



EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PUBLIC SUPPORT TO TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION, TURCO-SKEPTICISM IN EUROPE: A Multi-Level Analysis

Emre Hatipoglu, Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Ekrem Karakoç

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Freie Universität Berlin
MAXCAP
„Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons and prospects for enlargement and beyond“
Ihnestr. 22
14195 Berlin
Germany
Phone: +49 30 838 57656
Fax: +49 (0)30 - 838-55049
maxcap@zedat.fu-berlin.de
www.maxcap-project.eu



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EMRE HATIPOGLU, MELTEM MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ AND EKREM KARAKOÇ

Abstract

This paper tries to parse out the determinants of the European public's attitudes to Turkey's accession. Our factor analyses suggest that the attitudes of European individuals towards Turkey's accession are grouped under two main dimensions: utilitarian and normative. Furthermore, we posit and test the possibility that individuals' attitudes towards Turkey may also be shaped by the national political context they are immersed in. Our findings indicate that individuals who believe that Turkey belongs to Europe culturally and who believe that its EU membership will provide more benefits to the EU tend to be more pro-accession. An inverse relationship exists between individuals' belief that Turkey will benefit from EU membership and their support for Turkey's accession. The most important country-level factor affecting the level of turco-skepticism in a member state seems to be the level of Turkish migrants in its population. Finally, the ideological stance of the government amplifies the effect political ideology of individuals has on their belief about Turkey's accession.

The Authors



Emre Hatipoğlu holds a BA from Boğaziçi University, an MA from Sabancı University, and obtained his PhD from the Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Hatipoğlu's research employs quantitative and formal methods to examine the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. His work has appeared or is forthcoming in journals such as *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *International Studies Perspectives* and *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Emre Hatipoğlu is also a co-principal investigator in the I-POST project, which examines opinion formation trends among Turkish twitter users.

Meltem Müftüler-Baç is professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair at Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey. She received her B.A in political science from Boğaziçi University (1988), M.A in international relations from Temple University (1989) and Ph.D. in political science/international relations from Temple University, USA (1992). Prof. Müftüler-Baç authored *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* published by the Manchester University Press in 1997, and *Turkey and the European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities and Constraints*, co-edited with Yannis Stivachtis and published by Lexington books in 2008. Her publications appeared in *Journal of European Public Policy*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, *East European Quarterly*, *Journal of European Integration*, *South East European Politics and Society*, *Security Dialogue*, *International Studies Perspectives*, *Turkish Studies*, *Women's Studies International Forum*, *West European Politics*, *International Journal* and *Journal of Democracy*. She participated in the F6 project 'Reconstituting Democracy in Europe' for 2006-2012, in LISBOAN for 2011-2013 and the FP7 project 'TRANSWORLD' for 2012-2016, all funded by the European Commission. She received two different grants under the Jean Monnet Project of the European Union in 2002 and in 2008 both for teaching politics of European integration. In 2011, she was granted a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence for the European studies program she is coordinating at Sabancı University. Prof. Müftüler-Baç holds two prestigious awards from the Turkish Academy of Sciences: Young Social Scientist Investigator Award in 2002 and Distinguished Young Scientist Award in 2003. She was awarded with the Jean Monnet Professor ad personam title from the European Commission in 2004.



Ekrem Karakoç is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University, SUNY. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University in 2010. His primary field of interest is Comparative Politics with a focus on comparative political economy, political behavior and democratization. His works have appeared in a number of journals including *World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *European Political Science Review*, *Electoral Studies*, *Turkish Studies*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* and others.

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1. Introduction

Public support to enlargement and integration varies within the European Union. Even though there is no direct public involvement in EU level policy making, the EU decisions are taken within the boundaries of what is acceptable to the European public at large (Eriksen/Fossum 2002; Sjursen 2006; Eriksen 2007). Public support to enlargement in general, and towards specific candidates in particular influences the EU and frames policy choices. When the European Union launched its enlargement policy in the 1990s, it was promoted as the key to unite the European continent and to guarantee security and economic welfare of the Europeans (Schimmelfennig 2001; Smith 2004). Despite its relative success in Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement policy no longer seems to occupy an important place on the EU's agenda or among the member state priorities. Uniting the European continent is far from complete with the Western Balkans and Turkey waiting in line to get into this exclusive club. Yet, these countries face a new layer of complexity. In the previous rounds of enlargement, the ability of the candidate country to fulfill the accession criteria, specifically the *acquis communautaire* was sufficient for its accession. This no longer holds true. Toshkov et al. (2014) argue that "understanding the links between public opinion and enlargement is indispensable for assessing the integration capacity of the EU".

While the integration project has come quite far in the absence of overwhelming and resounding citizen support (i.e. the permissive consensus), further enlarging the EU seems unachievable in the absence of a common feeling of togetherness (McLaren 2002; McLaren 2004; Sjursen 2006). The EU's readiness at the political, economic and institutional levels plays a critical role in the accession process. Public support to enlargement as well as towards the individual candidate's accession emerges as a new factor to be considered within this readiness. The European public has never been too enthusiastic about the enlargement process to begin with (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998b); however, the support to enlargement might have now reached an all-time low among the European public who has become increasingly skeptical about the EU project. It is within this background that the perceptions of the European public about a particular candidate, Turkey, become important.

Even though official accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey were launched on October 3, 2005, Turkey's accession to the EU is still a highly contentious issue for some European member states and the European public (Müftüler-Baç 2008; Pahre/Uçaray-Mangıtlı 2009; Çarkoğlu/Kentmen 2011). This is why it is important to understand the many layers of the public support of or the opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. Is the European public supportive of or skeptical about Turkey's accession based on utilitarian and material calculations? Or do ideational concerns hold the key as to whether Turkey is perceived to belong to a larger European identity or not? Perhaps the European public is mainly responding to the cues it receives from the European governments and their own preferences? All these emerge as multiple dimensions of explaining the European public's support to Turkey and the variation in support across and within different countries. Some authors have argued that the European public's views on integration have been shaped by competing visions of rationality and identity (McLaren 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2004). However, how these competing visions impact the European public's views on Turkish accession is still an important question that is not yet fully empirically tested. Previous works by McLaren (2007), Pahre and

Ucaray-Mangitli (2009), Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011), and De Vreese et al. (2012) analyzed the European public's views on Turkey, yet our paper uncovers the many layers of European public support towards Turkey that are still to be captured. Specifically, we argue in our paper that there is a significant role that governments in power play in shaping public's views on Turkish accession.

In order to tackle the questions listed above and to understand why individuals support Turkey's accession or not, we employ a multilevel (random-coefficients) regression model. This model allows us to simultaneously test individual level traits (such as individual beliefs and attitudes towards Turkey) and country-specific factors (such as a country's economic performance, or the share of Turkish migrants it hosts). A novelty that our approach brings is that we also see whether country-specific political and economic factors interact with personal traits in shaping an individual's attitude towards EU accession. Controlling for this interaction of how a country's political and economic setup primes an individual's attitudes towards Turcoskepticism is especially important since Turkey's accession has become a contentious point in some EU members' domestic politics while not occupying a salient position at all in others' domestic agenda. To do this, we draw upon the Eurobarometer 66 from 2006 for our empirical analysis as this is the only Eurobarometer with specific questions on Turkey based on both material and ideational concerns across the EU member states. These questions were unfortunately not repeated in later years. Accordingly, while we conduct our empirical analysis on this Eurobarometer, we assume that most of the basic dynamics of the European public's views on Turkey did not radically alter since that time. That is because the Turkish-EU relations did not go through a significant transformation since the launch of accession negotiations in 2005. More importantly, neither the most significant utility based concerns, i.e. Turkey's role in European security or its economic dynamics, nor its cultural, ideational based differences, i.e. the European perceptions of Turkey as an Islamic country with substandard democratic credentials, changed. Turkey still is a democracy in transition with a Muslim majority, and despite its economic growth in recent years, it still lags behind the main European economies. This is why we assume that most of the views captured in 2006 still shape the European public's perceptions of Turkish accession today in 2014.

Our paper proceeds with an analysis of the competing visions of public support for enlargement and Turkey's accession to the EU and presents the main findings of the empirical study through multiple models. Our conclusions based on this analysis enable us to develop new links between public opinion and enlargement through the case study of Turkey's accession and to assess the integration capacity of the EU.

2. Competing Visions on Explaining the European Support to Turkey's Accession to the EU

The study of public attitudes towards integration is generally built around the contention (or assumption) that the power and influence of the EU over policy-making is immense, and that the very nature of modern democracies implies that the public must have some input into this system of multi-level governance. Accordingly, various scholars analyze European public's attitudes to the integration process as a whole (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993; Anderson/Reichert 1995; Niedermayer/Sinnott 1998; Gabel 1998a; Gabel

1998b; McLaren 2002; McLaren 2004), attitudes to the adoption of the Euro (Kaltenthaler 2002; Risse 2003) as well as attitudes of citizens in the new member states towards European integration (Caplanova et al. 2004). These studies furnish us with an understanding of the public's views on the integration process and provide considerable clues as to why there are differences across the European Union in terms of the member states' publics and their levels of support for the integration project, for various referenda, for specific policies like enlargement or the Euro and, ultimately for our purposes, for Turkey's accession. Based on these former studies, we now know that EU citizens are motivated to some degree by utilitarian or self-interested concerns (Gabel 1998b). We also know that feelings of group threat and differences in perceptions and conceptions of identity shape attitudes towards integration and enlargement (McLaren 2004; McLaren 2007). We can observe that the European public is increasingly skeptical about the EU's enlargement policy. This is, of course, not specific to Turkey but applies to all the candidates waiting for EU accession. Table 1 demonstrates the European public's support for the enlargement policy as well as for Turkey's accession.

So what shapes the public's views on enlargement and on Turkey's accession? Micro-economic approaches propose that support for integration is a function of individual gain and competitiveness, an approach that has been referred to as a "utilitarian model" of support for European integration (Gabel/Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Gabel 1998b). The model centers on the notion of rational cost-benefit calculations in which citizens who benefit the most from an EU policy should be the most supportive of such a process (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1999). In essence, some individuals stand to lose a great deal as a result of Turkey's accession, while others will win, and Europeans' attitudes towards Turkish accession are dependent on whether they think they will win or lose (or have already won or lost). From the utilitarian perspective, public views on Turkey's accession are shaped by the perceived material costs and benefits that it would bring to the EU, in line with the utilitarian logic from the rationalist based explanations of public opinion towards enlargement (Gabel 1998b; Kaltenthaler/Anderson 2001; McLaren 2004). These views would be shaped by either economic or security driven concerns. Based on the utilitarian logic, our first expectation in the paper is:

Proposition 1: The more individuals perceive that Turkey's accession to the EU will bring material benefits, the higher their level of support to Turkey.

This rational cost-benefit calculation European citizens may conduct with respect to Turkey's accession to the EU can emanate from two interrelated but separate mechanisms. On the one hand, a European citizen can focus on the immediate economic and security benefits Turkey's membership in the EU would bring. Such benefits would include, among others, an immediate extension of the European market and the rejuvenation of an otherwise aging European labor market. Security-wise, Turkey's accession would strengthen the EU's southeastern flank. Foreign policy-wise, European citizens are likely to support Turkey's accession if Turkey's membership would significantly contribute to a more effective EU neighborhood policy, and help promote the EU's role as a peace-builder in its near-abroad.

On the other hand, the benefits Turkey would derive from EU membership also seem to be of concern to many European bodies. These groups, such as the European social democrats, have voiced concern for a democratic and economically developed Turkey, also often for the sake of Turkey itself. An EU compliant

Member states	Support to Enlargement	Opposition to Enlargement	Support to Turkey's accession	Opposition to Turkey's accession
Poland	71%	20%	54%	31%
Croatia	71%	20%		
Lithuania	64%	24%	42%	32%
Romania	61%	20%		
Slovenia	57%	39%	53%	40%
Hungary	55%	33%	51%	38%
Slovakia	52%	40%	37%	50%
Bulgaria	54%	24%		
Estonia	53%	38%	27%	56%
Latvia	51%	36%	36%	44%
Malta	51%	30%	43%	39%
Sweden	47%	50%	50%	40%
Czech Republic	45%	50%	37%	51%
Spain	43%	38%	42%	33%
Denmark	43%	53%	30%	62%
Greece	42%	53%	26%	74%
Ireland	40%	48%	38%	34%
Belgium	36%	61%	36%	61%
Italy	34%	52%	33%	52%
Portugal	33%	50%	43%	33%
United Kingdom	33%	58%	45%	37%
Luxembourg	31%	66%	22%	72%
Cyprus	30%	56%	16%	80%
Netherlands	28%	68%	39%	53%
Finland	26%	70%	31%	66%
Austria	23%	69%	10%	80%
France	22%	71%	21%	70%
Germany	18%	75%	21%	74%

Table 1: Comparison of Public Support in the EU for Enlargement and Turkey's Accession¹

Turkey would also be for the benefit of minorities in the country, many of which have close ties to their respective diasporas in a number of EU member states. Turkey's accession could also be seen as a zero-sum game for some Turcoskeptics, where Turkey's well-being may be perceived at the cost of the EU's wellbeing. Other skeptics could possibly question whether Turkey could meet EU standards at all. This nuance relating to how Turkey's accession is projected onto material benefits for the EU, in turn, suggests two related sub-propositions emanating from Proposition I:

Proposition Ia: The more the individuals perceive that Turkey's accession to the EU will bring material benefits to the EU, the higher their level of support to Turkey.

1 Sources: Support for enlargement data from EuroBarometer 79.3, 2013. Support for Turkey's accession data from EuroBarometer 63.4, 2005, QB2.12.

Proposition Ib: The more the individuals perceive that Turkey's accession to the EU will bring material benefits to Turkey, the higher their level of support to Turkey.

These rationalist approaches to explaining variance in public opinion base their arguments on cost-benefit calculations and utilitarianism. Individual-based theories propose that support for integration (and presumably for enlargement) is impacted by expected consequences for the individual's own well-being. However, arguments based on this conception of material gain fail to adequately explain public's attitudes towards enlarging the Union because they tend to overlook the motivations for preserving community values and national identity. Specifically, they fail to consider the importance of the factors that influence individuals' cost-benefit analyses and shape their preferences. This is where norm-based approaches enter the equation with their emphasis on common values and identities. Therefore, in order to have an encompassing view of the public's support to enlargement, we need to assess both the individual, rational interests together with the communitarian based norms. This is because accepting new member states into the EU requires that European public perceive the candidate countries as being 'like them', and not a group of foreigners threatening their material wellbeing and moral values. To be specific, we expect the public to "distinguish between different policy choices based on material gain", as well as with "reference to an actor's sense of identity and understanding of good life" (Sjursen 2002). Accordingly, the competing vision from identity, norm-based perspective would have a different view on the explanations of the public's support to Turkish membership. Within this logic, the key to uncovering the European public's views on Turkey does not rest on the utilitarian vision but on the perceptions of otherness and the fit to a 'collective identity of the EU'. There are other important factors though: factors that impact the public's perceptions of the candidates as different, alien, and therefore as a threat to their cultural integrity (Sears/Funk 1991; Lahav 1997; De Master/Le Roy 2000; McLaren 2007). Beliefs, norms, and values influence public opinion towards many policies and directly determine calculations of material gain as well, since "cost-benefit theories miss important cultural influences on public opinion about the EU and integration because they rely too heavily on objective maximization of self-interest as the primary determinant of political behavior" (De Master/Le Roy 2000). It is our contention that, in thinking about Turkish accession, the European public is responding to the idea of allowing people from new and different cultures into their own spheres, and reactions to such an idea may stem from fear of such new cultures. According to Lahav (1997), "The construction of Europe brings to the fore existing diversities of cultures and political traditions, particularly in dealing with a concept that is so close to the core of identity, that of 'them' or foreigners". Accordingly, we expect to see the following:

Proposition II: The more the individuals believe in the Turkish differences from a European culture, the lower their level of support for Turkey's EU accession.

Finally, we argue that from a rights-based approach (Eriksen/Fossum 2002; Eriksen 2007), the public's views about Turkey's ability to meet the EU accession criteria shape their views on Turkey's accession. The public's views towards the country's EU accession revolve around both the material considerations and collective identity concerns. While the redistributive effects of foreign policy can be meaningful at the national level, making sense out of an individual's identity and/or economic well-being and supranational events

may be difficult for the individual. National politics is an important medium that shapes the attitudes of an individual towards EU issues such as enlargement. Issues that have both redistributive (Zimmerman 1973) and ideational (Hurwitz/Peffley 1987) implications may become subjects of domestic political struggles. In short, the political context within which the European public views Turkish accession matters. This is why we take into account an additional factor framing the rationalist calculations and normative views as the general direction provided by political leadership and governments (Ray 2003). Government preferences and its subsequent political rhetoric influence the public's views. Thus, it is likely that in addition to individual-level cost/benefit and identity concerns, the EU member state governments' preferences on particular candidacies have also been influential in determining public support to these countries. In other words, we expect to see a variation in public support to Turkey's accession to the EU under different governments, for example in Germany. Thus, we expect:

Proposition III: An individual's utilitarian and norm-based attitudes towards Turkey's accession are conditioned by the ideology of the national government s/he lives in.

These three propositions emerge as competing and complimentary explanations of understanding public attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU.

We will test to see whether these dimensions influence the EU public's support towards Turkish membership. To turn to the utility based factors, the security and economics based impacts of Turkey's accession as well as its population could be seen as the factors shaping the utility based calculations that the EU public is engaged in. In terms of security based implications, the Turkish role in European security has so far been emphasized as a critical element for Turkey's EU accession. Two key factors emerge here: first, the Turkish geographical location as the gateway from the European continent to the Middle East and Asia, and second, the Turkish military capabilities. The Turkish participation in the EU's defense operations since 2003 has been vital, and it is through the Turkish role in the NATO that the European allies had a significant presence in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The security dimension is a particularly important factor for the British, Spanish and Italian governments and public (Müftüler-Baç/McLaren 2003; Müftüler-Baç 2008). For example, David Cameron summarizes the British position in 2010 as "the country is vital for our economy, vital for our security and vital for our diplomacy... A European Union without Turkey at its heart was not stronger but weaker... not more secure but less... not richer but poorer".² Specifically, Turkey has significant military capabilities at its disposal, measured by military strength, standing army, fire power, conventional weapons and other tangible elements of capability, based on which the global firepower index currently ranks Turkey 11th out of 68 countries in total.

Table 2 shows that Turkey is among the five major powers in Europe with significant military power, and this is particularly important for the EU to project itself as a global power. This is also why the British foreign secretary in December 2011 co-authored a joint paper "with his counterparts from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden, where these countries declared Turkey's accession process to the EU to be of 'vital strategic and economic importance'".

² "Cameron anger at the slow pace of Turkish-EU negotiations", BBC news, July 27, 2010. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10767768>.

In addition to the crude capabilities aspect of Turkey's accession, one needs to consider another layer of related utility based security concern, and that is the possible impact that Turkey's accession might have on the reconciliation of European and Muslim values. In the post 9/11 international environment, the divide between the European and the Islamic societies emerged as a critical security factor shaping the parties' views and positions towards one another (Müftüler-Baç 2008). Turkey constitutes a unique example of a Muslim society with a European calling and it would be interesting to see whether this plays a role in shaping the European public's utility based calculations (Çarkoğlu/Kentmen 2011).


Ranking	Country	Power index
1	United States	0.2475
2	Russia	0.2618
3	China	0.3351
4	India	0.4346
5	United Kingdom	0.5185
6	France	0.6163
7	Germany	0.6491
8	South Korea	0.6547
9	Italy	0.6838
10	Brazil	0.6912
11	Turkey	0.7059
12	Pakistan	0.7331
13	Israel	0.7559
14	Egypt	0.7569

Table 2: Turkish Military Capabilities: Global Power Index³

Equally important as a material gain is the economic impact of Turkey's accession (Lejour/Mooij 2005). Turkey is the 16th largest economy in the world and the 6th largest economy in Europe with a clear goal to be within the top ten economies in the world by 2023. Turkey has been experiencing significant economic growth in the last 12 years: In 2002, the per capita income in Turkey was about 3,492 American dollars, in 2010 per capita income has risen to 10,079 American dollars, tripling in size, with a projected increase to 12,157 American dollars by 2014. Its GDP is predicted to become 1 trillion American dollars by 2015. This is largely due to its sustained economic growth rate; however, a downturn in global markets in 2013 impacted the Turkish economy along with other emerging economies. Despite this downturn, Turkey still has the highest economic growth rate in Europe among the OECD countries as seen in Figure 2 and is in the first 20 economies in the world as seen in Figure 1.


It is not only the size of its economy that is crucial for Turkey's place in Europe but also its economic growth rate. Turkey has a very solid economic growth performance, specifically in comparison to most of the European economies in trouble. Figure 2 summarizes the economic growth rates among the OECD countries, and the predictions for economic growth in the next 6 years.

3 Global Firepower calculations, 2013. <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2010

Figure 1: The World's Largest Economies, 2013



Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2013

Figure 2: Real GDP Growth Expectations of 2012-2017 for OECD Countries (Annual Averages, Percentage Changes)⁴

However, most of these economic developments are relatively new, and they are not captured in the 2006 data. Despite the actual figures on Turkish economy, the European views revolve around its lack of development compared to the best performing economies in Europe such as Germany.

Accordingly, we expect the EU public to evaluate the Turkish accession to the EU along these utility based material concerns (de Vreese/van der Brug et al. 2012). Given the relative size and strength of the Turkish

4 Data based on OECD Economic Outlook, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO93_INTERNET.

economy and Turkey's role for European security, we would have expected to see the European public to be supportive of Turkish accession along with the utilitarian approach and our Proposition I. However, precisely because the Turkish economic boom is relatively recent, we do not expect to see this reflected in the European public's evaluation of the material benefits of Turkey's accession in 2006. Instead, precisely because economic factors do matter in public's utility based calculations, we expect to see the public support to be shaped by their perceptions of Turkish economic performance. In other words, European public would be expected to emphasize the need for a stronger Turkey economically, before they would endorse its accession to the EU. A third material concern we take into consideration is with regards to population patterns. As Table 3 demonstrates, Turkey will become the most populous country in Europe by 2050.

The European demographic changes in the recent years have created a rather bleak picture for the future of European populations: in almost all the countries except the UK birth rates are either falling or have grown still. Currently, Turkish population ranks just below Germany. Yet, precisely because population still continues to grow in Turkey, it is destined to bypass all European Union members. This, of course, has implications both in terms of utility based concerns but also in terms of the ideational concerns. We expect to see the impact of the security, economy and population based material benefits and costs of Turkish accession in our public support data analysis.

McLaren (2007) suggests that group conflict over resources explains the European public's attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU. Müftüler-Baç (2008) stresses the explanatory power of the interplay of normative and utilitarian concerns in this respect. Our factor analysis below suggests that European voters indeed organize their attitudes towards Turkey's accession along these dimensions. We also argue that there is a clear domestic-EU nexus where the EU governments' preferences towards enlargement in general and towards specific countries in particular are important in terms of their impact on shaping public support. Indeed, the reluctance toward the Turkish accession at the political elite level across most EU member states is reflected in the level of public support to Turkey's membership. It is expected that public support for a particular candidate would be low in an EU member which has a government with serious reservations about this candidate along the propositions noted above.

It is precisely for this reason that we need to note that there are factors that only apply to Turkey in the EU enlargement process. One can summarize them as the perceived cultural differences of Turkey from the rest of the candidates, i.e. it is the only candidate which has a Muslim population and this feeds into the fears of political Islam in the EU. Although our model does capture some of this sentiment through the norm based proposition, there are further historical factors that one can identify to explain the EU public's reluctance towards Turkey. For example, the French public seems most reluctant about Turkey, and this could be contextualized in terms of rise of nationalist sentiment and a backlash to immigration. If one considers the particular problem France is facing in political Islam and headscarves in French education, it becomes easier to understand the reluctance in the French public toward Turkish membership. Public support to Turkey's accession seems to be shaped by the interplay of the perceived material costs, specifically loss of resources to a group thought to be alien, and feelings of hostility to the foreign. Utilitarian approaches, by their emphasis on expected consequences, however, tend to overlook that loss of resources to 'foreigners' by 'kin' matters more than loss of resources to an individual herself. We find that norm and identity based factors coupled with probable material costs lie at the heart of weak public support to Turkey's accession.

		2003	Yearly Growth rate	2050
1.	China	1,387,702,397	0.61 %	1,393.060,000
2.	India	1,256,079,719	1.24 %	1,623.482.000
3.	United States of America	320,709,617	0.81 %	401,680,000
4.	Indonesia	250,637,243	1.21%	293,656,000
5.	Brazil	200,794,328	0.85%	220,483,000
6.	Pakistan	182,913,446	1.66 %	274,432,000
7.	Nigeria	174,845,112	2.78%	389,815,000
8.	Bangladesh	157,070,963	1.19%	194,363,000
9.	Russian Federation	142,756,171	-0.21%	109,429,000
10.	Japan	127,116,365	-0.08%	103,000,000
11.	Mexico	122,709,551	1.21%	143,938,000
12.	Philippines	98,823,026	1.71%	154,000,000
13.	Ethiopia	94,712,393	2.55%	278,950,000
14.	Vietnam	91,902,115	0.95%	120,000,000
15.	Germany	82,703,440	-0.11%	71,500,000
16.	Egypt	82,397,171	1.63%	123,452,000
17.	Iran	77,704,290	1.30%	101,900,000
18.	Turkey	75,166,332	1.22%	101,208,000
19.	Congo	67,981,403	2.72%	189,000,000
20.	Thailand	67,061,382	0.30%	74,705,000
21.	France	64,380,884	0.55%	72,000,000
22.	United Kingdom	63,227,155	0.57%	80,000,000
23.	Italy	61,022,600	0,21%	40,500,000

Table 3: Global Populations. Source: UN World Population Prospects⁵

To see if data confirms our Propositions, we conduct a factor analysis. Looking at variance patterns, factor analysis aggregates individual items that tend to co-vary into groups (factors). When we include the list of questions in the Eurobarometer survey regarding Turkey's membership in the EU (European Commission 2006), we see that the answers cluster on three main dimensions. The first two dimensions relate to utility-based attitudes, namely whether the EU will benefit from Turkey's accession, and whether Turkey will benefit from the membership. The third dimension presents the norm-based approach: questions on whether or not Turkey is a part of Europe's geography and history load on to this dimension. Table 4 illustrates these results.

Let us also look at the face validity of these results: Below are Lowess smoothers that depict the bivariate relation between our three dimensions and the level of support for Turkey's membership.

⁵ Data based on UN World Population Prospects, 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm.

Dimension	1 Utility: EU	2 Utility TR	3 Norm- based	4 (omitted)
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography	0.34	0.06	0.63	-0.03
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history	0.39	0.01	0.64	-0.04
Turkey's accession will rejuvenate Europe's population	0.55	0.02	0.19	0.09
Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region	0.70	0.03	0.29	-0.09
Turkey's accession to the European Union would favor the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values	0.72	0.02	0.27	-0.10
The cultural differences between Turkey and the European Union Member States are too significant to allow for this accession	-0.28	0.31	-0.10	0.42
Turkey's joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	-0.10	0.40	-0.05	0.41
To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights	0.08	0.72	0.06	0.04
To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy	0.00	0.73	0.01	0.10

Table 4: Factor Loadings on Attitudes towards Turkey's Membership




Figure 3: Beliefs about the Level of Benefit the EU Will Derive from Having Turkey as a Member and Support for Turkey's Accession

Figure 3 delineates a simple relationship between benefit to the EU and level of support for Turkey's membership in a country. We see that the stronger the belief that the EU will benefit from Turkey's accession on average in a country, the higher the level of support. Figure 4 looks at the relation between the belief

on whether or not Turkey is a part of European history or geography and its effect on support for Turkey's accession. The simple smoothed line clearly shows that, on average, the belief that Turkey does not belong to Europe leads to lower levels of support for its accession to the EU.




Figure 4: Beliefs about Cultural Discrepancy and Support for Turkey's Accession

Finally, Figure 5 examines whether the level of belief of whether EU membership will be beneficial to Turkey has an effect on the level of support for Turkey's accession to the EU in that country, clearly providing us with empirical proof for Proposition 1a. A negative relationship is visible, but it is considerably weaker than the previous two. As the average opinion in a country tends towards the idea that Turkey will benefit from EU accession, the populace on average is more likely to oppose Turkey's membership (ignoring the outliers).




Figure 5: Beliefs about the Level of Benefits EU Membership Will Bring to Turkey and Support for Turkey's Accession

One reason explaining the high level of variance observed in 'Benefit to Turkey' dimension may be that this variable is comprised of two questions. One question asks whether or not the respondent believes that Turkey's accession will improve Turkey's human rights performance. The other question asks whether or not Turkey's accession will help Turkey's economy. Separately analyzing these questions does not add much to our understanding. There is somewhat a curvilinear relationship between expected improvements in human rights and support for Turkey's accession (Figure 6). The relationship between benefit to Turkey's economy and support for Turkey's accession is inconclusive (Figure 7). This might, however, be due to the fact that the 2006 analysis does not take into account the tremendous economic leap in Turkey. Had this analysis been conducted in, let us say 2014, our conclusions in terms of the economic based utility calculations might have been different.




Figure 6: Views on the Impact of Turkey's Human Rights Record on Support for Turkey's Accession




Figure 7: The Relationship between Turkey's Economy and Support for its Accession

These results seem to indicate that we indeed do have some empirical evidence for utility based concerns, specifically for demographic trends, security dimension and for the reconciliation of European and Muslim values, but there is also an indication of the perceptions of Turkey as culturally different from the EU as a critical factor shaping the European public's views.

3. Testing the Causality: A Multilevel Model

The skirmish presented above establishes the validity of norm versus utility-based approaches to Turkey's accession categorization. The next step then is to (1) see if these dimensions hold explanatory value when alternative explanations are controlled for, and (2) gauge the extent to which these three main dimensions affect European respondents' attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU. To do these, we will utilize a multilevel (random coefficients) model.

Multilevel modeling is used in cases when individual (atomic) units are nested in larger, distinct groups, such as individuals in different countries, scholars in different departments, or diabetes patients in different healthcare facilities. Each of these groups is called levels; lower levels denote more atomistic entities (e.g. individual respondents), and higher levels denote larger entities (e.g. countries). While groups may be nested within each other in multiple levels, we will confine ourselves to two levels: individual and country.

Multilevel modeling allows the researcher to examine context dependent factors. To illustrate, let's assume we are looking at the effect of family income on a student's performance in class. Higher family income may have a boosting effect on a student's performance in a 'middle-income' classroom, a detrimental effect in 'low-income' classroom (perhaps since the student will be an outcast), and no effect in a 'high-income' classroom (perhaps since everybody is rich, therefore, money is not an issue). Therefore, family income's effect is in relation to the context it operates in, which is the average parent income of the class that the student belongs to.

The political context in which a European citizen is embedded in may condition the extent to which the three aforementioned dimensions shape that European citizen's attitude towards Turkey's accession to the EU. For instance, an individual who thinks that Turkey does not geographically belong to Europe may not necessarily find it as an impediment towards Turkey's accession if she lives in a country where the dominant political discourse stresses the economic benefits Turkey would bring as a member. On the contrary, 'geographic discrepancy' may turn out to be a salient attitude shaper for a similar individual who is regularly exposed to Turkey's cultural dissimilarities with Europe's Christian tradition,⁶ particularly salient in Germany under the Christian Democratic rule. This argument squares well with the role of Turkish accession in national politics agenda, which varies considerably across European states. The French government under Nicholas Sarkozy and the German government under Angela Merkel's leadership, for instance, have

6 Note that a finer study would also take into account what each individual specifically is exposed to from political communication channels such as the media, the church or civil society organizations. Available data, however, does not allow for such fine-grained analysis.

often used Turkey's accession to mobilize their voters. In others (e.g. Czech Republic and Finland), the space Turkey's accession occupied in the political agenda was miniscule.

What can we infer from this context dependence? Country-specific factors may affect our inferences in two main ways. First, country-level factors may shift the overall mean support level for each country, i.e. predicts a different 'average citizen' in each country. In statistical terms, each country may have a different intercept in the same explanatory model. For instance, our model can indicate that respondents in a country with, for example, more Turkish immigrants, on average will be more opposed to Turkey's accession. Second, country-specific factors may condition the cause-effect relationship between variables. In statistical terms, we may observe cross-level interactions. A cross-level hypothesis could be that the linkage between (1) perceived benefit to the EU from Turkey's membership and (2) support for Turkey's accession may be stronger in richer countries. To illustrate, assume both a Swede and a Portuguese individual believe that the EU will benefit a lot from admitting Turkey since the accession will infuse dozens of millions of young consumers into the EU market. However, this perceived benefit may be more influential in shaping the Swede's attitude towards Turkey's accession while being less relevant for the Portuguese's attitude formation.

Our dependent variable is whether the respondent supports Turkey's membership to the EU. The answer takes the value of 1 if the respondent thinks Turkey should be a member of the EU and 0 otherwise. Therefore, positive coefficients denote increasing support towards Turkey's membership to the EU.⁷ Country-level variables were obtained from the World Bank data (for inflation and GDP), Comparative Manifestos Project (for government ideology), and various national statistical institutes (for the percentage of Turkish migrants in that country).

4. Results

The statistical results generally affirm qualitative arguments on individual level determinants of support for Turkey's accession to the EU (Table 5). Model 1 suggests that the less convinced an individual is that Turkey and Europe share the same cultural norms (history and geography), the less likely s/he is to support Turkey's accession. Likewise, the stronger a respondent believes that the EU will benefit from Turkey's admittance, the higher the chance that s/he will be in favor of Turkey's accession. We also found a highly interesting result that the stronger a respondent believes that Turkey will benefit from EU accession (through Human Rights and Economic improvement), the stronger the respondent will oppose Turkey's accession. This finding perhaps reflects a negative priming effect: individuals who are already aware of Turkey's long-standing problems of democratization are more likely to be against its membership.

Our control variables also indicate interesting results. While a negative correlation seems to exist between education and support for Turkey's accession, the rich seem to be more supportive of Turkey's accession.

7 Stata 11's `xtnlogit` command was used to estimate the model, using four integration points. The results remain robust when integration points are increased to seven.

A similar correlation holds true for older Europeans. Support for Turkey's accession seems to be divided along the gender lines as well, with women being more supportive of Turkey's accession. Finally, individuals who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum tend to support Turkey's accession less.

How do country-level factors specifically affect individual's attitudes towards Turkey's membership to the EU? To gauge this effect, Model 2 adds country level variables, though not allowing for cross-level interactions yet. The previously discussed individual level findings hold when country-specific variation is accounted for. Among the country-level variables, only one turns out to be significant: the (log) percentage of Turks living in a country makes the population in that country significantly more opposing to Turkey's accession. This result seems to be in tandem with McLaren's findings in 2007. The insignificant variables include whether there was an election in 2004 or 2005, the ideological placement of the incumbent government in 2005, and gross domestic product per capita, inflation and whether the country was admitted to the EU after 2001.

Our findings on the impact of domestic politics on individual preferences were significant. Since we aimed to see whether and how domestic politics shape the way individuals' perceptions determine attitudes towards Turkey's accession, we tested whether certain macro-level political variables (such as government ideology or the economic health of the country) have a bearing on the way our main three independent variables condition an individual's attitude towards Turkey. To illustrate, we expected a right-wing government to increasingly resort to Turcoskepticism to mobilize voters and boost its own popularity, specifically ideational based arguments may be used as effective mobilizers. As a result, we expect support to Turkey's accession to decline in EU members where right-wing governments are in power.

Thus, our findings in Model 3 indeed indicate that as the incumbent's ideology shifts towards the right in a country, cultural (in)congruence of Turkey with the EU becomes more of a concern for the citizens of that country. Thus, there is a positive and significant coefficient of the Ideology of the Government X Cultural Congruence variable. Model 4 shows that a similar relation exists between government ideology and an individual's belief that the EU will benefit from Turkey's membership. We do not see such an interaction effect between government ideology and belief that membership would benefit Turkey in Model 5.⁸

8 To reiterate, government ideology, as an intercept-term turns out to be insignificant. In other words, the ideological placement of the national government in a European country -by itself- has no effect on whether the individuals in that country on average are likely to be in favor of or against Turkey's accession to the EU. The interaction variables, however, suggest that the effect an individual's beliefs on how Turkey relates to European cultural norms, whether Turkey's accession will benefit the EU or Turkey itself have on the chances that this individual will support Turkey's accession is conditioned by the ideology of the government the individual lives in. To illustrate, let's assume two identical individuals, one living in Country A, where a right-leaning government was in power in 2005, and the other living in Country B where a left-leaning government was in power in 2005. This individual's hypothetical belief that Turkey does not belong to Europe culturally makes her more likely to be against Turkey's accession if she lives in Country A.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cultural Congruence:	0.350	0.349	0.356	0.349	0.349
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Benefit to Turkey:	-0.264	-0.261	-0.261	-0.259	-0.253
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Benefit to the EU:	0.667	0.067	0.667	0.681	0.668
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education Level:	-0.035	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Individual's Ideology:	-0.173	-0.174	-0.174	-0.174	-0.175
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Urbanite:	-0.010	-0.014	-0.015	-0.016	-0.014
<i>p-value:</i>	0.758	0.659	0.647	0.620	0.661
Age:	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female:	0.138	0.137	0.139	0.140	0.137
<i>p-value:</i>	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.005	0.006
Individual Affluence:	0.079	0.078	0.078	0.080	0.078
<i>p-value:</i>	0.047	0.049	0.049	0.045	0.051
GDP per Capita 2005 (\$K):		-0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>p-value:</i>		0.211	0.209	0.241	0.221
Unemployment:		-0.036	-0.037	-0.033	-0.035
<i>p-value:</i>		0.208	0.197	0.247	0.227
GDP 2005 (\$M):		-0.027	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>p-value:</i>		0.823	0.818	0.872	0.830
Elections (04 or 05):		0.085	0.085	0.072	0.078
<i>p-value:</i>		0.625	0.630	0.681	0.659
Ideology of the Gov't:		0.002	-0.014	-0.010	-0.026
<i>p-value:</i>		0.735	0.134	0.134	0.230
% of Turks in popn (log):		-0.126	-0.127	-0.128	-0.127
<i>p-value:</i>		0.011	0.010	0.010	0.011
New EU member:		-0.153	-0.168	-0.142	-0.153
<i>p-value:</i>		0.579	0.545	0.610	0.580
Govt Ideology X Cultural:			0.003		
<i>p-value:</i>			0.023		
Govt Ideology X Benefit EU:				0.005	
<i>p-value:</i>				0.000	
Govt Ideology X Benefit TR:					0.003
<i>p-value:</i>					0.177
Constant:	-1.106	-1.408	-1.447	-1.530	-1.501
<i>p-value:</i>	0.001	0.051	0.046	0.035	0.039
Sd of the random term:	0.050	0.356	-1.027	-1.025	-1.029
<i>p-value:</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N:	12332	12332	12332	12332	12332

Table 5: European Citizen's Attitudes Towards Turkey's Accession to the EU

5. Conclusion

Public support to enlargement, and towards Turkish accession, is a relatively new area of scientific inquiry. The current crossroads in European integration with the European public being increasingly skeptical about integration and enlargement require new studies to uncover the many layers of public support. The importance of understanding the public is clear when we observe the manipulation of EU level policy such as enlargement in domestic level politics in order to boost political parties' popularities in their home constituencies. It is within this logic that public support for Turkey's accession emerged as an important cornerstone in this debate. During the past several years we have witnessed an increasing polarization in many European polities with respect to Turkey's accession to the EU. Undoubtedly, national politicians played an important role in this polarization, suggesting the issue's potential for voter mobilization.

This paper makes two major contributions to this debate. First, it provides a large-N analysis showing utilitarian and norm-based concerns, which have been qualitatively analyzed in depth, and indeed significantly shape individual attitudes regarding Turkey's accession to the EU. We have found out that utilitarian concerns are significant in older EU members which are relatively richer, providing empirical proof to our Proposition I. On the other hand, we have also found out that the norm based, ideational factors driven logic does not seem to hold, for example, in the new EU members. These new members in Central and Eastern Europe do not seem to perceive Turkey's accession problematic due to cultural, historical or religious factors, lessening the explanatory power of our Proposition II. We also found out that in member states where Turkish migrants are not visibly present, the norm-based, ideational factors matter less, while the opposite holds true for individuals in EU members with large Turkish immigrant populations. More importantly, our analyses indicate that these ideational concerns are rather influenced by national politics and domestic political structure, demonstrating the importance of political cueing from the elites. Our findings still demonstrate that, unlike the previous enlargements, Turkey's accession to the EU depends to a large extent on the public's readiness and enthusiasm.

Thus, a critical element in the negotiations currently unfolding would be a significant public relations campaign specifically addressing the European public's concerns. For example, the European Commission might choose to emphasize the Turkish economic growth and the multiple opportunities that Turkish market brings for the European companies. Similarly, a discussion on the Turks in Europe, especially those who have become notable participants in their host countries' political and economic lives could generate a public debate on the merits of Turkish accession. De-emphasizing the cultural differences, and focusing on the mutual benefits for both parties might be a good strategy to increase public's interest in the Turkish accession. It is clear that the European public's approval for Turkey's accession will be a determining factor for the accession negotiations as well as for the final approval of the Accession Treaty. Thus, it would be important for the European Commission to address areas where the European public feels uneasy towards Turkey. This also requires a responsible political behavior on the behalf of incumbent governments in the EU as they need to refrain from mobilizing popular support by demonizing the Turkish accession.

All in all, since cultural congruence seems to be an important indicator shaping public's support to Turkey's accession, the public debate could be remodeled to explore areas of possible cultural affinity, instead of enmity.

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“Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond”

The ‘big bang enlargement’ of the European Union (EU) has nurtured vivid debates among both academics and practitioners about the consequences of ‘an ever larger Union’ for the EU’s integration capacity. The research project MAXCAP will start with a critical analysis of the effects of the 2004-2007 enlargement on stability, democracy and prosperity of candidate countries, on the one hand, and the EU’s institutions, on the other. We will then investigate how the EU can maximize its integration capacity for current and future enlargements. Featuring a nine-partner consortium of academic, policy, dissemination and management excellence, MAXCAP will create new and strengthen existing links within and between the academic and the policy world on matters relating to the current and future enlargement of the EU.