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The insights that clear up both issues, that is, the monetary deficiencies
as well as how to improve money's exchange services, are very simple. Above
all, they are quite in line with modern monetary economics which says that
money saves information and transaction costs and thus economizes economic
communication: money extends the frontiers of profitable transactions and
through that it also widens the frontiers of production as well as of consumption
and increases welfare.
To steer clear of the hindrances associated with traditional thinking,
we shall start from some very elementary observations and proceed step
by step from Robinson Crusoe to the money economy and, finally, to our
monetary pilot project. This financial innovation, namely the Neutral Money
Network, is designed to compete with traditional money. Since the transaction
services in this new network are cheaper than those of its traditional
rival, our Neutral Money Network is destined to win out.
But money does not merely save information and transaction costs. It
also gives rise to a new kind of monetary transaction cost, unknown in
a barter economy and virtually ignored in economic theory up to now. My
aim is to visualize and to develop an awareness of these novel transaction
costs, which burden individuals in our economy and which reduce money's
cost saving efficiency. For this purpose we shall first look at an economy
without exchange, then at a barter economy and, at last, at the costs (and
the profits) that arise when money is introduced into the economy.
Living self-sufficiently, our Robinsons are quite limited in many respects. They can only consume what they themselves produce. They are unable to make use of one another and to profit from socio-economic interaction. Rather they subsist on their personal ability and capacity to work. Hence, they are lacking nearly all the conveniences we are accustomed to.
For instance, superfluous goods which Robinson can dispense with today and of which he expects to have need of at a later date must be stored personally, causing storage costs. For Robinson lacks the opportunity to substitute his storage activities by simply giving the goods to somebody who needs them today and who would provide them at the date at which Robinson expects to need them himself.
Today, we can substitute the storage of real goods by claims to future
goods or even by claims to future money. Robinson, however, must do without
these freedoms. Or, in other words, Robinson not only misses out on the
advantages from the division of labour but also on those arising from division
of consumption between individuals along the time axis. He suffers losses
from being forced to hold and store all the real goods he wants to "save"
for consumption at a later date.
If, however, the performance of an exchange causes a partner to expect efforts and endeavours which exceed his expected gain then the exchange gets stuck in transaction costs. Indeed, as has been said above, barter is troublesome. In addition, individuals who produce for exchange run the risk not finding takers for their goods who will supply what they demand. The high transaction costs severely limit the range of exchange and through that also the frontiers of production and consumption.
Of course, exchange does not produce "costs" in the sense of pecuniary expenditures, because money does not yet exist. However, exchange is connected with real costs in the form of search work, communication efforts, bargaining energy, etc. It is this kind of cost that functions as a barrier which deters individuals from exchange. Customs have similar effects.
Hence, in a barter economy individuals soon reach a level of transaction
costs that makes marginal exchange unprofitable and holds them back in
the realm of self-supply. When producing goods for their own use, individuals
at least know that they are serving their own needs.
However, money is outfitted with properties which predestine it to be
used in socio-economic situations either as a means of exchange or as a
"store of value". In the latter case, money is useful in that it is a kind
of claim or legal expectation which relates the money holder to the other
individuals' supplies. Now money can be used as a substitute for the storage
of real goods because there are others who have (or produce or store) and
supply the goods in question and because money bestows on its owner the
option to have access to those goods held by the others. This is why money
is sometimes distinguished from usual goods by defining it as a "social
relation good".
With money as a socio-economic institution transactors can simply send the goods offered by them and call for the goods they desire through the channels of specialized markets. Money is the admission ticket to these institutionalized transaction channels of the money economy. The efficiency of the monetary institutions extends the range of profitable transactions substantially. Economic communications and transactions are increased significantly, and the frontiers of production and consumption are widened correspondingly. In addition, welfare grows greatly through the extended division of labour and consumption.
Note that this rise in welfare is due to the increase in profitable
communications and transactions. It is the productivity of a more efficient
system of information and transaction which brings forth more wealth. Productive
or consumptive goods and services, supplied by others, are simply achievable
at lower cost. We have not yet spoken of "capital" and its "productivity".
There has been no need to use this term up to now because the phenomena
could be grasped and described sufficiently in terms of individuals, goods,
information, transactions and, most important, information and transaction
costs.
Hence, individuals who, for whatever reason, are unable to play the
role of an acquirer of money also can never assume the role of a money
spender and will never succeed in buying goods or services. Moreover, it
can be shown that the lack of money in the hands of needy individuals can
virtually prevent them from otherwise feasible and mutually profitable
transactions. Assume, for this purpose, a potential seller who struggles
to acquire money by offering commodities, useful services or labour. Assume
also that he finds a potential buyer who desperately needs the goods offered.
Even then, the former will not sell his goods to the latter and receive
money unless his potential buyer has money or is able to acquire it, for
instance, by selling goods himself or by taking out a loan. Assume, again,
that this potential buyer also knows another potential taker who needs
his goods. Once again, even then he also will not be able to sell his goods
and to receive money unless his potential taker has, or can get hold of,
money ... etc.
Being unable to acquire money means being prevented from transacting.
And not to transact means to be hindered from producing or consuming. He
whose transactions get stuck because he can not acquire money is virtually
excluded from the economic community.
These novel difficulties concern the acquisition of transaction money by the potential transactor:
Note that in these cases interest does not at all figure as cost of
"capital". The transactors pay their money interest not for "financial
capital" but for being enabled to employ money in their transactions regardless
of what the money is used for afterwards. Interest has not only to be paid
for "financial capital" which is used to buy investment goods but also
for loan money that is spent on consumption and even for money to convert
debts or to finance a burial. Once again, it was not necessary to use the
term "capital" to grasp und describe the economic phenomena in question.
Assume an exchange economy where a central bank is created to print and issue money. As money usually is not given to individuals for nothing, assume also that the new money is issued by lending it to individuals who have need of money to save information and transaction costs. (This idealized method or model of issuing money conforms to the modern reality of money in both, first, that the banking system also creates fresh money by some form of credit and, second, that fresh money earns interest just as well as credit money from private money holders.) Assume also that consumers and producers, being informed about the advantages, plan to employ money to economize their transactions, and that the authorities have taken care of limiting the total amount of money.
Now the consumers and producers who take out loan money to be spent on goods have to take into account both,
These novel transaction costs were unknown in the barter world. Unknown
were also the bank that issues the money and the yield to that bank from
its issuance of money. As the costs of printing and issuing money are relatively
low whereas the interest paid for it is relatively high, the bank profits
from its money issuing services: "seigniorage" in the form of "return over
cost" from issued money. In the end, thus, we have in the money economy
not only novel transaction costs but also a new kind of profit which nearly
exactly corresponds to the novel costs. The bank simply profits from the
fact that the individuals have transaction needs and that money saves more
costs in the course of their transactions than its own production burdens
the bank with.
And here our introductory hypothesis concerning the inefficiency of
current money is confirmed: because money does not only save costs but
also gives rise to transaction costs which reduce the transaction frontier,
our monetary system is suboptimal. It suffers from inefficiencies in that
it causes novel costs.
In monetary economics, issuance of money is also called "creation" of
money. Correspondingly the disappearance of money from the markets and
the secure keeping of it in a bank safe is named "destruction" of money,
because money which is taken from the market no longer functions as a medium
that saves transaction costs.
Of course, in the eyes of the "investor" who spends the money borrowed
on productive instruments, the money acquisition costs are somehow connected
with what he plans to do with that money. And afterwards, in his eyes,
the costs seemingly adhere to the good that was purchased. But it confuses
cause and effect and leads to fatal intellectual confusion in economics
if one disguises through one's terminology as special "capital" cost what
is actually general money acquisition cost and, thus, transaction cost.
However, even in these cases, we must be aware that the physical investment goods which make production more effective are not created by that "financial capital" at all. What happens is just that the borrowed money enables the "investor" to perform the transactions required to obtain the "productive" production goods needed. We have to see that there is an investor who needs investment goods and that there is also somebody who already has and offers these very same goods and that they have no chance to contract and transact unless the bank or somebody else supplies them with money. Here, too, money is the transaction catalyst that brings together the buyer and the seller of the investment goods in question, while a lack of money means that their transactions, which ideally (in "real terms") would be quite feasible, get stuck because of the inefficiencies of the monetary transaction system.
And, correspondingly, we must be aware that "saving" in our minds may be seen as something which it generally is not, and that we are led astray by the terminology used and by the associations induced by that terminology. And, in fact, at this stage in our investigation we encounter the most severe form of what we have called "resistance in our minds", namely that "the difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones" (Keynes). So we must make tabula rasa in its literally and original, Aristotelian sense, that is, we must try to think regardless of what we have been accustomed to think. To free ourselves we even have to go against the current of what has traditionally been seen as given in the realm of "saving and investment". For, if there really is an intellectual delusion that veils our sight and hinders us from understanding the inefficiencies of our money, then we do not have a chance to break free and clear up our vision unless we succeed in thinking anew, regardless of habitual concepts of "saving and investment".
In our case, "thinking elementarily" means applying the concepts and terminology of the modern transaction economics: "transactions" and "money" as the very means to economize on "transaction costs". The time-honored phrase, that interest equilibrates the "abstinence" of consumers and the "productivity" of physical "capital" is bound to the less precise ideas which also relate the psychology of individuals to physical properties of goods instead of dealing with the economic interactions influenced by those psychological and physical factors. In addition, it is not at all clear who the "investor" is: the saver when he lends his money (or buys nonfinancial assets), or the entrepreneur when he spends the borrowed money (or uses productive goods owned by others)? Above all, the traditional wording only relates to a special case. Not spending one's money has often other grounds than merely "abstinence" from consumption. For instance, it can be profitable to hold money or claims to money instead of holding goods the (marginal) costs of which exceed their (marginal) benefits. And borrowed money is not only employed for productive investment goods but also for consumption purposes. Interest, in the latter case, would be the price that equilibrates abstinence from present consumption and the very opposite, namely the proclivity for present consumption. Though this, indeed, would be a very inspiring variant of the traditional wording, it would raise doubts regarding the generality of the traditional concepts of "saving for investment".
Lending and, reciprocally, borrowing is the common procedure (or "point
of intersection") of various series of economic interactions that can have
very different motives on the side of the lender and on that of
the borrower. We must be aware that interest on loan money has to be paid
regardless of the lenders' different motives for "not spending" and "lending"
their money and regardless of the borrowers' different purposes for acquiring
money. In any case the lender abstains from using his money for present
transactions and the borrower acquires that money, because he needs
it for his present transactions.
Regardless of his psychological motives, the traditional "saver" does not spend his money on real goods but holds it back. In terms of transaction economics, he abstains from present transactions. Since, however, all transactions involve at least two people, abstaining from transactions by the one of them who does not spend his money simultaneously means that another potential transactor also abstains, or rather is prevented, from transacting. The money, which was originally acquired by somebody from the money issuing bank and which incurred costs burdening that acquirer, now rests quietly in the cash box or safe of someone else who "saves" the money.
In the barter economy a person who abstains from exchange also possibly hinders someone else from exchanging. However, to hold back simple goods of the kind exchanged in that economy affects only those potential partners whose supply reciprocally meets the demand of the first individual who holds back his goods. In the money economy, however, one potential buyer who does not spend his money interrupts the whole series of transactions that would be set in motion by him if only he would continue to buy goods from potential sellers.
Thus, we have to state that the traditional "saver", during the time he holds instead of spends his money, blocks the series of transactions that would go on if he spent his money. Or, in more fashionable terms, this saver produces "negative externalities" to others who suffer from not selling, that is, from being prevented from acquiring money. The "saver" in his role as a "non-spender" who keeps his money securely in the safe or stores it elsewhere makes the money disappear from the markets.
Remember, now, that the disappearance of money from the markets and
the keeping of it elsewhere is called "destruction" of money when it is
done by the bank that issues money and then gets it back (above 2.3.9.).
Here, where it is done by private "savers" the effects are the same. The
"saver" behaves like a small private quasi-bank that destroys money for
a period of time.
Thus, the procedure "lending instead of spending" one's money is profitable
as such and functions, on its own, as an artificial incentive for
individuals to postpone spending because of the profits from doing so.
This also explains where the increment of prospective consumption comes
from which makes individuals save more than they would without the
profit mechanisms of "lending instead of spending". Hence interest does
not come from an original sacrifice of present for future consumption but,
the other way round: the money economy offers to individuals the profitable
seigniorage from "lending instead of spending" and in this way it intices
them artificially to sacrifice present for more future consumption.
However, the option to profit from "lending instead of spending" presupposes that the individuals involved do not personally use their money for actual transactions. This is the case when they are satisfied that they have, at the margin, dispensable money. This is not the case with needy individuals who require money for purchasing goods nor for needy individuals who plan to produce goods in order to sell them for money to live on. Hence, the current money system gives to the satisfied individuals the option to blockage the transactions of the others and to profit from this blockage.
The current monetary system endows the rich, who are outfitted with wealth already, with the additional option to profit from the game of "lending instead of spending". And the option to lend and not to spend is completely free to the wealth holders. They decide voluntarily, calculating only in terms of more or less profit ("opportunity costs").
The others, who still have substantial physical needs and, thus, also transaction needs, are endowed with the reciprocal role in that game, namely with the role of the borrower in the game "borrowing instead of selling". The needy do not decide to borrow voluntarily. They are forced by their needs to do so, and they calculate in terms of the real costs with which they burden themselves.
The reciprocal structure of profitable "lending instead of spending"
on the side of capital and expensive "borrowing instead of selling" on
the side of consumers and producers represents in nuce the asymmetry or,
in professional terms, nonneutrality of money. The lender exploits the
transaction needs and, by that, also the physical needs and the economic
activity of borrowers: not, once again, by "supplying financial capital"
but by giving up their blockage of transactions for a period of time. This
is exactly how our money makes the poor, the needy and the active pay for
the superfluity of the rich, the satisfied and the idle ones. And this
is exactly how our current money's inefficiencies are accompanied by injustice
and unfairness.
This, again, shows that money imposes on the economy an asymmetric distribution
structure: individuals who can already afford to hold money instead of
being forced to consume their income are given the valuable freedoms of
money while the others, who are less satisfied, are burdened with risks
and costs. This is a kind of steady stream or transfer from the active
and the industrious who have the costs to the idle who have the benefits.
The production of money's liquidity, however, is interrupted when individuals
do not accept the others' money or when they do not spend their own money.
And here, again, he who interrupts and disturbs the process of producing
money's liquidity profits from doing so, namely in that he enjoys the "freedom
of timing" and has the option of "lending instead of spending", while the
others suffer from being forced to "borrow instead of sell". Hence the
money holder profits from the liquidity of money which is produced by the
others.
These benefits of money at hand are constituted by the genuine ability of money to serve as a means of economic transaction. However, the transaction function of money is undermined in that money yields its services for free even, and in particular, when it is held back and prevented from functioning as it should. It is this power to sabotage the transaction series, and to profit from that, that makes money suboptimal with regard to its efficiency. The valuable services of money intice individuals to hold money or to lend it instead of spending it. So, if we plan to reduce money's dysfunctions and to improve its efficiency we have to remove or neutralize the distribution effects of money by which the money holder has the benefits and the pecuniary returns and the others have the costs, risks and expenditures.
Since the cause of the distribution effect, namely money's liquidity services, can not be eliminated without abolishing money itself, the strategy must focus on neutralizing the effect. This can be done in a way which is extremely simple, at least, as far as its theoretical foundation is concerned. For, if the problem is that money yields its money services for free, then the positive psychological effect of these services can be compensated for simply by attaching to money disutilities in the form of costs so that their negative psychological effect counterbalances the positive one.
Thus, the concept is simply that money held must incur "carrying costs"
or "storage costs" to compensate for money's liquidity premium. Or, in
more professional and general words: liquid real-M balances must be connected
with symmetric costs such that these costs, at the margin, equalize the
benefits from being liquid. The elementary formulae that underly these
ideas can be found in John Maynard Keynes' General Theory (1936,
pp. 225229). Keynes considered in detail the effects of such "carrying
costs". He even incorporated modest liquidity costs of this kind into the
so called Keynes Proposals for the International Clearing Union.
However, current money has the superior starting position because everybody accepts, spends and uses this traditional medium of payment whereas NeuMoNe still has to be implemented and propagated. Moreover, in monetary affairs, people usually are extremely careful, reserved and conservative. Nevertheless, the spreading of barter clubs shows that financial markets leave an opening for transaction techniques that are even less effective during the introductory phase than neutral money will be. In particular, NeuMoNe is very flexible in that it offers facilities to use one's neutral money as a basis for current money and vice versa.
Of course, the starting phase is the hardest because neutral money cannot
yet prove its efficiency as long as participants of NeuMoNe are
still so rare that they have search costs to find partners, and costs of
frustration if they can not find them at all. But these starting impediments
can be reduced substantially if, for instance, local authority treasuries
declare their participation. The pilot projects which were launched in
Schwanenkirchen in Germany and Wörgl in Austria during the depression
of the Thirties give evidence that it is not impossible to introduce cost-bearing
money. On the contrary; these projects apparently worked so well and threatened
to spread over the country so fast that they could only be stopped by the
authorities' prohibition and suppression of them. They could be prohibited
because they used notes as the technical instrument for payments and this
was illegal. They attached liquidity costs to these notes, the reverse
side of them was divided into 12 spaces (for every month) or 50 resp. 52
spaces (for the weeks of a year) with the provision that the notes only
maintained their face value if they were stamped periodically.
The central idea is that N-Bank credits to its clients N-money balances
at an interest rate near zero but with liquidity costs for the time of
holding that liquid N-money balance. (Conventional interest also includes
a premium or price for the default risk. In the NeuMoNe system this
risk premium or price can be charged as if it were interest or, for instance,
through a single charge at the beginning of the whole credit period.) If
a client disposes of his liquid N-money balance so that the next N-money
client receives that money on his N-money account the former frees himself
from those liquidity costs by shifting the N-money, together with its costs,
to the next participant in NeuMoNe. In this way every participant
bears liquidity costs only for the exact time, and for the extent to which,
he is actually liquid. N-Bank, however, continues to receive its liquidity
costs since the money which is debited to one client is simultaneously
credited to the next one. As N-money migrates from account to account,
it is accompanied by N-money's liquidity costs.
The Stamp Scrip project and the other predecessors of neutral money were based on paper notes. The notes always represented a positive money balance. NeuMoNe accounts, however, are suited to represent positive as well as negative liquid neutral money balances:
To reduce costly positive balances, they alienate N-Money by buying goods or by lending it either to someone else or to N-Bank itself. For instance, they transfer it to N-money saving accounts with N-Bank. This means that they are giving up their irresolution (rather than that they "save"!) and that they are rewarded for their decisive behavior by being relieved of liquidity costs (not by interest earnings).
To reduce costly negative balances, they acquire money by selling
goods or by borrowing N-money from someone else or from N-bank itself.
For instance, they take out a term loan in N-money from N-Bank to equalize
their liquid N-money debt. This means, again, that they are giving up an
irresolution (rather than that they acquire "financial capital"!) and that
they are rewarded for their decisive behavior by being relieved of liquidity
costs (instead of being burdened with interest for "financial capital").
Of course, a positive N-money balance cannot be directly exchanged for the same amount of traditional money. This would ruin the system. However, clients can deposit their N-money on N-money saving accounts or buy N-money bonds so that they avoid liquidity costs and create securities with the bank which can be used as a basis for taking out a conventional loan. For this loan money the client must pay interest as usual.
A client who has to pay a liability in N-money and who disposes of the required amount in traditional money will not deposit this money on his N-money account to carry out the payment because he would sacrifice the costless benefits of traditional money for nothing. The bank will suggest that he deposits that money on a traditional money savings account or to buy bonds that yield interest and, then, to take out a loan in N-money for his payment purposes. Here we see that clients can profit from the margins between traditional and new money without endangering the NeuMoNe system. This option for clients to profit from the margins between old and new money is one of the ways NeuMoNe can win the competition with traditional money because even transactors with traditional money at hand have an incentive to persuade their partners to participate in the NeuMoNe accounting system. And by taking this chance they contribute, in the long run, to reducing the very same margins from which their profits come: they cause NeuMoNe to spread at the cost of traditional money.
The more NeuMoNe spreads the greater the chances of all participating
banks to refinance NeuMoNe not in the traditional financial markets
but in the markets in N-money financial instruments. Then, at last, N-money
will be exchanged into traditional money and vice versa. The price
of traditional money in N-money will exceed its face value because traditonal
money will serve as the ideal liquid reserve asset which is worthwhile
to pay a surplus price for. But the surplus properties of traditional money,
then, will no longer give rise either to inefficiencies in the money economy
or to social injustice and unfairness.
The answer is simple: everybody who cares minimally for his future has the incentive to distribute his life-time income optimally in a way so that he can maintain his expected standard of living also in times when he is no longer gainfully employed. If, however, these careful individuals receive interest rewards for postponing consumption, then they are motivated and induced to consume less in the present and more in the future than is actually optimal according to their own "real" preference schedules, not to speak of the others who have to finance that increment of future income by being forced to consume less at that time. "Interest" does not push forward production by rewarding "saving"; rather it counteracts present activities because it rewards the present inactivity of the "saver" and, at the same time, punishes the entrepreneur with costs for his transaction and, thus, for his production activities. Moreover, all investments which are modestly profitable "in real terms" but which do not render returns that match the value of money's yield are blocked because of too high pecuniary transaction costs called "interest for financial capital".
Borrowers who no longer give away money to meet their interest liabilites
will use it for other purposes. They can "save" it and buy claims to future
money. They can spend it on present or future goods. Since individuals
who take out loans usually need that money for goods, they will predominantly
use their saved interest to purchase goods. Consumers will demand more
consumptive and producers will demand more productive goods than
today. On the other hand, wealth holders who do no longer earn interest
can spend less money. They will reduce their demand either for real goods
or for assets. Since lenders typically dispose of dispensable money they
will still intend to "save": more real goods would render to them shrinking
marginal utility but burden them with rising marginal cost. Therefore it
can be quite profitable for them to avoid the cost of additional riches
by holding costfree bonds, even if the bonds yield not interest.
As has just been said, "capital" stands for returns on loan money which do not increase but disturb and decrease the efficiency of money as the transaction catalyst in our economy. (The same is true for "capital" in so far as this term stands for returns on real goods which are let out or leased or used by others in even other ways: the active users will not be able to bring to life these goods' efficiency unless they finance returns that, roughly speaking, correspond to the interest which they would have to pay if they bought the goods instead of being allowed in other ways to use the goods of the others.)
It is part of the "resistance in our minds" that we believe in
the "productivity of capital" whereas, in fact, this alleged productivity
of financial or other "capital" exhausts itself in incentives for abstaining
from real activities on the supply side and in punishments for engaging
in activities on the demand side of "capital". Hence "financial capital"
is virtually nothing but, first, the term which is given to the embodiment
of a conceptual self-deceit and, second, the term for the ideological legitimation
of present money's inefficiency and of the social injustice springing from
it. We suffer from a fatal capitalistic delusion which lets counterproductive
"capital" be considered something productive!
If the present demand for transactions is no longer constrained for needy borrowers by interest costs, then the prices to be paid in the course of these transactions respond more adequately to the real present demand of these transactors. And, correspondingly, if the present demand for transactions is no longer subsidized for wealthy lenders by interest income, then, once more, the real needs of both lenders and borrowers are more adequately reflected in the spot prices, and this holds true, in particular, regarding the present prices of future goods. Hence, instead of the price of money falsifying the price of goods, making them cheaper for the rich and more expensive for the poor, neutral money is transparent and reflects the real needs in an unfalsified way, giving the poor a chance to acquire goods at costs similar to those at which rich people can acquire them and giving the rich the chance to experience a life without being artificially subsidized. With the prices reflecting the real needs more adequately, allocation of funds will be improved. Prices will respond to these changes in demand. Therefore the counterproductive allocation by the price of money (interest) will be substituted for by the more efficient allocation by the prices of the goods themselves.
With the subsidies for the wealth holders tending to zero, the accumulation of real goods becomes costly instead of being profitable because the increasing marginal cost of goods overcompensates their declining marginal utility. Hence, the real costs of goods limit the mass of goods which are worthwhile holding. Then, individuals will not be so irrational to take out unlimited amounts of neutral money credits (which must be spent to avoid liquidity costs!) if additional goods only bring to them more (marginal) cost than benefit. The absurdity, thus, is not with neutral money, but with the present system which motivates and induces wealth holders to hold goods which they do not need and, at the same time, to prevent others, who need the goods, from using them. Neutral money is both destined and suited to abolish these deficiencies in the allocation of goods.
Besides, who or which bank will be ready to credit to a borrower more than he is able ro repay? Even today, loans are limited not only by their (pure) interest cost but also by the costs of the default risk. Indeed, this should be the "real" limit on credits.
Gesell, Silvio, 1929. The Natural Economic Order. Berlin: Neo-Verlag.
Keynes, John Maynard, 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.London: Macmillan, (1961).
Suhr, Dieter, 1983. Geld ohne Mehrwert. Frankfurt: Fritz Knapp.
Suhr, Dieter, 1989. The Capitalistic Cost-Benefit Structure of Money. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
Suhr, Dieter, and Hugo Godschalk, 1986. Optimale Liquidität. Frankfurt: Fritz Knapp.
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