastern and Central Europe.

At first glance one may think that NATO has tried to influence the Central and East Europeans through the use of instrumental incentives and sanctions (e.g. either grant or refuse membership depending on the performance of the candidate state). But it seems that NATO has done much more than that. In order to project norms onto the former Communist countries, NATO has been involved in a series of practices that are mainly aimed at leading selected actors from the former Communist countries to accept a given set of Western defined liberal democratic norms as the correct foundation of their polities and as such, as norms that are desirable in themselves rather than being attached to an international reward.

Through successful educational programmes targeted at political and military elites, but also the so-called ‘baby-politicians’ and ‘baby-generals’, i.e. the younger actors, NATO relied mainly on two strategies of norm transmission: teaching and persuasion. Teaching involved dissemination of very broad ideas of what liberal democracy means or should mean. Persuasion was more narrowly targeted and persuasive appeals that were essentially aimed at convincing Central and Eastern Europeans that some of their policies were flawed and that alternative policies, i.e. those prescribed by NATO, would be much more beneficial to their countries. NATO’s efforts were not always successful, but they did have in many instances a significant impact on many of the targeted Central and Eastern European actors as the study on the Czech Republic and Romania shows. Through the use of teaching and persuasion, NATO influenced the way in which political elites as well as younger military officers and civilians thought about appropriate norms of domestic governance and international behaviour of their polity. NATO’s experience in the Czech Republic and Romania reinforces the conclusion that, if the international community is to bring about significant and sustainable change in ex-communist countries, it will need to find complex ways of mixing strategies designed to affect not simply short-term strategic behaviour (through the use of sanctions), but dominant ways of thinking, social practice and domestic institutions as well.

**Discussion – Chair Thomas Risse**

Ichijo: When reading Gheciu’s paper, Ichijo was reminded of the post-war Japanese experience when the Allies came to Japan to teach them about democracy. The interventions made by the Allies did not work very well because Japan was not accustomed to democracy, i.e. you cannot force people to be free. Is the EU trying to adopt this model? And if
yes, is it not then acting as an enlightened absolute monarch? Is this going to produce a European demos?

**Nedrebø**: Is there a preconceived notion in Spohn’s paper that the Central and Eastern European countries are second-rate nation-states compared to the North Western European ideas of the nation-state? For instance, what does it mean that the Central and Eastern European countries represent peripheral forms of state and nation formation? Peripheral to what? What is the centre in this notion? We should rather think of the Central and Eastern countries as representing different legacies and traditions of European polity models. Just because they were dominated by multi-ethnic empires and not representatives of homogeneous nation-states (like e.g. France, England, Norway, Denmark, Sweden etc.) it does not mean that the Central and Eastern states should be defined as the periphery or second-rate states. One should also keep in mind that many of the Central and Eastern European states were industrially advanced before they became Communist and dominated by the Soviet Union. Before WWII Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic countries were industrially advanced states, not second rate or lagging behind the Western European states. The problem for these countries has been the dominance of the Soviet Union and Communism. We have to make an effort to shed preconceptions that are based on the Cold War situation.

**Giesen**: Comment relating to the interventions of Nedrebø and Ichijo: There is a range of variation regarding the processes of state formations in Europe. Firstly, there is the nation state which represents the most recent development. Secondly, there is the idea of enlightened absolutism where no demos is needed, but rather a strong centre, a high degree of rule of law and a devotion to reason. The Brussels administration comes close to this model at the moment. And thirdly, there is the empire model or what we can call the Habsburg model which is characterised as de-centred, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and with a high tolerance level of diversity. The drawback is that this model relies on a strong centre, it relies on the tension between a strong centre and a kind of expensive and shifting frontier zone like the Habsburg empire had. This is the reason why the Habsburg model would not work in the EU. Moreover, it would also counter the central role of legitimacy played in the discussions on the idea of a European demos. It is impossible to skip the issue of democracy even when democracy yields bad outcomes (e.g. Hitler was voted into power through democratic procedures). We should face the fact that democracy is no remedy against catastrophic political outcomes, but it plays a central role in political discourse.

**Bruter**: There is still no agreement on the definition of a European identity, but a triangle of three components has surfaced during the discussions. The first side of the triangle has, as Gheciu pointed out, to do with norms or so to speak with literal integration and Europeanisation, a common picture of Europe. This is almost a kind of objective identity. The second has to with what Melich and Føllesdal referred to as values, trust and interpersonal relationships, that is, the very foundational elements of identity. The third component relates to something deeper and is, of course, harder to measure. This component is closest to how Bruter himself and Risse understand identity.

Bruter’s understanding of identity and the distinction between the cultural and civic components does not refer to the public/private distinction mentioned by Melich, but has rather more to do with what Giesen defined as the difference between state- and nation identifications. It is interesting to notice that whether people emphasise the cultural or the civic components of a European identity also has implications for their attitudes towards Eastern Enlargement. Bruter does not know how this patterns in the accession countries, but when individual citizens in already existing member states were asked about their identification with Europe and their attitudes towards Enlargement, surveys show that the cultural/civic
distinction yields different opinions about Eastern integration. Those who can be said to hold a cultural identification with Europe (i.e. an identity based on common values, common historical heritage etc.), are the ones who want to further European integration and who are positive to the Enlargement process. In contrast, those who can be said to hold a civic identification with Europe (i.e. who emphasise the rights and advantages of membership), are the ones who are predominantly against Enlargement even when they in general can be said to be strong supporters of the Union. It is a big question mark regarding how many pro-European citizens of the EU who actually perceive the question of Enlargement as a trade-off between greater cultural consistency, on the one hand, and looser political integration, on the other hand.

Sabathil: Comment on Giesen’s comment: The EU should not only be seen as a centralised and highly bureaucratic organisation. The Convention debate indicates something else as does the fact that the Council not only meets in Brussels but also in a number of different cities in the member states. Moreover, the rotating Presidency system means that the political leadership changes every six months. In addition, the common European legal system leave the member states a significant room to manoeuvre in order to adjust directives according to national law. Consequently, the EU is both centred and de-centred, but the latter is not often underlined.

Comment on Nedrebø’s comment: Sabathil very much agrees with Nedrebø, but it should be remembered that before the Cold War the Czech Republic was the only Eastern European country that was just as industrialised as the Western European countries. Apart from the Czech Republic there was a big gap in modernisation between the East and the West. Currently, these countries are struggling through two transformations, i.e. from Communism and the adjustment to the European system. In this connection it is important not to forget that six of the ten accession countries are new states that appeared after 1989. How does this fact impact on the integration process? The Enlargement process is not over in 2004 because the forging of a new identity, new frontlines and new majorities between the countries are not done over night. During this process important issues and questions will arise: Will there be a block inside the Union? How will the Council change when the number of member states increases from 15 to 25? Will new coalitions appear? Will the South appear as a strong alliance fighting to keep their funds? If Turkey joins the EU, there will be the same number of Muslims as Protestants in the EU. Moreover, Enlargement will not only involve an increase in the number of Catholics and Muslims, it will also significantly increase the number of atheists. This fact will, of course, affect a European identity. In sum, there are many new features that will influence and change the character of EU identity.

Checkel: General comment: Adding the accession countries to the cultural mix of the EU is going to have severe academic and policy implications for how we think about a European identity or a European public sphere. How shall this be approached? This is an important issue to keep in mind.

One interesting observation, seen from the practical policy level, is that Gheciu and Kelley, who come from very different theoretical perspectives, actually share the same bottom line that effective-, on-the-ground change in the candidate countries (whatever the organisation involved; NATO, EU, OSCE) is triggered by a combination of conditionality, persuasion, teaching etc. This seems to be a very robust finding across the whole set of studies and should have policy implications.

Risse: This comment is more a kind of self-critical assessment regarding the work on Enlargement particularly in the political science field: So far there seems to have been two
kinds of focuses here. The first is concerned with the question of what kind of impact Western institutions (e.g. the EU, NATO etc.) have on the Eastern European countries. Secondly, there is a set of pretty well-informed work and a lot of worries about what the whole thing means for the institutional structure of the EU starting with Sabathil’s point on the rotating Presidency system. There is, however, no work as of yet on how the Enlargement process transforms the EU apart from the fact that the number of members in the Council and the other institutions will increase significantly. In other words, Sabathil’s point is very important in this regard and there is a need for new and good work in this field in order to facilitate comparative studies. Both the Southern and the 1994 Enlargements transformed the EU enormously not only institutionally, but also concerning the questions of a European identity and the public sphere.

Melich: Identity is not only a romantic idea, it also has to do with economic interests and material benefits, power and influence. These more instrumental elements of collective identities should not be forgotten when we discuss the Eastern Enlargement process. One should perhaps learn from the processes of state and nation building where welfare played a crucial role.

Kelley: Comment to Gheciu and the teacher/student relationship NATO seems to endorse: The terminology in NATO is quite tellingly paternalistic when they think of the Eastern European actors not as juniors, the future elites or the next generation, but merely as babies, i.e. baby generals and baby politicians. Logically, this also implies a notion of the Eastern European states as baby democracies where the Western actors become the nurturers of democracy and which in the end also gives them more leverage and influence in the Eastern European countries. This point also feeds into the comment made by Ichijo about asymmetry in the sense that it matters who the teacher is. It does not even have to be about power asymmetry, it can just as well be about an image, a reputation or an admiration for the teacher as an institution to be listened to as NATO obviously has been. If we for example take the Council of Europe where workshops with teaching aspects very similar to those of NATO’s have been conducted, it is not so sure that we will end up with the same empirical finding, i.e. that these workshops will result in a normative change. It is hard to tell whether this is because the Council of Europe does not enjoy the same kind of status or power asymmetry as NATO or whether it is because they do not have the same access to (for the same reason they do not have the power asymmetry) the same level of personnel. This is a question of the status or reputation of the teacher and the level of access to the students to be taught.

Liberatore: General comment: The relation between identity changes, enlargement processes and perceived security and insecurity have only been implicitly detectable in some of the memos and the discussions, but this dimension should be made more explicit, especially with regard to the issue of social risks. This dimension has not only consequences for scientific and political analysis, it has also policy implications. Spohn argued that the Enlargement process will increase the level of social risks and that a solution to this could be multicultural programmes. Liberatore agrees that this is important, but in this connection Liberatore argued that Melich’s point about increasing the level of welfare would perhaps be an even better instrument to deal with the risks of social and economic polarisation. Liberatore thinks that it makes a difference if the EU more often chooses a welfare system, rather than an IMF approach or at least a combination of the two in order to help mitigate the social risks involved in a situation of social and economic polarisation. Another related point is how we think about conflict resolution mechanisms. We tend think in terms of borders, but conflicts happen just as often across or within borders.
Comment to Gheciu: To think about soft rather than hard core issues concerning organisations such as NATO illustrates that a huge transformation has taken place. What are the explanatory factors regarding the fact that there has been more inclination in the Central and East European countries to join NATO than the EU? Maybe it has to with the lower threshold for accession in NATO than in the EU? Not only is it quite difficult to incorporate the acquis communautaire, but maybe the Central and Eastern European countries conceive EU membership to require a stronger change of identity than joining NATO and that this is an important reason why they prefer NATO membership?

Checkel: Comment and information: With regard to the issues of conflict resolution mechanisms it can be worthwhile to know that both in Norway and Germany there are groups of scholars who have conducted and have a rather long tradition on conducting peace and conflict resolution studies that can be of interest in this connection.

Udgaard: Will the competition on security issues between NATO and the EU affect the building of a European identity? NATO has accepted new countries (and is about to accept Romania and Bulgaria in the next few weeks) much sooner and with less demanding requirements than the EU. Will the EU’s policy towards the accession states change the attitude in these countries in a way that will have a detrimental effect on the building of a common European identity? Through NATO, the Americans have direct impact on identity formation at the internal level in the Eastern European countries. It is hard today to see that the EU is leading a very decisive security policy. An example can be found in a speech by Chris Patten in Chicago some weeks ago. This speech also represents a good account of the European view on the rivalry between the EU and the US. Patten went pretty far in his speech arguing that we have to discuss the reasons for terrorism in the sense that the focus must change and different aspects must be explored. The reasons for terrorism is not only poverty, it is also hatred and the feeling of armed groups that they are being suppressed. Patten compared the destruction of Buddha statues in Afghanistan with the crushing of Catholic crucifixes in protestant churches some 400 years ago in our part of the world. Altogether, it is possible to look at Patten’s speech as identity formation. Here is a key European leader telling the Americans that they have to look at the issue from different angles. With regard to terrorism, the Europeans and the Americans conceive the situation differently and the open attitude to discuss these matters says something about European identity.

Risse: Udgaard made a very important comment about the relationship between Europe and the US and about the foreign policy dimension of identity building. It is hard to tell whether the difference between the US and Europe only has to do with the sitting US administration or whether it reflects a larger trend in American society, but we seem to be moving into a situation of competing world order concepts. See how the reaction against terrorism is framed in Europe compared to the US. In the US, three days after September 11th it was announced that this was a war against terrorism, i.e. it is a military security frame. In Europe, very few people talk about war on terrorism, but rather about the fight against terrorism in the form of law enforcement, intelligence etc. Here there is a much more limited role for the military, partly because the capacity is lacking. In sum, it is all about the framing of identities and competing world order concepts. This is clearly reflected in the debate on the international criminal court. What status should international law have? What and who is above international law?

Checkel: Comment: The relationship between the EU and the US is missing in the memos prepared for this conference and it is therefore very important that this issue has been picked up in the discussions. A lot of complicated changes seem to be taking place in the
US and it is important to be aware of the impact these changes will have on an emerging European identity.

Spohn: Response to Nedrebo: It is not the intention to build in a normative or pejorative understanding of the Eastern European countries by characterising them as belonging to the periphery. A conceptualisation will always involve values, but to define these countries as the periphery is not intended to involve a normative statement. In addition, there are also huge variations between the Eastern European countries. It is, however, fair to say that with regard to independent nation-state building the East differs greatly from the West. This is part of Spohn’s notion of peripherality and has had long-term consequences for national identities in the Eastern European countries.

Spohn’s main point is that one has to take into consideration the ambiguity of national identities vis-à-vis the European Union and it is in this connection his 7 proposals should be carefully discussed. The cultural aspect is crucial, but this does, however, not mean that Spohn finds economic factors unimportant regarding the problem of social risks. Rather, it means that the cultural aspect plays a vital role in understanding the differences between the East and the West. Take for instance Poland. Polish catholic nationalism is very strong on the Polish countryside in exactly those areas that are vulnerable or most likely to be in the social risk zones. If you want to get along with Poland you have to address these issues directly. The same goes for the Czech Republic which feels inferior or weak compared to its powerful German neighbour. There is a need for an open arena to discuss these fears otherwise Europeans will not get along with one another.

Gheciu: Response to Kelly on NATO terminology and the baby generals: This terminology is, of course, not official language, but this wording is arguably not a coincidence as there often seems to exist a prior understanding of authority. The interesting thing is that there must be a mutual recognition of the student/teacher roles in order to make such a relationship work and this seems to be the case in the NATO/Eastern European states scenarios.

Response to Liberatore: Regarding the changes in the East versus the change in the West in the late 1980s before the collapse of the Soviet empire. Of course the West is also affected by the changes in the East, it is important to look at it both ways because these changes go in cycles and are inter-linked. NATO was also changed.

Response to Udgaard on the issue of competition between NATO and the EU in terms of security: This is an important issue and Gheciu thinks that the fact that some countries are allowed to join NATO but not the EU will have implications for the understanding of what it means to hold a European identity and eventually also for the support of European security institutions.

SESSION IV – SOCIALIZATION DYNAMICS IN THE EU AND BEYOND

Memo I – Jan Beyers: Multiple Sites of European Socialization

In this memo, Beyers investigates whether Council officials in the Council working parties (hereinafter the CWP) promote the project of European common policy-making, whether they act as Community decision-makers or whether they just act as member-state representatives who confine their task to defend and negotiate national positions.

Research shows that European allegiances do not or do not only originate from the experiences actors have with the European level. It was observed that domestic institutional patterns are quite thick and difficult, maybe impossible, to be replaced by European or other
allegiances. Most officials entering the EU-level are strongly pre-socialised at the domestic level which represents their primary socialisation site. The most likely scenario is that domestic socialisation is supplemented with, not replaced by, a secondary European socialisation and that this secondary European socialisation is significantly shaped by domestic factors. That European socialisation is secondary rather than primary is not unimportant. Firstly, an increasing number of member-states means a greater level of interaction complexity due to the involvement of a larger spectre of national habits and customs. Secondly, ambitious road maps for the integration of Europe towards a supranational federal system are not likely to be successful if they do not take into account the importance of domestic politico-administrative situations. In this respect, an extensive committee system with intergovernmental features, such as the CWPs, does not necessarily contradict the ambitions of the Commission. In general, the atmosphere in CWPs is cooperative. Face-to-face interactions in committees prevent intergovernmental bargaining to become a public battle between the member-states which consequently also prevents the likelihood of reinforcing nationalistic populist political anti-European tendencies.


How do decision-making processes unfold in the European Union? What decides who get what, when and how?

EU institutions in general, and the Council Working Parties (CWPs) in particular, are complex institutions with different roles to play. It seems that the Council of Ministers and its working groups are primarily intergovernmental institutions, but with a significant supranational component. This supranational component is primarily indicated in this memo by the supranational role perceptions evoked by the officials at the permanent representations who attend the CWPs. Moreover, these committees should also be conceived as expert groups with the role of solving complex and technical issues among independent experts. However, despite the institutional complexity of the CWPs in particular, as well as the EU institutions generally, some institutional dynamics seem to exceed others. In the Council, the intergovernmental dynamic seems to be the most important one. However, we have located some ‘cells’ of supranationalism among the permanent representatives who interact and socialise fairly intensively and informally. These officials ‘go native’, as we say.

‘Going native’ in EU committees, however, do not imply that the officials ‘stay native’ when they return to their domestic ministries and agencies. After their stay in Brussels, these officials are likely to put greater emphasis on their national and sectoral roles. The current memo, however, has emphasised that permanent representatives who attend EU committees with a high degree of intensity are more likely to ‘stay native’ than officials having only occasional trips to Brussels.

Memo III – Judith Kelley: Membership Conditionality and Domestic Change in Eastern Europe

This memo deals with how international organisation such as the EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe can use institutional membership incentives to change and influence domestic political situations. Despite the fact that many domestic situations appear very difficult and are tempting to ignore, international institutions and their member states
should realise that the attraction of membership is often sufficient to overcome even quite apparent and strong domestic opposition.

When institutions link incentives such as membership to behavioural norms, they become powerful actors on the domestic policy scene. The key is to target the rewards so that they appeal to the leadership’s calculation of costs and benefits. It is also important to pay attention to the design of the conditionality strategy and to seek to incorporate gradual progress rewards, checks on the credibility of the linkage, and clear, consistent communication that is coordinated with other institutions pursuing similar goals.

**Discussion – Chair: Thomas Risse**

**Melich**: Question to Beyers and Trondal: Is it possible to argue that European citizens conceive their national representatives in the Council to be socialised into a supranational identity to the extent that the citizens question whether they any longer represent the national interest, i.e. that they somehow have lost some of their legitimacy in their respective states?

Melich wonders if this was the case in 1992, in the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty which ended with a no-vote. During the campaign before the ballot was cast, the Danish Commissioner, Henning Christophersen, had recommended to vote yes in the referendum, but his interference was by many Danes interpreted negatively. Many have argued that his support harmed the yes-vote because he, through his work in Brussels, was socialised into a supranational identity and consequently no longer representing the Danish people.

**Risse**: Question to Kelley: What are the implications of Kelley’s insights for our previous discussions today? Although it is politically correct to promote ethnic minority rights, the baseline in Kelley’s memo is how to make the Eastern European states comply. Logically, it follows that the discussions conducted so far in this conference are all very nice, but not relevant. Why should the East comply with already given standards, this is paternalistic. Should they not contribute to set the standards?

**Egeberg**: Comment: Strangely, it is only now, in the fourth session of the conference, that the relationship between identity and concrete EU institutions (e.g. the Commission, EP etc.) has been mentioned for the first time. If the goal is to create primary European loyalties and allegiances one has to create European institutions, like the Commission, the European Central Bank etc. It is these institutions that may have the ability to provide people with a primary allegiance to the EU rather than to the nation-state. An alternative way of searching for a European identity is to look to what Risse called crosscutting identities and develop allegiances and loyalties that cut across national borders in order to provide sectorial, functional, ideological, partisan, environmental interest identifications. The special thing about the EU compared to other regional organisations is that its institutions are organised in such a way that they encourage and even oblige people to hold multiple identities and affiliations. Beyers’ and Trondal’s memos confirm that this is the case.

**Føllesdal**: Practical observations regarding all three memos: If the aim is to strategically socialise new members, what kind of European identity is one actually looking for? The empirical findings from Beyers’ and Trondal’s memos suggest that the affiliations of international officials change through socialisation in the EU committee system. But what kind of socialisation is actually going on? A change of strategic behaviour or real identity change? The fact that the officials discover that they must enter into new coalitions does not necessarily involve a change of identities. This should be clearer because there can be
confusion about the character of the socialisation that has been going on. An alternative kind of socialisation that seems to be closer to the IDNET understanding is what we know from several federal arrangements and what the Germans call Bundestreue. This model is built on the idea of a combined commitment to one’s own sub-unit as well as to the interests of all those living in the Union, a marble cake kind of affiliations. In federal arrangements where the powers are more clearly defined and divided, individuals seem to have a much better understanding of when they can expect their representatives to pursue which interests, i.e. national or regional. The problem in Europe is that role expectations are very unclear, people do not know when to be loyal to what (cf. the Danish Commissioner in the Danish referendum).

Risse: Lewis has a chapter that deals specifically with the COREPER and the dynamics of socialisation which can here be characterised as following the logic of appropriateness. Brigid Laffan call this the ‘double hating’, i.e. that the representatives have to wear two hats, they must balance the European and the national aspects. They can neither be too European nor too nationally oriented. In order to increase their bargaining power inside the COREPER they must actually be able to combine both roles

Melich: The role expectations in all the EU institutions are very clear, except perhaps for the MEP’s who are elected in their countries and who represent a nationality, but whose mandate are to be MEPs of Europe.

Føllesdal: The problem, however, is that there is no shared understanding of how the role expectations are supposed to be interpreted.

Risse: Unlike in Germany where the Bundestreue is almost legally formalised, in the EU the COREPER system is completely informal.

Nedrebø: Anecdote relating to Kelley’s memo: In 1996 Nedrebø was in charge of the Council of Europe in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs when discussing the membership of among others Croatia. There seemed to be agreement between the majority of the other member countries that they too were doubting or having reservations about whether Croatia fulfilled the membership conditions (i.e. rule of law, respect for human rights etc.). Suddenly and with no explanation everything changed and everyone wanted to take Croatia onboard. Norway was too small to change, ask questions and or contest Croatia’s membership. There is no clarity concerning why and who made the other countries change their minds in this case. It only serves to show that powerful persuasion was going on.

Checkel: Comment to Kelley: It is true that the strategy of the Council of Europe to accept new members right away and then try to make them comply with the norms and rules of democracy, human rights, rule of law etc. has failed seriously (e.g. Ukraine and Russia). Kelley argued basically that once you get the incentive structure right, the ‘student’ will behave/comply with the conditions set by the organisation. This may be right, but is it not too early to tell? Look at the experiences of the IMF. Instead of improving the situation, there seems to be political backlash ahead for the countries where the IMF is involved. Moreover, is it not wrong to entirely dismiss the efforts of the Council? For instance, the Council has introduced the principle of equality which states that every member should be treated equally. This means that for example Belgium and Denmark have received negative reports on the minority rights situation from the Council of Europe. Can this be a way of potentially minimizing the domestic political backlash that may be emerging in Eastern Europe?
Kelley: Response to Checkel: It was not the intention to mock the Council of Europe and it is Kelley’s opinion that the Council of Europe, OSCE and the EU should cooperate on these issues. One thing that was not mentioned in the memo was that the EU would have been in trouble concerning the question of minority rights had it not been for the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The latter organisations had already developed definitions, standards and criteria for minority rights, upon which the EU relied heavily. Consequently, the OSCE and the Council of Europe were both very influential in formulating what the EU actually wanted in this field. Moreover, there has been an inter-institutional influence process between these organisations with regard to minority questions.

On the issue of ownership, the IMF and whether there will be a backlash: The main difference and the advantage the EU and its institutions have compared to the IMF is that the EU is still there once the request is granted, that is, it is possible to disassociate oneself from the IMF. With the EU, it is different because after a country fulfils the requirements it becomes part of a community that is fairly well integrated at least compared to the IMF. The IMF is a loosely integrated, if at all, organisation whereas the EU is a legally integrated organisation that has significantly stronger capacity to penalise countries that do not meet the membership conditions. It has to do with durability of membership.

Comment to Nedrebø: It is not clear what happened in the Croatia case, but one thing that is sure is that this was a dilemma for the Council of Europe in the sense that its institutions were weak and that it desperately needed to re-constitute its own validity and relevance in order to survive after the Cold War. Consequently, it tried to do so by taking on the members it had been criticising for years. In contrast, the EU did not need to enlarge in order to survive as an organisation.

Response to Risse: It was not the intention to discredit the previous debate. Like Risse pointed out, the focus is different. Kelley is not talking about identity changes, but about compliance and legislative changes and it is not the intention to make normative judgments about whether this is right or whether this is how it should be done. It is also important to be aware that conditionality in this connection is not meant as a substitute for normative persuasion approaches. For example when the EU turned on the incentive mechanism, it was important for the accession countries to gain good scores in the Commission’s annual reports on how the reforms were going in the candidate countries. The EU turned on an incentive system that the candidate countries cared about, even if this meant just implementing a few reforms a couple of months before the reports were coming out. For the candidate countries it has been important what the EU says about their countries in the sense that they want to achieve benefits from the EU system.

Trondal: Response to Melich: Do supranational roles de-legitimises decisions in the eyes of the citizens? Are supranational roles de-legitimising in the national sphere? Trondal is not sure about this, but it seems logical to argue that this is not very relevant with regard to output legitimacy because the citizens are not used to participating in the processes of implementing law-making even at the national level. However, to obtain legitimacy on the input side is more problematic with regard to interest group representation because these groups are usually nationally organised and can therefore face problems of being heard by the civil servants. Another point that relates to this issue is the question of what matters or how do civil servants influence EU committees, what are the success criteria in order to get your voice heard in these committees? Surveys show that both intensive contact with EU committees and substantive skills among the officials matter for gaining influence. Consequently, the lack of access for the nationally organised interest groups may imply that it is not so important to get input from the citizens through the interest groups.
Comment to Føllesdal about the clarity of role perceptions: This reminds Trondal more about representative ambiguity involving that officials have to cope with and balance several roles at the same time. Maybe it is better to think about this as something that one has to find a way to live with rather than trying to dissolve it.

_Beyers:_ Melich made an important point about whether officials working in supranational institutions take on a supranational identity and therefore lose legitimacy in the eyes of their compatriots. This is, of course, an important concern, but Beyers does not think we have to be pessimistic because survey data show that domestic socialisation is still the most important or primary socialisation and that European socialisation is secondary or a supplement to domestic identification. Beyers’ concern here is not necessarily the awareness of a growing European public about how the EU system is working but rather the domestic political elites’ seeming lack thereof. What is more disturbing is exactly that the domestic political elites are not aware of how the EU system is working and therefore often end up in what Risse called blame shifting. There is something dubious going on here. It is also important to be aware of the fact that officials in Council working groups adopt a style of decision-making that is not characterised by pure bargaining because of the expected durability of cooperation, i.e. that since decision-making will take place in the future too, the officials cannot rely merely on pure bargaining.

_Checkel:_ Most empirical work shows the importance of domestic embeddedness, (be it in the Council, EU committees, Eastern Europe etc.), that is, the importance of domestic politics and domestic institutional legacies for identity and socialisation.

_Risse:_ Comment on blame shifting: This is a far more serious problem than has been emphasised so far. It is not only that the officials do not know how the EU system works, they often consciously uses the EU system to avoid responsibility. The same representatives negotiate and agree on decisions within the EU institutions and when confronted with the results by the media they tell a completely different story, i.e. that they have been forced to adopt the agreement/deal. This has disastrous consequences because it creates an understanding that the EU only interferes with national politics in a negative way and it is possible to explain it by the national officials’ problem of accountability nationally. For example, the German environmental minister in the Council of Ministers was promoting a certain directive that he was unable to get through the German legislative process then goes to Brussels. When meeting the press, he pretends as if the other countries forced him to adopt the position he is actually defending.