Thematic Network

EUROPEANIZATION, COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSES (*IDNET*)

Final report

Edited by
MATTHIAS L. MAIER and THOMAS RISSE

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Abstract

IDNET is an interdisciplinary research network dedicated to questions of European identity, comprising political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and historians. Its primary objective was to investigate the processes by which, and the outcomes with which, Europeanisation impacts upon and transforms collective identities relating to the nation-state. Mass media and public discourses as well as individuals' direct interactions in more private settings were analysed to this effect, with a special emphasis on various forms of socialisation processes. Regarding the outcomes of processes of identity formation and change, particular attention was paid to the identification with Europe as opposed to, or in addition to, other collectivities; and to the substantive memories and values constituting a European identity. Process- and outcome-oriented perspectives were combined in analyses of the existence and the character of a European public sphere, as well as in discussions of the Eastern enlargement and its impact on European and national identities.

IDNET has shown, among other things, (1) that European and national identities are related to each other in non-zero sum, but rather complex terms; (2) that European integration has left its mark on collective identities in EU member states, although to different degrees among elites and masses; (3) that in the study of identities there is great potential for cross-fertilisation between various methodologies; (4) that different ways of remembering the past, and in particular the shift from triumphant to traumatic memories, constitute an important element of contemporary European identity; (5) that the concept of socialisation provides a useful tool for analysing identity changes but that socialisation processes vary strongly depending on specific conditions; (6) that a European public sphere is emerging, at least on specific issues, but more sophisticated analytical frameworks are needed to capture it; and (7) that the Eastern enlargement of the EU poses a variety of challenges as well as chances for the development of collective identities in the East as well as the West.

On the basis of these findings IDNET draws several lessons for policy-makers in the EU and its member-states. These include (1) taking the existence of multiple national and European identities seriously; (2) the politicisation of European affairs; (3) overcoming the obstacles posed by linguistic diversity through consciously staged public rituals; and (4) the urgent need of going beyond mere institution-building and focusing on intercultural communication, especially in and with the new Eastern member states.

1. Executive summary

1.1 *Background and objectives*

Modern democracies rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules. Collective identification with a polity provides an important source of diffuse support for political systems. The normative desirability and the empirical possibility of a collective European identity are thus directly linked to the issue of the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union.

In this context, IDNET has been concerned with four sets of questions: (1) What is the impact of Europeanisation and the emergence of a European polity on the collective identities of social groups in various countries? (2) What are the micro-mechanisms by which collective identities change; what is the role of learning, arguing, persuasion, and material incentives in these processes? (3) Which role do the media and public discourses play in these processes of identity formation and identity change; is there an emerging European public sphere, or do public spheres continue to reside exclusively in the nation-states? (4) How does the Eastern enlargement of the European Union influence the European, national, and social identities, the inter-European perceptions and discourses as well as the political cultures and the legitimacy bases of the European integration project?

1.2 *Results*

Research on European identity: the state of the art

Students of contemporary collective identities face a number of challenges. We live in a world which is increasingly globalised but also increasingly fragmented. As a result, hybrid identities that include local or national traditions and allegiances intertwined with global cultural patterns emerge. The collectivities which are the bases of social identity today are more in number, more varied, more intermingled, and more open to redefinition than ever before. Studying identity in this context becomes troublesome because the scholar is faced with a whole range of social and cultural forms that sit uncomfortably with existing definitions of social identity. The aim of our project was not least to discuss the very concept of identity, and to address conceptual and theoretical issues concerning the definition of identity and its operationalization in empirical research. Most importantly,

this discussion has driven us towards attempts at overcoming traditional methodological cleavages, such as the one between macro-sociological and micro-psychological research, or between quantitative and qualitative methods.

The current multiplicity of identities poses particular difficulties in terms of research, but it also creates opportunities for the formation of *European* identities. If individuals hold multiple social identities, they can feel a sense of belonging to Europe *as well as* to their nation-state, their gender, etc. It is thus wrong to conceptualise European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreased one's loyalty to national or other communities. Survey research shows that "country first, but Europe, too" is the dominant outlook in most EU countries, and people do not perceive this as contradictory. The real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation *and* Europe, on the other hand. From this we conclude that the European polity does not require a "demos" that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist and complement each other.

Just *how* multiple identities are related to each another is another issue. Traditionally, identities have been thought of as being either nested inside each other or as cross-cutting. We propose a third way of conceptualising the relationship between European and other identities, called the "marble cake" model of multiple identities, according to which the various components of an individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels, as the concepts of both nested and of cross-cutting identities imply, but rather influence, mesh and blend into each other. A corollary of the "marble cake" model is that European identity might mean different things for different people. Hence it does not mean much if we find in survey data that people identify with "Europe." Such survey data are also challenged by qualitative studies which, e.g., find no spontaneous mentioning of Europe or the EU by inhabitants of border towns.

The conceptual distinction between "civic" and "cultural" components of identity helps us to make sense of such findings. It is mainly cultural identity which forms the substance of citizens' identification with Europe as a whole, whereas the EU has achieved "hegemonic" status in the civic dimension. And not only does the EU increasingly define what it means to be "European," it also aims at filling "Europeanness" with distinct post-national civic and liberal substantive values. Nonetheless, identification with Europe is made difficult especially by the lack of clear boundaries. It depends on the political context whether

Europe's "others" are perceived in geographical terms (other regions of the world and their culture, politics, religion, etc.), in historical terms (the continent's own past of militarism and nationalism), or in social terms (the "enemy within", e.g. xenophobia).

Visions of Europe and historical memory

The historical dimension is important not only for the definition of Europe's "others". Socio-historical analysis also helps to put into context the widespread scepticism with regard to the formation of a European identity. Such scepticism is fuelled not least by the fact that Europe is and will remain a multilingual community. Nations, however, are not naturally given collectivities either, but historical products generated by and imagined in particular public discourses. Moreover, the idea of Europe has a long intellectual history. There have been strong visions of European unity and identity before anybody could think of the European Union. Contemporary efforts to determine the "nature of the beast" can be stimulated and enriched by looking back to these historical visions of Europe.

We analyse three such Europe-wide mediated visions. All of them were generated as a response to the traumatic experience of devastating wars within Europe, and all of them imagine Europe as a cultural unity. The first, "classical" model refers to common descent and heritage. The invention of a historical continuity between the ancient Roman Empire and the Carolingian empire represented the first construction of a European unity and identity. Yet this imagination of a European descent as represented by a cultural heritage was challenged by the devastating confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second, "modernist" vision of Europe is instead based on joint destiny and mission. This vision looked to the future instead of looking to the past, and the idea of hegemonial empire was replaced by its opposite, a de-centred balance of power between the European states.

Today, however, neither the idea of translation and embodied heritage nor the idea of Europe as a vanguard of universal history can provide a distinct European identity that will be accepted by the outside world without major reservations. The relationship between politics and culture in today's European Union also differs strongly from the one that prevailed during most of Europe's history, when the unity of Europe could be found in the cultural realm while the political map was patterned by diversity. Today unity and integration are pushed forward by politics, whereas on the cultural level the diversity and polycentrism of European cultures are stressed in order to counteract the unifying and

levelling forces of market and administration. Hence the reference to a common cultural heritage will hardly engender a strong European identity today. Nor can European identity be built on a revolution as the most important founding myth of modern democratic nations, since there is no common memory of a triumphant uprising that includes all European nations.

However, the reference to triumphant foundations, to heroes and revolutions is not the only path of collective memory that could give rise to a European identity. In modern Western nations the triumphant founding myth is increasingly replaced by the reference to a traumatic past, to the collective memory of victims and perpetrators – the third, "post-modern" way of constructing collective identities on the basis of historical memories. Its importance for current nation-state identities is reflected in monuments as well as in official rituals, which are part of a new political culture of confessions of guilt, focusing mainly on the Nazi genocide of the European Jews. Today many representatives of different European nations officially confess their nations' involvement in the Shoah. In this sense, a new European identity can be said to exist which is based neither on triumphant rejoicing nor on the fear of an outside threat; instead, it is based on melancholy, on non-action rather than on action. European rituals of confessing the guilt of the past differ markedly from other nations' – e.g., Turkish or Japanese – collective memories of past genocides. This difference in turn can be explained by Europe's religious tradition, in particular the Christian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent.

European integration, socialisation and identity change

In IDNET we were interested not least in the impact of European integration, and in particular EU institutions, on the formation and expression of collective identities. A large gap between (limited) mass public and (almost consensual) elite support for EU membership suggests that this impact is much higher in the case of societal elites than in the case of "ordinary" citizens. In line with expectations generated by the marble-cake model of multiple identities, however, the number of those members of the general public who felt *only* attachment to their nation-state has declined over time, while the percentage of those who perceived some sense of belonging to their nation-state *and* to Europe has increased.

We suggest that elite-mass difference in identification with the EU can at least partially be explained by different degrees of "entitativity" or "realness" of European institutions in the

lives of elites and masses, respectively. The EU is an entitative community for the European political, social, and economic elites, as a result of which their sense of belonging is also rather high. For other citizens, the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now. The prevailing ambivalence in elite discourses about the EU also contribute to this state of affairs.

Different causal mechanisms can be invoked in order to account for the impact of European integration on collective identities. Functional models assume that institutions almost automatically change people's perception of community and sense of belonging. Socialisation models focus on actors' differential experiences with the institution and its consequences. Finally, persuasion models complement socialisation concepts by emphasising the active role of institutions as agents of identity construction. We have been interested especially in the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialise state actors. For our purposes, the classical definition of socialisation as a process of inducting actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community had to be expanded, to include not only full-fledged belief changes but also cognitive role playing and strategic calculation. We wanted to establish both *how* socialisation happens (mechanisms) and *when* it occurs (scope conditions).

These issues were addressed at two different levels. At the micro level we explored the role of socialisation processes in central EU institutions, in particular committee settings under the Commission and the Council, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Our analyses draw attention to these European institution's basic organisational characteristics and their compatibility (or the lack thereof) with an individual's domestic organisational home. The length and intensity of an individual's interaction with European institution do influence supranational allegiances and loyalties, but the latter remain secondary to pre-existing national and sectoral allegiances. We also show that actors' multiple embeddedness must explicitly be taken into account, and that any study of European-level socialisation must explore and control for the effect of domestic context. In line with our general theoretical assumptions, the pattern of identity change in Coreper does not indicate that national identities are replaced or subsumed; rather, there is a socialisation dynamic leading to new understandings of national identities and an expanded conception of the self.

In a second set of studies we have explored socialisation dynamics more at the macro-level, analysing the socialisation potential of NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe with regard to Central and Eastern European states. Consideration of these other European institutions helps us to put into context arguments made about the EU. More specifically, we show socialisation effects to be dependent (a) on whether national actors are "novices" or not, and (b) on the international interlocutors' "teaching style" (lecturing vs. dialogue and debate). We pay particular attention to the relative importance and the interaction of persuasion-based diplomacy, on the one hand, and incentive-based conditionality, on the other. Persuasion mechanisms alone rarely change policy outcomes; the clear provision of incentives is necessary as well. Both mechanisms interact in the socialisation mechanism of "intergovernmental reactive reinforcement," where international organisations offer material and political rewards in return for norm compliance, but do not coerce non-compliant governments.

Public discourses and the European public sphere

The effects of European institutions on collective identities clearly depend on the legitimacy of these institutions. The EU has a somewhat ambiguous reputation in this respect, as continuous discussions of its "democratic deficit" show. Modern democracies generally rely upon multiple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. In this context, an open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media is considered crucial for providing an interface between state and society in a democratic polity. How to conceive of such a democratic public sphere on the European level, and how to demonstrate its existence or the lack thereof, was another of IDNET's central concerns.

Two different ways of measuring the degree of Europeanisation of the public sphere, leading to seemingly contradictory results, coexist in the literature. On the one hand, counting how often terms such as "Europe," "European institutions," or "European affairs" are mentioned in the media almost inevitably results in the conclusion that European questions pale in comparison with national, regional, or local issues. On the other hand, leaving aside their relative salience vis-à-vis non-European issues, to the extent that European issues *are* discussed in national media, it turns out that this is done in a very similar fashion and using similar reference points across Europe – suggesting a much further developed European public sphere than the first type of analyses.

In order to reconcile these findings, we propose to consider the level of media attention to European affairs, on the one hand, and the similarity or difference of frames of reference in reporting on these affairs, on the other, as two separate dimensions. While both a high level of attention and similar frames of reference would be required for an ideal-typical European public sphere, current empirical findings of low salience yet similar substantive interpretations suggest that a European public sphere may gradually be emerging out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres.

We apply this conception of the European public sphere to an empirical analysis of media discourses surrounding the participation of the rightwing-populist FPÖ in Austria's last federal government and the way other EU member states dealt with this situation. Given that the "Haider debate" quickly turned into a debate on what the EU is really about, we considered this to be a "most likely case" for the formation of a European public sphere. Indeed, newspapers in the five countries analysed used very similar meaning structures or frames of reference in discussing the issue, irrespective of their particular stance on the issue. We take this as evidence of the potential for a cross-border "community of communication" to emerge in Europe.

Europeanisation, national identities, and Eastern enlargement

With the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and with the following process of a progressing reconnection between Western and Eastern Europe through the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the relations between European, EU and national identities are also in the process of a fundamental reconstruction. This process unfolds asymmetrically on different sides of the former "iron curtain". From a Western European perspective, what is most noteworthy is a resurfacing of the civilisational foundations of European integration. We argue that European integration cannot be based on constitutional patriotism alone but has to include also a European cultural foundation, without however adopting an essentialist definition of a European civilisation. In this context too, we emphasise the resilient weight of nation-states and national identities and the need to build a European identity on the foundations of these multiple national identities, rather than by opposing or replacing them.

From an Eastern European perspective, the parameters of the relational triad of European, EU and national identities are different. Here, the civilisational and national identities are primary and an EU identity will only emerge with the realisation of accession – although

the enlargement negotiations and the close prospect of accession already show an increasing impact on collective identities in the postcommunist societies, in accession as well as non-accession countries. In this context, and against the background of the burdened history between Germany and Poland, we analyse the progressive coming-to-terms with the past in these societies as a crucial building block of Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In a related study, we show that and how Polish attitudes related to the own nation and the EU in the context of the emerging Eastern enlargement have changed in the last decade.

The general theme of collective memory and its role in the construction of national identities (see above) has also been explored in a comparative perspective on Western and Eastern Europe, as well as with regard to East-West European integration. A basic West-East cultural cleavage is shown to be involved in the enlargement of the European Union. In Western Europe, Eastern enlargement is primarily seen as a vehicle to expand the Western European peace and security order, the European economy and welfare zone and the Western political and civic culture to the East. In those nation-states with long civic-democratic traditions, collective memory emphasises more the triumphant aspects of national identity and thus feeds into an unproblematic European civic mission to the East. In those nation-states with an authoritarian past, collective memory is related to the troublesome history of democratisation, serving as the basis for an attitude showing solidarity with post-communist transition countries. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the major common interest is securing national identity, preventing ethno-national conflicts, stabilising the new democracies and catching-up to the Western European socio-economic level. At the same time, collective memory is haunting the accession to the European Union and creating ambivalence with regard to (a) the renewed transfer, even if partial, of national sovereignty, (b) the memory of Yalta as a treason of the Western European nations vis-à-vis the Eastern empire, and (c) the potential renewal of a German *Sonderweg* against the Eastern peripheral nations.

Finally, we have tried to find out which consequences the presence of ethnic minorities has for the construction of national and European identities, either through historical processes of nation-building or through growing international and transnational migration processes, and whether, and if so how, the impacts of these ethnic minority groups on collective identities differ between Western and Eastern Europe. Among other things, our case studies analyse the manifold social and cultural ways in which the processes of

immigration and incorporation as well as adaptation and ethnicisation impact on the social structure, political culture and national identities of the host societies. Taken together they show a pattern of transformation of national and European identities on the part of the European host societies as well as on the part of the (im)migrants that is more nuanced than the current debate on European citizenship and derived forms of European identity.

1.3 Policy implications

The development of a European identity that stands in opposition to (sub-)national traditions and cultures is not only highly unlikely, it is also unnecessary for the legitimacy of European institutions. Individuals hold multiple identities, and to the extent that supranational identifications emerge, they will be supplements to, rather than substitutes of, existing loyalties and affiliations. The diffuse support on which the legitimacy of European institutions rests thus does not depend on the weakening of national identities.

The key toward increased identification with Europe and the EU is increasing the reality of the community in the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The EU already plays an important role in the lives of many political, social and economic elites, but less so for the rest of the citizenry. Public-relations efforts or information campaigns about the EU in themselves are unable to create the shared cultural values, perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness which make a community "real" for its members. It would be more important to overcome the ambivalence of elite discourses about the EU in member states, where "Brussels" is routinely used the shift the blame for unpopular policies, while national policy-makers try to take all the credit for popular ones. Moreover, it is wrong to try and avoid the politicisation of European affairs. Politicisation increases the salience of the EU in the perception of the citizens. Hence controversies about EU policies are not bad for European identity; they can actually increase the sense of community among Europeans.

Another way of increasing the sense of community among European citizens is through symbolic means such as monuments, museums and public rituals. Given the absence not only of a common language but also of a pan-European revolutionary founding myth as a basis for a common identity, it might make sense for the EU to rely more strongly on public rituals, the authenticity of which is based on the facticity of bodily presence rather than on words. One suggestion along these lines is for the opening ceremony of the European parliament to be staged on European city squares and broadcast across the continent, somewhat like the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.

Such conscious efforts notwithstanding, the construction of any pan-European identity will be a slow and protracted process. Our studies of socialisation processes suggest that particular attention should thus be paid to arenas for moulding and adapting attitudes and identities over the longer term, in particular schools and educational curricula more generally. In addition, domestic politics and national context are important for the effectiveness of socialisation. In policy terms, this means there is a need to craft more nuanced and country-specific socialisation instruments.

This is particularly true for Central and Eastern European (future) accession countries. A key finding is that Western efforts to induct these states into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of the existing community work best when a variety of policy instruments are used, including straightforward conditionality as well as more pedagogic suasion/teaching techniques. Especially in view of the considerable and partially rising anti-EU sentiments in the accession candidates, the public clarification of the European Union as a pluralistic, secular and religious, value community besides special material support is seen as import. Relevant intercultural programs should be developed in cooperation with local organisations.

The endemic ethnic-national conflicts in most of the postcommunist countries, and the ambivalent impacts of the Eastern enlargement on those conflicts, also deserve particular attention. Finally, in view of the tendency – not only in the current member states but also in the new member states – to exclude Turkey and other Eastern European states as accession candidates, a middle way of a privileged in-between status between full and non-membership urgently needs to be found, and a transnational public debate on these issues needs to be launched.

2. Background and objectives of the project

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a collective European identity and how it relates to national identities. The debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU). There is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules. Collective identification with a polity provides one source of diffuse support for political systems. The EU is no exception.

IDNET was launched as one of the first attempts on the European level to create an inter-disciplinary research network dedicated to questions of European identity. Given the rather limited state of the theoretical, methodological, and empirical art in the area, this network was meant to substantially expand our knowledge base on collective European identity and European public spaces. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists and historians have joined forces within this interdisciplinary network to collect and further develop the available empirical data and theoretical expertise on the changes of collective identities at the various levels of subjective affiliation resulting from Europeanisation, and to make these data and concepts available to policy-makers and the public in general.

Thus, IDNET's primary objective has been to investigate the processes by which Europeanisation impacts upon and transforms collective identities relating to the nation-state. We have analysed the role of the media and public discourses in the processes by which individuals and social groups negotiate and transform their collective identities. At the same time, the private conversations among citizens as well as the socialisation experiences of actors involved in European policy-making at the various supranational, national, and sub-national levels have also concerned us.

More specifically, IDNET has investigated four sets of questions:

1. What is the *impact of Europeanisation* and the emergence of a European polity *on the collective identities of social groups* in various countries? To what extent do the emerging European "discourse" and increasing transnational communication patterns influence established national identities in different countries and contribute to the processes of redefinition of such national and sub-national identities? How will

Europeanisation affect collective identities on the various levels of subjective affiliation in the future?

2. What are the micro-mechanisms by which collective identities change? Do European integration and the increasing involvement of social groups and actors in European policy-making at the various levels lead to *socialisation* effects on the collective identities of actors? What is the role of learning, arguing, persuasion, and other legitimation attempts in these processes? What are the identity-related effects of efforts by EU institutions such as the Commission and by national governments to increase the support basis for EU policies among ordinary citizens?

3. Which role do the *media and public discourses* play in these processes of identity formation and identity change? Is there an emerging European public sphere, or do public spheres continue to reside exclusively in the nation-states? How do transnational influences and developments in other countries affect national public debates, and what are the consequences for collective identities referring to the nation-state or sub-national entities?

4. How does the *Eastern enlargement* of the European Union influence the European, national, and social identities, the inter-European perceptions and discourses as well as the political cultures and the legitimacy bases of the European integration project? How does the Eastern enlargement of the European Union impact upon the restructuring of opportunity structures, social interests, and social identities? What developments are likely in the future?

IDNET was divided into four substantive sections ("workpackages"). Each of the workpackages described in the following sections has concentrated on one particular set of questions, with a common emphasis on the complex methodological and theoretical questions involved in the study of collective identities.

3. Scientific description of the project results and methodology

3.1 How can we study European identity and what do we know about it? An overview

THOMAS RISSE (Free University of Berlin)

This section draws on results from IDNET as well as from a joint project of the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University and the EUI's Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies[1], so as to set the stage for the more specific reports on findings from individual projects which follow below. In particular it addresses the questions of (1) whether, and if so, how European and other collective identities go together, (2) what it means, in terms of composition and content of identity, to be "European", (3) under what conditions EU institutions are likely to influence the formation of collective identities, and (4) what are the mechanisms by which EU institutions impact upon collective identities.

How do European and other collective identities go together?

It is no longer controversial among scholars and – increasingly – policy-makers that individuals hold multiple social identities. As a result, people can feel a sense of belonging to Europe as well as to their nation-state, their gender, etc. It is wrong to conceptualise European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decrease one's loyalty to national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991) and people can feel as part of both communities without having to choose some primary identification. Analyses from survey data suggest and social psychological experiments confirm that many people who strongly identify with their nation-state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe (Citrin and Sides; Castano; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Martinotti and Steffanizzi 1995).

This finding may be trivial for scholars studying collective identities, but it nevertheless has important implications for the political debates about Europe and the nation-state. Take the contemporary debate about the future of the European Union and about a European constitution. Many people still hold that Europe lacks a demos, one indicator being the lack of strong identification with Europe in mass public opinion. Yet, as Citrin and Sides

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[1]   See Herrmann, Brewer and Risse, eds. (forthcoming). References in the present section are to this volume unless otherwise noted. A provisional table of contents is reproduced on p. A-14 below.

demonstrate, "country first, but Europe, too" is the dominant outlook in most EU countries and people do not perceive this as contradictory. Moreover and more important, the real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe, on the other hand. Citrin and Sides show that the individual willingness to support further European integration increases quite dramatically from the former to the latter group. They argue, therefore, "that willingness to grant the EU authority does not require an identification that actually prioritises Europe over the nation." In other words, the European polity does not require a "demos" that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist and complement each other. This is a significant empirical finding which speaks directly to the current debate on the future of the union.

Beyond the rather simple insight that European and national identities can go together, the more interesting question is how multiple identities go together and how they relate to each other. We can think of multiple identities in at least two different ways. First, identities can be *nested*, conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the next. Someone's regional identity is nested in her national identity which is again nested in her "Europeanness". We find the "Russian Matruska doll" model of European and other identities on both the levels of elites and of ordinary people. This model suggests some hierarchy between people's sense of belonging and loyalties. European and other identities pertaining to territorially defined entities can be nested into each other so that "Europe" forms the outer boundary, while one's region or nation-state constitute the core. The survey data that mass publics in most countries hold national and regional identities as their primary sense of belonging, while Europe runs a distinct second, are consistent with such a concept of how multiple identities relate (Bruter; Citrin and Sides).

Second, identities can be *cross-cutting*. In this configuration, some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group. One can feel a sense of belonging to Europe and strongly identify with the Catholic Church, and some, but not all of one's fellow Catholics would share this European identity. Elite surveys show, for example, that member of the European Parliament or of the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) hold such overlapping identities by feeling a sense of belonging to Europe as well as to their party groups and their nation-states respectively (Laffan; Wodak). This sometimes leads to "double hating" and a sometimes conflictual relationship

between European and other identities among officials working in Brussels. In a similar vein, the professional identities of journalists working in Brussels can be shown to cut across their identification with Europe (Siapera). Distinct role identities of journalists as investigators, chroniclers, or therapeutic analysts go together with distinct perspectives on the construction of Europe (anti-national, national, post-national).

There is, however, a third way of conceptualising the relationship between European and other identities which people might hold. We could call it a "*marble cake*" model of multiple identities. Accordingly, the various components of an individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels as both concepts of nestedness and of cross-cutting identities imply. What if identity components influence each other, mesh and blend into each other? What if someone's self-understanding as German inherently contains aspects of Europeanness? Can we really separate out a Catalan from a European identity? Or take the major European party families. From the 1950s on, Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe were at the forefront of European integration. Europeanness has always been a constitutive component of post-World War II Christian Democratic ideology originating from the inter-war period. The same holds true for modern Social Democrats in Europe. It is interesting to note that the turn toward accepting capitalism and the social market economy which the German Social Democrats experienced in the late 1950s, the French Socialists in the early 1980s, and British Labour in the 1990s, went hand in hand with a strong identification with European integration in each of these cases. Today, Europeanness forms a constitutive part of modern Social Democratic ideology (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse 2001).

What does it mean to be European?

What do we know about the substantive content of European identity in terms of both "who is us?" (composition of group identity) and "what is us?" (content of group identity; see the introduction)? One corollary of the "marble cake" model is that European identity might mean different things for different people. EU membership, for example, might lead to an identity change, which impacts upon the previous national identity. Since EU membership identity then interacts with rather different national identity constructions, the overall effect will not be homogenous leading to a generalised EU identity. Rather, Europe and the EU become enmeshed with given national identities leading to rather diverging identity outcomes. This concerns, above all, the content and substance of what it means to identify with Europe. Indeed, a longitudinal study of political discourses about Europe

among the major parties in France, Germany, and Great Britain revealed that the meaning of Europe varied considerably (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse et al. 1999). For the German political elites, "Europe" and the European integration meant overcoming one's own nationalist and militarist past. The French elites, in contrast, constructed Europe as the externalisation of distinct French values of Republicanism, enlightenment and the *mission civilisatrice*. While French and German political elites managed to embed Europe into their understandings of national identity, the British elites constructed Europe in contrast to their understandings of the nation, particularly the English nation.

To some extent Europe can thus be thought of as an "empty categorisation" (Breakwell) with various and rarely unchallenged social meanings. If European identity means quite different things to different people in terms of its ideological, territorial, political, or cultural and even religious connotations, it does not mean much if we find in survey data that people identify with "Europe." Such survey data are also challenged by findings from qualitative studies. A series of in-depth interviews found no spontaneous mentioning of Europe or the EU by people in border towns even though the significance of EU enlargement is quite obvious for them. When confronted with photographs containing European symbols, interviewees would still not refer to Europe. Only when asked direct questions concerning their attachment to Europe would people start talking about it. However, the statements were contradictory and inconsistent; respondents gave very different accounts of what Europe means for them (Meinhof).

An important conceptual distinction that might help us think more clearly about the substance of European identity is the one between civic and cultural components of identity (Bruter; see also Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). On the one hand, 'culture' in this understanding encompasses everything from history, ethnicity, civilisation, heritage to other social similarities. A recent Europe-wide focus group study commissioned by the EU Commission's Governance Unit (OPTEM 2001) as well as a most recent Special Eurobarometer study (Gallup Europe 2001) suggest that it is mainly cultural identity which forms the substance of citizens' identification with Europe as a whole. 'Civic identity', on the other hand, is much more circumscribed and refers to identification of citizens with a particular political structure such as the EU or the political institutions of the nation-state. In the civic dimension the EU clearly appears to have achieved "hegemonic" status in Europe. States in Europe are increasingly defined as EU members, non-members, or would-be members. Their status in Europe and to some degree also world-wide depends on

these categories. The extent to which the EU defines Europe in political terms can be seen also in the context of Eastern enlargement, where Central Eastern European states want to "return to Europe," as if they were currently outside the continent.

The EU's hegemonic role in defining European civic identity has potentially far-reaching consequences, insofar as the EU succeeds in its attempts – supported by other European institutions such as the Council of Europe – to promote a post-national civic identity in the Habermasian sense emphasising democracy, human rights, market economy, the welfare state, and cultural diversity (Laffan). These values have become constitutive for the EU, since you cannot become a member without subscribing to them, at least from the Copenhagen criteria onwards. As the enlargement debates show, the self-description of the EU and the dominant discourses surrounding it have moved quite a long way toward building a polity and going beyond simple market integration (see also Laffan, O'Donnell, and Smith 2000). Thus not only does the EU increasingly define what it means to be 'European,' it also aims at filling 'Europeanness' with distinct post-national civic and liberal values as far as its substance is concerned.

Yet social identities not only describe who we are as members of a community, they also connote the boundaries of a group, who is "in" and who is "out." In the case of Europe, and the EU in particular, the lack of clear boundaries makes identification more difficult (Castano). A quick look at those international organisations that carry 'Europe' in their name shows that there is no uniform answer to the question where Europe ends. Moreover, Europe's "others" are usually invoked dependent on the political context. We routinely pitch the "European welfare state" against "American laissez-faire capitalism" (see also Wodak). In a different context, Europe's other is the continent's own past of militarism and nationalism (Risse et al. 1999). Furthermore, in the context of the "Haider debate" regarding the new Austrian government and the European reaction to it, Europe's other was the "enemy within", e.g. xenophobia (see Section 3.5 below). In sum, Europe has many 'others' which are referred to and represented in a context-dependent way. This does not mean at all that anything goes, but it warns us not to reify the concept of European identity and to fix its meaning once and for all (see also Siapera).

Finally, social psychology warns us that increased tolerance toward fellow Europeans is highly conditional on the complexity with which Europe is presented. According to the "ingroup projection model", individuals who simply project their own values on Europe and then identify with their 'national' Europe actually tend to be less tolerant with fellow

Europeans (Mummendey and Waldzus). If, for example, German understandings of 'Europe' and the EU largely conform to visions of German social and political order, this might lower rather than increase German tolerance of Italians. The German discourse on the Euro and the convergence criteria was a case in point. In order to reconcile these findings with the liberal cosmopolitan picture, according to which identification with Europe increases tolerance for foreigners and decreases xenophobia, a better understanding is needed of how various attitudes relate to each other and co-evolve.

When do EU institutions matter for identity?

The degree to which individuals' attachment to Europe matters in relation to their other collective identities is one question. Yet we do not only want to describe the degree to which citizens – elites and masses alike – identify with the EU and with Europe in general, but also to explain identity change resulting from more than forty years of European integration. Do the European institutions affect collective identities? Do they lead to a greater sense of belonging to Europe? And if so, what are the mechanisms of identity change?

In general, the EU is an elite-driven project – similar to other nation-building projects. No wonder that identification with and support for Europe and its institutions is highest among political and social elites. Eurobarometer data demonstrate an enormous gap between elite support (in fact, elite *consensus*) for the EU, on the one hand, and widespread scepticism among the larger public, on the other. According to 1998 data, European elites supported EU membership almost unanimously (94% mean across EU 15), while only a bit more than 50% of the mass public endorsed membership of their own country. Countries with the largest gaps between mass public and elite support for EU membership include Germany, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Finland, and the United Kingdom (Spence 1998). Of course, these data do not measure identification with Europe, but support for the EU. But since attachment to Europe and support for integration co-vary, we can safely assume that identification with Europe among the elites is also higher than among the citizens where Europe and the EU run a distant second (or third after regional iden-tification; cf. Citrin and Sides).

Yet, European and national identities are not zero-sum propositions and citizens can easily negotiate strong national identities and some secondary identification with Europe. Moreover, Citrin and Sides point to a quite dramatic change during the 1990s. From 1991

to 1999, the number of those who felt only attachment to their nation-state declined by 12.6 % across the EU 15 (from 65.8 to 53.2 %), while the percentage of those who perceived some sense of belonging to their nation-state *and* to Europe increased by about the same number (from 29 to 42.6 %). The outliers are British and Greek citizens, while Belgians, Italians, Spanish, and East Germans express above average dual identities. These developments are quite interesting, since support for EU membership and perceived benefits from EU membership – the latter being the main indicator for 'utilitarian' evaluations of the EU – declined during the 1990s. At the same time, the correlations between identification with and attachment to Europe, on the one hand, and support levels for the EU as well as perceived benefits from EU membership, on the other hand, grew much stronger.

The social psychological concept of "entitativity" (Castano) can help to explain these developments, both the difference between elite and mass identification with Europe and the change during the 1990s. Entitativity refers to the reification of a community resulting from increasingly shared cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness which then lead to collective identification. Yet increased salience of a community in people's lives does not necessarily increase support for the community; it could also result in growing rejection (ibid.). Different levels of entitativity could well explain the enormous difference between elite and mass identification with Europe and the EU. The EU is certainly very *real* for Europe's political, economic, and social elites. Whoever is doing business in Europe has to constantly be aware of and refer to EU rules and regulations. Policy-makers and government officials on all levels of governance spend a considerable amount of their daily time dealing with the EU (Wessels 2000; Rometsch and Wessels 1996). In other words, the EU is an entitative community for the European political, social, and economic elites as a result of which their sense of belonging is also rather high.

For the citizens, the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now. There are at least three reasons for this which relate to the concept of entitativity. First, while EU law is the law of the land, has direct effect, and overrides national law, EU authorities do not implement European rules and regulations, but national and sub-national authorities do. Thus, when citizens are confronted with, say, environmental regulations in their daily lives, they do not even know that these are EU rules more often than not. The salience of the EU

is rather low, even if the EU affects the citizens' lives on a daily basis. Second, as mentioned above, 'Europe' has fuzzy boundaries. While there are plenty of indicators telling me that I have left Germany, it is unclear when I have left Europe. Having to show my passport is certainly not a valid indicator, as I argued above regarding the funny boundaries of "Schengenland". Boundedness, however, is a crucial ingredient of entitativity.

Last not least, the elite discourses in most EU member states about the EU are ambivalent at best when it comes to 'shared values' and 'common fate.' On the one hand, there is the conscious identity construction of a liberal and civic community emanating from the EU and its various institutions (for the latest effort see Commission of the European Communities 2001). On the other hand, national policy-makers routinely reify the nation-state in their dealings with Brussels. Whenever they can charge the EU for some tough decision at home, they adopt a populist rhetoric of conscious blame-shifting ("Brussels made me do it") and construct EU institutions as remote bureaucracies which cannot be trusted (in contrast to national governments, of course). At the same time, whenever the EU succeeds in solving a commonly perceived problem, national policy-makers take the credit in front of national media. Few citizens know, for example, that the liberalisation of telecommunication markets slashing people's telephone bills across Europe during the last ten years, was actually due to EU initiatives. The ambivalent position taken by the media certainly does not help to increase the entitativity of the European Union. As Siapera points out, journalists in Brussels who routinely report about the EU, hold multiple affiliations and see their professional role in various ways which adds to the ambivalent and fuzzy picture of the EU emanating from the mass media, the most important source of information about Europe for the citizens.

In sum, it is probably safe to argue that the EU as a community still lacks quite some entitativity as a condition for collective identification among the citizens. At the same time, things seem to be changing, the more Europe "hits home". The reported change in sense of attachment to Europe could well result from an increasing reality of the EU in people's daily lives. The single market, Schengenland, for all their fuzziness, have enlarged the entitativity of the EU, and the Euro is likely to do so even more.

How do EU institutions matter for identity?

Unfortunately, our knowledge about the effects of the EU on collective identity only allows for tentative conclusions with regard to the causal mechanisms involved. On an

abstract level, three such mechanisms can be distinguished (Herrmann and Brewer): Functional models assume that institutions almost automatically change people's perception of community and sense of belonging. Socialisation concepts focus on actors' differential experiences with the institution and its consequences. Finally, persuasion models focus on institutions as identity-shaping agents. Deliberate efforts may be made to create collective identification through myths, symbols, or framing.

What does the available evidence suggest about these mechanisms? There is little evidence for a *functional* logic at play. Haas's ideas that those elites that profit most from the union, would gradually transfer their loyalty to supranational institutions, seem to be disconfirmed (Haas 1958). Neofunctionalism's basic argument has been that European integration would lead to identity changes among those transnational interest groups benefiting from European integration. There is little evidence for such a mechanism. Farmers, for example, who arguably benefit most from the EU through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are not particularly known for their enthusiasm for European integration. In more general terms, the data presented by Citrin and Sides show rather modest correlations between attachment to and identification with Europe, on the one hand, and individual perceptions of benefiting from the EU, even though this correlation grew stronger during the 1990s. The direction of the causal arrows also remains unclear from these data. One could, for example, turn the functional logic on its head and argue that strong identification with the EU leads to a sense of profiting from EU membership, rather than the other way round.

Socialisation appears to be a better candidate for explaining the findings in various studies. This is particularly true for those who are directly involved in the daily business of EU policy-making, either in Brussels or in national capitals (e.g., cf. Egeberg 1999; Lewis 2000; Wessels 2000; Laffan; Wodak; Siapera; see also Section 3.3 below). Individuals working in EU institutions tend to adjust to the various "logics of appropriate behaviour" (March and Olsen 1998) in these institutions. These officials have direct experience with the institutions and need to internalise their rules of appropriateness at least to some degree in order to be able to carry out their tasks. As a result, we expect them to develop a stronger sense of group identity with the EU than those who have less direct experience with its institutions.

Different degrees of socialisation in terms of direct experience with the EU would also explain the huge gap between elite identification with Europe and the mass public where European identity runs a distinct second or third after national and/or regional identities.

The ability of citizens to identify with the EU in terms of a civic and political identity and the reported increase in (secondary) identification with Europe and EU during the 1990s could be explained on the basis of the socialisation hypothesis. During that time period, the EU has become more visible in people's lives – from the single market to the single currency, 'Schengenland', Eastern enlargement, and most recently debates about institutional reform. At the same time, the EU has started portraying an image of itself as a political actor on the world scene going beyond pure market integration.

This leads to the third mechanism connecting institutions and social identities, *persuasion*. Persuasion does not actually constitute an alternative account to socialisation, but rather complements it by emphasising the active role of institutions as agents of identity construction. A complex picture emerges. On the one hand, the attempt by European leaders to deliberately construct the EU around civic and post-national values has made some inroads in people's perception of and identification with the EU. The growing visibility of the EU in people's lives is connected to a specific content and substance of European identity as civic and post-national emphasising liberal values of democracy, human rights, and the social market economy with a strong welfare state component. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the EU is often presented in the national discourses including the media in a rather fuzzy and contradictory manner. In other words, the homo-geneity which is a prerequisite of entitativity and identity-building, is clearly lacking (Castano; see also Breakwell).

3.2 Europeanisation and identity change: conceptual and methodological questions

LAURA BENIGNI and ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU

(Institute of Psychology, CNR, Rome, and European University Institute)

'Identity' has become one of the unifying frameworks of intellectual and political debate since the 1990s. Most of the social science and humanities disciplines have something to say about it: sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, geography, history, philosophy. Politicians and journalists seem to be no less interested in identity matters. Indeed, much of the political and public discourse concentrates on collective and individual identities and their evolution in post-industrial societies. This debate reflects a growing concern with identity politics started by the New Social Movements in the 1960s around issues of peace, ecology and gender and followed up since the 1990s by the resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism as significant political forces. Indeed, identity as a concept embraces all these different social issues and seems to provide a keyword for our times.

Popular concern about identity is in large part perhaps a reflection of the uncertainty produced by rapid change in late modern societies (Giddens 1990; Beck 1986). The compression of space and time, the exponential development of transport and communication, the mass mediated contact with distant countries and peoples and also the actual cultural contact with migrants or tourists have created new socio-cultural landscapes especially in large urban centres. The future is no longer so predictable as it seems to have been for previous generations. Rather, the future is intertwined in the present in the late modern new conception of the individual's life (Giddens 1991). Naturally, change, the confrontation of languages, traditions and ways of life, the transformation of divisions of labour and population flows are not confined to late modernity. However, it is the pace and magnitude of change today that seems to trigger feelings of insecurity and brings the issue of identity and its presumed stability, 'authenticity' or coherence to the fore.

During the past decades, theoretical and empirical research in the social sciences has concentrated on the concept of collective identity and the related phenomena of identity formation and change in the contemporary world. More specifically, in the context of European integration, increasing attention has been paid to the possible existence or emergence of a European identity and also to the complementarity or opposition between

feelings of attachment to Europe or the EU and national identity. Some scholars have argued that collective identity has lost its meaning in the post-industrial world, where population and capital mobility as well as communication networks have increased exponentially. Contradictory tendencies are however observed. On the one hand, the culture of consumerism and technological progress have overruled traditional lifestyles while, on the other hand, there is a revival of local and ethnic cultures and identities both in Europe and elsewhere. As a matter of fact, individuals live in societies that are increasingly globalised but also increasingly fragmented. As a result, *hybrid* identities that include local or national traditions and allegiances intertwined with global cultural patterns emerge.

New tools for analysis

This dynamic state of affairs requires new tools for analysis and understanding. The concept of identity and the research methods used to study it have often been accused (see for instance Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Malesevic[2]) for their vagueness and lack of clarity. Indeed, the intellectual debate on identity does not always sound too different from everyday common talk. There is for example a tendency to take for granted what identity is, and to focus upon expressions of, or changes in, particular identities without considering the broader theoretical issues which may be at stake (Jenkins 1996).

Studying identity, be it ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national or regional, in the contemporary context becomes troublesome because the scholar is faced with a whole range of social and cultural forms that sit uncomfortably with existing definitions of social identity. The aim of our project was not least to discuss the usefulness of the very concept of identity. More particularly, we addressed conceptual and theoretical issues concerning the definition of identity as a concept and its operationalization in empirical research. Our aim was to avoid conceptual or methodological confusion in both theoretical and empirical studies. Given, however, the increasing fluidity of identities and the polarising tendencies towards either cosmopolitan individualism or the "ethnicisation" of society, we also welcomed the use of alternative and/or complementary concepts that may help us capture the increasingly complex, fragmented but also dynamic nature of collective identity nowadays.

Although identity has been a central concern in a number of disciplines during the past decades, there has been considerable disagreement regarding the methodological tools

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[2]   In Triandafyllidou, ed. (forthcoming). References in the present section are to this volume unless otherwise noted. A provisional table of contents is reproduced on p. A-17 below.

most suitable to study its formation and change. Social psychologists have analysed collective identity through experimental studies conducted mainly in laboratory settings. The aim of such studies has been to isolate specific variables and test concrete hypotheses concerning group identity formation and change. However, this type of research tends to isolate artificially the social psychological mechanisms studied from their social and political context. Sociological research, on the other hand, has often overlooked the psychological dynamics underlying collective identity formation, privileging sociological explanations based on social, economic or political factors. Sociolinguists have sought to overcome the dichotomy between "universalist" and "contextualist" accounts by addressing the issue of identity development and transformation in a context-sensitive perspective, without however neglecting the social psychological dynamics activated in discourse. Nonetheless, discourse studies have been influenced by the quantitative-qualitative dilemma in social science methodology. Thus, empirical research in this area has developed either along the content analytical tradition or following an entirely qualitative logic. In brief, few have been the attempts to combine qualitative and quantitative tools in the study of identities and also to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective drawing together concepts from sociology, social psychology, anthropology or linguistics.

The workshop organised in the context of this IDNET project (see programme on p. A-6) has shown how "borrowing" from different disciplines can provide for new insights in the study of identity and even help clarify the analytical status of the concept. Dilemmas between sociological and psychological approaches, qualitative and quantitative methods, theory and empirical research are shown to be false. Our aim has been to propose research strategies that combine "positivist" with constructivist approaches as well as quantitative with qualitative methods.

Different views on identity

Different views on identity have been elaborated in our workshop and in the papers presented there and revised later in the light of the workshop's discussion. Xenia Chryssochoou introduces a social psychological model for studying identity introducing the idea of identity as social representation. Chryssochoou reviews the relevant social psychological literature with particular reference to social identity theory, self-categorisation theory, identity process theory, social identity definition and enactment and the cross-cultural approaches to the self, in order to unpack the different concepts of

identity they assume and their methodological implications. The aim of such analysis is to understand how identity is conceptualised, the different ways of measuring identity and their links and/or discrepancies with the concept. Further, the paper discusses the common-sense perception of identity and its function in policy-making discourse and argues that a useful conceptualisation of identity is to perceive it as a social representation. This approach allows us to highlight the relationship between scientific and common-sense perceptions of identity and embeds identity within the dynamics of society, showing why it is an important concept in explaining social phenomena.

Jessica Jacobson adopts an empirical perspective highlighting the complexities of collective identity at the individual level with particular reference to British Pakistani youth. Her paper addresses the question of how to conceptualise collective identity in the current era. In doing so, it draws on two very different sets of empirical data from two studies conducted in 1990s Britain. The first of these was a qualitative study of attitudes to identity issues among young Britons from Pakistani backgrounds; the second, an analysis of expressions of national identity in the British tabloid press. Thus the paper looks both at individual perspectives on identity and at part of the cultural context within which individuals operate. Both data sets indicate that the parameters of collective identity in contemporary Britain are shifting and mutating. There is great diversity in the British Pakistani respondents' comments about the content and significance of their ethnic, national and religious identities; and most appear to regard identity-formation as a necessarily open-ended process. The data from the tabloid newspapers illustrate that conceptions of British and/or English nationhood are rapidly changing and take many forms: being British can be about, for example, defying 'Europe'; hanging one's head in shame at the behaviour of the nation's football hooligans; joining with others to mourn the death of Princess Diana; remembering the glories of the former Empire; participating in the general excitement over the National Lottery. Such findings accord with much current social scientific theory about the increasing fluidity and hybridisation of collective identity, in this era of globalisation.

But should it be concluded from the data that individuals are free to construct their own social identities out of the numerous and ever-changing cultural building blocks available to them? That it is time to invert social identity theory, as the individual is no longer defined by, but must himself define, the groups to which he belongs? In fact, a further interrogation of the data clearly reveals that many of the processes of social inclusion and

exclusion are still perceived as inevitable, almost immutable, and as the source of much meaning in life. It is therefore apparent that the collectivities which are the bases of social identity today may be more in number, more varied, more intermingled, more open to redefinition than ever before, but still exist above and beyond the individual. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps most appropriate to conceive of collective identity not so much as being a matter of group belonging and not-belonging, but as arising out of the sense of being bound to others within large, dense networks of social ties. These ties can sometimes be cut or at least worn down, while others can be strengthened, expanded, or slowly built up over time; but all individuals are to some extent enmeshed.

Marina Petronoti points to the importance of context in studying identity from an anthropological perspective. Her paper focuses on national identity construction in contemporary Greece. In particular, it looks at the multiple dimensions of this process and examines the use of elements which are regarded as stable (such as the purity and continuity of the Greek nation) as well as those which tend to be negotiable (such as the Europeanness of national identity). The discussion is placed within the framework of social interaction between Greeks and Eritrean refugees as this has developed during the thirty years or so since their arrival in Athens. The author argues that the ways in which national identity is defined, maintained or reformulated is context specific. The more demanding surrounding situations are, the more individuals or groups resort to values and stereotypes they are familiar with. Through the analysis of oral testimonies, social practices and interrelationships the author delineated the areas in which dominant values and representations are reproduced, contested, disguised or altered in the process of national identity construction.

Peter Collins analyses identity as a narrative drawing on ethnomethodology, anthropology and philosophy. He argues that identity is an unusually complex concept, particularly so when applied to the human self and human culture. In adopting an ethnographic approach to identity he tries, first, to avoid oversimplifying the social construction of identity and, second, to show how identity is fundamentally storied. Through his own fieldwork among a religious community in the North of England, he sets out to describe the three spheres of narrative identity (the canonic, the vernacular and the prototypical) and attempts to make sense of their articulation in everyday life.

Giovanna Leone presents a psychological perspective emphasising the importance of memory in the construction of identity. Her presentation focusses on the problem of time

dimensions in social identity, and she notes that the fact that individuals have to cope with the problem of changes of their social position in time has not been explored in depth. She argues against the linear representation of temporal changes of identity – time as a kind of physical movement: backward (from present to past) or forward (from past to present, or from present to future) – and suggests that a more complex perspective should be adopted shifting from a linear to a configurational model of time perspectives in identity. Leone substantiates her point by considering in some depth two classical psychological theories: Lewin's description of the psychological field and Bloch-Halbwachs debate on the problem of persistence of collective mentalities, later developed in the well-known hypothesis of Braudel's *longue durée*.

Arie Nadler's paper concentrates on group relations and on the politics of identity in high conflict areas. He suggests that a group can establish social dominance, and maintain it through helping the out-group. Further, by refusing to seek or receive help from the dominant group, the low status group may challenge the existing social hierarchy. From that perspective inter-group helping relations are viewed as a benign form of establishing, maintaining or challenging power hierarchies between groups.

Ruth Wodak shows how discourse-analytical tools can be used to highlight the construction of multiple identities in a variety of social settings. She analyses different genres (speeches of politicians, media, interviews, focus group discussions) of discourse in order to highlight the discursive construction of national and supranational identities. Her paper analyses the re-contextualisation of certain central *topoi* and arguments constructing identities, and analyses a number of important macro-strategies which serve to construct, transform or deconstruct identities. As Petronoti, Wodak also sustaines that identity narratives and constructions are context dependent. She also discusses issues of methodological design, arguing that discourse analysis but also trans-disciplinary approaches are useful to investigate identities on all levels.

Clive Seale comments on the use of quantitative and qualitative tools in the study of identity through text analysis. After briefly reviewing several ways in which social researchers have tried to combine qualitative and quantitative methods, he illustrates one approach to such mixing of methods that he used in a recent study of news media reports, the topic of these being narratives of self identity told by (and about) people with cancer. He shows how computer software for text analysis, chiefly NVIVO and CONCORDANCE, enabled him to combine the advantages of both modes – quantitative

and qualitative – of analysis, in a way that is relevant for researchers engaged in studies of collective identity.

Gordana Uzelac highlights the possible uses of statistical analysis to uncover the meanings that national identity has for different individuals. She argues that the determination of 'national identity' involves at least two levels of analysis: one which is oriented towards 'measuring' intensities of identity; and another which tries to determine the differences in actors' perception of the object with which they identify. Following Richard Jenkins's distinction between 'nominal' and 'virtual' identity, her paper examines how a social group that shares the same nominal identity differs in perception of the object of their identification, that is, their nation. She thus alerts researchers about difficulties in measuring collective identities in a meaningful way.

Sinisa Malesevic inquires into the conceptual roots of the identity concept and the ways in which these are reflected in empirical research. He explores the links between the conceptual and methodological problems in the study of ethnic identities. More specifically, he argues that conceptual deficiencies in defining and understanding the notions of 'identity' and 'ethnic identity' are reflected in the quality and type of the research strategies used to assess empirical claims about ethnic identity.

Last but not least, Arturo Tosi emphasises the role of language and language politics in issues of identity formation as well as education policy. He discusses the relationship between language competence and ethnic identity in countries of old immigration and of new immigration, and shows that pride in identity and language and cultural maintenance are often stronger in countries of old rather than new immigration. Tosi argues for more nuanced research concerning the concept of ethnic identities in today's context where national identities are also at a phase of mutation while transnational communities seem to gain ground.

Identity as social representation

Among the different views on identity represented in this project, we would like to highlight in particular the model proposed by Chryssochoou for the study of identity. Chryssochoou discusses the concept of identity in social psychology, suggesting that it is a particular form of social representation that mediates the relationship between the individual and the social world. She argues that identity makes the link between social regulations and psychological organisations (i.e. identifications/self-categories) and

constitutes the organising principle of symbolic relationships. Its functions are to inscribe the person in the social environment, to communicate peoples' positions and to establish relationships with others (social recognition). In the model proposed by Chryssochoou, identity is seen as a cyclical process constituted by three actions: knowing, claiming and recognising. The author in fact argues that through their active participation in the social world (by knowing, recognising and claiming), individuals construct a set of knowledge about the world and themselves: their identity. To protect from, provoke or respond to changes to this knowledge people act in the name of identity. Thus, identity constitutes the social psychological context within which worldviews are constructed, through which these worldviews are communicated and for which battles are fought.

Chryssochoou's proposal to look at identity as action opens new possibilities for using the concept to analyse contemporary social and political phenomena. Through the three-part cyclical process of cognition, communication and recognition, she links personal identity to the social world and provides a 'process' framework through which to study, for instance, identity politics, specific claims of individuals as well as groups or identity disputes.

This model goes also beyond past cleavages between social psychology and sociology where the former looked for universal psychological processes completely detached from their historical context, while the latter concentrated on the specific historical, social or political conditions in which group phenomena took place neglecting the social-psychological mechanisms involved. The author here provides a way out of the impasse by theorising identity as a social psychological concept in relation to social action, successfully anchoring it into earlier social psychological research but also current social and political concerns. The importance assigned to communication as one of the links between cognition and recognition gears this model towards a discursive perspective too, enabling for instance the adoption of discourse-analytical methods and tools for empirical research and subscribing to an overall conceptualisation of identity as meaning that is built, negotiated, developed and changed through discourse.

Overcoming the qualitative-quantitative divide

Among the contributors to this project, Collins and Seale in particular propose different strategies for combining quantitative with qualitative tools in the study of identity. Peter Collins proposes a "storying" perspective for the analysis of identity. He distinguishes

among three levels: individual-prototypical, local-vernacular and social-canonic. His model borrows from ethnomethodology, anthropology and philosophy and creatively integrates these perspectives. It is a reflexive approach, which seeks to dynamically elaborate the individual and the social level through the heuristic albeit empirically based notion of the local-vernacular, intermediate level. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken among British Quakers, the study attempts to elucidate some of the connections between the narrative quality of everyday interaction and the local construction of self. Focusing on the Quaker Meeting, Collins finds that the social identity of individual participants is precipitated in the interplay between three modes of discourse: the prototypical or individual, the vernacular and the canonic. For individuals to participate successfully in the Meeting they are required to present and then reconstruct their autobiographical selves in response to their increasing familiarisation both with well-known canonic texts and also the local expression of these texts. The tensions which characterise this process may also be said to define the politics of community in this case.

Aiming to make the most of new methodological tools, Clive Seale argues against stereotypical views of 'traditional scholarship' as presumably incompatible with methodologically informed procedures. He argues that such stereotypes, which parallel the presumed dilemma between quantitative and qualitative studies, can have a negative effect on the practice of social research in general, and textual analysis in particular. Drawing on a study of morally charged narratives of identity in newspaper texts, where personal stories of the experience of cancer are told with considerable attention by speakers and writers to the politics of gender, Seale shows how this distinction can be overcome in research practice. Quantitative analysis is shown to be useful in exploring text and generating insights, as well as strengthening generalisations from qualitative anecdotes. Automated text analysis using NVIVO and CONCORDANCE software can produce new 'readings' otherwise hidden from view that can be followed up in close qualitative analysis. Seale thus shows how traditional views of qualitative research as exploratory and quantitative as confirmatory can be overturned. Automation and counting are shown in this study to enhance the scholar's capacity to think creatively, indeed more than qualitative methods do in this case at least. The methodological tools proposed by Seale contribute to refining our understanding of identity formation and representation in discourse.

3.3 European identity, visions of Europe, and historical memory

BERNHARD GIESEN and VALENTIN RAUER

(Institute of Sociology, University of Konstanz)

How is European identity mediated in the past and today? With which representations can we conceive of the European people; what is the collective identity of Europe? In the case of the European Union the traditional relationship between the sovereign people and the political system appears to be reversed: Europe has already a legal system, soon it will have a constitution, but its collective identity has yet to be constructed, its sovereign people has yet to be defined. This collective identity of Europe is not to be reduced to just an unstable alliance of volatile interests or to the mere addition of the national identities of its member states. If the European *demos* is the ultimate source of law and politics, its identity has to claim an unconditional validity, it has to be constructed on seemingly unquestionable foundations as they are represented by common descent and destiny, by kinship and culture. Only if this collective identity of Europe can be conceived in a convincing way, only if the sovereign can imagine its identity – the *volonté generale* of the people – as stronger than the diverging interests and varying identities of its component parts – only then will the member states voluntarily accept majority votes in the European Council or engage in international solidarity as it is practised in national frames for disadvantaged regions and for the victims of catastrophes.

Within IDNET, there had been serious doubts as to what extent Europe will ever be able to generate this kind of identity. The main obstacles on the road to European identity are commonly considered to be the following:

1. In contrast to most nations, Europe is a multilingual community and will stay so for the foreseeable future. A transnational public sphere that could give rise to an encompassing European identity would have to overcome this linguistic diversity.

2. Some multilingual nations like Switzerland were able overcome this obstacle by referring to a common rebellion against the monarch or against foreign rule. Revolutions are, by their very definition, ruptures in the continuity of constitution and legal rule, a relapse into the "state of nature". Therefore the revolution is the most important founding myth of the modern democratic nation. But Europe is not united by the memory of a common revolution.

3. The imagination of a threatening outside is another way of forging a strong collective identity. But this route also seems to be blocked for Europe today. Who should represent this common enemy? The Islamic world? The African immigrants knocking on the doors of the European welfare fortress? Russia? Japan, the US?

4. Finally, reaching out to a level above the nation will not enhance identification and attachment. Both are relatively easy to produce on the level of personal relations and local communities, but they tend to fade away if large invisible communities are concerned. Even the construction of national identity has to be taken as a highly improbable and fragile achievement that has to be reinforced by rituals and myths, by museums and monuments.

Considering these problems, the "euroscepticism" of the scientific literature would seem to make sense.

We argue, however, that eurosceptics forget two important historical facts: *First*, nations, too, are not naturally given collectivities, but historical products generated by and imagined in particular public discourses (Giesen 1998, 1999, 2001). There was a time in which – faced with the diversity of dialects, regional cultures and religious confessions – the idea of an encompassing German nation could easily be discarded as lofty speculation. The *second* historical fact that eurosceptic voices tend to forget is the long intellectual history of the idea of Europe. There have been strong visions of European unity and identity before anybody could think of the European Union. Contemporary efforts to determine the nature of the new Hobbesian beast could be stimulated and enriched by looking back to these historical visions of Europe.

In the remainder of this Section three such Europe-wide mediated visions, based on the results of our project, will be outlined. The first refers to common descent and heritage, the second to a joint destiny and mission, the third to the collective memory of a past trauma. We could call the first model of Europe the model of classicism, the second could be called the model of modernism, and the third has some traces of post-modern melancholy. All of them were generated as a response to the traumatic experience of devastating wars within Europe and all of them imagine Europe as a cultural unity.

Europe as common descent

The "ideal" way to collective identity is the mediatisation of a common past, of a myth of origin, of a common heritage (Assmann 1999, Delanty 1995, Connerton 1989). And indeed

it was the invention of a historical continuity between the ancient Roman Empire and the Carolingian empire, the famous *translatio imperii* that represented the first construction of a European unity and identity (Ullmann 1969). The Carolingian renaissance of Europe in the seventh century fulfilled the yearning to overcome the misery of tribal wars that had devastated the continent after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Europe was represented as the prey of barbarian tribes warring each other and turning the classical civilisation into ruins. An escape from suffering and misery was expected from monastic communities and ascetic life. And it may well be that the Irish monks and missionaries who baptised the tribesmen in Germany were the first who mediated the term Europe after the decline of the classical world.

After his coronation in 800, Charlemagne was praised as the *pater europae*. The person of the emperor embodied not only the continuity of the imperial heritage, but also the identity of Europe as the unity of spiritual and mundane power, of *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. This unitary idea of Europe continued to inspire intellectuals and politicians, priests and princes even after the Carolingian empire was split up into three separate parts – what contemporaries regretfully described as the separation of Europe. The Ottonian and the Staufian emperors renewed the European ambition of the empire, and even later on the European frame of the empire and the church remained an obvious difference from Byzantium and the Muslim world. We can understand the crusades only if we consider them as a pan-European enterprise that related church and empire, sword and cross, politics and religion (Wallach 1972, Pirenne 1987, Leyser 1992, Reuter 1992).

However, during the crusades the Christian knights were not only united by a common descent and a common mission, but they discovered also their national differences. National differences and the partition of the empire into different kingdoms shifted the unitary vision of Europe gradually from the empire to the church. Even if later attempts to restore the imperial power often referred to its European roots, the Christian church mediated the idea of European unity more than any other institution. Thus the growing tension between pope and emperor, between church and state, between the spiritual and the political powers, appeared also as an opposition between a cultural construction of a common European heritage on the one hand, and a political construction of boundaries and diversity as represented by the fractionated and scattered map of feudal states on the other. The unity of Europe that was lost on the field of politics was still represented in a common culture.

This common European heritage centred around Christian faith, but it was also based on the continuity of the Roman law and on the classical repertory of art and architecture, literature and philosophy. The changing tides of epoch and style varied the mode of reference to the classics, but all these epochs and styles had a European scope and, hence, contrasted with the fractionated situation of political units.

The social carriers, the mediators of this European cultural identity were not the rulers, but scholars, monks, artists and humanist intellectuals – a relatively small intellectual elite who travelled across Europe between monasteries and academies, universities and feudal courts, and who, most important, wrote and spoke in a common European language – Latin. We can hardly overestimate the importance of Latin for the construction of a European public sphere until the rise of national literatures in the sixteenth century.

Europe as destiny and mission

This imagination of a European descent as represented by a cultural heritage was challenged by the devastating confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The original religious unity was gone, Europe was divided into three confessional camps – the polycentrism that had marked the political arena before now took over also the realm of culture and religion.

European intellectuals responded to this situation of decay and dissection by a new intellectual movement of European scope and ambition – the Enlightenment – and by a new discourse about Europe. This new discourse about Europe, too, was carried by a small intellectual elite that included enlightened princes, noblemen, scholars, officeholders and merchant capitalists. It was not descent and heritage, but education and scholarship that granted membership in this intellectual elite. Scholars like Pufendorf or Erasmus, Leibniz or Bodin, Grotius or Spinoza did not yet address a large public and they imagined their readership not yet in national contours. They travelled between the princely courts and changed their commitments, they communicated in several European languages and they published frequently abroad to escape censorship. New publications of famous authors were quickly translated and available to a Europe-wide educated readership. Certainly Paris and Leiden, London and Königsberg, Edinburgh and Göttingen had their own intellectual climate. But the enlightenment was a decisively transnational movement.

This new movement changed the idea of Europe in two important respects that prefigured the spirit of modernity. On the political level, the vision of a European unity centred

around the hegemonial empire was replaced by its opposite – the idea of a de-centred balance of power between the European states. Europe was represented as a realm of peace devoid of religious fanaticism and devoted to reason, tolerance and the rule of law. The polycentrism of European powers that patterned the political reality since the thirteenth century was turned into a program of European integration and international peace. The fractionated and fragmented political map of medieval Europe deviated from the original ideal of the hegemonial empire centred around the person of the emperor. The new vision of Europe considered this very hegemonic and centred structure to be the "pathological deviation".

Thus the modern imagination of Europe as a de-centred system prefigured the modern conception of society as a system of different but equally important spheres. Like the European powers that should abstain from hegemonic ambitions and be sovereign in their domain, also society was, later on, imagined as consisting of economy and state, culture and family, each sphere governed by its distinctive logic, without allowing one sphere to dominate the other.

But the new discourse about Europe differed from the classical heritage not only by its focus on balance and equilibrium, on tolerance and equality. It also had a new temporal orientation: it turned *from descent to destiny*. The enlightenment vision of Europe was no longer based on the defence of a classical heritage. Instead it imagined Europe as a cultural mission, as the vanguard of history, it looked to the future instead of looking to the past.

Of course the enlightenment did not invent the idea of European mission. The idea of a European mission can already be found in early modern Christianity. In this missionary vision, Europe was gradually decoupled from its territorial ties, it gained a temporal connotation. The *res publica christiana* could and should finally include every human being. European Christendom was turned into a universal community in relation to a God who was invisible and omnipresent, inaccessible and beyond description. The sacred core of European culture could not any longer be seen as embodied in particular places and objects. It became a missionary project that referred to all human beings and to all regions of the globe. This missionary universalism was secularised in the eighteenth-century notions of enlightenment, progress and education (Gollwitzer 1964). The constitutive boundary between Europe and the outside was even more temporalised and decoupled from the ties of descent and territory. It did run between the European vanguard of history and the backward "races" of outsiders, but it could also hint occasionally at the

backwardness and decadence of the European centre and at the natural innocence of the periphery. The noble savage could be closer to human perfection than the European – in particular in times when the Europeans seemed to oppose the rule of reason and the natural order.

The Enlightenment was a European movement that transcended territorial boundaries – it aimed at a universal community of humankind. Everybody's true identity was European, and it was the task of education and emancipation to further the awareness of this identity. Thus what started as a genuine European movement dissolved into a free-floating discourse that could be appealed to by every human being everywhere and at every time. Later on this missionary universalism promoted the abolition of slavery and engendered the cause of human rights – including the respect for human life and the abolition of the death penalty.

European collective identity and traumatic memory

Today, however, neither the idea of translation and embodied heritage nor the idea of Europe as a vanguard of universal history can provide a distinct European identity that will be accepted by the outside world without major reservations. In a post-colonial world the idea of a European mission, of a Europe teaching the world, faces as strong objections as the idea of a European empire – obviously the days of European hegemony are gone. But also the much less offensive idea of an inimitable cultural heritage may provoke frowns because of its highly exclusive claim.

Furthermore the relationship between politics and culture in today's European Union differs strongly from the one that prevailed during most of Europe's history. For a thousand years the unity of Europe could be found in the cultural realm while the political map was patterned by diversity. This relation between unity and diversity is reversed today: unity and integration are pushed forward by politics, whereas on the cultural level the diversity and polycentrism of European cultures are stressed and marked in order to counteract the unifying and levelling forces of market and administration – again it is a compensatory relationship but this time the other way around. Hence the reference to a common cultural heritage – although not completely without appeal – will hardly engender a strong European identity today.

Also other modes of relating to the past may not open up an easy road to European identity. We mentioned already the revolution as founding myth of the modern demos. In

the heroic uprising against the princely rule or foreign domination, the people relapse in a state of nature and constitute themselves as the ultimate political sovereign. In the memories of triumphant or tragically failed revolutions this democratic sovereignty is re-narrated, represented and re-enacted.

But it is exactly this memory of a revolutionary birth of the demos that is lacking in the European case – there is no common memory of a heroic uprising that includes all European nations. The memory of a triumphant uprising is almost exclusively tied to single nations, i.e. it undercuts systematically the level of an all-embracing European identity. Even the memory of a tragically failed revolutionary uprising is related to a particular nation that rebelled against an oppressor, i.e. mostly against another European nation. Whether triumphant or tragic, the memory of past revolutions can hardly unite all European nations.

However, the reference to triumphant foundations, to heroes and revolutions is not the only path of collective memory that could give rise to a European identity. In modern Western nations the triumphant founding myth is increasingly replaced by the reference to a traumatic past, to the collective memory of victims and perpetrators. New national memorials and museums rarely remember triumphant victories, but recall the victims of the past. This turn *from triumph to trauma*, from heroes to victims has been preluded by a major change in the monuments representing the nation as embodied in the hero. After the First World War the monument of the anonymous soldier rephrases the once victorious hero who had a face, name and story as a tragically failing hero (Koselleck 1997). At the end the hero is replaced by the nameless victim who ranges among other depersonalised victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The new national memorial of the reunited Germany in Berlin is such a memorial of anonymous victims, a memorial constructed by the nation and for the nation of perpetrators. In remembering a collective trauma it includes victims as well as perpetrators, and it can do so because it represents the collective memory of the German nation instead of hinting at the personal guilt of individual perpetrators, very few of whom are still alive. Individual suffering and guilt on the one hand and collective trauma and responsibility on the other are decoupled here.

The turn from the memory of heroes to the memory of victims and perpetrators, from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective identity, is also reflected by official rituals performed by representatives of the state. After the First World War the head of

state on an official visit in a neighbour capital paid respect to the fallen soldiers and the victims of war of the host nation. In the frame of this ritual the German Chancellor Willy Brandt performed the famous kneeling gesture in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial thirty years ago (Giesen, Rauer, Schneider forthcoming). This gesture was considered to be a turning point of Germany's post-war history. It engendered, later on, a political culture of ritual apologies with respect to the victims of the past (Cunningham 1999). So, in a strange way, not only the figure of the victim, but also the figure of the perpetrator becomes an archetype of collective identity – not only in Germany, although the public confession of guilt may be regarded as a special German contribution to the political rituals of post-war Europe (Giesen forthcoming).

Today many representatives of different European nations officially confess their nations' involvement in the Shoah. France is more concerned with issues of collaboration than with the myth of resistance, Norway's former President Brundtland admitted publicly that more young Norwegians died in the ranks of the Waffen-SS than as victims of the German occupation, Poland discovers its own genocide-involvement in Jedbabwne, the Pope apologises for the non-intervention of the Roman Catholic Church, and even the Italian Neo-fascist leader Fini and Austria's Haider visit Auschwitz (Giesen, Rauer Schneider forthcoming). Compared to these solemn confessions of guilt and its representation in monuments, museums and public debates, the traditional celebrations of triumphant memorial days are increasingly reduced to the status of local folklore.

The spread of a new political culture of ritual confessions of guilt focuses the Nazi genocide of the European Jews. But it views the Holocaust not as an exclusive German issue, it sees it as a collective European trauma which relates to many nations as victims and collaborators and even includes the allied forces, insofar as they did not prevent or stop the genocide by bombing the railroads to the death camps. This secular shift from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective memory contrasts sharply with the post-war attempts to purify one's own community by shifting the guilt to one nation and within this nation to a limited group of criminal if not demonic perpetrators. Today the turn towards a collective memory of past traumas blurs the once clear-cut separation between the nations of perpetrators and those nations that could remember themselves as victims.

This holds true even for Germany. Today Germany not only commits herself clearly to the guilt of the past, but also starts slowly and cautiously to rediscover and to remember her own victims – the victims of bombing raids and of ethnic cleansing after the war. This

explains the extraordinary success of Günter Grass's novella "Im Krebsgang" that describes the death of thousands of German refugees in a shipwreck in January 1945. A new traumatic memory of perpetrators and victims seems now to unite the European nations. It provides for a tacitly assumed moral consensus: a melancholic European identity based on the horror of the past.

Today, the burden of collective trauma is accepted by European nations more readily because most of the individual perpetrators are already dead and therefore out of the range of jurisdiction. By decoupling collective identity from the sum of individual identities, the present of the European Union has been separated from the European past of war and genocide – in similar way as the Carolingian Empire responded to the trauma of the tribal wars and as the enlightenment vision of Europe responded to the trauma of the confessional wars.

This new European identity based on a collective trauma of Nazism was challenged when the right-wing FPÖ, lead by Jörg Haider, entered the Austrian government in 2000 (see Section 3.5 below). Not the sheer existence of right wing extremism, but the official representation of a member state by a party that is considered to be ridden with Nazism, was the reason for sharp critique. We may consider the European response to the Austrian government to be grossly exaggerated – Haider is a right wing populist not much different from French Le Pen or Italian Fini – but the Austrian case provided an excellent opportunity to emphasise the new collective identity of European nations by staging the deviant case and marking Austria as an outsider. Stigmatising the Austrian government also demarcated the European boundary with respect to future candidates for a membership of the European Union.

The new European identity is based neither on triumphant rejoicing nor on the fear of an outside threat; instead, it is based on melancholy, on non-action rather than on action. This melancholic identity explains also the European hesitation to engage in warfare, and it is strongest in those member nations that have to bear the burden of the past in a concentrated way – in Germany more than e.g. in Great Britain or in Ireland.

The particularity of European collective memories

At the end of our research one could raise the question why this secular shift from triumphant to traumatic memories occurred in Europe, which conditions fostered it and in particular why this memory of a collective trauma should be considered as a European

peculiarity? Indeed the trauma of genocide and the collective responsibility of the perpetrators are by no means a unique European feature. But the official responses of Turkey to the Armenian genocide or the Japanese reaction to the international pressure to apologise for the Nanjing massacres greatly differ from the European response to the Shoah.

The Turkish and Japanese reluctance even to admit the crimes can hardly be explained by a phase of latency in which a nation is ridden with haunting individual memories and cannot stand to face the brutal conversion of her triumphant heroes into criminal perpetrators. In Europe as well as in Japan or in Turkey the perpetrators are dead and out of the reach of jurisdiction. Also the rise of international media networks that increases the sensitivity with respect to triumphant manifestations of national identity between neighbour states extends to Japan as well as to Europe.

But it is not just plain chauvinism that prevents these nations from admitting their genocide crimes. Instead their reluctance or refusal hint at different religious foundations of collective identity. The Judeo-Christian tradition starts with the idea of the original sin that is handed from generation to generation until the redeemer, the Messiah, appears in order to dissolve the bonds of the collective guilt. In the Christian tradition this Messiah is embodied in the person of Christ. Christ represents the ultimate innocent individual, the Son of God who sacrificed his life in order to relieve the burden of collective guilt from his people (the myth of the divine king sacrificing himself was quite common in African kingdoms too, see Eliade 1963). Because he is innocent his suffering does not result from retaliation and revenge but, instead, it represents the ultimately sovereign act of the divine hero. For the individual person this myth of original sin and redemption is turned into the ritual of confessing the guilt. The confession of guilt not only relieves the confessor from the burden of guilt but it even uplifts him to a purified position. If in addition to this, the confessing individual even is innocent, but nevertheless takes the burden of collective guilt, then he sanctifies his own mundane individuality; he performs *Christomimesis*. As a political leader he partakes in the charisma of the divine hero. Thus the European ritual of confessing the guilt of the past relies on a mythology that continues even if the political representatives performing this ritual are utterly secularised individuals who ignore the cultural origin of their actions.

In contrast, Japanese confessions of guilt are limited to individuals, who are blamed for having put shame on the collectivity, the nation, the family (Benedict 1974). Here, the

relation between individual and collective identity is reversed: it is only the individual who can be guilty, who can be humiliated and ashamed, whereas the embracing collectivity can not be imagined other than being innocent. The reason for this remarkable difference can be found in the axial contrast between the this worldly deed and otherworldly salvation in the European case, whereas in the Japanese perspective the confession of guilt cannot be alleviated by the promise of salvation in an otherworldly realm (Eisenstadt 1996). There is no otherworldly salvation in Confucian civilisation.

Even with respect to the spread of rituals of mourning and confessions of collective guilt, European identity relies on a cultural heritage that persists – in many transformations – even if the Europeans are no longer aware of it. Of course, the Christian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent is not the only possible foundation of European identity. Other institutions and ideas – the enlightenment, the idea of civil equality and civil rights, the individual as the source of creativity and carrier of rights in contrast to the authority of the state, the separation of state and religion, the constitutional nation state – all these are of similar importance and have been exported to other areas of the globe, mostly even without keeping a mark of their European origin. But confessing the collective guilt of the past may provide a European identity that can neither be accused of missionary triumphalism, nor be regarded as darkening the future of Europe.

3.4 European integration, socialisation, and identity change

JEFFREY CHECKEL (ARENA, University of Oslo)

This part of the IDNET project has brought together EU specialists and international relations (IR) theorists to explore the ability of European institutions to transform the interests and identities of states and other social agents. Put differently, it explores the *socialising role* of European institutions. Do national representatives 'go native' in Brussels, adopting European mores and values at the expense of national traditions? How and through what mechanisms are the transition states of East Europe and the Former Soviet Union adopting European standards, e.g., on ethnic rights and civil-military relations, thus facilitating their 'return to Europe'? Is it possible to view what is arguably the world's most successful *military alliance* – NATO – as a socialising institution?

More specifically, at issue are the conditions under which and mechanisms through which institutions in Europe socialise states. While standard sociological definitions, with their stress on the internalisation of values and norms, emphasise the end point of this process, it ought to be "unpacked" – exploring the intervening mechanisms that may lead to such end states. This issue is addressed on three different levels:

1. *Theoretically*, these intervening mechanisms of state/agent socialisation are explored from a variety of analytic perspectives, including organisational theory, social constructivism, rational choice and social psychology. We do not pretend to offer a single theory of socialisation; rather, the emphasis is the development of so-called scope conditions. In theoretical terms, the goal is thus middle-range or typological theories of socialisation.

2. *Empirically*, this theoretical diversity helps to capture the complex reality of contemporary Europe, where a variety of mechanisms are socialising states and individuals/ groups within them. Project participants thus analyse the socialisation potential and practices of several different European institutions (EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE), and do so in both West and East Europe and in macro (state socialisation by European institutions) and micro (individuals within the EU Commission, say) settings.

3. *Methodologically*, each contributor addresses a series of operational issues – how to recognise socialisation when we see it; the development of empirical indicators; what

counts as good data – and thinks in terms of scope conditions (when and under what conditions is a particular socialisation mechanism more likely to be at work). Attention to such questions improves the validity of individual contributions, while also helping to place the nascent socialisation literature in IR and EU studies on a more systematic footing.

Socialisation: definitions and levels

In a classical definition, socialisation refers to a process of inducting actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community. While this is an excellent and well established starting point, the devil is in the details. Earlier work – especially within sociology (Siegel 1965, 1; see also Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 287-92) – equated socialisation with internalisation and belief change. More appropriately, however, this should be seen as only one element in a multi-stage process (see also Alderson 2001, 417-20; Johnston 2001, 495).

In particular and as an increasingly robust empirical literature suggests (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, for example), this 'process of induction' can include a variety of causal mechanisms. A central goal of our project was better to specify these mechanisms and the conditions under which they operate. We thus argue and empirically document that socialisation can proceed along several different levels or dimensions simultaneously – ranging from partial (behavioural adaptation), to intermediate (role enactment), to complete (internalisation). Put differently, when a social agent comes to follow the 'norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community,' one or more causal mechanisms may be at work: strategic calculation, cognitive role playing or normative persuasion.

The purpose of this analytic parsing is not simply to come up with a roster of socialisation mechanisms. Rather, questions of scope and domains of application have to be explored as well – that is, when and under what conditions is a particular mechanism more likely to be operative. We thus face a two-fold analytic challenge: to establish how socialisation happens (socialisation mechanisms) and when it occurs (scope conditions).

These conceptual preliminaries were necessary because, until recently, mainstream research in both international relations theory and EU studies ignored, downplayed or under-theorised socialisation dynamics. Within IR, neorealists advanced a Darwinian and empirically inaccurate view of it. Even the so-called English School, which stressed the socialising role of international society, paid little heed to how this occurred (Bull 1977). A

similar state of affairs confronted students of the European Union. While the early neo-functionalist work of Haas and others had hinted at the EU's powerful socialising role, theoretical underspecification and methodological challenges had hindered the development of a robust empirical research program (Pollack 1998; Martin and Simmons 1998). This was and is a pity, for the EU's densely institutionalised structure would seem an ideal laboratory and "social soil within which actors' preferences might be transformed" (Caporaso and Jupille 1999, 440).

Socialisation research: the state of the art

Given this background, the good news is that the last decade saw a revitalisation of socialisation research by both IR theorists and Europeanists. One strand of research – conducted by IR constructivists – views institutions in a macro and holistic sense as *promoters* of socialisation in *public arenas*. In an important sense, this recent work thus builds on the arguments of Bull and others in the English School regarding the socialising effects of international society; its value added comes in systematically explicating how and when such effects occur (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, for example).

Another strand of socialisation research views institutions at a more micro-level as *sites* of socialisation in *private settings*. Here, Europeanists and a smaller group of IR constructivists have taken the lead. The former theorise and document how West European state elites, in insulated settings where social pressure is absent or deflected, adopt multiple identities and redefine their interests through processes of social learning. The latter build upon a long tradition of research in integration studies (early work by neo-functionalists), IR theory (Haas 1990) and negotiation analysis (Chayes and Chayes 1995) that emphasises the socialising affects of international organisations and institutions on the actors who participate in them. In these diplomatic, in-camera settings, scholars have shown how social learning and persuasion can change people's minds.

The project directly addresses unsolved problems and puzzles in this more recent socialisation research. In particular, for both the macro- and micro-perspective we theorise and then empirically document the *mechanisms* of socialisation and the *conditions* under which they are expected to operate.

Socialisation at the micro-level

Four contributions explore the role of micro-socialisation processes in central EU institutions. Collectively, they utilise rich empirical data to add specification and nuance to earlier claims on the transformative power of European institutions. They also highlight the central importance of domestic politics, broadly understood.[3]

The studies by Egeberg, Trondal and Beyers all explore socialisation dynamics within committee settings under the Commission and Council.

The exiting literature on this issue is dominated by two competing theoretical claims. Intergovernmentalists claim that national officials arrive pre-packaged at the EU level, and that their interests and identities remain largely unchanged while participating in European institutions. Most institutionalists and constructivists, on the other hand, argue that international institutions are capable of socialising government representatives so that their preferences and identities might be transformed. Morten Egeberg argues that to explain when and how EU institutions socialise government representatives, it is necessary to unpack an institution's basic *organisational* characteristics and explore whether these compete with or reinforce those of an individual's *domestic* organisational home. He uses data on national officials' participation in EU Commission and Council committees to shed light on these questions.

Applying an institutional approach to the socialisation of national civil servants embedded in EU committees, Jarle Trondal claims that individuals who participate in Council working groups tend to supplement pre-existing allegiances with supranational role perceptions. EU committees are seen as transformative institutions and sites of socialisation with respect to the roles of the committee participants. Based on survey and interview data with Danish and Swedish government officials who attend Council working parties, Trondal argues it is the *length* and *intensity* of attendance on Council working parties that accompanies the enactment of supranational allegiances and loyalties among the participants. However, contrary to neo-functionalist arguments, these supranational allegiances are clearly secondary to pre-existing national and sectoral allegiances.

In a contribution that partly challenges Trondal's findings, Jan Beyers explores whether the adoption of supranational role conceptions is caused by extensive and sustained contact with 'Europe' – a key assumption for many studies of European socialisation. Based on

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[3]   For more detailed summaries of the research described below, see the journal/book prospectus in on p. A-18 below.

qualitative and quantitative interview data, he scrutinises this so-called contact hypothesis, arguing that studies on European socialisation must take actors' multiple embeddedness more explicitly into account. In an empirical analysis of committees operating under the European Council, Beyers then demonstrates that any study of European-level socialisation must explore and control for the effect of domestic context.

A fourth study on the EU turns our attention to a central – but poorly understood – EU institution: the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or Coreper. As the heart of everyday EU decision-making, Coreper is a key laboratory to test whether and how national officials become socialised into the Brussels-based collective culture and how this impacts national identities. Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a controversial EU citizenship directive, Jeff Lewis finds evidence of a socialisation process in Coreper that goes beyond mere strategic adaptation. Crucially, however, the pattern of identity change in Coreper does not indicate national identities are replaced or subsumed; rather, Lewis uncovers a socialisation dynamic leading to new understandings of national identities and an expanded conception of the self.

Socialisation at the macro-level

Three additional contributions explore socialisation dynamics more at the macro-level. In doing this, they consider the socialisation potential of other European institutions, thus contextualising arguments made about the EU; they also broaden our theoretical toolkit for understanding such processes by drawing upon insights from both social constructivism and rational choice.

Alexandra Gheciu examines the dynamics and implications of NATO's socialisation of Czech and Romanian actors after the end of the Cold War. She argues that the organisation's involvement in Central/Eastern Europe has been more complex than rationalist analyses might lead us to expect. In addition to (a limited use of) instrumental incentives, NATO has relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion. A close empirical study of the Czech and Romanian cases reveals that international socialisation affected not just the socialisees' strategies, but also their definitions of identity and goals. Gheciu goes on to argue that successful persuasion of this sort is most likely when the national actors are 'novices' and when the international interlocutors (from NATO in this instance) do not lecture, but instead engage in dialogue and debate.

In her contribution, Judith Kelley combines quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the role of the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe in shaping domestic policy on ethnic minorities in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s. The author explores the influence of two very different socialisation mechanisms: persuasion-based diplomacy and incentive-based conditionality. Highlighting the key role of domestic politics, Kelley theorises the scope conditions for when each of these socialisation mechanisms works. Empirically, she demonstrates that persuasion mechanisms alone rarely change policy outcomes and that the clear provision of incentives is necessary as well. The findings thus suggest that rational choice models can also provide important insights into socialisation dynamics.

Frank Schimmelfennig advances a slightly different rationalist approach for understanding key aspects of socialisation in the transition states of post-communist Europe. In particular, he theorises the main socialisation mechanism as one of "intergovernmental reactive reinforcement," where international organisations offer material and political rewards in return for norm compliance, but do not coerce non-compliant governments. Empirically, Schimmelfennig substantiates these propositions with quantitative data on the development of liberal democracy in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and with case studies on Slovakia and Latvia.

Putting results into context

We have made a particular effort to place the theoretical/empirical claims advanced by individual contributors in a larger context. What is good and bad? Where do we need to go next in terms of theory and method? In his evaluation of the project's meta-theoretical framing and its empirical cases, Michael Zürn takes a number of contributors to task for not giving alternative accounts a fair enough hearing. While such a criticism can be levelled at most research, it is of particular concern given our bridge building aspirations. Theoretically, he calls for greater attention to the increasingly robust literature on compliance as it offers additional tools for exploring the mechanisms of socialisation.

In another evaluation of the project's overall accomplishments, Iain Johnston assesses the core analytic claims regarding institutions. Are there other literatures that can shed additional light on the relation between institutions and socialisation? Integrating across the studies, what collective lessons can be gleaned on the role of institutional design in promoting/hindering socialisation? Finally, Johnston asks whether our arguments are really

about *European* institutions as opposed to more generic institutional effects. Why is it that institutions and their socialising influences are so seemingly different in Europe than in other world regions – Asia or Latin America, say? He argues that cross-regional comparisons are essential to help us develop more fine-grained hypotheses on the (multiple) causal connections between institutions and socialisation.

3.5 *Public discourses and the European public sphere*

THOMAS RISSE, VALENTIN RAUER, SYLVAIN RIVET, and MARIANNE VAN DE STEEG

(Free University of Berlin, University of Konstanz, and European University Institute)

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a European public sphere. This debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU). There is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon multiple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. In this context, an open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media is considered crucial for providing an interface between state and society in a democratic polity. If we conceive of the EU as an emerging democratic polity beyond the nation-state, the issue of a European public sphere is raised quite naturally.

Yet, there is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes a democratic public sphere, let alone a European public sphere – and how do we know one when we see one. As a result, different conceptualisations lead to diverging assessments about whether there is a transnational public sphere in Europe in an empirical sense and, if the answer is no, whether something resembling such a sphere could actually emerge in principle. Different concepts of a public sphere inevitably result in different empirical indicators how to measure it which leads to almost incompatible empirical data.

In this section we try to make sense of the empirical and theoretical literature by asking two questions:

1. What do we know empirically about a European public sphere?

2. How can we make sense of the empirical findings in light of the theoretical debate on a European public sphere?

We also report empirical findings from a content analysis of print media in five European countries pertaining to the so-called "Haider debate," i.e., the access to power of a right-wing party in Austria in 2000 and the European reactions to it.[4]

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[4] This project has been directed by Bernhard Giesen (University of Konstanz) and by Thomas Risse (Free University of Berlin, formerly European University Institute). It has been funded by the German Research Association (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*).

The short answer to the first question is somewhat paradoxical: the available evidence suggests that the salience of European themes is still low, but that similar meaning structures and frames of reference prevail in media reporting about Europe. The short answer to the second question is that a European public sphere emerges out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres. An ideal typical European public sphere would then be characterised by

- a comparatively high degree of attention to European themes in the national media;

- similar frames of reference with regard to European affairs in media reporting about Europe and the EU indicating an emerging "community of communication."

Linking theory and evidence, we can then conclude that we can see an emerging European "community of communication," the more salient European themes become in the various national public spheres.

What do we know about a European public sphere?

Systematic empirical research about a European public sphere and about cross-national media reporting about European affairs is still in its infancy. In other words, the theoretical and normative debate on a European public sphere and a European communication space far outpaces our empirical knowledge about these themes. Moreover, there is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes a European public sphere (see below). As a result, different empirical studies use different criteria and, as a result, come to different conclusions as to the (non-) existence of a European public sphere.

However, two apparently contradictory findings are worth reporting here:

1. Some measure a European public sphere by counting how often "Europe," "European institutions," or "European affairs" are mentioned in the media (e.g. Gerhards 1993, 2000). The result is almost inevitably that European questions pale in comparison with national, regional, or local issues. A recent cross-national study comparing media reporting on national, European, and global affairs seems to indicate that "Europe" only matters in media reporting on monetary questions, agricultural issues, and, of course, on issues of European integration itself (Ruud Koopmans, personal communication). This work, therefore, concludes: There is no European public sphere to speak of in a meaningful sense given the rather low issue salience.

2. Others concentrate on particular European issues, such as the corruption scandal of the European Commission, BSE, or the debate about the future of the European Union (EU) (e.g. Eder, 2000; Eder and Kantner, 2000; Trenz, 2000). These studies tend to observe that these European issues are discussed in the various media across Europe in a very similar fashion and using similar reference points. Our own study on media reporting about the European reaction to the new Austrian government (the "Haider debate") shows very strongly, that newspapers in five different countries used very similar meaning structures (frames) in discussing the issue. This was irrespective of one's particular stance on the issue. In this case, we could clearly observe a "community of communication". As a result, these types of studies are usually more optimistic with regard to the existence of a European public sphere, since they observe many more commonalities.

So, who is right? There is no easy answer, since the two types of studies measure different aspects of what could be a European public sphere. On the one hand, the first measurement refers to the significance or salience of European affairs, as compared to local, regional, national, or global questions. If media pay little or no attention to the EU, the public awareness of European questions is equally low, hence the scepticism about a European public sphere. On the other hand, the second type of measurement refers to common meaning structures and frames of reference. If media report about Europe and the EU at all, they seem to do so using similar frames and meanings; in other words, they have a similar understanding of what it is that they talk about, irrespective of their political standpoint. We might disagree about how we judge the Commission's corruption scandal, but we all agree that corruption is bad behaviour.

Putting the two findings together then leads to a paradoxical result: The national media do not report about Europe and the EU as often as policy-makers in Brussels would like them to do, but if they do report, they use similar perspectives irrespective of national backgrounds. The following graph summarises this finding:

Graph 1: Dimensions of a European Public Sphere and Empirical Findings

Media Attention for European Affairs *Frames of Reference in Media Reporting on European Affairs*	HIGH	LOW
SIMILAR	Ideal typical European public sphere	Current empirical findings
DIFFERENT	Prevailing national perspectives on Europe	No European public sphere

How to make sense of a European public sphere?

What do these results tell us about the (non-) existence of a European public sphere? Conventional wisdom holds that there is no European public sphere, because there is no "community of communication" on the European level based on a common language and genuinely European media. This suggests that we must somehow transcend our national public spheres and that a "European public sphere" is somehow located above and beyond the various national media and publics. In concrete terms, the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" and "Le Monde" could never be part of the same public sphere, by definition. But there is no reason why we should all speak the same language and all use the same media in order to be able to communicate across national borders in a meaningful way. If people attach similar meanings to what they observe in Europe, they should be able to communicate across borders irrespective of language and in the absence of European-wide media. Thus, the findings reported above disconfirm conventional wisdom.

Moreover, the conventional view is based on an idealised picture of an almost homogenous national public sphere which is then transferred to the European level. There is no reason why we should expect agreement or consensus on an issue in a common public sphere. Agreement about European policies across boundaries, ideological, and other cleavages cannot serve as an indicator for the existence of non-existence of a European public sphere. The same holds true for support levels for European integration. One could even argue that the lively debates in France, Britain, and Denmark about whether or not to join Euroland at least show that people care about Europe, in comparison to the silencing of such debates which we witnessed in Germany, Italy, or among other staunch supporters of the Euro.

In short, contestation might be a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence. The more contentious European policies and politics become and the more social mobilisation occurs on European issues,

the more we should observe truly European public debates. If political issues are not contested, if European politics remains the business of elites, the attention level for Europe and the EU will remain low. In sum, European issues must become salient and significant in the various public debates so that a European public sphere can emerge. Politicisation of European affairs would then be crucial to raise the low salience of Europe in the national media reported in the empirical studies.

Social mobilisation about and contestation of European policies and politics is a necessary pre-condition for an emerging European public sphere, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. One could easily imagine social mobilisation and public debates surrounding European policies within the member states that discuss these questions solely from the various national perspective. Is joining the Euro in the British, Danish, or German national interest, or not? If the debate is solely framed in these national terms, people would still debate the same question, but the frames of reference would be totally different. A study of the Commission's corruption scandal showed, for example, that Spanish media reported it as a German attack on a Spanish Commissioner for some mean nationalist reasons. German media, in contrast, reported the issue as another proof that Southern European cultures including the Spanish one just do not understand that corruption is irreconcilable with democratic values (see Trenz, 2000). While the two public spheres still observed each other, the same question meant two very different things in the two national communities.

Some authors are, therefore, very sceptical about the emergence of a European public sphere: "The territorial boundaries of the public sphere are, therefore, mostly identical with the territorial boundaries of democracies, because the elected representatives of the respective people orient their communicative, public behaviour to the 'demos' who elected them and on whom they depend" (Gerhards, 2000, 292/our translation). In the absence of transnational interest groups, parties, and social movements, we are unlikely to see an emerging European public sphere in which the issues are discussed from a European rather than the various national perspectives. The result is clear: We need to fix the democratic deficit of the EU first, before we can fix the deficit in European "public-sphereness". Others, however, see the emergence of a European public sphere as a pre-condition of being able to tackle the European democratic deficit. Is this then a "hen and egg" type of problem?

And is it really necessary that we all adopt a European rather than a national viewpoint in order to be able to communicate meaningfully across borders in a European public sphere?

At this point, we are back at square one: What constitutes a public sphere? Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner suggest in this context (building on Jürgen Habermas's work on public spheres) that a meaningful concept of public spheres requires that media communicate "the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance" (Eder and Kantner, 2000, 315). What does this mean concerning our question of a European public sphere?

First, the Eder/Kantner definition starts from the assumption that a transnational European public sphere can be built on the basis of the various national publics and media. Second, the concept implies a similarly (high) degree of issue salience across national public spheres. These two points are not controversial in the literature.

The controversy starts with the third part of the definition, "same criteria of relevance". On the one hand, there are those who would argue that a European public sphere requires that speakers in the sphere adopt a European rather than a national or otherwise partisan perspective (see above). There can still be controversies, but the debate would centre on whether or not a particular policy is in the European rather than any other interest. On the other hand, there are those who argue that "same criteria of relevance" simply means that we are taking notice of each other in a common public sphere, that we mutually observe each other. The example above of the German and Spanish media reporting of the Commission's corruption scandal would still qualify as one public sphere, since the two national media still observe each other.

But can we really argue that a common public sphere exists in the absence of some "community of communication?" In particular, if we posit the existence of a common public sphere as a necessary ingredient of a democratic polity, it is inevitable to talk about a community of communication. But how can we do this without falling into the trap of simply projecting our national democratic polities unto the European level? Are we stuck between a rock and a hard place? In other words, how much community spirit in Europe is necessary to find a European public sphere and how do we know it when we see it?

Communication in a public sphere means that speakers talk to each other and to their audiences rather than simply voicing utterances. As a result and at a minimum, speakers in a public sphere should recognise each other as legitimate participants in a debate. We might disagree fundamentally, but we take each other's statements seriously in a democratic polity. Nationalist reactions deny this legitimacy. Polarisation's along national lines by definition create boundaries using nationalist "self-other" distinctions, as in the case of the corruption scandal: *The* Germans are after *our* (Spanish) Commissioner. *The*

Spanish don't know what the rule of law means. In these and other statements, the two public spheres still observe each other and they also use some common reference points. But they surely do not treat each other as legitimate speakers in one's own public sphere. There is little sense of belonging to the same "community of communication."

Thus, accepting other fellow Europeans as legitimate speakers in a public sphere implies that the "we" in whose name actors speak and to whom they relate, extends beyond national boundaries. Thus, a certain degree of collective identification with Europe is necessary to treat fellow Europeans from other countries as legitimate voices in one's own national public sphere. We can call it "identity light," since it does not imply a deep sense of loyalty toward each other, but some minimum sense of belonging to the same community.

But how do we know that speakers in a public sphere treat each other as legitimate participants in a debate across borders? There seem to be two ways of measuring it which we used in our project on the European public debates concerning the rise of Haider's party into the Austrian government and the European reactions to it (see below). First, we can find out who the "we" is in whose name speakers communicate or to whom they refer in their utterances. We can also find out who the "they" is against whom the community is constructed or who is treated as outside the community. To what degree is a European "we" constructed and how does this relate to the national "we"?

Second, it is possible to measure the degree to which national media use similar reference points, similar frames and similar meanings when reporting about an issue. They do not need to agree in their views on specific policies, only on the criteria or the references that are at stake here.

An empirical approach to the public sphere in the EU: the "Haider debate"

In early October 1999 Jörg Haider's FPÖ won a major electoral victory in Austria. The coalition formed by the FPÖ and the ÖVP in February 2000 led to protests from all over Europe and bilateral sanctions of the other EU member-states against the Austrian government. Eventually, these sanctions were withdrawn in September 2000 when a commission of "wise men" judged the situation in Austria in line with the founding values expressed in the EU Treaty. The reason that precisely this case has been selected to learn about the public sphere in the EU is that we decided to go for the most likely case. This is a crucial case, for the debate on Haider and the situation in Austria turned into a debate on

what the EU is actually about now and in the future. In the end, the EU itself and what it stands for became the object of the debate. It is easy to maintain that if even in this debate nothing like a European public sphere can be identified, it is better to stop looking for it.

In order to analyse the material, we used frame analysis. Frame analysis is a method for studying the way in which social reality is meaningfully defined and valued in discourse. On the basis of our specific material, we identified 22 different frames. The four frames which turned out to be the most salient are: on Europe "Europe is a moral community", and "European legal standards", and on Haider and the FPÖ "Haider and the Nazi-past", and "Haider and xenophobia".

Whenever in the debate normative issues are raised it is repeatedly done by stating for example that there are "European common values" or that "the EU is more than a common market". We called this frame "*Europe is a moral community*". Usually, the exact meaning of these "European values" is left open or remains rather vague, e.g. references are made to concepts such as "democracy", "respect of Human Rights", "anti-racism" or "anti-nazism". Those who refer to this vision of the EU usually tend to legitimate the sanctions against Austria. The logic of this frame is that Haider and the FPÖ cannot be accepted in the EU because they do not share its common values based, amongst other things, on the refusal of Nazism and xenophobia.

In another perspective, the EU is identified with certain institutional procedures, laws or Treaty articles. This is the frame of "European Legal Standards". It is a reference to the "rule of law" as a founding principle for the EU. In most of the cases, the sanctions against Austria are criticised by referring to common European legal standards such as the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty provides for sanctions to be taken in case a member-state "violates the basic principles of freedom, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental rights, or the state of law in a serious and continuous way". This often leads to the conclusion that since Austria did not violate any law it should not be sanctioned *a priori*.

The frame of "European legal standards" is a different definition of the legitimacy within the EU than the one based on values, as in "Europe is a moral community". In "European legal standards" reference is made to "rules" and not to "norms and values", to formality and not to ethics, to the realm of the law instead of to the one of politics. However, what is striking about these two visions of the political community with which the EU is identified, is that the dividing line is not drawn between the EU and the nation-state, but between two

political visions of the EU. The question raised here is "which Europe do we want", and not the belonging to the EU as such.

In the previous section, we have seen the EU being portrayed as being a community based on moral values, or on a legal structure. However, there is another way of defining what the EU is about, namely by taking a distance from the darker side of our European heritage. Often, this is done by way of two specific frames. First, Haider is branded as a xenophobe and a racist. Racism and xenophobia are posed as a counter-model to the European ideals. Traces of xenophobia can be found in the European traumatic past as well as in the ideologies of right-wing political parties that nowadays constitute a challenge to European democracy. In the debate, Haider and the FPÖ are depicted as a symbol of what the EU does not want to be. Denouncing Haider, the EU is projecting itself as an anti-racist political body. Second, the issue and its protagonists are linked to the Nazi-period for example by comparing or denoting Haider as Hitler. As a proof the articles cite Haider talking positively about the Nazi politics or using typical Nazi-expressions.

The overall meaning of the "past"-frames can be summarised as: "Europe has learned of its past and will not make the same mistakes again, thus Haider should be stopped without any hesitation!" These frames about the past propel a strong symbolic mobilisation, against a collective "other". Everything which *can* be done, *should* be done to oppose against this dangerous other. However, it is important to mention that this "other" is neither Austria as a country, nor Haider as a person, but instead Haider as a symbol for a past that should never occur again. If this is a pertinent way of framing in the newspapers from all the five countries, than one could safely speak of the Nazi-period as a common European "them", or in other words, the ego/alter of Europe would be a collective past, i.e. the traumatic experiences of the Second World War.

A public sphere in the sense of a community of communication can be identified by looking at whether there are significant similarities in the discourse that is produced. To find out whether the debate between the various newspapers is significantly the same or different a statistical analysis is used. (In SPSS a Post-hoc ANOVA analysis was run [Tamhane]). On the basis of the differences and similarities between the newspapers it might be possible to distinguish various patterns, such as clearly identifiable national clusters, left-wing or right-wing clusters, and clusters of the quality newspapers in contrast with the more popular newspapers. In the end, the main conclusion from our data is that there is a high amount of similarity between the newspapers from all the countries in the

number of times they used the 22 frames. What is striking is that no specific national clusters can be pointed out, which confounds the hypothesis of the Haider-issue being debated in specifically national public spheres.

For each frame, one can count the amount of relations of difference and similarity between the various newspapers. Graph 2 reports for the four frames discussed previously the number of times that two newspapers are significantly different or significantly the same

Graph 2. Relations of similarity and difference between newspapers (in percentages)

while leaving aside in an "open" category those occasions in which it is statistically impossible to say whether the newspapers in question are different or similar. From this graph can be clearly noticed that there is quite some similarity, and only little difference, between the debate in the newspapers from the various countries. In this sense then, we found a "community of communication" in the Haider debates.

Linking theory and evidence: an emerging European public sphere

Summing up the above theoretical discussion, we can speak of a European public sphere in a meaningful sense if

1. similar issues are communicated at the same time with the same salience or significance;

2. the speakers treat each other as legitimate voices in a community;

3. the reference points and meaning structures in which a particular policy problem is being communicated are similar across national publics.

If we use these three criteria to interpret our empirical findings, the conclusion is very clear: People do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one's particular viewpoint in the issue at question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national public sphere to the other, as far as the frames of interpretation are concerned. In this latter sense, media reporting about the EU is no different from their reporting about national issues and events. In sum, we can observe an emerging European public sphere.

3.6 *Europeanisation, national identities, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union*

KLAUS EDER and WILLFRIED SPOHN

(Institute of Sociology, Humboldt University Berlin)

The major research aim of the scholars brought together in this group of the IDNET research network has been to explore methodologically and analyse empirically the relations between European and national identities in Western and Eastern Europe with a special focus on the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In order to reach this research aim, the group assembled about 30 scholars from various Western European member states and Eastern European accession countries as well as from three major academic disciplines: sociology, political science and history with both social-scientific and cultural-scientific orientations. Accordingly, the group had to bridge not only the different disciplines through cross-disciplinary theoretical and methodological orientations but also the different national academic traditions in the West and the East.

The research aim of the group was pursued at two conferences, both of which will result in book publications, edited by Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou and Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn, respectively (see pp. A-8 and A-15). The following sections summarise the interdisciplinary and comparative results of the "West-East" group's main research topics on the relation between European and national identities in Western and Eastern Europe. These main research topics have been: (1) an interdisciplinary conceptualisation of European and national identities; (2) Europeanisation, European and national identities; (3) Europeanisation, national identities and collective memory; and (4) Europeanisation, national identities and ethnic minorities.

An interdisciplinary conceptualisation of European and national identities

In the West-East IDNET group, given the disciplinary presence of sociology, political science and history, different theoretical approaches to the relation between European and national identities have been present. On these bases, the emerging cross-disciplinary common ground can be defined as a constructivist macro-sociological conceptualisation of the relation between national and European identities. The background of this macro-sociological constructivist approach is the multidisciplinary debate on whether or not and in which ways national identities have been transformed through the process of European

integration. The stark oppositions on this battleground of European identity (Kohli 2000) are two complementary "essentialist" concepts of collective identity: a national and a European one. The first position sees national identities, according to the presupposed confederal character of the EU, as the basic form of collective identity in the EU compared to which a European identity is an empirically negligible and normatively unwanted phenomenon. The second position expects, based on the assumption of the developing transnational-functional character of the EU, the replacement of national identities by a common overarching European identity.

In between these stark oppositions, there are positions which, according to the multi-level character of European governance, converge in a perspective that sees the character of European collective identity as a varying mix of national, subnational and transnational or European components. These multiple identities, as summarised by Thomas Risse for IDNET as a whole (see Section 3.1) can be conceptualised as "nested" or "cross-cutting" or perhaps most convincingly as "marble-cake" identities: all three models are in tune with empirical findings on the complementary rather than exclusive relations between national and European identities. In the same direction, the West-East IDNET group has taken up the macro-sociological constructivist approach from of one of the major participants (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). Here, collective identities are seen as socially constructed through boundary definitions and symbolic distinctions in the primordial, civic and cultural/religious dimensions and within specific social, institutional and cultural contexts. Accordingly, in approaching the relation between national and European identities our main methodological orientation is to analyse the social construction of the multiple collective identities involved in the European integration process.

More specifically, two theoretical elaborations of this macro-sociological constructivist approach have guided the interdisciplinary work in the West-East IDNET group. The first one is represented by Klaus Eder's approach to European identity that emphasises the reflexive construction of a European identity through processes of communication (Eder 1998). From this perspective, a de-coupling of collective identities from the nation-state and an increasing coupling with Europe is theoretically presupposed, directing the analytical focus to the social-communicative construction of a European public sphere in interaction with national-communicative spaces. This includes particular attention to the construction of a European public sphere in its issue-specific components (Eder and Kantner 2000).

The second theoretical elaboration is represented by Willfried Spohn's formulation of a three-tiered model of national, European and EU identities (Spohn 2001). Against the backdrop of the planned inclusion of the East Central and Eastern European accession candidates and their invoked European identities, the proposal here is to differentiate between the national, European-civilisational and European-integrationist aspects of collective identities and to focus analytically on the constructive interaction between these dimensions.

Within the framework of this macro-sociological constructivist approach, the main guiding questions regarding the impact of Eastern enlargement of the European Union can be formulated as follows:

1. Which impact does a European public sphere have on the construction of national and European identities? How does this impact converge or diverge in its effects in the Western European member states as compared to the Central and Eastern European accession candidates? And conversely, how do the national identities, national public spheres and embedded European orientations as well as the international relations or mutual constructions of national identities impact on the process of Eastern enlargement of the European Union?

2. What specific role do the manifold and interrelated collective memories play in the constitution of national identities and their mutual construction? What impact do the heroic and inversely the traumatic layers have in this collective memory? How do these layers in collective memory converge or diverge in Western and Eastern Europe? Which European civilisational components in interaction with other civilisations and which elements of the European integration experience in interaction with each national society are of importance here?

3. What consequences for the construction of national and European identities does the presence of ethnic minorities have, either through historical processes of nation-building or growing international and transnational migration processes? How do the impacts of these ethnic minority groups on collective identities differ between Western and Eastern Europe? What role do the differences in citizenship and incorporation modes between Western Europe as primarily receiving societies and Eastern Europe as (still) primarily sending societies play? Do the inter- and transnational migration processes, the different national incorporation modes and emerging forms of European

citizenship enhance European or rather national identities on the side of the migrants and on the side of the host societies?

Europeanisation, European and national identities

One of the crucial starting points of the West-East IDNET group has been that with the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and with the following process of a progressing reconnection between Western and Eastern Europe through the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, the relations between European, EU and national identities are also in the process of a fundamental reconstruction. On the Western European side, the hitherto progressing, deepening and widening European integration process within an iron-curtain demarcated border to the East, has been challenged by the opening of the Eastern European space. As a consequence, the civilisational foundations of European integration resurfaced and the international relations between Western and Eastern European countries re-emerged. On the Eastern European side, the wish to return to Europe as one of the crucial *leitmotifs* in the anticommunist revolutions were confronted with the prospect of entering the Western European transnational organisation of the European Union. Here, an – often ambivalent – European integrational identity started on the foundations of national identities formed in opposition to the transnational Soviet Empire, invoking at the same time a common European civilisational identity. Thus, an asymmetric process of the reconstruction of the interrelations between European, EU and national identities in the West as compared to the East has to be assumed.

Within this general geopolitical and geo-cultural context, several scholars participating in the West-East IDNET group have attempted to analyse the general contours of the interrelations between European civilisational, European integrational and multiple national identities. In "The collective identity of Europe: Constitutional practice or community of memory", his contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume, Bernhard Giesen defends the view that European integration cannot be based on constitutional patriotism alone, but has to include also a European cultural foundation. But in contrast to essentialist definitions of a European civilisation, he sees the task to build on the European multiple cultural heritage as transforming it into processes of cultural reconstruction and symbolic representation. Of particular importance here are two legacies: the Greek-Roman tradition of city democracy and the consciousness of moral guilt resulting from the nationalistic destruction and the Holocaust in World War II. Richard Münch in his contribution "Democracy without demos: European integration as a process of the change

of institutions and cultures" argues that European integration is leading to a pluralistic multi-level democracy that is not based on a uniform European demos but rather on a European society of individuals linked by a complex web of networks. John Hutchinson in his article "Enduring nations and the illusions of European integration" emphasises the resilient weight of nation-states and national identities and the need to build a European identity on the foundations of these multiple national identities, rather than by opposing or replacing them.

These different approaches to the relational triad of European, EU and national identities, though of a general European analytical relevance, are primarily developed in a Western European perspective. From an Eastern European and East-West European comparative perspective, the parameters of this triad of collective identities are different. Here, the civilisational and national identities are primary and an EU identity will only emerge with the realisation of accession, though the enlargement negotiations and the close prospect of accession already show an increasing impact on collective identities in the postcommunist societies – in accession as well as non-accession countries. With this theoretical orientation in mind, Willfried Spohn's contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume, "European East-West integration, nation-building and national identities: the reconstruction of German-Polish relations", analyses against the background of the burdened history between Germany and Poland the progressive coming-to-terms with the past in both societies as a crucial building block of Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In a related study, Miroslava Marody in "Polish identity in the process of Europeanisation" shows that and how Polish attitudes of their own nation and the EU in the context of the emerging eastern enlargement have changed in the last decade. Finally, Erhard Stölting's contribution "Russian perspectives on German and Russian self-definitions" explores the historical relations between the Russian imperial-national identity and embedded European components by reference to Germany and its implications for the currently developing relations between post-Soviet Russia and the EU.

Europeanisation, national identities and collective memory

A more fully developed comparison of the relations between European, EU and national identities emerged in the follow-up conference and the related Eder-Spohn volume on "Europe, national identities and collective memory: cultural impacts on the eastern enlargement in Western and Eastern Europe". Here, the focus was not primarily on the triadic relations between European, EU and national identities but rather on the specific

role of collective memory in the construction of national identities in a comparative perspective on Western and Eastern Europe as well as in East-West European integration. As developed in the contribution by Bernhard Giesen, "Triumph and trauma", a comparative analysis of collective memory focuses on the highly emotional, triumphant or traumatic, components of collective identity formation that are of particular importance for the cultural repertoires, moral bases, boundary definition and symbolic distinctions of national as well as European identities.

Regarding Western Europe, Hartmut Kaelble in his contribution "European Self-Understanding in the Twentieth Century" outlines five constitutive cultural codes which are developed by European intellectuals rather than representing mental currents of mass consciousness. These cultural codes are European superiority, threatened Europe, Europe as part of global modernisation, Europe as one civilisation among others and European unity in diversity. They crystallise in varying combinations in the periods before 1914, from 1918 to 1960 and after 1960 on the basis of common European social and cultural particularities. From this perspective, European integration as developing in the period after 1960 has played an important role in the constitution of a European identity, but on the basis of deeper social and cultural commonalities, including common triumphant and traumatic components.

The traumatic components in collective memory for the constitution of a European identity, on the one hand, are then exemplified in several case studies on the reconstruction of German-Polish relations by Oliver Schmidtke, on the reinvention of Europe in the case of Italy by Ilaria Favretto, and on the role of the transition to democracy and Europeanisation in Spain for the "Special solidarity with the East" by Pablo Jauregui. The triumphant aspects for a typically ambivalent European identity, on the other hand, are highlighted by Atsuko Ichijo in her contribution "A reluctant European and a tactical European: British and Scottish views on Europe".

Regarding Eastern Europe, Jerzy Jedlicki in his contribution "East-European historical ballast en route to an integrated Europe" points to the various layers of national identities and collective memory within an overall context of a strengthening romantic ethno-national identity under the conditions of Nazi genocide and Soviet terror. At the same time, he analyses these traumatic historical memories as a ballast in the threefold sense of a burden to be forced upon, preserved and thrown away: as social, cultural and morally reflexive foundations on the way of Eastern European countries to European integration.

These deeply traumatic components of collective memory in the East Central and Eastern European countries are then again exemplified in several case studies by Andras Kovacs on "Joining NATO and national identity in Hungary", by Karel Kubis on "Troublesome Anniversaries: the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic and its European fellows in Czech collective memory", by Olga Sezneva on "'Cultural Treasure': Constructing Russianness and Europeanness in Kaliningrad, Russia", and by Dejan Jovic on "The Macedonian-Albanian frontier: The re-articulation of post-Yugoslav political identities".

Comparing the Western and Eastern European national identities and collective memories, a basic West-East cultural cleavage is involved in Eastern enlargement of the European Union. In Western Europe, Eastern enlargement is primarily seen as a vehicle to expand the Western European peace and security order, the European economy and welfare zone as well as the Western political and civic culture to the East. In the nation-states with long civic-democratic traditions, collective memory emphasises more the triumphant aspects of national identity and thus feeds in an unproblematic European civic mission to the East. In those nation-states with an authoritarian past, collective memory is related to the troublesome history of democratisation, serving as the basis for an attitude showing solidarity with post-communist transition countries. In the case of Germany, the support of Eastern enlargement is directly connected to the coming to terms with the Nazi past, feeding in a mission of reconciliation towards the East. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the major common interest is securing national identity, preventing ethno-national conflicts, stabilising the new democracies and catching-up to the Western European socio-economic level. At the same time, collective memory is haunting the accession to the European Union. The first ambivalence is connected to the renewed transfer, even if partial, of national sovereignty or the enforced de-coupling of national identity to an Empire-like transnational order. The second ambivalence relates to the memory of Yalta as a treason of the Western European nations vis-à-vis the Eastern empire. And the third ambivalence is linked particularly to Germany and the renewal of a German *Sonderweg* against the Eastern peripheral nations.

Europeanisation, national identities and ethnic minorities
One of the important components in the construction and reconstruction of national and European identities, covered as an additional research topic by the West-East IDNET group, has been the role of ethnic minorities. On the one hand, ethnic minorities play a crucial role in the historical formation of nation-states and national identities, and given the

mostly troublesome history of the relations between majority and minority ethno-national groups, they have become a central part in the construction of European citizenship. On the other hand, ethnic minorities have developed also as a consequence of the growing migration and immigration movements changing the ethnic composition of nation-states, transforming national identities, and thus impacting on the construction of European citizenship as well.

The role of historical ethnic groups for the formation of national and European identities is addressed by several case studies in the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume as well as in the forthcoming Eder-Spohn volume. Y. Michal Bodemann in his contribution "Remembrance without recognition: On the problem of ethno-cultural plurality in Germany" analyses the process of reconstruction of German Jewry in post-Shoah Germany from an essential part of traditional German high culture to a German ethnic-religious minority, the legitimatory use of German Jewry for the moral reconstruction of German society and at the same time the fundamental problems of a Christian-secular nation-state in accepting German Jews in their ethnic-religious identity as an equal part of German society. Europe, here, figures as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and civic solution to this troubled relation between national majority and minority. The reconstruction of Russian identity in postcommunist Kaliningrad, subject of Olga Sezneva's above-mentioned study, is another example of the impact of German history and memory on Russian national identity in combining it through the German legacy with Europeanness. In a similar direction, the article by Judith Toth and Endre Sik on "Joining an EU identity: integration of Hungary or the Hungarians?" analyses the ambivalent role of the European Union in constructing through Eastern enlargement new borders between the Hungarian nation and Hungarian near-abroad co-nationals, and the thrust of a Hungarian European identity to bridge these historical and new borders.

The role of migratory ethnic groups for the construction of national and European identities again is the subject of several case studies in both volumes. Krystyna Romaniszyn in her contribution "Migration, cultural diversification and Europeanisation" analyses, in a comparative Western European perspective, the manifold social and cultural ways in which the processes of immigration and incorporation as well as adaptation and ethnicisation impact on the social structure, political culture and national identities of the host societies. Although here the predominant reaction is a fortress-Europe radicalisation

of non-western European immigrants, the author also sees at work a tendency towards Europeanisation, i.e. a European inclusion of Eastern Europeans and non-Europeans.

These conflictive tendencies between an ethnic exclusivism and a European inclusivism on the part of the host societies are also the subject of Ruth Wodak's study "Racism at the top: Parliamentarian debates on issues of immigration in six EU countries". On a micro-sociological ethnographic level, these conflictive tendencies are moreover analysed by two closely related studies by Norbert Cyrus on "Changing rhetoric and narratives: German trade unions and Polish migrant workers" (in Berlin, Germany) and by Ewa Morawska on "National identities of Polish (im)migrants in Berlin: four varieties, their correlates and implications". Whereas Cyrus shows the strongly exclusivist orientations of German trade unions to be accompanied by a counteracting European rhetoric, Morawska demonstrates that the experience of (im)migration predominantly strengthens nationalist-exclusivist identities, but also generates as a minority current of European inclusivist orientations.

These case studies show a pattern of the transformation of national and European identities on the part of the European host societies as well as on the part of the (im)migrants that is more nuanced than the current debate on European citizenship and derived forms of European identity (cf. Eder and Giesen 2001). This debate is elaborated in Andrew Geddes's contribution to the Spohn-Triandafyllidou volume on "Integrating immigrants and minorities in a wider and deeper Europe". From a political-scientific top-down perspective, Geddes investigates the recent developments in the immigration policy designs on the European Union level that may override national sovereignty if the issue at stake concerns existing legal and economic repertories such as anti-discrimination policy or market-related provisions. Yet the empirical – historical, ethnographic, and quantitative sociological – studies assembled by the East-West IDNET group show that the European notions of citizenship on the top do not reflect directly the European identities at the bottom, but rather conflicting tendencies between ethno-nationalist exclusivist and European inclusivist identities, and that an interaction between both levels is at work here.

4. Conclusions and policy implications

4.1 European identity

The complexity of contemporary collective identities

The discussion above, in particular Sections 3.1 and 3.2, draws attention to the complexity of contemporary collective identities. In addition to the national level of identification, sub-national and transnational levels have to be taken into account. Also open to discussion are the ways in which these multiple levels of identity, in particular European and national or regional identities, relate to each other. With regard to European identity, both the boundaries of the collective of its bearers and the substantive values and beliefs of which it is composed are malleable and elusive. And while there are good reasons to believe that European institutions do have an impact on the formation of collective identities, the strength of this impact clearly varies across sections of the population, and the precise nature of relevant causal pathways needs more attention.

All of this has implications both for further research and for policy-making. First of all, in terms of research an interdisciplinary approach to the study of identity is indispensable (see Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.4). Political scientist, sociologists, social psychologists and historians have joined forces within IDNET, and although interdisciplinary cooperation does pose particular challenges of its own (see especially Section 4.4 below), the expediency of our joint efforts, we feel, is borne out throughout this Report. More attention also needs to be paid to the combination of diverse methodological perspectives and tools. The use of new types of software and the intertwining of quantitative with qualitative methods may provide the means for understanding better the dynamics of identity formation and change (see especially Section 3.2).

In terms of policy-making, it follows from the complexity of contemporary collective identities that cultural or education policies should take into account different levels of identity formation, the importance of local realities as the 'place' where individual identities are expressed but also where wider collective identifications are actualised. Moreover, attention ought to be paid at the fluid and often 'hybrid' character of individual identities in post-industrial societies. Important here is the distinction between nominal and virtual identity, or more simply put: the possible difference between a group label and the actual content of the group identity for its members. Moreover, cultural and citizenship

policies need to pay attention to the individualisation and fragmentation of ethnic and national identities while keeping up also with more traditional current of national identification. The politics of communication and recognition are important aspects that need also to be addressed at the national as well as European or EU level.

An increasing sense of community

Despite remaining uncertainties of conceptualisation and measurement, the available evidence shows quite clearly that there is an increasing sense of community among the European citizens, among elites and ordinary people alike. The EU clearly represents a genuine community for the political, economic, and social elites in Europe and it essentially defines modern statehood in Europe for them. Among the citizens, identification with and attachment to Europe (in conjunction with the nation-state) has also grown in recent years, while exclusive loyalties to the nation-state are in decline. Moreover, the EU is understood as a civic community as distinct from cultural understandings of Europe in general.

There is more to an emerging European demos than many seem to realise. In particular, the European polity does not require a "demos" that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities co-exist. Europeanisation, European integration, and European identities seem to co-evolve over time, both at the elite and the mass levels. The causal arrows between European integration and institution building, on the one hand, and the evolution of European identities, on the other, seem to run both ways. The increasing 'realness' of the EU in people's daily lives seems to affect their identification with Europe as a political community. At the same time, support for European integration and attachment to Europe appear to be closely related motivating European elites toward continuing on the path of institution building.

It follows that building a European identity has little to do with public relations efforts or information campaigns about the EU. Rather, the key toward increased identification with Europe and the EU is increasing the reality of the community in the daily lives of the citizens. In this sense, the Euro represents a huge experiment in collective identity building, and Europe could need more symbols and collective myths of this and other kinds (see the following sub-section). Relatedly, national political elites, who care about the EU, should stop the blame shifting games ("Europe made me do it!"). This does not imply to support everything that comes from Brussels. But routine references to "those

faceless bureaucrats in Brussels" represent cheap ways of avoiding political responsibility, and they confuse efforts at European identity construction.

The ritual construction of a European identity?

Thus there are ways of further increasing the sense of community among European citizens, and the turn from triumphant memories of past heroism to traumatic memories of a collective entanglement into guilt and victimisation (see above, Section 3.3) may help to overcome the lack of a revolutionary founding myth in Europe. Yet the absence of a common language remains a major impediment on the way to a transnational European public sphere. Indeed a European-wide sphere of deliberation, a space for an exchange of arguments that could ignore the boundaries between linguistic communities will hardly emerge in the near future. TV programs and newspapers will address a national and not a European audience.

However, collective action and public communication are not confined to discourse, to speech and texts. Even stronger than arguments that may provoke counter-arguments are monuments, museums and public rituals. Monuments and museums can remember the past without lengthy texts, and it is the very absence of text or its limited use that conveys a sense of immediacy and compelling presence in museums and monuments (Nora 1986, Schechner 1990). Rituals, too, construct a collective identity that claims unconditional validity for the participants and that is mostly experienced as authentic and unquestionably given. This authenticity of rituals is based on the facticity of bodily presence and the co-ordination of bodily movements in the ritual performance – on common singing, praying, listening, dancing, marching or being silent. And the feeling of authenticity even extends to those who are not directly participating in the ritual, who are even not present in the local site of the ritual but watch a live broadcasting of it on TV. This explains the extraordinary and European-wide attention of ceremonies like the funeral of princes Diana, the wedding of a Dutch crown prince or even the annual blessing of the pope *urbi et orbi* on Saint Peters. These rituals are highly formalised, there is not much suspense in them, but they attract millions of spectators all over Europe.

The European Union could refer to this feeling of authenticity that is generated by public rituals in order to construct a collective identity of the European demos that transcends the boundaries of language and region. E.g., the opening ceremony of the European parliament could be staged and broadcast like the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games – with

colourful choreography, with music and public addresses in all languages of the Union. The site should be changing between the beautiful European cities with a republican tradition like Barcelona and Florence, Bruges and Prague, Frankfurt and Dublin. The spectacle should not only show the diversity of European nations, but it should also present the particular cultural heritage of the respective city or region as part of an embracing European identity. We assume that this would not only attract a large audience, but also enhance the public construction of a European demos.

Most strong constructions of collective identity are grounded in a ritual performance that merges the diversity of the participants into a community. The staging of European collective identity, too, has to balance the symbolic representation of the diversity of the members states with the symbolic performance of unity and commonality. In this respect, too, the ritual representation might be especially appropriate for the process of constructing a European collective identity that can refer neither to unanimously hold historical memories nor to a common language.

4.2 Socialisation and identity change

Empirical, theoretical and methodological conclusions

In substantive terms, our research has shown that European socialisation and subsequent identity change is not an "either/or" process. Acquiring new roles and identities in Brussels or Prague does not come at the expense of national identities and traditions. Rather, one has a layering, a 'complexification' of identities. For sure, this is not a totally unexpected finding as there have been arguments of this sort circulating within the scholarly literature for several years. Moreover, it is consistent with numerous Eurobarometer polls showing that most individuals feel themselves to be both European and Spanish (or whatever) at the same time. The value added of our work on socialisation and identity change, and of IDNET as a whole (see in particular Section 3.1), has been to provide better theoretical specification and robust empirical confirmation of these insights.

Theoretically, our project demonstrates the utility of middle-range, grounded theory for best capturing and explaining socialisation processes. Such approaches are complex, typically identifying a series of causal variables to explain an outcome (socialisation, in this case). While we feel there are more general grounds for developing such theory, its use is essential for socialisation studies. In particular, our empirical results led us to

appreciate the complex and multi-faceted nature of socialisation as a process involving not only internalisation (the traditional focus of earlier work), but strategic adaptation and cognitive role enactment as well. Middle-range theory, with its emphasis on scope conditions and domains of application is particularly well suited for disentangling such dynamics.

The stress on contingent, middle-range theories had another important benefit, one glossed over by most previous research. Simply put, our findings demonstrate that when one unpacks the concept of socialisation and attempts theoretically to specify its various mechanisms, rational choice frameworks that stress the calculation of costs and benefits and individual choice have a role to play as well. This realisation allows the work package to speak to the emerging dialogue and debate in the broader theoretical literature between rationalism and more sociological approaches.

However, such complex theorising places a premium on methods and research design. Methodologically, then, a key challenge for the workpackage was to address such issues. We did this in a number of ways – explicit discussion of research methods and their limitations; serious attention to alternative analytic accounts, for example. However, the contributions by Johnston and, especially, Zürn suggest that more is needed. In particular, future research must adopt more ambitious cross-national and, ideally, cross-regional designs that will control for: (a) the fact that Europe is a most likely case for regional institutions to have socialising effects; and (b) the independent effect of the various causal factors the work package uncovered (for example, role of material power asymmetries, role of noviceness, role of domestic organisational base).

Policy Implications

Four policy implications follow more or less directly from our findings. First, the development of a European identity that stands in opposition to national traditions and cultures is highly unlikely. Rather, to the extent that supranational identifications emerge, they will be supplements to existing loyalties and affiliations.

Second and related, our work on European socialisation indicates that the construction of any pan-European identity will be a slow and protracted process. Indeed, many of the dynamics we studied – prolonged professional contact in Brussels, sustained efforts at teaching and persuasion, requirements of joining European organisations, and the like – had minimal impact in changing identities. (However, this finding should be read with

some caution as the temporal focus of all work package contributions – 4 to 5 years at most – was perhaps too short to detect longer term dynamics of identity change.) In policy terms, this indicates that an insight from the older literature on political socialisation still holds, namely, that schools and educational curricula more generally are key arenas for moulding and adapting attitudes and identities over the longer term.

Third, a robust finding across our studies is the importance of domestic politics and national context. If one wants to understand the degree to which national officials 'go native' in Brussels, it is essential to control for prior domestic socialisation and organisational context. Likewise, it is impossible to predict whether the former communist states in East Europe will adopt the mores and values of the West without first exploring their own national traditions and constellations of political actors. In policy terms, this means there is a need to craft more nuanced and country-specific socialisation instruments.

Fourth, regarding East Europe, a key finding is that Western efforts to socialise these states work best when a variety of policy instruments are used, including straightforward conditionality as well as more pedagogic suasion/teaching techniques.   Different instruments reach different domestic actors and have different types of effects (changing cost/benefit calculations versus changing beliefs and attitudes), thus maximising the likelihood of a successful socialisation process.

4.3 Identities and enlargement

Interdisciplinarity in practice

As an overarching theoretical-conceptual approach to the analysis of identities in the context of Eastern enlargement, we have used the Eisenstadt-Giesen macro-sociological constructivist framework that has been able to bridge the different inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary approaches and methodologies (see Section 3.6). In particular, this framework has served to link constructivist orientations within the sub-discipline of international relations in political science on the one hand, and constructivist approaches in sociology and history on the other. As it turned out, the core problematique of this interdisciplinary link has been the methodological interconnection between the "top-down" analyses dominant in political science and the "bottom-up" analyses of national and European identities dominant in sociology and history.

Since we did not understand this project primarily as a theoretical-methodological seminar but rather as an explorative methodological and analytical enterprise, the core problematique of linking top-down and bottom-up perspectives was tackled not in the form of a systematic cross-disciplinary investigation but rather in the context of the various empirical studies. Specifically, top-down and bottom-up perspectives had to be linked in three research areas: (i) the relation of national and European identities in the process of European East-West integration; (ii) the specific contribution of collective memory for the formation of these collective identities; and (iii) the impact of ethnic minorities on the construction of national and European identities.

Regarding the first research area of the relation between national and European identities, the major contribution of the East-West IDNET group has been to complement the predominating political-scientific international relations research by exemplary analyses of the historical-inter-societal construction of national and European identities. The Eder-Kantner approach to the communicative formation of a European public sphere as a social-cultural basis of European identity formation, here, is one fruitful direction, though further research should extend the Western European focus also to the Eastern European accession candidates as well as to the analysis of Eastern enlargement as specific issue of European identity formation. Spohn's triadic model of national, European and EU identities here is another fruitful direction which is of particular value for the comparative analysis between the varying identity configurations in Western and Eastern Europe.

Regarding the specific focus on collective memory in the formation of national and European identities in a Western/Eastern European comparative perspective, the research network clearly explored new ground. Collective memory has been so far rather a topic of anthropologists and historians rather than sociologists and political scientists and therefore applied to the past or non-European societies. Regarding the contemporary construction of collective identities in Europe and their implications for European East-West integration, the work of the West-East IDNET group has generated interesting new data.

Regarding the second specific focus on ethnic minorities in their impact on national and European identities, the West-East IDNET group has moved on a large body of well-established inter-disciplinary research on historical and migratory ethnic groups as well as on national and European citizenship. The specific and important contribution, however, relates to the comparative micro-sociological analysis of the national-ethnic nexus and its link with national and/or European identities. A second important contribution, though to

be developed in further systematic and comparative research, is the link between the macro-configurations of national/European citizenship and the micro-levels of national/European citizenship in collective identity formation–either in the host societies or in the ethnic communities themselves. Also here, a further exploration of the methodological connections between the approaches present in this research network and the Eder approach on cultural codes, boundary constructions and ethnic minorities would be a fruitful future task.

Finally, regarding the role of national and European identities in Eastern enlargement, the East-West IDNET group has oriented its interdisciplinary research on a highly relevant and rarely investigated topic. Here, the social and political scientific research is dominated by investigations into the institutional, political, legal and economic dimensions of the EU Eastern enlargement. The cultural dimension and particularly issues of collective identity formation, by contrast, are however rarely researched. An inter-disciplinary East/West European comparative perspective, linking top-down perspectives on Eastern enlargement of the European Union and bottom-up perspectives on social and cultural processes of European East-West integration is one of the crucial results of the West-East IDNET group, a result which also defines a desideratum.

Policy implications

Within the macrosociological-constructivist framework and on the basis of the research foci of this project, tentative policy recommendations have been developed in two directions: (i) with the aim of supporting the evolution of a civic-democratic European identity by enhancing the arenas of a European public sphere as well as by empowering it through symbolic representations; and (ii) with the aim of bridging the cultural divide between Western and Eastern Europe as a fundamental task of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union.

Based on the above-mentioned social-communicative approach to the European public sphere as a constitutive element of the construction of a European identity (Eder and Kantner 2002; Section 3.6 above), we call for a 'progressive era' in the enhancement of a European public arena and, with it, the overcoming of the democratic deficit of the European Union (policy memo by Cathleen Kantner; see Section 5.2). The empirical basis for this call is the emergence of transnational, issue-specific forms of communication across Europe that already constitute a partial European demos and function as a

democratic challenge and corrective of political decision-making on the European level. Accordingly, the so-called pessimistic particularist view is criticised for restricting the existence of a public sphere to the individual nation-state and neglecting the emerging forms of a transnational public sphere. But inversely, also the so-called optimistic federalist view is criticised for over-estimating the possibilities of constitutionalising and parliamentarising the EU-institutions. Instead, it is argued for a progressive enhancement of a European public sphere backed up by transnational institution-building.

Against the backdrop of the cultural divide between Western and Eastern Europe based on the longue-durée centre-periphery relations between Western and Eastern Europe and the short-term experiences in the 20th century, we argue for a conscious tackling of these cultural West-East asymmetries as a crucial task for a successful dealing with the challenges of the eastern enlargement of the European Union. Seven proposals are developed (memo by Willfried Spohn):

(1) In view of the basic ambivalence of the Eastern European accession candidates regarding the just won national sovereignty and its partial transfer to the European level, it is recommended to enhance the public discussion on the specific character of the EU and the subsidiarity principle.

(2) In view of the crucial importance of overcoming the traumatic experience of the short 20th century as a basis for a European identity, it is recommended to support and develop public spaces particularly in the postcommunist countries as a counterweight against the nationalistic-exclusivist fears in those countries and some recent attempts to increase them by external pressures–as in the case of the re-politicised Benes decrees.

(3) In view of the considerable and partially rising anti-EU sentiments in the accession candidates particularly in less secularised social risk zones, the public clarification of the European Union as a pluralistic, secular and religious, value community besides special material support for the people at risk is seen as import.

(4) In view of the likelihood that the social risk zones as simultaneous social carriers of nationalistic-xenophobic attitudes in the Eastern European accession candidates will continue to exist and even grow also after the incorporation into the EU, it is recommended to develop intercultural programs in cooperation with local organisations to reach these people.

(5) In view of the endemic ethnic-national conflicts in most of the postcommunist countries and the ambivalent impacts of the eastern enlargement on those conflicts, it is seen as a crucial task to improve a European public debate on and counteract the negative consequences.

(6) In view of the partial intensification of nationalistic-xenophobic attitudes of (im)migrants from the East to the West in the context of discriminating every-day life experiences, again special intercultural programs should be developed to improve transnational communication and incorporation.

(7) In view of the rising tendencies, not only in the current member states but also in the new member states, to exclude Turkey and other Eastern European states as accession candidates, there is a special urgency to find a middle way of a privileged in-between status between full and non-membership and enhance a transnational public debate on these issues.

The interesting common denominator of these recommendations is that they are not only directed at European Union policy makers but also at collective actors in what could be called an emerging European civil society (see also Section 4.1 on "The ritual construction of a European identity?"). The focus is not only on European institution-building, but also on European intercultural communication to construct a common civic-pluralistic European identity intertwined with ethnic, cultural and civic components of national identities. This common denominator reflects the macro-sociological inter-disciplinary framework and research focus of the East-West IDNET group. At the same time, after the first meeting of European policy makers and academic intellectuals, there is also the need to further clarify the relationship between the policy memos and the political actors addressed. At least, it remains an open question whether the policy memos presented meet actually the action horizon of the addressed policy-makers, whether the policy memos should be formulated in a different way to the same public, or whether the addressed policy-makers represent the adequate political public for the thrust of the policy recommendations.

4.4 The European public sphere

Empirical research on the existence and the nature of a European public sphere is still in an early stage. IDNET in our view has made significant contributions to this evolving

research area both in conceptual and in empirical terms (see Section 3.5). Conceptually, we have stressed the distinction between two different dimensions along which the existence of a European public sphere can be measured, namely the salience of European issues in national media on the one hand, and the extent to which substantively similar frames of reference are employed across national boundaries in reporting on European affairs. In the light of this distinction, existing findings which emphasise the relatively low salience of European as compared to (sub-)national and global issues should not be overestimated in their importance for the (non-)existence of a European public sphere. Cross-national comparison should look not just at the amount of space and time, but also at the substantive frames of reference which media apply to issues of European importance.

Our empirical research has focused on this second dimension of a European public sphere. It leads to the conclusion that people do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one's particular viewpoint in the issue at question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national public sphere to the other, as far as the frames of interpretation are concerned. In this latter sense, media reporting about the EU is no different from their reporting about national issues and events. In sum, we can observe an emerging European public sphere.

The policy conclusion is equally clear: Many political and business leaders in Europe believe that controversial debates on Europe, the EU, and European policies will endanger the European integration process and slow it down considerably. Therefore, one should not touch the European elite consensus which still prevails in many, particularly Continental European countries. This belief is dangerous in democratic terms and plain wrong in empirical terms. Contestation and politicisation is constitutive for a democratic polity including the European polity. And it serves a European purpose, since it is bound to increase the issue salience and significance of European affairs in the national polities. The data on frames of reference suggest that raising the salience of the EU in the national polities will not drive the Europeans apart, but pull them together in a European public sphere.

5. Dissemination and exploitation of results

5.1 Academic conferences and workshops

Title	Organiser(s)	Place & time
European integration and the changes in European boundary constructions	Spohn and Triandafyllidou	Florence, 7-8 April 2000
Europeanisation and multiple identities	Risse with Brewer and Herrmann (OSU)	Florence, 9-10 June 2000
Socialisation and identity change: theoretical and methodological issues	Checkel	Oslo, 16-17 June 2000
Collective identity: conceptual and methodological issues	Giesen	Konstanz, 8-9 December 2000
International institutions and socialisation in the New Europe	Checkel	Florence, 18-19 May 2001
Europeanisation: institutions and the evolution of social identities	Risse with Brewer and Herrmann	Florence, 18-19 June 2001
Studying collective identity: a conceptual and methodological inquiry	Benigni and Triandafyllidou	Rome, 6-7 July 2001
Europe, National Identity and Collective Memory	Eder and Spohn	Berlin, 25-26 January 2002
Europeanisation and the public sphere	Giesen and Risse	Florence, 20-21 February 2002
International institutions and socialisation in the New Europe	Checkel	Florence, 22-23 February 2002
Europe Transformed? The European Union and collective identity change	Checkel and Risse	Oslo, 11 October 2002

5.2 Dissemination activities for policy-makers and the general public

Annotated bibliographic database

An annotated bibliographic database compiled in the framework of IDNET is accessible for the general public via our website on the server of the Robert Schuman Centre <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Tools/IDNET/Access.html>. The database contains some 900 entries on the subject of identity, with a sharper focus on European identity. References cover a wide range of social scientific disciplines, spanning over the last 25 years. The database can be searched in a variety of ways. The standard type of search is by field, such as by author, title, date and so on; in this respect the database can be searched in the same way as a standard library web site. In addition, the entries to the database have

been classified on the basis of certain categories ("IDNET keywords", see Section 7.1), with a view to facilitating a more focused type of search. All the works cited in the database have been classified on the basis of: discipline; theoretical orientation (when applicable); methodology (when applicable); country concerned (when applicable); and subject matter. All entries can then be searched according to these dimensions; for example, one may be interested in publications on identity within sociology, from a social constructivist theoretical perspective, with a qualitative methodology, with a focus on ethnicity. Thirdly, free keyword searches can be conducted which extend beyond the range of IDNET keywords. Finally, to the extent that abstracts are available individual terms can be searched for in those abstracts.

Outreach conference

An international policy outreach conference was held at the University of Oslo in October 2002. This event brought together practitioners from the European Commission, national ministries and journalists along with IDNET scholars to discuss and debate our findings. The conference itself was divided into four sessions. Session one addressed the broader questions of what we know about collective political identities in Europe, both conceptually and empirically, and how identity formation can be promoted. The remaining three sessions addressed more focused aspects of these broad questions, namely the preconditions for a European public sphere, the impact of Enlargement on collective identity formation and the importance of socialisation for the production of a common identity. The programme and an extended conference report are reproduced in Section 7.4.

Policy memos and briefing book

For the Oslo conference, we produced and distributed a briefing book, which is composed of brief "policy memos" where various IDNET scholars highlight the policy relevance and implications of their research in non-technical language. The briefing book can be accessed at <http://www.arena.uio.no/events/idnetgeneral.htm>. The briefing book not only sparked a lively discussion at the policy conference itself; it has also been highlighted in several national media outlets, including the *Irish Times* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

5.3 Publications resulting from IDNET activities

(1)   Checkel, Jeffrey, ed. (forthcoming). *(Re-)Joining Europe? Socialisation and European Institutions*.

(2)   Eder, Klaus, and Willfried Spohn, eds. (forthcoming). *Europeanisation and Collective Memory: Cultural Impacts on European East-West Integration.*

(3)   Giesen, Bernhard (forthcoming). *Triumph and Trauma*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

(4)   Giesen, Bernhard, Valentin Rauer, and Christoph Schneider, eds. (forthcoming). *Tätertrauma*. Konstanz: UVK.

(5)   Herrmann, Richard K., Marilynn Brewer, and Thomas Risse, eds. (forthcoming). *Identities in Europe and the Institutions of the European Union.*

(6)   Spohn, Willfried (forthcoming). *The Role of Collective Identities in the Eastern Extension of the European Union: A Western-Eastern European Comparison.*

(7)   Triandafyllidou, Anna, ed. (forthcoming). *Conceptual and Methodological Questions in the Study of Collective Identity* (Special Issue of *Language & Politics*).

(8)   Rauer, Valentin et al. (2003). "Toward a European Public Sphere? Evidence from the 'Haider Debate'" paper presented at the Biannual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Nashville TN, March 26-30.

(9)   Risse, Thomas (2003a). The Euro and Identity Politics in Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 10.

(10)   Risse, Thomas (2003b). Toward a European Public Sphere? Theoretical Considerations. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association, March 26-30, at Nashville TN.

(11)   Giesen, Bernhard, and Kay Junge. 2002. "Historical Memory." *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, ed. Gerard Delanty.

(12)   Risse, Thomas (2002). "Zur Debatte um die (Nicht-) Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit." *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13: 5/6, 15-23.

(13)   Risse, Thomas (2002). "Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe Versus the Nation-State?" *Developments in West European Politics*, ed. Paul Heywood, Eric Jones and Martin Rhodes. New York: St. Martin's Press.

(14)   Risse, Thomas, and Daniela Engelmann-Martin (2002). "Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany." *The Idea of Europe*, ed. Anthony Pagden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(15)   Spohn, Willfried, and Anna Triandafyllidou, eds. (2002). *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration: Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe.* London: Routledge.

(16)   van de Steeg, Marianne (2002). "Eine europäische Öffentlichkeit? Die Diskussion um die Osterweiterung der NATO." *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13: 5/6, 57-66.

(17)   Risse, Thomas (2001). "A European Identity? Europeanisation and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities." *Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change*, eds. Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 198-216.

5.4 List of agreed deliverables

No.	Title/description	Status	Availability*
1	Conference report on international conference "Europeanization and Changes in Collective Identities" (Workpackage 1)	Completed	Annex to first periodical progress Rreport
2	2-3 joint research reports on collective Identity formation as part of the European integration process (Workpackage 1)	Completed	See this report
3	Edited volume "Europeanization and Changes in Collective Identities" (Workpackage 1)	Completed	See (5)
4	Workshop report summarizing the findings from the three workshops on conceptual and methodological issues pertaining to the study of socialization, identity change, and the role of the media (Workpackages 1, 2, 3)	Completed	WP 1: see (7); WP 2: see (1); WP 3: Annex to second progress report
5	Edited volume on "European Integration, Socialization, and Identity Change" (Workpackage 2)	Completed	See (1)
6	Conference report and (possibly) edited volume on "The Role of the Media and Public Discourses in the Process of Identity Formation and Change" (Workpackage 3)	Completed in partially revised form	Report: see fourth progress report; ed. vol.: see (4)
7	Workshop Report on "European Integration and Changes in European Boundary Constructions" (Workpackage 4)	Completed in revised form	See (15)
8	Conference Report and (possibly) Edited Volume on "The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Social Transformation and Collective Identities in Western and Eastern Europe" (Workpackage 4)	Completed	See (2)
9	Database on Research Activities concerning Europeanization and Collective Identity Change (Workpackage 5)	Completed	www.iue.it/RSCAS / Research/Tools/ IDNET/Access.sht ml
10	Short Policy Memos for decision-makers on the various levels of European governance summarizing relevant findings from network activities (all workpackages; coordinated by EUI)	Completed	www.arena.uio.no/ events/idnetgeneral. htm
11	Conference Report on "International Outreach Conference" (Workpackage 5)	Completed	Annex to this report

* Nos. refer to the list of publications on previous page.

* Nos. refer to the list of publications on previous page.

6. Acknowledgements and references

6.1 Acknowledgements

6.2 References

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